U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
INDEX
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1998
Briefer: JAMES P. RUBIN
IRAQ |
|
2-4,6-7 |
Iraq's Latest Proposal for Inspection of Sites |
2-6,8,11 |
Secretary's Consultations with Russian Foreign Minister/ |
6-7 |
Israel's Right to Self-Defense If Attacked |
5-6 |
Russian President Yeltsin's Criticism of US/Risk |
6 |
US Policy re Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction |
7 |
Congressional Concerns re Saddam Remaining in Power |
SOUTH KOREA |
|
10-11 |
Republic of Korea's Obligations to KEDO |
SYRIA |
|
11-12 |
Reported Remarks by Turkish Defense Minister re: |
12 |
Reports of Russian Cooperation in Building Nuclear Reactor |
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB # 16
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1998 12:35 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
...................
QUESTION: The Administration hasn't been very impressed with what the Russians have conveyed from Iraq. Was there anything new today to revive any hope of a settlement through negotiations with Iraq?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, as you know, our position is very simple: full and unfettered access to the sites. It's a simple standard, and it has not yet been met in anything we've heard about. What we know is that insofar as we understand the current Iraqi proposal, nothing has changed; it does not meet this simple standard, and it falls short.
Again, the fact that these proposals are being tossed around and there is discussion of possible access to these sites, it does seem that Iraq is moving towards a recognition that the blocking of presidential sites is an untenable position. And that, in turn, shows the importance of the international community's standing firm and insisting that Iraq allow this simple standard to be met: full and unfettered access.
QUESTION: The report that surfaced last week while we were all - some of us and the Secretary were on the road, turned out to be basically an old offer by Iraq -- the eight sites offer, let's call it. Are they saying something more now? Are they coming - I know what your standard is -- your standard in the Middle East is a settlement, but, I mean, if you make headway, you say you make headway. Is there any headway here? Have the Iraqis improved their offer?
MR. RUBIN: I would dispute the premise that this is the same old offer. I mean, there have been many different versions of offers. And to the extent we understand this, we believe it falls short. So when we say what our standard is and then describe whether it meets the standard, that is designed to give you some information.
This current offer, to the best of our understanding of it, falls short, because it does not allow full and unfettered access. But we think it may mean that the Iraqi regime is starting to get the message that their position that no access to presidential sites is an untenable position. Certainly, Secretary Albright found on her trip, in her meetings with all the key leaders in Europe -- or many of the key leaders -- as well as key leaders in the Arab world, that all of those leaders believed the Iraqi position is wrong, that it is the requirement of the UN resolutions that full and unfettered access be provided.
What I can't tell you is whether every nuance of everybody's stated version of this offer is different, because there are a lot of people in Baghdad right now, or have been in the recent days, and they may all be talking about the same offer and talking about it differently. But to the best of our understanding of this offer, it doesn't meet the standard; it falls short.
QUESTION: Your statement falls considerably short of the virtual ridicule that the Iraqis' position was subjected to on the trip, that he's only feinting, he's only fooling around.
MR. RUBIN: I'll be happy to say it again if that will help you.
QUESTION: I'm not talking about helping me; I'm talking about the clear change in the US posture on Iraq. You're now speaking as if they're engaged in negotiations. It isn't quite what you want, but you're hearing new stuff. And that's different from saying they feint and they cut and lie and --
MR. RUBIN: There is no negotiation, there is no --
QUESTION: Not with the US. There is no negotiation --
MR. RUBIN: There is no negotiation. This is a simple standard of required access by the Iraqis to the standards laid out in Security Council resolutions.
To the extent that this offer does not yield full and unfettered access, it falls short. To that extent, it is another feint, another parry, and not the full and unfettered access that we need if this crisis is to be resolved.
QUESTION: One last one - and the US posture, all options are on the table, you haven't been so - you haven't heard such sweet music that you've taken the military option off the table?
MR. RUBIN: On the contrary, Barry. The principle applied here - diplomacy backed by the use of force and the threat of force - is very much alive.
QUESTION: Jamie, you mentioned that the Secretary talked to Foreign Minister Primakov. When she talks to him and other foreign ministers, does she convey a message to them to be relayed to Baghdad?
MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry, please repeat the question. I got interrupted by some discussion in the front row.
QUESTION: I know, it's very distracting.
(Laughter.)
Okay, you mentioned the Secretary spoke to Foreign Minister Primakov this morning.
