Background Briefing
Tuesday, November 4, 1997
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Senior Defense Official
Briefer: My name is Jeff Star. This is Laura Holgate and Annie Webber. We were all involved in this project and we'll take your questions.
Q: Firstly...correctly, there is no plan to reassemble these planes and take them out for testing? Secondly, if you do reassemble them, what's the maintenance plan given the MIG-29 notoriety for maintenance problems?
A: I didn't hear the Secretary say they wouldn't be reassembled. The question that was posed to him was why weren't those planes flown out under their own power? One answer is we don't want to put American pilots into planes we haven't tested and flown around. So it was deemed to be safer for us to disassemble these planes by taking the wings off and the vertical stabilizers off and putting them into American C-17s and having them flown into the U.S.
Q: How did we find out about the Iranian interest in the MIGs? Did Moldova come to us and say the approach has been made, do you want to buy? Or did we find out through some other means?
A: We were, in fact, informed by the Moldovans.
Q: The Secretary of Defense mentioned excess defense articles. Can you be more specific about what kind of quid pro quo we promised the Moldovans besides some money?
A: We considered this, and in our discussions with the Moldovans we considered this deal to be the first step of a greatly enhanced relationship between our countries. As you know, Moldova is a Partnership for Peace country, and we're using this operation as an opportunity to expand our ties with Moldova, including our ties between the Defense Department and the Ministry of Defense. This summer, Moldova -- along with seven or eight other countries of the former Soviet Union -- were certified to Congress by the Administration as being available and eligible for receiving excess defense articles.
What that means is that they can receive excess American military equipment at the cost of transportation. Of course if any refurbishment is required for this equipment they would have to pay for that as well.
Q: The Secretary said he wasn't going to disclose the cost of this agreement, but can you tell us what the sort of market price for a nuclear-capable MIG 29 is?
A: We don't have a figure for that, but I would assume that Jane's Defense Weekly -- that is publicly known information.
Q: There's a difference between what the official producer of these aircraft would charge and what the black market price would be.
A: Market economics are a funny business when it comes to weapon systems of this type. You could go to the manufacturer and find out what the price is and look at what the loading would be and what kind of maintenance package would go along with the MIG. All of that would be included in the price. But it's not a good comparison. We did look at the question, though, of whether the price we were paying was a good price or not. We did look carefully at the question of what we thought the market would bear, what the rogue market would bear in terms of illicit arms sales. We're convinced that our price was a very good one for us.
Q: Is this, like an equivalent American plane would be in the neighborhood of $20 to $30 million a copy?
A: There are... The MIG 29 is an advanced fighter. If you consider what the fly-away cost is of a new American F-18 you can get into those kinds of figures, yes.
Q: So what exactly is the condition of these aircraft? When was the last time they were flown? Were these aircraft in their active inventory, or are they mothballed...
A: They were in the active inventory. I don't know what the annual flight time of these was. I expect it wasn't high. But we had inspectors go in and examine these aircraft both before we made the deal to purchase them, and we had inspectors go look at them upon agreement with the Moldovans that we would purchase them. So we'd had inspections both before and after to ensure that what we were buying was the same quality as what we expected to buy. And the answer, it was.
Q: What's the reasoning on not disclosing the cost of this contract...?
A: There were several reasons. The Moldovan Government was interested in not disclosing the price, as well. We also were interested in not disclosing the price. This has a precedent, for example, in Project Saffire when we purchased highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan. We are engaged in a process of cooperative threat reduction and we are not engaged in a process of creating a new market with new base standards for how much the United States is willing to pay for X, Y, and Z.
A: If I could just respond to the rest of your question. These aircraft were flown by the Moldovan air force as recently as several months ago.
Q: How many other nuclear-capable MIG-29 aircraft are floating around there in the ex-CIS states' inventories? Does this not set a precedent, despite what you said, that the U.S. would be willing to...
A: If there is another state that has an advanced nuclear-capable MIG-29C and they want to sell it, it might well set a precedent for that state to come to the United States saying look what I have.
Q: Do you want them to...
A: My attitude about that is I'd rather have them come to us first, and we can evaluate on a case-by-case basis what the problem is. We can look at alternatives for the U.S. purchasing, for example... I'd rather have them come to us first than simply put the word out in the rogue market and have them come to the first, talk to the first buyer.
Q: To follow up on Iran...
A: I'd just like to make a key distinction. The other countries of the region are still using their aircraft in their air forces. It was the Moldovan military's decision to decommission these aircraft, and that's why they were available.
Q: Let me ask a couple of questions about Iran. If they were to make a deal and receive delivery of this type of aircraft, could they use it without a lot of training support? Their people, I take it, would not be capable of flying the aircraft. Secondly, the Russians have got to provide the spare parts, basically. Have we talked to the Russians about cutting off spare parts to say Iran or any rogue state to prevent these aircraft from being usable?
