12 February 1998
TRANSCRIPT: PRESS CONFERENCE OF ACDA DIR. HOLUM IN BONN, 2/11
(Discussed enforcement mechanism for BWC) (3730) Bonn -- John D. Holum, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said February that he came to Germany to "brainstorm" on technical details for an effective enforcement regime for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972. "We want to go full speed ahead in the negotiations to complete this work" by the end of the year, he said. "The current events in Iraq and Saddam Hussein's long-standing interest, going back to the 1970s, to develop a biological weapons capability just underscores the importance of the international community dealing effectively with biological weapons." Regarding provisions of the enforcement regime, Holum said that it must include mandatory, not just voluntary, declarations of biological weapons facilities and must mandate a variety of on-site activities, including "on-site challenge inspections," while avoiding "steps that would endanger legitimate national security information or proprietary business information." The fact that "the international community ... has been slow to apply effective export control mechanisms" has created another gap in the current enforcement mechanism of the BWC, said Holum. The 29-member Australia Group, which includes both the United States and Germany, is, he said, "actively engaged in cooperating to control both chemical and biological weapons technology and substances." Holum said the United States would be willing to review a new U.N. resolution regarding Iraq, but does not find it necessary. "There are a total of nine United Nations resolutions already in place in various degrees of intensity that insist upon Iraq fulfilling its commitments," he said. Although diplomatic aspects of the Iraqi situation were not part of his mission in Germany, Holum said that he thinks "the Chancellor has made clear that Germany is prepared to support whatever action may prove necessary in Iraq." It is believed, said Holum, that roughly 25 countries currently have some kind of chemical and/or biological weapons capability. This group includes Iraq, Iran, and Syria among others, but not the United States or any other NATO country. In 1992 President Yeltsin ordered the termination of Russia's biological weapons program, and "we have been engaged with the Russians to see that that is done," said Holum. There is still work to be done to expand membership in the Biological Weapons Convention from the current 140 members to the nearly universal 185 members achieved for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, said the ACDA director, adding, "We'd obviously like that treaty to be universal as well." Following is the text of the press conference: (Begin text) Press Conference with John D. Holum Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs February 11, 1998 Bonn, Germany Opening Statement: Mr. Holum: Thank you and thank you all for coming. I am here to work at addressing a gap in our capabilities to deal with weapons of mass destruction. In the recent past, we have made enormous strides in the international community to address the growing threat in the post-Cold War era of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and chemical and biological weapons and delivery systems. We have negotiated a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty, we have extended the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and made it permanent. We have negotiated and now have in force the Chemical Weapons Convention. There is one glaring gap in that coverage, and that is an effective enforcement regime for the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. Biological weapons are very frequently grouped with chemical weapons. In my judgment, given their destructive potential, they should more appropriately be considered akin to nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons, for all of their toxicity and danger, when they are dispersed, become less toxic. Biological weapons in the right environment can actually multiply, self-perpetuate and even mutate to defeat protective measures. The biological agent, botulinum, has been estimated to be three million times as toxic as the chemical nerve agent sarin. A particle of anthrax the size of a particle of dust could be fatal. The current events in Iraq and Saddam Hussein's long-standing interest, going back to the 1970s, to develop a biological weapons capability just underscores the importance of the international community dealing effectively with biological weapons. The President, in his State of the Union address, underscored the fact that the danger posed by biological weapons in the hands of rogue states and potentially in the hands of terrorists, is increasing. He said in that address, to prevent the use of disease as weapons of war and terror, the international community has to act now. The Biological Weapons Convention, he said, has been in effect for twenty-three years. The rules are good, but the enforcement is weak. We must strengthen it with a new international inspection system to detect and deter cheating. The signatories to that convention have promised not to develop, produce or possess biological weapons. But as the President said, the convention lacks teeth in the form of tough enforcement measures. The United States is committed to developing a legally binding protocol that will help prevent the proliferation of these weapons and help catch countries that attempt to cheat on their obligations under the