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: When she speaks to him and to other foreign ministers, does she convey an American message to be relayed through them to Baghdad?
MR. RUBIN: We don't normally -- to my knowledge, in all the discussions I've seen with Foreign Minister Primakov, we don't relay messages to Baghdad through the Russians. What we do is make clear to the Russians what our standard is; what falls short of that standard; what would meet that standard. And that is what Secretary Albright communicated to Foreign Minister Primakov in her meeting with him in Madrid and in a phone call this morning and in phone calls yesterday morning. But as far as a message to Baghdad, I'm not aware that that was the intent of the call.
QUESTION: But you've said innumerable times the American position is simple and clear: full, unfettered access.
MR. RUBIN: Right. Yes.
QUESTION: How many times does she have to repeat that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I know that that question may easily fall of your lips, but the issue is - as we discussed a few times, in response to the last questioner - is when ideas are thrown out, if we don't think it meets that standard, we think it's worth repeating.
QUESTION: But doesn't Primakov understand that? Does he have to be told again that an offer of eight sites is not acceptable?
MR. RUBIN: Again, Foreign Minister Primakov can speak for himself on this issue; and I'm not going to purport to speak for him. What we are doing is setting out our standard in our discussions behind the scenes, and setting out the standard for all of you. And to the extent that I can talk about proposals, the last one we understand, as best we understand it, falls short. I don't know how else to say it.
QUESTION: There is a French Foreign Ministry official also in Baghdad. Do we have any - have you all received any information as to what he is up to?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I'm trying to do the best I can to communicate to you what we understand the latest Iraqi proposals are - not the latest French proposal, the latest Russian proposal, the latest Turkish proposal, or the latest Arab League proposal. These are governments or people who are there communicating the determination of the international community to resolve this problem.
During the course of our discussions, we try to understand what it is the Iraqis are saying. To the best of our knowledge, the most recent Iraqi position falls short of our standard. But we hope it signals that they're getting the message that their position that presidential sites will not be allowed access is an untenable position; and that makes the point that we've been making to foreign ministers and heads of government around the world that the stronger the will of the international community, the more likely it is that Saddam Hussein will reverse course.
QUESTION: Jamie, what is the Russian goal, do you think, in all of this? Yesterday, as you probably know - I think you already reacted to it - President Yeltsin talked about the risk of another world war if the United States went on the way it is. Are the Russians more worried about us or more worried about the Iraqis? And what are they trying to achieve, really?
MR. RUBIN: We have no reason to doubt the Russian goal is to achieve Iraqi compliance. We don't always agree with the methodology; we don't always have the same degree of optimism, perhaps, as the Russians that we can achieve that. But Secretary Albright came away from her discussions with Foreign Minister Primakov, and as I understand it, President Clinton as well, that the Russians want to see, with us, compliance by Iraq with UN resolutions. They have voted for resolutions to that effect repeatedly in the Security Council, including supporting statements in the early '90s - in 1991, '92 and '93 - declaring Iraq in material breach at various occasions because they, like us, understand the inherent dangers of weapons of mass destruction. We have no reason to doubt that.
QUESTION: So what do you make of Mr. Yeltsin's language, which sounded as if it was worried about the US starting a war?
MR. RUBIN: Well, it's no secret that we and the Russians have disagreed on the means to achieve these objectives. What we've said is that diplomacy should be given its chance, but that the diplomatic string is fraying and that it's only the threat of force and, if necessary, the use of force that can achieve our objectives. They have a different view of that, but that's quite different than the premise of your question, that the Russians have some other goal here than compliance.
QUESTION: They said that - Yeltsin reiterated this morning, said that Russia had no interest in being involved in a war. And he - Mr. Rubin, I would ask you, has the US gone to the Russian leadership to ask for an explanation of why the Russians think that there's a risk of a large world war coming out of this Iraq crisis? And secondly, does this have anything to do with the Israelis saying that they may not be restrained if Iraq attacks?
MR. RUBIN: First let me - one clarification for you, George. My understanding is, the value is $75 million for this WFP food program.
Again, I'm not going to try to analyze the motivations of the President of Russia. I will be prepared to talk about what we understand their position to be. There were some press reports in the United States that the US is planning to use nuclear weapons to destroy chemical and biological storage facilities in Iraq. Those reports have no basis in fact. The US has no plans or intentions of using nuclear weapons.