A: The second question first. As you know, the United States is engaged in a high level effort with the Russian Government to reduce, to preclude, to blunt, to terminate Russian assistance to Iran that has potential military implications, including in the ream of weapons of mass destruction. That doesn't mean that Iran could not find a spare parts supply line also. Also, Iran does have trained pilots, and our judgment was they would be able to make use of these aircraft, and that they would represent an enhanced military capability on the part of Iran were they to receive such aircraft as these.
A: If I could just add to this, please, the Iranians currently have in their inventory a less capable MIG-29A aircraft.
Q: Can you tell us in plain English, what does a nuclear-capable MIG-29 mean? What's on that plane that would be very hard for them to duplicate otherwise?
A: Electronics, the ability of the plane to carry to release and have proper fusing of nuclear weapons.
Q: Are these the first advanced nuclear-capable 29C's ever acquired by the United States? Do we have other 29's? Or are these the first 29's ever? And I apologize. You may have answered this already and I missed it.
A: I believe these are the first MIG-29C's that we've acquired, yes.
Q: But do we have other 29's somewhere in our inventory in the United States?
A: I believe that we probably have other 29's, but not 29C's.
Q: Okay. My other question then is, are all 21 of them 29C's?
A: No, not all of them.
Q: What are the others?
A: Fourteen of them are 29C's, and I think six were 29A's and one was a 29B which is the trainer model, which is the blue one in the photograph.
Q: And does this essentially end Moldova's own MIG-29 force? Or do they have others in inventory?
A: There are six remaining in the Moldovan inventory.
Q: Do we know what they are?
A: I believe those are MIG-29Cs.
A: Yes, they are.
Q: Why didn't we buy those?
A: We were informed... We discussed this matter with the Moldovan Government. We were informed that, first of all, these are in a neighboring country being maintained, and we were informed that the Moldovan Government had another buyer for those planes, and that that buyer was not a rogue state. We've had very detailed discussions with the Moldovans about this. They understand well our policy that... And other countries in the region, not just Moldova, understand well our policy that a country that supplies arms is responsible also for where those arms might wind up, even in the second tier. So if a weapon goes to a legitimate state, so to speak, and then gets retransferred down the road to a rogue state, we will still hold the original supplier responsible for maintaining the track on its own weapon systems.
Q: Are those in Germany? Those airplanes?
A: No, they're not.
Q: Where did the money come from to buy these? What account?
A: Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
Q: Not to keep harping on this, but 21 aircraft. We've got to be talking about a sizable amount of money. Just, again, the U.S. rationale for not disclosing the amount of this contract. I'm just at a loss...
A: Again, the purpose of this was not just so that we could acquire a plane. We have plenty of planes, so it's not like we're adding to our own inventory. The purpose of this deal was to preclude a situation in which these planes would be available on the market and might wind up in the hands of rogue states. Therefore, we purchase these planes, we have to deal with the countries with whom we're negotiating, and we have to be respectful of their wishes as well. So we had both sides, both countries involved had their own sets of reasons for wanting to keep the actual dollar figure out of the public domain.
Q: What kind of equipment are they asking for under the excess articles program?
A: The kind of equipment provided under excess defense articles will be, for this kind of a program that Moldova's involved in, will be non-lethal -- for example, trucks.
Q: ...the Moldovans for finishing up the buy?
A: I'm sorry? I missed the first part of it.
Q: Are there any other strings attached to the Moldovans for...
A: No, the operation is complete.
Q: We paid cash up front for this?
A: Cash at the back. They have not been paid yet, but they will be shortly.
A: The agreement specifies the time frame in which we must make a transfer of funds.
Q: But all in FY98?
A: They will be paid certainly well within FY98. The funds that are being used are prior year funds.
Q: Was there any compensation to the Russian Government to get them to accede to this arrangement?
A: No.
Q: Are we going to reassemble them and flight test, qualify pilots, and are we going to fly them?
A: We are not involved with the arrangements or the decisions that we've made for what to do with these planes once they're in our hands.
A: That's a decision that will be made by the Air Force.
Q: Who actually in the Air Force has control over them? Is it ACC? Is it the Wright Labs? Who is it exactly who gets them?
A: The planes were all delivered to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.
Q: But what unit or what outfit actually... Wright-Pat has a number of...
A: I'm not sure of the answer to that question.
A: The last aircraft just arrived several days ago so these decisions are being made. They're ongoing decisions.
Q: What other states expressed interest in these aircraft other than Iran?
A: We know that there were a number of inquiries. I think I'm not at liberty to... I don't think I can say what we know about the other, but we know there were a few other states that showed some interest in these, but it was the Iranian interest that really triggered our concern.
Q: Were you in a bidding war with Iran at all?
A: Absolutely not.