treaty. I am here in Germany to follow up on the President's State of the Union address in which he, in associated documents, laid out some new initiatives to try to energize the negotiations that have been under way since 1995 in Geneva in the hopes that we can complete the framework to the protocol to the convention, an enforcement protocol, by the end of this year. I am looking forward to discussions this morning and afternoon, and I'm looking forward to your questions. With that I'll turn it over to your questions. Q: Please elaborate a little on the initiatives you are talking about here in Bonn with the representatives of the government. Can you do that please? HOLUM: Sure. One of the issues in the Biological Weapons Convention is the extent of inspection activity. We believe that the regime must include not just, as we have now, voluntary disclosure, but mandatory declarations of relevant facilities. We think there should be a series of different kinds of on-site activity ranging from voluntary visits by inspectors, to relevant activities, through clarification visits of some kind that would answer questions pertaining to a country's declaration. And, of course, on-site challenge inspections. This is a very complex area because there are literally thousands of sites that would likely be declared around the world that arguably have the capacity to produce biological weapons, but are in operation for legitimate medical or commercial or other purposes. What we have to do is find the right balance that strengthens enforcement and gives international inspectors a fair chance of detecting cheating and clarifying ambiguities but, at the same time, avoid steps that would endanger legitimate national security information or proprietary business information. So we will be exploring some of the questions that arise when you try to fashion that kind of an international regime. Q: Why all of a sudden right now? Why not do it, what is the reason for this now? Is Germany the first stop? HOLUM: Germany is the first stop on this trip. I'll also be going to the UK and France now, in part, because the President has directed a renewed impetus. We have been engaged in this negotiation since 1995 so it is not new, but what we have found during the course of those discussions is it is fairly easy to get bogged down in technical details. There are a number of country groups that have differing perspectives, and I think the President's speech gave us new impetus, both in terms of his personal interest and his direction that we develop new ideas to bridge some of the gaps among different countries. This gives us a good chance to stimulate the negotiations and move forward. We have also, in the context of the discussions in Geneva among the member countries, intensified the work steadily. Last year, we had nine weeks of work. I think this year it will be eleven, including another session in March, additional more intense work schedule plus a lot of consultation in between. I mentioned that I think the situation in Iraq concentrates the mind as well. This is one of the areas where Iraq has been most determined to pursue weapons of mass destruction and has been least forthcoming in its declarations. Q: German enterprises have been engaged in helping Saddam Hussein to build up factories for chemical weapons. Do you know anything about, maybe German enterprises that are helping him in constructing biological weapons...? HOLUM: I haven't seen any reporting to that effect. I think one of the difficulties that we face in this area, and it reveals the gaps in coverage, is that the international community, and I wouldn't single out any country, has been slow to apply effective export control mechanisms. The Australia Group, of which Germany is a member as well as the United States, is twenty-nine countries total. It is actively engaged in cooperating to control both chemical and biological weapons technology and substances. It has grown progressively stronger. But the international community has been trying to catch up with the danger of the spread of, particularly, chemical and biological weapons. There are a lot of countries, I suspect, that have had in the past, export and business relationships with Iraq, Iran and others that they would have just as soon have foregone, looking at the direction that those programs have taken. That is true of the United States as well. Q: Talking about Iraq, do you think a new UN resolution is needed in order to, on the one hand be effective, in avoiding things the way they happen around Iraq at the same time to put a strike against Iraq and its military bases? HOLUM: No, we don't believe that a resolution is necessary. There are a total of nine United Nations resolutions already in place in various degrees of intensity that insist upon Iraq fulfilling its commitments. The obligation is to allow unfettered access to UNSCOM inspectors. The Security Council has authorized all necessary actions in order to enforce those obligations. On the other hand, we are prepared to review an additional resolution if a resolution has support from the international community. But we don't believe it is necessary. Q: ... Which resolutions were you particularly referring to? When it comes to military preparation against Iraq. HOLUM: I can do a rundown. I have the full list here of the resolutions. UN Resolution 687 as you know is the one in April 1991 that required that Iraq unconditionally accept the dismantling its WMD capabilities and not produce or acquire them in the future. Iraq is in breach of