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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

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QUESTION:The Sri Lankan diplomat going to Baghdad or gone to Baghdad, who does he report to - the Security Council or to Kofi Annan?

MR. RUBIN: The structure of the relationship is as follows. There are over 20 commissioners of the special commission, of which Dhanapala, Ambassador Dhanapala, is now a commissioner. That commission is headed by the Executive Chairman, Ambassador Butler.

QUESTION: Right.

MR. RUBIN: And so, therefore, the work of Ambassador Dhanapala's special group is done under the authority of the special commission. We have very clear assurances that that work will be done and reported to the council through Ambassador Butler. Now, there has always been a technical fact that Ambassador Butler sends his reports to the Security Council with a cover note from the Secretary General saying, I hereby transmit the report of Ambassador Butler. That has been going on for seven years. I would expect that to continue.

With respect to how his inspectors will work and who they will take their lead from, the inspectors in this special group will be experts. The diplomats will merely observe. So those experts will come from one of two organizations, either UNSCOM, the UN Special Commission for the Chemical, Biological and Missiles, or the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency for the nuclear account. Those inspectors will be led in their work at each of the sites by a team leader who will be a member of UNSCOM or the IAEA.

So the long and short of it is that Ambassador Dhanapala operates under the authority of the Executive Chairman, Ambassador Butler, and was selected, like Ambassador Butler was selected, by the Secretary General.

QUESTION: Yeah, but it really - you know, not - that doesn't exactly answer the question. It's the structure. I understand the structure.

MR. RUBIN: All right.

QUESTION: And you understand what we're asking. Is he Kofi Annan's agent there to report to Kofi Annan, who seems to have another view of the dispute than the US has educated the public what the issues are?

MR. RUBIN: The answer is that Ambassador Butler is Kofi Annan's agent as well, because Ambassador Butler was selected by Kofi Annan under that theory. So the short answer is we don't believe that there is a problem in the agreement or the procedures set forth to implement the agreement. The problem isn't going to come in those procedures. The problem will come if Iraq violates those procedures.

QUESTION: Jamie, there apparently has been a court ruling that will result in the deportation of six members of the Iraqi National Congress or the Iraqi opposition, where generally - first of all, what can you tell us that you know about the details of this, and what does that do to the Administration's efforts to work better with the Iraqi opposition, as stated some weeks ago?

MR. RUBIN: Let me give you a little background for people to understand it properly. It's a very complex issue. After Saddam Hussein brutally struck into northern Iraq in September 1996, a large number of Iraqis, most of whom had close connections to the United States, sought our protection. With the help of the government of Turkey, the United States Government evacuated over 6,500 Iraqis, mostly Kurds, from Iraq to Guam and then to the United States. These were mostly Iraqis who were associated with humanitarian programs in northern Iraq.

This was an honorable and humanitarian effort to protect Iraqis who would otherwise have been harmed by Saddam's troops. We were aware at the time that Saddam had many infiltrators in northern Iraq, and to the extent we could, we would quickly review the backgrounds of these individuals prior to the evacuation. But because of the urgent circumstances surrounding the evacuation, we deferred complete background checks. Once the individuals arrived in Guam, further background investigations were completed and 25 individuals were identified as persons we believe to pose threats to our national security. The INS placed these individuals into exclusion proceedings on the grounds that they could pose a threat to the national security. They were brought to California for hearings before immigration judges. These cases are in various stages of the immigration process.

Yesterday, a judge found that six of these individuals were ineligible for immigration relief based on classified information developed by the US Government indicating that these individuals posed a danger to our national security. No final decisions have been made about what the US Government will do if the exclusion orders in these cases become final. Further questions about the disposition of these six need to be directed at the Justice Department.

With respect to how this will affect the prospect of working with opposition groups, let me say that we have no doubt that the people of Iraq and the rest of the world would be better off with a new government in Baghdad, but such an effort is a long-term process and involves many costs and risks. We have worked with the Iraqi opposition in the past and we are actively considering ways to do so more effectively in the future. The Senate, as you know, has put forward some ideas. Some of those are very interesting to us and we are carefully reviewing them. For example, Radio Free Iraq is an interesting idea that we are examining.