If any country were foolish enough to attack the United States, our allies, or our forces, with chemical or biological weapons, our response would be swift, devastating and overwhelming. We have worked hard to fashion non-nuclear responses to the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction, in order to give military commanders and the President a range of options from which to choose. As Secretary Perry said in 1996, we are able to mount a devastating response without using nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, we do not rule out in advance any capability available to us. I stress that these policies have to do with a situation in which the US, our allies and our forces have been attacked with chemical or biological weapons.
There was a highly inaccurate press report about this issue that was circulating in Russia, that made the rounds in the Duma, that may have given rise to unjustified concern about the implications of the use of force in the Middle East. But that is our position.
As far as the Israelis are concerned, Secretary Albright made clear in her discussions with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Israel, as any other country, has the absolute right of self-defense; that the United States has an iron-clad commitment to Israel's security; and that an attack by Iraq on any of Iraq's neighbors, including Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or others would be met with a swift and forceful US response.
So in this kind of environment, it often does happen that the reporting isn't perfect, and some of the results of that you might have seen.
Let's go to Crystal, and then back over here.
QUESTION: Do you think - I know that we've gone over this many times, but these recent proposals from Iraq, do you think they in any way indicate that Saddam is getting weak in the knees, and there's still a chance that you'll be able to resolve this, though a small chance, without force, from the signs that you --
MR. RUBIN: Number one, the diplomatic string is fraying. Number two, the latest proposals fall short. Number three, they could signal, however, Iraq's recognition that it's position is untenable. If they do, and he allows full and unfettered access, then the diplomatic string will firm up.
QUESTION: Do you think the window, though, is cracking a little bit in his defiance; and that maybe is it just opening a little more than it was, let's say, in November?
MR. RUBIN: Can't we stick to our one metaphor here, which is string?
(Laughter.)
If the Iraqis do, indeed, get the message that has been drilled to them by leader after leader, resolution after resolution, Secretary Albright's statements, the President's statements, and they do, indeed, come up with a way for them to meet what they have been yet unwilling to meet, which is the simple standard of the Security Council, and give the UN - that is, UNSCOM - the access it needs, then the diplomatic string will stop fraying.
QUESTION: If it frays all the way and Iraq falls short and all of that and push comes to shove, Secretary Cohen said, I believe yesterday, that the US will urge Israel very strongly not to retaliate if Israel is attacked. How does that coincide with what you just said Albright told the Israelis, in that they have the right of self-defense? Then you seem to confuse it further by saying that the US would defend Israel if Israel is attacked.
MR. RUBIN: Well, I certainly don't think I confused anything further. It may have confused you, but what I was trying to say -
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: I'll accept that.
MR. RUBIN: -- is that the United States' position is very clear on this. It may not be as forthcoming publicly as you would like, but it's quite clear; that is that Israel has the right of self-defense. Secretary Albright made that clear to the Israeli Government; number two, that our commitment to Israel's security is iron-clad; number three, that if Iraq were to make the serious mistake of attacking any of its neighbors, including Israel, that our response would be swift and forceful. Number four, the United States will stay in close consultation with Israel through the course of this crisis. Beyond that, I'm not prepared to say.
QUESTION: The Israelis are essentially saying, forget it, according to a statement from the Prime Minister's office, that they will defend themselves.
MR. RUBIN: Well, you've recorded a very different version of the Prime Minister's statements that I've seen. But all I can say - and I'd be happy to repeat it for you - is that we have an iron-clad commitment to the state of Israel in terms of security, and that we stand by that; that every country has the right of self-defense; that we're going to stay in close touch with the Israeli Government; and that if Saddam Hussein were foolish enough to take this kind of action, that our response would be swift and forceful.
QUESTION: Jamie, do you have a response to Senator Lott and Speak Gingrich, both of whom say the US policy is too narrow because it doesn't deal with Saddam remaining in power?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - our goal here is to thwart, as the President said last night, Iraq's capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction and threaten his neighbors. We have said before, and I will say again, that we look forward to the day when Iraq has new leadership that would allow it to join the family of nations. So we certainly share the views of the members of Congress in this regard.
However, Desert Storm, the Gulf War, demonstrates that it would take hundreds of thousands of ground troops to remove the current leadership by force. Our current policy, preventing Iraq from threatening the region, serves the objectives and interests of the United States, our friends and our allies. That policy is based on the goals of thwarting his capacity to develop or use weapons of mass destruction and limiting his ability to threaten his neighbors. That is our view of what is the appropriate policy at this time.