that resolution. UN Resolution 699, 707, 715, 1051, 1160, 1115, I don't want to go through the whole number. Q: Mr. Butler of UNSCOM said that Iraq could destroy Tel Aviv. What are your estimates on the capability of Iraq to do that? HOLUM: There is some question about specifically what he said, so I don't want to confirm his quote. Obviously, he can speak for himself. But what we have in Iraq specifically related to biological weapons as in the case of chemical weapons, is repeated determination on the part of Saddam Hussein to lie and deceive the international community. There have been, as you know, a succession of so-called full, final and complete declarations, each one of which has proved the dishonesty of the one that came before. He denied, Iraq denied, that it had any biological weapons capability both before and after the Gulf War. UNSCOM discovered that in fact they had a custom-built biological agent production facility that was masquerading as a chicken feed factory, that has since been destroyed. Much of this information came out after his son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, defected and revealed a great deal of information and then, of course, there was a flurry of additional new information that came out of the Iraqi government. We know that Iraq had loaded -- and this is from UNSCOM -- had loaded and deployed at least fifty aerial bombs with biological agents. That Iraq had ten long-range SCUD missiles with biological warheads loaded with anthrax. He also had loaded artillery shells and rockets. They had tested aerosol spray capability on aircraft. We also know, of course, that Saddam Hussein is predisposed to use chemical weapons or weapons of mass destruction. He used chemical weapons against his neighbors and against his own people. UN inspectors believe Saddam Hussein currently maintains facilities to make biological agents such as anthrax. And UNSCOM has said, and this is a quote: "Biological Weapons are the most serious and persistent area where Iraq has violated its obligations to the United Nations." Q: ... can you guess what he has right now? HOLUM: I don't want to go into specific details about what he has. I think this is a matter for UNSCOM to ascertain, and UNSCOM has made clear that there is still a capability to produce in rapid order a quantity of biological agents that would be immensely destructive. Q: Are you going to talk with your German counterparts about special contributions by the German government in order to help the Americans in a possible Iraq conflict? Do you have any order by the White House to talk about these things in Bonn? Is there any concrete request by the White House? HOLUM: No. And that's not part of my mission. The diplomatic effort is being managed by the President, who has been in touch with a number of national leaders, and by Secretary of State Albright. Secretary [of Defense] Cohen has been here recently. So I am some distance away from the diplomacy, lining up the coalition forces and planning for whatever might ultimately prove to be necessary. That's not my mission. I might say that we are very appreciative of the support that Chancellor Kohl and the German government has provided. Q: ...What support is that? I mean, he said you could use the air bases, but was that big really news? (Inaudible.) HOLUM: I think that the Chancellor has made clear that Germany is prepared to support whatever action may prove to be necessary in Iraq. Let me underscore that I think we are all on the same wavelength in terms of preferring a diplomatic solution that would enforce the UN resolutions. But we and the German government have had very good consultations looking toward other eventualities. Q: The German Defense Minister keeps saying the Americans never asked for any help. Are you going to ask the Germans for help? HOLUM: As I said, that's really for Secretary Cohen to address. Q: What kind of problems do you want to resolve today and during your mission in Europe? HOLUM: Well, the main objective is to sort of brainstorm with our German colleagues on how to address some of the technical details of an inspection regime. We have some ideas. We expect they will have some. What we are looking toward is the next session in March of the negotiating organization, the Ad Hoc Group. To see if we can advance the process. So we will deal with, for example, how do you trigger an inspection? Who decides when one will proceed? Those kinds of issues. Q: Can you tell us something about the main obstacles? HOLUM: The question of what kinds of inspections will be provided for is an important -- has been an obstacle and something that we should be able to break through on the basis of the initiatives the President laid out. We have had good preliminary discussions with the German side on this question. There are a variety of others. What kinds of declarations will be mandatory? What kinds of facilities should be included in declarations? There is a continuing argument in all of these regimes by countries such as Iran who argue that once you have a prohibition, an international prohibition, in place, you should abolish export controls and count on countries to abide by their commitments under the treaty. There will be efforts in the negotiations to provide that kind of an adjustment. That's not acceptable to us, and I don't think would be acceptable to the international organization. But that will be an issue in the negotiations I'm sure. Q: Could you tell us something about who exactly are your German colleagues and who you will talk