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THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF "STAR WARS"

MEDIA ADVISORY:         Contact:    Lisbeth Gronlund or David Wright
Tuesday, March 17, 1998                 617) 547-5552

Next Week Marks Fifteenth Anniversary of "Star Wars"
Despite big budgets, little progress, and high security costs, deployment of a national missile defense looms closer than ever

On March 23, 1983, the United States embarked on an ambitious program to develop a "Star Wars" system to defend itself from a large-scale attack by ballistic missiles and to, in the words of President Ronald Reagan, render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." Fifteen years later, the US continues to develop and plan for deployment of a national missile defense system. Although some $40 billion dollars has been spent and the goals are much less ambitious now, the basic technology is still not ready and key technical problems remain unsolved (see enclosed fact sheet). And yet, the United States is closer than ever to deploying a national missile defense system and scrapping the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Unfortunately, this is more than just a waste of tax-payers' dollars. The ongoing national missile defense program threatens to undermine current reductions in US and Russian nuclear arsenals and block prospects for much deeper reductions in nuclear weapons. This year, as for the past several years, Congressional Republicans are pushing to mandate the deployment of a limited national missile defense by 2003. Although the Clinton administration maintains that there is no current threat that would justify deployment, it is pushing to develop a system that would be ready by then. The Pentagon will soon select a general contractor to develop this system. By 2000, for the first time, a national missile defense will be certified as ready for procurement and deployment by 2003. This alone will add to the political pressure for deployment.

Why is the United States still pursuing a program of such dubious technical and political merit? Deploying missile defenses remains a strongly ideological issue for many Republicans. This seems to be a misguided attempt to unilaterally guarantee US security and thereby avoid the difficult-but ultimately necessary-cooperative work with other countries to ensure our common security.

This spring, Senator Jesse Helms and other Senate Republicans are also taking aim at the ABM Treaty itself, which prohibits the United States and Russia from building national missile defenses. Their zeal to eliminate the treaty is proceeding with apparent disregard for the negative effect this could have on security relations with Russia and also China.

If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund of Dr. David Wright in the UCS Cambridge office at 617-547-5552

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FACT SHEET
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF "STAR WARS"
Big Budgets But Little Progress

On March 23, 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced his "Star Wars" program to build a defense of the United States against attacks by nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. After 15 years and some $40 billion, how far has the US national missile defense program come? Although the goals of the program have been scaled back dramatically, they are still technically infeasible. Despite this, the United States is closer than ever to deploying a national missile defense: it will select a general contractor this month to develop a system by 2000 that could then be deployed within three years of a decision to do so. At the same time, pushing ahead with national missile defenses poses a political barrier to deep reductions in nuclear arsenals, which remain the most effective way to increase US and international security.

The Goals Have Been Scaled Back Dramatically:

1983: The original goal, laid out in Reagan's March 23 speech, is to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" and to protect the US population from a large-scale attack by thousands of Soviet nuclear warheads.

1987: The original mission is implicitly dropped as unrealistic and the focus shifted from protecting cities to enhancing deterrence by protecting US nuclear weapons from a disarming first strike.

1991: Under President Bush, a space-based layer of "Brilliant Pebbles" interceptors is added to the plan, but the goal is scaled back to defending the United States against up to 200 warheads launched simultaneously.

1997: Scaled back once again, the current goal is to defend against only 5 to 20 "simple" warheads, nominally launched by accident or without authorization by Russia or China, or deliberately by a hostile nation that might acquire long-range ballistic missiles in the future. The program might be expanded over time, with the objective of defending against a greater number of warheads.

Given Its New Limited Goals, Is the Program Now Closer to Success? Ironically, no. Why not?

The technology still isn't ready:
Despite the considerable time and money invested, the basic technology for a national missile defense-"hit-to-kill" interceptors that would destroy their targets by ramming into them-is not ready for deployment. The test record for hit-to-kill interceptors has been very poor, even against cooperative test targets. According to a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report, "Of the 20 intercept attempts since the early 1980s, only 6, or about 30 percent, have been successful." Even more relevant to national missile defenses are the 14 of these intercept tests that were conducted at high altitudes, of which only 2 were hits, for a 14 percent success rate. And the test record is not getting better with time: the most recent successful high-altitude test occurred in January 1991 and the last 9 such intercept tests have been failures.

The testing program is inadequate:
The planned test program is so meager that the Pentagon won't know how well the system works by 2000, when they may decide to build it. The Pentagon is completely ignoring the "fly before you buy" maxim. As the GAO report notes, only one integrated system test is planned prior to the deployment decision, and even that test will not include all system elements. Moreover, according to the system engineering contractor, the test program will not adequately test the ability of the system to discriminate warheads from decoys and debris, even though this task would be essential to the successful defense of the United States.

The fundamental problem of countermeasures remains unsolved: A more fundamental problem is that defenses will not face cooperative targets. All defenses that seek to intercept warheads outside of the atmosphere can be defeated by technically straight-forward countermeasures, and this problem remains unsolved despite decades of work. Indeed, this is precisely why the current program objectives call only for defending against "simple" warheads-those without effective countermeasures. However, any country that could build or acquire a long-range missile could also build or acquire effective countermeasures that would require less sophisticated technology than long-range missiles.

In the real world, defending against 5-20 warheads may be no more realistic than Reagan's dream of building an impenetrable shield.

National Missile Defenses Threaten Deep Reductions in Nuclear Weapons:
Fifteen years after Reagan's Star Wars speech, there are still compelling security reasons not to build a national missile defense. The most effective way to reduce the nuclear threat to the United States is to make deep reductions in nuclear arsenals worldwide, and the end of the cold war now makes this feasible. However, such deep cuts will almost certainly be derailed by US deployment of a national missile defense, because missile defenses can more easily threaten a small deterrent force than a large one. Perversely, even though a missile defense is unlikely to be very effective, other countries are likely to assume it would be and will act accordingly by resisting deep reductions. Indeed, Russia has made it clear that it remains concerned about US missile defenses and that its continued compliance with nuclear reductions under the START agreements depends on continued US compliance with the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, which prohibits national missile defenses. Moreover, given the strong Republican support for national missile defenses in Congress, Russia would likely (and not unreasonably) see deployment of even a limited system as the first installment of a larger system.

For more information, contact UCS Senior Staff Scientists Lisbeth Gronlund or David Wright in the UCS Cambridge office at 617-547-5552.