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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

TRANSCRIPT

DoD News Briefing


Tuesday, September 30, 1997 - 3:10 p.m. (EDT)
Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ASD (PA)

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Q: I understand that Secretary Cohen is any day now supposed to decide on whether or not the Army should test its laser, it's MIRACL laser. Has that happened yet? Or can you give us an idea as to when...

A: First, he's not made the decision; and two, as a result, nothing's happened. [Laughter]

Q: What's the window for the test having to occur?

A: It seems to change, but I think relatively soon. It would have to occur relatively soon. I think the Secretary will finish evaluating the material he's gotten from the staff and make the decision relatively soon. But it isn't made yet, and it probably won't be made today.

Q: Can you just run through the point of the test if it is approved?

A: The point of the test will be to test the vulnerability of our satellites. It's a test to gather information and gather data about the vulnerability of our satellites. So it would be a, if the test occurs, and as I say, no final decision has been made, it would be a relatively brief illumination of an existing satellite that's reaching the end of its life in order to give us data on the types of threats satellites could face, and to give us data on how satellites can respond to brief illuminations.

Q: Isn't it also just testing how the MIRACL's function, does it function properly, and so forth?

A: The primary purpose of the test is to collect data on the vulnerability of satellites. Obviously to test the vulnerability of satellites or to gather data you have to have data on propagation of lasers, on the conditions under which lasers work effectively and don't work effectively, so we'll be getting data on both ends of the test, obviously -- the laser and the satellite. But the main purpose of the test is to gather information about satellites.

Q: You said no final decision has been made. Is there a preliminary one?

A: No decision has been made.

Q: I have one more question on it. Two or three years ago the Hill removed the language that was an impediment to these types of tests. With that gone, I guess I just don't understand why it's taking so long. It has been awhile. The issue's been on the Secretary's desk. What's taking so long? What is he actually mulling here?

A: The Secretary's asked for a lot of information from his staff, from the Army, and he's evaluating that information. He just got the package, I think, what he hopes will be the final package yesterday or today, so it's not that he's been sitting around reading this thing for a long period of time. I believe he's just gotten it. So at the appropriate time -- he'll spend whatever time it takes to sort through this. He may talk to some people further about it and make up his mind.

Q: I guess what I'm getting at is what is there to look at? International treaty implications, or...

A: He's looking at what we're going to learn from the test. Clearly, this has been an issue of great interest on the Hill in the past. As you point out, there was legislative language proscribing these tests in the past, so he's been talking to some people on the Hill about it, he's been talking to other people in the government about it, and he's been talking to people in the building about it. He's now got a package that lays out what the test is designed to accomplish, what we hope to learn from the test, it evaluates what the probability is that we'll learn what we hope to learn from it, and he'll make up his mind.

Q: Has he or will he consult with the State Department on this?

A: Certainly his staff has consulted with the State Department, and we've consulted with people in the government on it.

Q: So a large part of the package also has to do with treaty implications?

A: We do not believe that this test violates any treaty. This is not a test against a missile. It is a test to gauge the vulnerability of one of our satellites.

Q: Why the Secretary's decision? Why not the Secretary of one of the services? Is it by statute that it has to be elevated so high?

A: It's not in a statute that it has to be elevated so high, but as I said, this has been an issue of great concern to Congress in the past, and to others, and the Secretary just wants to be sure that the decision is a solid one. He is the Secretary of Defense. It's his job to make important decisions. This is one that he's chosen to make.

Q: Critics say this would be basically breaching the gap... Would be the first conduct of a military offensive operation in space, and that's breaking down the threshold in Star Wars from that point on. This is not just collecting data on missile vulnerability. It becomes...

A: This has nothing to do with missiles. This has to do with satellites. I want to be very clear about this. It has nothing to do with missiles.

Q: I misspoke. But it is, in fact become, it's being seen as the first offensive military action in space.

A: I can't control how people see it. No decision has been made to do this test. If the test is done it will be performed to gather data on satellite vulnerability. There are lasers all over the world; many countries have lasers. It would be done as a prudent attempt to gather information about the vulnerability of our own satellites.

Q: There are a lot of critics who say this would spell the beginning of the militarization of space. Is that one of the reasons why the Secretary's taking so long or is mulling over this slowly? Are there countries or organizations coming to him saying don't do this? There's some sort of lobbying campaign going on to try to convince him not to?

A: The fact that Congress specifically barred the Secretary of Defense from carrying out the Mid Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser test, that's MIRACL, in 1985 suggests that this is an issue that deserves considerable scrutiny, and that's what he's giving it.

Q: Could simulations or some other way of... Is there some other way of collecting similar data without doing this test?

A: There may be, and that's one of the things the Secretary could look at in the course of making his decision. Alternatives... what we gain from doing the test and what we lose from not doing the test, and whether there are alternatives to doing this test.

Q: When was the congressional prohibition lifted?

A: I believe it expired... it was not included in language in FY96 or FY97. It was just included in language enacted in FY95. So, essentially, because the language didn't continue, it ended with FY95. And the language only dealt with FY95.

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Q: What is the reaction of the Defense Department, the view, to the article, Monday's article in the Post by Mr. Farrah about the Russian Mafia joining with the Latin drug cartels, I believe the Colombian drug cartel, the Cali Cartel, specifically with regard to recent undercover operations that detected attempts by the Russian groups to sell Colombia drug traffickers a submarine, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles, and according to Customs, two tactical nuclear weapons, at least, have been offered for sale. Is there alarm in the Defense Department at this union of the mafias?

A: Without getting into any details about the organization of international organized crime cartels -- if they are organized, and if they're working together -- we are certainly concerned about the impact of organized crime in Russia, and we're certainly concerned about the impact of the drug business in Mexico. We've made that clear in the past. It's been our policy, it remains our policy.

The FBI actually has an office in Moscow, I believe, to work with the Russians on crime issues, and you know that we work hand in glove with the Mexicans as closely as we can on stopping international narcotics trafficking.

I'm not qualified to get in, this is more of a Justice Department issue than it is a Defense Department issue on how crime elements in these two countries might be connected.

Q: ...for the purpose of sophisticated, former Soviet weaponry imported into the Western Hemisphere is not a concern of the DoD?

A: We're very concerned about proliferation. We have a very active policy to deal with proliferation. In Russia, it's the Nunn/Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction policy.

We're going to have a report to release, I believe, toward the end of October called the "Proliferation Threat and Response" which is the second iteration of a proliferation report we put out a couple of years ago, I think two years ago. A very complete rundown of what we see to be the proliferation problems that are being faced in the world today, how we're dealing with them as a military, and how we're dealing with them as a country.

I don't want to get into details now, but I think you'll find it very interesting, given your interest in this topic.

Q: Do you have a reaction to the CSIS report that Mr. Bill Webster was part of releasing yesterday where he said that safeguards of nuclear weapons and fissionable materials in Russia were deteriorating and that this could... Do you have a reaction to that?

A: Mr. Webster certainly is an expert on this field, having served as Director of both the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency. I can't comment directly on his report except to say that we take proliferation very seriously, and we have been working very hard with the government of Russia to try to help it improve its controls over nuclear weapons. We've had some notable successes in this area with former Soviet states. One was Project Sapphire, bringing back nearly 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan in 1994. We've continued to work on this, and will with the Russian government.

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