to? HOLUM: The German side in the discussions today will be led by Jurgen Poehlmann. And a group working under his direction. Ordinarily my counterpart would be Rudiger Hartmann, but he is on vacation. Jurgen is the Deputy Arms Control Commissioner in the Foreign Ministry, and Hartmann is the Commissioner. Q: You mentioned the so-called Ad Hoc Group. Exactly where and when will it convene? HOLUM: There are 140 members of the Biological Weapons Convention. They have gone through a succession of technical experts and more formal negotiations. It is a free standing treaty-related group and they meet by agreement in negotiating sessions to work on this protocol. The number of countries participating has varied but it is open to all members of the convention and they meet in Geneva. Q: Do you know how many countries are producing and storing biological weapons or are making experiments with these weapons? HOLUM: It is hard to quantify and I can't go into a great deal of detail without getting into intelligence information. The sum of the chemical and biological weapons interested countries with varying degrees of activity is roughly 25. That's countries that have the capability and we believe have some kind of chemical and/or biological weapons capability. Q: That includes the United States? HOLUM: No. The United States signed the 1972 Convention when it was first negotiated and had maintained a biological weapons capability up until that time, but totally abandoned all of those. Q: Could you name some of the countries... anything in Europe for instance? HOLUM: Clearly the most prominent is Iraq. This is something Iran has also explored. Syria has looked into this kind of activity. In 1992 the Russian government revealed that it had a biological weapons program and President Yeltsin ordered its termination and we have been engaged with the Russians to see that that is done. There are a number of other countries of concern... (My aide) reminds me that President Nixon renounced biological weapons in November of 1969 and said the United States would unilaterally disarm, then the BWC followed that. Q: Do you have any information say about any, especially German activities according to dual-use programs for instance, that could be used in combination with biological weapons ...? HOLUM: Well, in terms of inventorying the capacity of virtually any country that has a developed pharmaceutical, biotechnology industry with the basic equipment to conduct such programs, could have a biological weapons capability, there are a very large number of potential facilities around the world. The Biological Weapons Convention, as well as national security policies in the affected countries, has been sufficient in the vast majority of cases to prevent most biological weapons programs. Most countries, when they join a convention, adhere to it. Very few countries, as we've seen, don't take those obligations seriously and therefore we need tougher measures to go with it. I can confirm that no NATO country has biological weapons. Some of my colleagues who have looked at these materials more recently than I have can confirm that. Q: Your goal is to have a favorable treaty by the end of this year? HOLUM: Yes. Q: And have the treaty signed by then? HOLUM: Well there are already 140 members of the treaty and we would assume that all the existing members would also ratify the protocol that would provide for an enforcement mechanism. Our aim with all of these treaties, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is universal coverage and that would be something we would continue our efforts on once the protocol is completed. I might say in that context that the appeal of these controls is growing. A few years ago, when we started the effort to extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it had 155 members, now it has 185. It will be 186 shortly. So it is as close to universal as any nonproliferation treaty regime. That shows the job we have to do in the Biological Weapons Convention, we have 140 members. We'd obviously like that treaty to be universal as well. Q: I see Iraq is on this list. HOLUM: Iraq is a member of the BWC. Q: BWC? HOLUM: Biological Weapons Convention. Q: It was signed in 1972? HOLUM: That's correct. Q: And it's just a nice piece of paper with no enforcement...? HOLUM: It has broad prohibitions as I recited earlier on production, possession, transfer. But what it doesn't have is an effective reporting and compliance mechanism. It essentially relies on voluntary reporting and confidence building. That is not to denigrate the work of the people who designed the treaty in the first place. There have been many developments since 1972 both in our technical ability to monitor and detect illicit programs and in the willingness of countries to accept more and more intrusive types of verification, including challenge, on-site inspection in case there is an allegation of use or, in this case, suspicious outbreak of disease that would warrant inspectors actually visiting a site on short notice and examining what happened. Q: You have no predications about what is ... treaty or ...? HOLUM: It will be a compliance protocol. Q: When might that be? HOLUM: Well we are hoping that the basic elements will be finished -- the basic frame work -- will be finished by the end of this year. It will take perhaps some time into 1999, maybe longer to work out the specific details. But we want to go full speed ahead in the negotiations to complete this work. (End text)
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