07 January 1998
U.S. STATUS AS SUPERPOWER: GOOD; SHOULD BE BETTER; BAD AND UGLY
Over the last three months, musings on the role of the U.S. in the
world continued to figure prominently in foreign commentary. Once
again, there was agreement among almost all pundits that the U.S. has
emerged as the most powerful nation in the post-Cold War era--
influential and preeminent in the economic, political, security,
military, technology and cultural spheres. Only a few chose to
highlight what they perceived as limits on American power. On any
given subject, a majority of analysts saw American attitude and
policies as the defining ones. This idea extended to the ongoing
dispute between Iraq and the U.S., U.S. trade sanctions policies, the
Middle East peace process, the Asian currency crisis, NATO
enlargement, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, democracy building
in Africa, China, the land mines convention, the Kyoto climate
conference, free trade, global financial matters and a host of other
issues and events. Most acknowledged that "the U.S. is the only
international player who can create constructive movement" in
deadlocked situations. Opinion on the nature of U.S. global leadership
and its implications, however, varied widely, and fell roughly into
three broad categories. The first consists of those observers who are
apparently at ease with the so-called "unipolar" world and welcome the
American "model" of democracy and economy. The second grouping, while
implicitly untroubled by the concept of the U.S. as the only
superpower, expressed deep dissatisfaction with its leadership. The
last--and most extensive--category comprises editorialists who lament
the unipolar nature of the post-Cold War era, find great fault with
U.S. leadership and yearn for a multipolar world. These are major
themes found in commentary:
GOOD: U.S. SECURITY UMBRELLA, ECONOMY, AND SOCIAL MODEL-- A
considerable number of editorialists looked with much admiration and
contentment upon the "Pax Americana." Notably, an abundance of
positive murmurings emanated from opinion-makers in Germany,
Scandinavia and Central Eastern Europe, where U.S. leadership on
security issues and NATO enlargement were the main points of interest.
These commentators generally lauded the U.S. role in winning the Cold
War. Other observers focused on the Balkan hot spot in Europe,
stressing that without President Clinton's leadership, Bosnia would
still be suffering the ravages of war. Even when it came to economic
issues, a Swedish daily observed that while "the U.S. certainly is no
paradise on Earth...the countries in Europe with mass unemployment,
stagnating standard of living, crumbling security systems, and
opinions hostile to immigrants, have not very much to be proud of. We
have more to learn from the U.S. than we have to teach the Americans."
Many others in Asia, Latin America and Europe held up the phenomenal
U.S. economy as a model for all to emulate. A paper in India summed it
up this way: "This year made a formidable case for the American way of
doing business--strong on institutions, transparency and domestic
answerability." In Brazil, a nation that has emerged as a strong
economic force in Latin America, center-right O Estado de Sao Paulo
extolled the virtues of the U.S. economic example, advising Brazil not
to "turn its eyes towards the European model.... The best example is
here, in the New World." Several writers wrote paeans to the internal
social strengths of America--where, according to one Belgrade daily,
"freedom, democracy, legal order, justice, wealth, abundance and
happiness are really empirical categories."
SHOULD BE BETTER: U.S. LEADERSHIP--A number of columnists, while
offering diverse critiques of U.S. policies, all supported the same
basic proposition--that although there is no inherent problem with the
U.S. superpower status, America's leadership is not being exercised in
the best possible manner. This view was well captured by one German
writer who chastised the U.S. because generally its "weight does not
translate into the appropriate political influence in the world;" and
more specifically because the U.S. has been unable to solve a number
of contentious international issues--such as Saddam Hussein's
intransigence and human rights violations in China. Some of these
critics also stressed their concern over an alleged growth of U.S.
isolationism, which is claimed to be particularly strong in the U.S.
Congress. The Clinton administration also came under fire for its
purported failure to inform the U.S. people adequately on important
foreign policy initiatives and its inability to foster a more enduring
internationalism among the public. Many saw in the derailment of the
president's request for fast track authority an especially ominous
sign--a harbinger of a possible broader U.S. disengagement from the
world. Some expressed concern about an alleged growth in the influence
of various single issue lobbyists in Washington--a trend, they
believed, that is likely to further weaken the U.S. ability to
formulate a coherent foreign policy. There were calls from many in
this group for the U.S. to act in a less "overbearing manner" in
dealing with its partners. London's independent Economist urged the
superpower to "keep its alliances in good repair," lest it find itself
increasingly isolated in its attempts to solve global problems--e.g.
Iraq.
BAD AND UGLY: THE 'HEGEMONIC', UNILATERALIST, PROTECTIONIST, 'BRASH'
UNCLE SAM--What united an otherwise divergent and large third body of
opinion was an underlying belief that the U.S. status as the world's
sole superpower was an inherently undesirable situation and that
moving toward a more "balanced" international system was an important
policy imperative. Within this "down with American hegemony" school of
thought, several distinct themes could be discerned. One set of
commentators waxed philosophically, arguing that the U.S., left
without any major international opponent, would pursue a course of
"soft imperialism." Critics also saw the U.S. behavior on the
international scene as disagreeable, and termed it "bullying,"
"arrogant" and "brash." They held that the superpower is not
interested in multilateral approaches to solving problems, and does
not cooperate unless all of its interests are protected. Several
Russian commentators expressed their own unique view of how the world
should be. Moscow's neo-communist Pravda Five, for example, contended
that Russia's "vast expanse should be preserved as an epitome of
equilibrium in this unstable world." The paper said that this Russian
"shield between East and West" would be an "insurmountable obstacle to
hegemony-seeking powers." Other Russian dailies cast Moscow in
combinations with such countries as China, France and Germany as a
possible counterweight to American hegemony. In France--a country that
was seen by a number of analysts as continuing to effectively
challenge a number of U.S. initiatives--pundits were predictably
peevish, complaining frequently about U.S. policies and leadership.
Paris's left-of-center weekly Le Nouvel Observateur spoke approvingly
of a "weakness" in U.S. diplomacy that "leaves the door wide open to a
multi-polar world policy in which many average sized nations such as
France can play a role." On specific policies, there was a bevy of
standard condemnations of U.S. trade sanctions policies, with a
particular emphasis on the Helms-Burton law and the Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act. Numerous Muslim and Arab pundits reiterated all of the
usual criticisms about the U.S.' perceived pro-Israel tilt, excessive
hostility toward Iraq, and by extension, the Islamic world. A number
of media voices in all corners of the globe alleged U.S. hypocrisy in
such matters as human rights, global warming, banning land mines and
world trade issues. They held that U.S. policies in these areas were
driven by parochial U.S. interests rather than by any principled
policy stances.
This survey is based on numerous commentaries appearing in previous
media reaction reports October 1, 1997-January 6, 1998. Comprehensive
quotes are available upon request.
EDITOR: Diana McCaffrey
##
For more information, please contact:
U.S. Information Agency
Office of Public Liaison
Telephone: (202) 619-4355
1/7/98
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