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11 February 1998

EXCERPTS: ACDA DIRECTOR HOLUM AT THE NY ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

(Says Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can be verified) (2670)
Washington -- U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director
John Holum says the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has
been submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent, "can and
will be effectively verified."
The ACDA director told Business Executives for National Security
(BENS) recently that the CTBT will thwart the possibility of a renewed
arms competition and, without testing, "there is no way of being
certain that a new weapon will function as designed, as intended, or
function at all." The treaty is in the security interests of the
United States, Holum pointed out, "and our own ratification is the
best way" to get the treaty regime "up and running."
There is also the issue of leadership, Holum said, noting that
President Clinton believes the United States should lead by example on
the treaty. "The U.S. needs to be in the business of promoting
ratification, not complicating it. We should set the right example for
other nations we want to bring into the fold," he stressed.
When the Senate considers ratification of the pending nuclear test ban
treaty, Holum said, "here is what the CTBT issue comes down to, what
the Senate must decide: the nuclear arms race is over; arsenals are
shrinking; our dramatically fewer remaining weapons can be kept safe
and reliable by other means; we don't need tests; proliferators do;
the American people overwhelmingly want testing banned."
Following are excerpts of Holum's January 22 speech delivered at the
New York Academy of Sciences:
(begin excerpts)
Fifty-two years ago, near Alamogordo, New Mexico, the first nuclear
explosion turned desert sand to glass. Since then, nearly 2,000 more
such nuclear test explosions have been detonated -- more than 1,000 by
the United States, some 700 by the Soviet Union and Russia, China's
reported 41, others by the U.K. and France, and one by India.
Three-quarters of those tests were underground.
All these tests led to the development of dozens of different types of
nuclear weapons with varying explosive yields, with different
combinations of blast, radiation, and thermal effects. They were
designed for delivery by aircraft, missiles, and artillery; to explode
in the atmosphere, underground, or underwater. They can destroy
missile silos, fleets of ships at sea, tank formations, command and
control capabilities, and, of course, cities, and millions of people.
A regular goal of testing was to make weapons more efficient -- a
bigger bang and taller mushroom cloud in a smaller, lighter package.
Success in that opened new technical avenues, including multiple
independently-targetable re-entry vehicles, or MIRVs, allowing a
single missile to strike multiple targets many miles apart. This,
coupled with improvements in accuracy and maneuverability, led to the
geometric growth of stockpiles, and war-fighting plans employing
literally thousands of warheads and bombs.
Still, American leaders, beginning with President Eisenhower,
understood the peril inherent in nuclear weapons and sought ways to
rein them in.
Some 35 years ago, President Kennedy warned of a "nuclear sword of
Damocles," hanging by the slenderest of threads. He argued that such
weapons must be abolished...the logical place to begin is a treaty
assuring the end of nuclear tests of all kinds...."
He did not succeed in that. Over four decades of arms control work,
though, important progress was made:
-- The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty ended testing in the atmosphere,
underwater, and in space.
-- The 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty limited U.S. and Soviet
underground nuclear weapons tests to 150 kilotons.
-- And, in 1976, the Threshold Ban limit was extended to what we now
recognize as an oxymoronic term, "peaceful nuclear explosions," which
were also confined to the 150 kiloton limit.
But nuclear explosive testing and further refinement of nuclear
arsenals still proceeded.
Now, at last, the original goal is at hand. In 1993, President Clinton
directed resumption of the U.S. effort to achieve a comprehensive test
ban treaty. Our negotiators in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
went to work, backed up by a mighty effort in Washington to sort
through technical details and make hard policy choices. And by
September 1996, President Clinton -- wielding the pen John Kennedy
used to sign the 1963 partial test ban -- became the first world
leader to sign the result -- a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions
of any size, by anyone, anywhere, forever.
In September 1996, the CTBT was adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly, 158 to 3, and now has almost 150 signatories.
What will it accomplish?
With a ban on nuclear testing in place, we pour cement on any
possibility of a renewed arms competition. Make no mistake, there are
more possibilities -- to focus the energy from nuclear weapons, or
enhance radiation, or otherwise advance the art or lower the threshold
to use. But without testing, nuclear weapon states will not be able
confidently to develop advanced new nuclear weapons types. For without
testing, there is no way of being certain that a new weapon will
function as designed, as intended, or function at all.
