DoD News Briefing
Thursday, August 14, 1997 - 2:00 p.m. (EDT)
Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ASD (PA)
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Q: Pertaining to the 1990 Livermoore National Lab report on Gulf War bombing, General Schwarzkopf told Gannett News Service this morning he never saw the report. My question is why not, and how far up the chain of command did that go?
A: I can't answer either of those questions. We do have a separate investigation going on into the intelligence aspects of the Gulf War -- what we knew, when we knew it, who learned it, how they learned it, why didn't other people learn it, did the right people learn it, were our procedures efficient and effective? That's all being run by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight, Walt Jacoh. He was instructed to do this study in the fall of 1996 at the same time Dr. Bernard Rostker was appointed as the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses. He's been laboring away in that study, and we hope that it will provide answers to some of these questions.
I might add two things about that study, though. The first is, the idea that there were intelligence reports done that did not always reach all the soldiers in the field is not new. We have discovered that there have been other examples of that. One of the reasons that Mr. Jacoh is investigating the treatment and use of intelligence is to find out how we can avoid that from happening in the future.
Second, there is nothing in this report, as I understand it, that suggests that poisonous materials that may have been blown up north of Baghdad or around Baghdad during the war drifted far enough to go over U.S. troops. I believe there is nothing in this report that suggests that. But again, we have, and Dr. Rostker announced this along with Mr. Walpole at the CIA when we did the plume analysis, we have decided to go back and to reexamine a lot of these analyses using the new formulas we've developed and the new computational techniques for charting wind directions and dispersion of gasses or potential chemical elements.
Q: You said drifted, past tense. This report was done three months before the war. I've seen the report. It predicts a plume of 378 miles -- well within the combat theater.
A: It's not my impression that it does, but I will doublecheck on that. There are actually diagrams of plumes in the report, and the modeling indicated, in fact the CIA provided a report on intelligence related to Gulf War Illnesses in August of 1996, and in that report it said Our modeling indicates that chemical agent fallout from these facilities, both located in remote areas west of Baghdad, do not reach troops in Saudi Arabia. We have no information to suggest that casualties occurred inside Iraq as a result of chemical warfare agents' release from the bombing of these sites, probably because, and they mention some facilities that are in remote locations far from any population centers.
Q: One of the models was done by Livermoore specifically at the request of the Pentagon. My understanding from Livermoore is that that model was thrown out as being too extreme and that it did show theater-wide dispersion.
A: I'm not aware that that's the case, but I'll look into it.
Q: You'll take that question?
A: Yes.
Q: Will that report be released?
A: You're from Gannett, right?
Q: I am from Gannett.
A: You've already gotten the report, haven't you? I guess the...
Q: We're talking about two different reports. My first question was on the 1990 request. Livermoore was tasked with doing a study on the Khamisiyah plume also, and that study was deemed, I'm paraphrasing, but too extreme. Said it was not useful. The other model...
A: You're asking me about two things.
Q: I am.
A: I was confused because it wasn't clear that you were asking me now about Khamisiyah. I will check into that.
I know, obviously, that in general terms as Mr. Walpole disclosed, there was a lot of trouble getting what we thought were adequate models of the Khamisiyah experience, and I will look specifically into that Lawrence Livermoore...
Q: The second part of your answer, I think, I assume, when you said these new, more sophisticated models that Walpole has said will be applied, they're going to be to Methana and Almadiyah?
A: And we will apply them to other possible... To any possible incident where there's concern about drifting or dispersion of agents. We will, as I understand it, apply the new, more sophisticated techniques that were developed to analyze the Khamisiyah plume.
Q: Can you be a little more clear on that? I'm kind of confused. This Livermoore study...
A: The Livermoore study, as I understand it, refers to Khamisiyah.
Q: I'm sorry, I'm talking about the pre-war...
A: That's a different study, right?
Q: Right.
A: The Livermoore study applies to...
Q: Reported by Gannett...
Q: ...October of 1990.
A: Right.
Q: Does this go into detail about specific agents at specific locations and the type of threat or harm it might do to troops in certain regions? I'm asking about the specificity of this...
A: I do not know.
Q: ...if it's a template or...
A: I haven't read the study.
Q: Can you say that the... This model I can buy. Livermoore was commissioned by Tactical Air Command, is that correct? That's my understanding.
A: That is what I've been told, yes.
Q: And if General Schwarzkopf never saw it, then it presumably did not make it, and I don't know whether you know the answer to this yet, but that the report didn't go beyond Tactical Air Command at that point?
A: This is the type of thing that Walter Jacoh is trying to figure out. He is looking at what happened to all of these studies, where the information got, did it get to the right people, did it get there on time, and he, I hope, will have the answers to these questions. I do not.
Q: The Senate Banking Committee asked for the information in October of 1993, and it had to be revealed via FOIA. That person only got it last Saturday. Why is there a delay of four years in getting the announcement out of the study?
A: I cannot explain that. all I can tell you is that since the fall of 1996 when Mr. Jacoh was appointed to do his review and Dr. Rostker was appointed to his job, that we worked very aggressively to get out as much information as possible. It's clear that there are vast numbers of studies, there are vast numbers of intelligence reports. Many of these have been revealed, some have not yet. One of the things Mr. Jacoh is doing is looking at the whole picture of what we knew and who got to know that and whether it was efficiently and properly distributed.
Q: Now I'm a little confused. Your answer to Susanne's question about there was not specificity in the report...
A: I did not answer the question. I don't know. I haven't read the report. I made it very clear. I don't know whether there was specificity in the report.
Q: I'm sorry. I thought Colonel Bridges had indicated to you from off-line here that there was not a lot of specificity in the report, so let me rephrase my question then.
I thought Susanne had asked whether the report addressed the potential of agents being released from targets in Iraq, and you said it was not clear whether there was specificity? Is that it?
A: I did not comment on specificity because I haven't read the report. I can't tell you anything about specificity.
Q: Can one of your aides who has the report tell us?
A: You can check with Brian afterwards on that.
Q: Can you say up until this point in time if the Pentagon has had any evidence that bombing by the Air Force did, in fact, release agents?
A: We do not have evidence that agents were released from bombing of facilities in Iraq that affected U.S. troops.
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