With regard to humanitarian assistance, this is complicated by the fact that we have just increased the quota for northern Iraq to $682 million in humanitarian assistance, and before providing any humanitarian assistance to such an area, we would want to make sure we were using the money wisely.

With regard to war crimes, we have supported the calls for an investigation into the Iraqi regime's war crimes, crimes against humanity, and possible genocide. In short, there are a lot of ideas out there. We are exploring them and I don't think the disposition of these cases has any impact on our ability to work more effectively with the Iraqi opposition that has been - it's been difficult to work with in the past.

QUESTION: I'm sorry, if I may follow up. You started off with 25 and then six had sort of reached this level. Do you know what happened to the balance?

MR. RUBIN: You'll have to check with the Department of Justice on that.

QUESTION: Do you think that these six necessarily face retaliation or that their lives may be in danger?

MR. RUBIN: Again, the Department of Justice, in coordination with other agencies, will obviously be deciding what to do with them. And when those decisions are made - no final decisions have been made - we'll be in a position to judge or to explain why we took whatever actions we decide to take.

QUESTION: You're saying then that these six people were identified as infiltrators, Iraqi agents?

MR. RUBIN: I didn't say that.

QUESTION: No, you said that we were aware at the time that Saddam had many infiltrators in northern Iraq, then you described 25 people who were identified as such and singled out.

MR. RUBIN: No, I didn't say that. Sid, if you're going to read real carefully and try to catch me, then you should really listen more carefully. I said that we were aware that Saddam had infiltrators in the north and we wanted to review people's backgrounds. We didn't have a chance. When I got to a description of why 25 were isolated, I did not say that they were isolated because they were, you know, infiltrated by Saddam Hussein. I said that we believe they posed a threat to our national security.

QUESTION: So are you saying they were not -- you're just not commenting on that?

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: Do we have the Korea briefing coming right after this?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. In the back, yes.

QUESTION: Jamie, among the ideas that the Administration is considering in terms of supporting Iraqi opposition -- of people in the Iraqi opposition, would supplying arms be one of them?

MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry. Please repeat the question.

QUESTION: You listed several ideas like Radio Free Iraq that the Administration is looking at and possibly considering for support to help the Iraqi opposition. Would supporting -- or giving weapons to the opposition also be one of those efforts?

MR. RUBIN: The question of how we would implement any decision to more effectively support the opposition is something that is under discussion. I wouldn't be in a position to describe what tactics we might pursue.

QUESTION: Do you have anything to say about the Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting and whether there had been any progress on the missile issue in particular?

MR. RUBIN: What I have to say on that is that there will be a press conference at 4:45p.m. in Room 450 of the Old Executive -

QUESTION: It's 5:30 p.m., isn't it? Are you sure?

MR. RUBIN: I was just - 5:30 p.m. was crossed out and 4:45 p.m. was written in. So, hopefully, my able deputy wrote that in correctly.

QUESTION: Which one is that?

MR. RUBIN: So I have no comment during an ongoing discussion, and they will report.

QUESTION: Well, when they (inaudible) START treaty will be ratified, will you throw your hat in the air again? The Administration?

MR. RUBIN: No, we will throw our hat in the air when the START treaty is ratified, Barry, as you know. In fact, I doubt we'll throw our hat in the air at all.

QUESTION: You ought to be pretty tired of it by now.

MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry. Betsy, then Sid.

QUESTION: Iraq yesterday complained that the US was holding up goods under the oil for food program yet again. Would you agree with their assessment?

MR. RUBIN: This is another example of Iraq making outrageous allegations that are not supported by the facts. Since the beginning of the oil for food program over a year ago, more than 2,400 requests for importation of humanitarian goods to both the northern and southern parts of Iraq have been reviewed. Nearly 97 percent of all applications have been approved. Fewer than 2 percent have been denied. At this time, under phase three of the program, 144 applications have been approved, four applications are on hold. Not one has been denied.

The reason why the program has slowed down is because Iraq decided not to export oil to fill up the bank accounts that control the money that can be used for humanitarian assistance, and I believe there is a significant backlog. The UN has over $500 million in contracts ready for approval but awaiting receipts of funds from oil sales. So if there is a slowdown and if they are suffering in Iraq, it is the direct cause of Saddam Hussein's regime, again demonstrating that it cares more about enriching the regime than it does about purchasing humanitarian supplies.

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