The CTBT and the strategic arms reduction process will be mutually
reinforcing. The test ban provides confidence that neither side is
making significant qualitative improvements in its arsenal, thus
fostering a stable environment for further reductions. The CTBT will
not eliminate nuclear weapons in one stroke, but it will enhance the
START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) process and move nuclear
disarmament closer.
The CTBT is also a non-proliferation treaty, throwing another tough
obstacle in the way of anyone who aspires to nuclear arms. Of course a
fission bomb can be made without testing. But remember, they had to
dig a hole under a B-29 bomber to load our first one aboard. It is a
much harder task to get nuclear weapons down to the sizes, shapes, and
weights most dangerous to us -- deliverable in light airplanes,
rudimentary missiles, even a terrorist's luggage.
That is where the test ban comes into play. It backs up the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and safeguards in drawing the noose ever
tighter around the nuclear ambitions of rogue regimes.
The simple fact is that our security is enhanced to the extent we can
lock all nations in place on the nuclear weapon learning curve --
especially given that the United States has already left the testing
business. Congress in 1992 put sharp legal restrictions on further
testing, which remain in effect. We have no plans, and we have no
military requirements to test. Why, then, not hold others to the same
standard we already observe?
What awaits, quite simply, is U.S. leadership to ratify the CTBT and
put real muscle behind it.
The effort begins with strong popular support. A recent nationwide
poll showed 70 percent of the people, Republicans and Democrats alike,
favor a treaty to prohibit underground nuclear explosions worldwide.
Rarely does any proposition command such overwhelming support.
Still, ratification will not be easy. At least three main strands of
argument against it have already emerged. Let's review them.
Some will argue that the Treaty cannot be verified.  They are wrong.
When it is brought into force, the CTBT will rely on a broad network
of more than 300 sensors capable of detecting, at considerable
distances, the different kinds of signals nuclear explosions emit
depending on where they occur -- seismic vibrations; underwater noise;
very low frequency sounds in the atmosphere; and radioactive gases or
particles. These sensors will blanket the globe.
In addition, the United States will bring to the table its own
considerable national technical means of verification. At U.S.
insistence, the right to use these is specifically recognized in the
Treaty.
And if any of these suggest there may have been a nuclear explosion,
Treaty parties can call for on-site challenge inspections to root out
the facts.
Remember that with or without the CTBT, the United States will
continue to monitor nuclear testing worldwide. The CTBT simplifies
that task.
We had a practical demonstration of some of these capabilities last
summer. In the Kara Sea, near a former Soviet nuclear testing facility
where there had been ongoing activity, sensors detected a seismic
event. This raised red flags about a potential test in the area and we
began collecting and analyzing data. The event, with a seismic signal
equivalent to about one-tenth of one kiloton, was detected and
confidently located even though a major seismic station in the region
was out of commission.
After analysis, we were satisfied that there was no nuclear explosion,
based solely on remote sensing and study. If the Treaty were in force
we could, of course, choose to use its on-site inspection regime or
consultation and clarification procedures if there are similar
incidents.
It is possible to conduct an underground nuclear explosion too small
to be seen, heard, sniffed, or felt by these remote sensors. But this
does not negate the value of a "zero yield" Treaty. Remember that the
objective of the Treaty is not to ensure morality, but to enhance
security. We assume some countries will want to cheat; we want to
limit their options and protect our security:
-- For nearly all countries, the likelihood is that an explosion too
small to be detected would also be too small to provide any real value
to a nuclear design program, such as for boosting yields and making
weapons smaller, lighter, and easier to deliver.
-- The aspiring cheater would also have to worry about unintended
consequences of complicated evasion schemes, such as the so-called
"oops factor" -- the problem of a very small explosion turning out
bigger than intended, and so drawing unexpected attention.
-- And the cheater can never be confident of the exact placement of
the dividing line between escape and detection -- and so must always
consider that the overlapping international sensors, or our national
technical means, or perhaps a whistle-blower, would reveal the test
and prompt international action.
U.S. monitoring thresholds reflect our interest in detecting and
identifying a test with very high confidence. This calculation is only
a part of what goes into a judgment about verifiability. The bottom
line is deterrence. If, for example, a would-be cheater assesses that
there is even a 50 percent chance of getting caught, isolated, and
sanctioned, or perhaps even less, testing would be an unappealing
choice.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can and will be effectively
verified. It will effectively deter tests that would have an impact on
our security.
