THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
February 7, 1997
PRESS CONFERENCE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN
Old Executive Office Building, Room 450
4:15 P.M. EST
GORE: ... ... On arms control, we made crystal clear that reducing nuclear weapons is obviously in both countries' interest. Our people are safer because of the progress we have already made in reducing the nuclear threat, and continuing this process is at the core of U.S.-Russian security relations. Our focus now is to bring START II into force and get on quickly with further reductions in START III.
Q: Mr. Vice President, to break the stalemate in the Duma on START II, are you beginning to suggest that the United States is now prepared to begin negotiations on START III? And, of course, you understand how that would help the Russians adapt to START II?
And, Mr. Prime Minister, as we say politically in this country --
THE VICE PRESIDENT: This is a -- question, Mr. Prime Minister? (Laughter.)
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, is there any way, as we say in this country, Mr. Yeltsin can deliver the Duma on START II? It's been a long, long wait.
THE VICE PRESIDENT: Let me answer the first part of the question and then turn to Viktor Stepanovich. The only word in your question I have trouble with is "negotiations" because -- let me phrase the answer without that word. Yes, we have started discussions about the possibility that we could together create guidelines for what START III could accomplish. And yes, we anticipate the possibility that our two Presidents, in their meeting in March, might have discussions on this topic. The value of such guidelines would be to show both countries how we could move to lower levels of warheads in both countries without requiring the expenditures necessary in either country to comply with the START II levels and mix of forces during the period of time when negotiations might continue.
Moving more quickly downward in the number of weapons on both sides can make both nations more secure, can avoid these unnecessary expenditures in both nations and meet the mutual goals of both nations. So I think that we've made some progress in getting closer to a meeting of the minds, but frankly, these are complex questions, as you know very well, and it will take some time on the part of our experts to go over it with a fine-toothed comb, but as a matter of general principle, I think we made some progress there.
PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN: For us, the question of the START II is very important -- very. It was signed in 1993, and today as you understand is '97, no signature, no ratification. It has a political and military bearing and economic bearing, this treaty, quite naturally. And we would like the Duma to treat it with utmost seriousness, and it is doing so.
The issue cannot be addressed now solely in the context of the issue of the START II. Once again, this question will certainly be linked with other issues -- all other issues -- of course, including the European security, which is not quite consonant to interests of ours. And the difficulty is today of these issues when we discuss the European security, START II is Russia-United States -- very serious and important nuclear issue. The price is too high here. But some other issues are imputed into it which we would not like to be converged with the START II issues.
The First Deputy Speaker of the Russian Duma is here. He is a better versed person in this. But I think our Duma is -- our thinking place is thinking, and the decision, the solution will be adequate.
THE VICE PRESIDENT: I do think that the guidelines I alluded to, if successfully created, could make it significantly easier to describe why START II is so much in the best interests of both countries. And, of course, in the absence of ratification staying at START I levels would be very expensive for both countries, and not a desirable outcome.
I'll take another American question.
Q: Mr. Vice President, Mr. Prime Minister, there were reports out of Moscow today in which the Russian Defense Minister says that defense funding is so inadequate in Russia that the Russian nuclear weapons control system might soon collapse if that inadequate funding were to persist. Does that coincide with your understanding? Did you address this issue in your discussions, and what can be done about a situation that sounds in dire straits?
PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN: I haven't heard about this. I don't think that the Minister of Defense can throw about such weighty words just without reason, without good reason. I know him well enough. Mr. Rodionov is a serious person, a thinking person, understanding and reasonable person. And I don't think he'll throw about such words.
Was it a written message in a newspaper? Well, I understand now. It means it was never said. (Laughter.)
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