Any more on Iraq?
QUESTION: Did you hear of any consultations with the European Union for the Iraqi crisis?
MR. RUBIN: Well --
QUESTION: Besides with Russia, France?
MR. RUBIN: The European Union?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. RUBIN: Well, the president of the European Union is now meeting with President Clinton, and I have total confidence they are discussing Iraq.
...............QUESTION: Has the US Government been approached by the South Korean Government, and has the US Government been asked to take a greater share of the financial burden of the North Korean nuclear deal, in view of the financial crisis in South Korea?
MR. RUBIN: The reports to this effect we regard as incorrect. The Korean Government and President-elect Kim Dae-Jung have consistently stated that the Republic of Korea will meet its obligations to KEDO -- that is, the Korean Energy Development Organization -- including funding for the light water reactor project.
To put this in perspective, let me note that the Republic of Korea has the world's 11th largest economy, with a yearly government budget of some $40 billion. The cost of the reactor project, spread out over ten years, is about $5 billion, and Japan will also fund a significant part of the project's cost.
KEDO already has funding for the first year of costs for this project, approximately $45 million, which has been supplied by the Republic of Korea. There is occasionally debt servicing needed here, because this organization is obligated to deliver heavy fuel oil on a fixed schedule, and therefore from time to time, it must incur short-term debt.
As far as the second year of funding is concerned, early costs are relatively small and therefore manageable for both South Korea and Japan, which will together fund most of the project's cost.
Let me remind you here that the construction has begun on the first of two safer proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors to be built in North Korea, and delivery of heavy fuel oil for specified civilian use continues. Construction of the reactors will take several years; meanwhile, the North Korean's own nuclear program remains frozen and the process of canning spent fuel rods from its reactor at Yongbyon is nearly complete - all under the continuous supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
This is the important point: before any key nuclear components are delivered for these two safer reactors, the international community, through the IAEA, must be satisfied that North Korea is in full compliance with its safeguards agreement. North Koreans must take all steps deemed necessary by the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify the accuracy and completeness of their data. And those verifications can include visits by the IAEA to any sites it deems necessary.
QUESTION: Jamie, since the Secretary was in Riyadh have there been any further discussions with the Saudis about military cooperation in the event of --
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of any high-level interchange, other than --
QUESTION: Well, even low-level.
(Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of an interchange --
QUESTION: No, high-level would be the Secretary's level, and that's over.
MR. RUBIN: Or the Secretary of Defense, who might be there shortly. So if there have been any exchanges, as there normally are between our two governments, I don't think they've moved the ball beyond where we were prepared to place it on the trip.
QUESTION: If there have been discussions --
MR. RUBIN: Well, if there have been any lower-level discussions, as there normally are between our two governments on a variety of subjects, I am not aware they have moved the ball significantly beyond where we placed it after her visit.
QUESTION: Let me rephrase the question. When you left Riyadh, we were told that the Saudis would consider the military situation, the use of the bases, et cetera, and then they would get back to the US on it. They didn't say - we weren't told low level, high level, or any particular level. Have the Saudis gotten back to the US in any way since the stop in Riyadh?
MR. RUBIN: Right, I think I answered your question.
QUESTION: No, you said normally there are - you told me the way diplomacy normally works. I'm asking you about the specific situation.
MR. RUBIN: No, Barry, if you listen to the whole answer, I think you would have had your answer. The answer is, I am not aware of any contacts that have moved the ball significantly beyond where she left it before. Have there been discussions? Presumably; but there's no new information of significance to impart to you.
QUESTION: Turkish Defense Minister, Mr. Sezgin, he said yesterday that Syria has biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction as much as Iraq. After Saddam, are you planning to direct your attention against Syria?
MR. RUBIN: Let me get you a list of our views, as we can express them in an unclassified form, of our concerns in that regard. But let me also point out a simple fact, which is that the Security Council resolution that is binding under Chapter 7 applies to Iraq and not other countries.
QUESTION: On Syria, weeks ago there was a report that got some attention in this building that Russia is helping Syria with a reactor that could be used for unpleasant aims. In all your discussions with the Russians and all your fretting about Iraq, have you gotten into the Syrian situation at all?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any new information for you, but I can assure you and the American people that the United States, in its discussions with the Russian Government, has focused very heavily on the dangers of proliferation in the nuclear area, including the issue that you mentioned.
......................(The briefing concluded at 1:10 P.M.)
[end of document]
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