A: We made clear in our discussions with Moldova not that they were engaging in a bidding war with us... One of our things we said up front was we are not going to enter into any kind of a bidding war. We sort of gave the message this is the United States. We're doing this for our cooperative threat reduction purposes. We're prepared to enter into an enhanced relationship with you. It was in that context. It was definitely not any kind of a bidding war.
Q: Have we also purchased the weapons that were meant to go on these planes from the Moldovan air force?
A: Yeah, a number of... Over 500 air-to-air missiles were also acquired.
Q: Do you know what kind?
A: Yes. AA-2s, AA-8s, AA-10s, and AA-11s.
Q: How many AA-11s?
A: I'm not sure what the actual breakdown is.
A: We could get back to you with a specific number, but it's over 100.
Q: You bought all the spare engines, all the support equipment, logistics equipment, the whole logistics tail part of this?
A: Yes, we did. We brought all of the spare parts, all of the diagnostic equipment. Anything related to this aircraft.
A: All of it was there at the base. We're not going to take future shipments of spare parts and engines and that type of thing.
Q: How many C-17 flights did it take to bring all this stuff over?
A: The air operation ran for about 10 days, 12 days. I'm not sure of the exact number. I'm going to guess it's between 15 and 20 sorties. I'm not really sure, though. I wouldn't peg too much on that number.
Q: When did this begin? When did we first become involved? What decisions had to be made? When did the airlift start? How many folks went in on the ground, when? That kind of stuff.
A: We had our first discussions with the Moldovan Government in February of this year.
A: We became concerned about the possibility of a sale sort of at the end of last year time frame, and entered into our discussions in February with the Moldovans.
A: After negotiations, we signed an agreement with the Government of Moldova on the 10th of October. The airlift operation commenced within a week... Within, I believe it was...
A: Two or three days.
Q: The negotiations were from February to October?
A: Off and on, yes.
Q: Can you describe in a general way how close Iran got to purchasing these? They sent a delegation to Moldova? Was it phone calls? Did one of these planes get at the border, did it get stopped? How far along did they get?
A: According to the Moldovan military the Iranians, or dealers representing the Iranians, inspected the aircraft at the air base in Moldova.
A: We don't have a more complete answer to your question in terms of how close were they to signing a deal. I don't know. I don't know if we know. In terms of whether these planes were actually ever... Anyone ever attempted to ship them to Iran, I'm confident the answer is no. Certainly I never saw any such information.
Q: In your dealings with Moldova, would they have sold the aircraft the Iran? Are they the kind of government that would sell aircraft to Iran?
A: The answer is no, and we believe that the previous Government of Moldova was perhaps more inclined.
Q: So the reason for buying them is to prevent where successive government might have a different attitude? If Iran wasn't going to buy them, why did we...
A: We don't know if Iran... It's hard to predict the future. But by doing this deal we also created a relationship with Moldova that we didn't previously have with them. Now there's a set of expectations, there are links between our government and theirs, between our Defense Department and their Ministry of Defense that makes such a thing highly unlikely in the future. Obviously they don't have as many planes now either, but it's... We didn't have the relationship with Moldova prior to all of this that we do have with them now.
Q: If they don't have any nuclear weapons, they weren't going to sell the MIG-29s to Iran, I understand it's important to have friendly relations, but was it worth...
A: I don't know. Had we shown no interest, had there not been the development of the relationship that has developed between us and Moldova over the course of these negotiations, I don't know what they would have done.
A: They're under an enormous cash strain, as well.
Q: As a Partnership for Peace nation, was not Moldova already restricted from making a sale like this to an unfriendly government?
A: Moldova should not have made such a sale and did not, but one would have expected they would not have made such a sale to an unfriendly government. That's correct.
Q: ...under obligation not to, right?
A: But like I said, there were pressures... There were opportunities to make the sale, there were pressures to make the sale. As Laura pointed out, they're an extremely cash-strapped country. What we did was to establish a relationship with them. We helped them solve a problem and we solved a problem of our own.
Q: Do you think we're going to start buying more of this kind of stuff in the future?
A: I don't foresee us going out and buying a whole lot of other MIGs. I won't say it won't ever happen, but I don't see this as a precedent that we're now going to buy all the stray MIGs on the market. If it creates a precedent that a country which is cash-strapped or may have a lot of pressures to sell to apparently willing rogue states who have a lot of money to spend on weapons, I would rather have them come to us and say here is the problem we face. Can you help us solve the problem in a way that doesn't result in the transfer of arms to a rogue state?
Q: As a result of this purchase, is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Plan now cash-strapped?
A: Absolutely not.
Q: Is this only the second such arrangement after Saffire, or have there been others?
A: In terms of outright purchase, that's the case. Most CTR projects consist of destroying weapon systems, delivery systems, storing warheads safely on the territory.
Q: What about those SCUDs that DIA has? Did they buy themselves?
A: You'd have to ask DIA.
Q: Are other programs in the works? Other buys in the works?
A: I can't say.
Press: Thank you all.
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