A second issue will likely be the long-term safety and reliability of
the enduring nuclear stockpile. For we will rely upon nuclear
deterrence for the foreseeable future.
It is important, however, that with the end of the Cold War and
progress in disarmament, we are not designing new nuclear weapons,
which was our main reason for tests, and we have no plans to do so.
We are also maintaining much smaller arsenals with fewer different
designs -- dropping from scores of different weapons to fewer than 10.
All of those designs are well-tested and have been certified safe and
reliable.
Indeed, when Congress adopted a testing moratorium in 1992, it
authorized 15 tests for adding specific safety or reliability features
to existing weapons. Those tests were never conducted, because the
military saw no improvements requiring tests that met the cost
effectiveness standard.
The question is whether we can sustain the necessary level of
confidence without testing. Here I have to rely on technical experts.
The answer, according to the directors of our nuclear weapons labs --
Los Alamos, Livermore and Sandia -- and the leading weapon designers,
including a unanimous report of the Jasons, is "yes, if."
The condition is a rigorous, fully funded Stockpile Stewardship
Program, including careful surveillance, computer modeling,
non-nuclear experiments, and maintenance of remanufacturing capacity
to identify, address, and repair any problems that may arise in the
enduring arsenal. And such a program has been in place for the past
three years.
Moreover, we have a safety valve. Like most arms control treaties, the
CTBT has a provision allowing members to withdraw on grounds of
"supreme national interest." The President has determined that the
safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons is a supreme national
interest.
In addition, he has created an annual certification program for
stockpile weapons. If the senior officials in charge of our nuclear
weapons are unable to certify with high confidence that they will
continue to work as planned, and if tests are needed to remedy the
problem, they can happen. There is no reason to believe that situation
will arise. But if it does, we are fully protected.
Finally, some will counsel delay. The condition for the Treaty's entry
into force is ratification by 44 specifically identified countries --
members of the Conference on Disarmament possessing nuclear power or
nuclear research reactors. India, Pakistan and North Korea are on the
list, but have not signed. So why hurry?
Because it is the right practical course. The CTBT is in our security
interests, and our own ratification is the best way to get it up and
running. Forty-one of the 44 necessary parties have signed, and when
all of those ratify, entry into force will become a more realistic
prospect. The way to move reluctant signatories is to make them feel
the sting of isolation on this issue and not give them the present of
U.S. hesitation to excuse their own inaction.
The example of the Chemical Weapons Convention should be instructive.
Promptly after we ratified, Russia and other key countries joined as
well.
The earliest the CTBT can enter into force is two years after it was
opened for signature. That date arrives this September, when the
Treaty will have been pending in the Senate for a year. It poses a
reasonable timetable for Senate action.
Consider, too, that if the CTBT is not in force three years after the
first signatures, it provides for a conference to consider how to
proceed. Only states that have ratified can take part. The U.S. will
want to be there, to have a voice in the decisions.
The question of timing depends to some extent on how we see our
country. Should we lead the world on such issues, or trail behind?
President Clinton thinks we should lead. The U.S. needs to be in the
business of promoting ratification, not complicating it. We should set
the right example for other nations we want to bring into the fold.
At its very core, here is what the CTBT issue comes down to, what the
Senate must decide: the nuclear arms race is over; arsenals are
shrinking; our dramatically fewer remaining weapons can be kept safe
and reliable by other means; we don't need tests; proliferators do;
the American people overwhelmingly want testing banned.
Under these circumstances, who wants to argue that what the world
needs now is more nuclear explosions? Who would champion the cause of
making the Nevada desert shake again with nuclear blasts, and ensuring
more such events at China's Lop Nur test site, or Novaya Zemlya in
Russia, or other places around the world?
Nearly 40 years ago, Dwight Eisenhower reflected upon his White House
years and said not achieving a nuclear test ban, "would have to be
classed as the greatest disappointment of any administration -- of any
decade -- of any time and of any party...."
The ebb and flow of history have brought us the chance to remedy his
frustration.
The negotiators have done their part. Now it falls to the United
States Senate, to help close this nuclear chapter in human experience,
to help approach a new millennium with yet another strong tool to ward
off dangers to our people, to build a safer planet, and to advance the
human condition.
Let us hope they act well, wisely -- and soon.
(end excerpts)