[excerpts]
STATEMENT BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
TOBY T. GATI
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
HEARING ON CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
FEBRUARY 5, 1997
WWW - see the entire statement @ http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1997_hr/index.html#threat
PROLIFERATION CONCERNS
The spread of weapons of mans destruction (WMD) poses another serious threat to US national interests at home and abroad. Alert and focused diplomatic intervention, ably assisted by targeted and -timely intelligence, is the key to limiting acquisition of sensitive technologies and halting proliferation before military options are considered. The United States continues to lead international efforts to establish and secure an effective and comprehensive nonproliferation regime.
To succeed in these efforts, the United States and its partners must address regional tensions and instabilities that provide political incentives and opportunities for WMD proliferation. Diplomatic efforts are especially intense in the Persian Gulf, the Korean Peninsula, and South Asia. The United States is working to ensure that WMD material and know-how in the former Soviet Union are safely secured and kept out of the reach of irresponsible regimes and terrorists. Preventing and limiting proliferation requires integrating global and regional efforts.
Russia. Russia has consolidated all its nuclear-tipped strategic missiles, formerly located in several states of the former Soviet Union, onto its own territory. We and Russia no longer target one another's territory. It continues to ,be a central concern of the intelligence community to provide assurance that Russia's strategic forces remain under responsible control and do not pose the threat of unwarned attack on the US.
Fissile Material in the Former Soviet Union. We regard any vulnerabilities of materials and technology to acquisition by aspiring proliferators as a very real threat with potentially catastrophic consequences.
Although we are heartened by reports of enhanced security at several installations, and by the decline since 1994 in known smuggling incidents, we are by no means at a point where we can speak of the problem in the past tense. Diplomatic initiative and persistence will be essential to ensuring the full cooperation of the governments of the Newly Independent States in cutting off the availability of material and technology at the source, and in stopping illicit trafficking before it begins. We will be expanding our efforts on the basis of the initiatives embraced at last year's nuclear summit in Moscow.
Building on initiatives supported by "Nunn-Lugar" emergency assistance funding and the transfer of responsibility for nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting programs to the Department of Energy, more than 40 Russian facilities are now engaged in national laboratory-led efforts to put in place modern nuclear material security systems, with many more facilities in the preparatory phase. At April's nuclear summit, the P-8 committed to greater information sharing and expanded law enforcement to combat nuclear smuggling. The United States objective is to control the problem as close to the source as possible. This means bringing an array of expertise and assistance to bear, from material security installation to law enforcement and information, as well as customs and border control assistance. In this spirit we are placing greater emphasis on preventing illicit trafficking through the southern tier of the Newly Independent States.
China. China continues to be a worrisome supplier of materials and technology to countries of proliferation concern. The United States maintains an active dialogue with China aimed at bringing it into full observance of all international supplier norms, including adoption of a more effective national export control system. The Chinese have agreed to conduct regular dialogues at the senior level on arms control, global security, and nonproliferation. These dialogues will provide the opportunity to review Chinese commitments on a regular basis. With respect to missile proliferation issues, the USG has had several contacts with China over the past year. Discussions last November between Undersecretary Davis and Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing were the most detailed talks between our two governments on this topic since 1993. With respect to nuclear proliferation issues, our discussions with China on establishing national nuclear export controls and our close monitoring of Chinese behavior should provide a basis for evaluating China's compliance with its stated policy of not providing assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and of not assisting non-nuclear weapon states to acquire or develop a nuclear explosive device.
North Korea. The North Korean nuclear weapons program remains frozen under the Agreed Framework, an achievement that demonstrates what can be done to stop proliferation through
sustained and multifaceted diplomatic intervention. North Korea also has been a leading seller of SCUD missiles and missile technology in the Middle East since the mid-1980s and has been attempting to develop longer range missile systems. Our engagement to ensure regional stability and reduction of political tensions includes a strong reminder to North Korea that addressing our concerns on missile proliferation is required for bilateral relations to improve.
Discussion of North Korea's missile program raises the issue of the ballistic missile threat to the United States. Intensive analysis by the intelligence community on this issue, coupled with several reviews by experts outside the community, judged the threat to be low. But we must not become complacent; the situation could change and compel new conclusions. The IC certainly will continue to monitor the potential threat of ballistic missiles to the United States, and report on any significant changes in that threat.
Iraq. US leadership has ensured that the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continue to reveal the extent and operational details of Iraq's quest for WED capabilities. Saddam Hussein will try to evade accountability as long as he can in order to preserve a residual WED capability and to test the coalition's staying power over sanctions. International diplomatic and intelligence efforts limit Saddam's options, but only if the international community sustains its pressure on Saddam's ambitions.
Iran. Iran continues to seek a full range of WMD capabilities, but US-led efforts have made it more difficult to acquire the technologies and equipment needed to pursue its WMD programs. Iran has developed a chemical weapons capability and short-range missiles, both of which pose regional threats. Its efforts to procure nuclear equipment, materials, and technology have been circumscribed by US-led diplomatic efforts. Regional rivalries between Iran and Iraq could easily lead to renewed fighting in which some of these weapons might be employed.
South Asia. As the negotiations over the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty amply demonstrated, the stakes for nuclear arms control are also critical in South Asia. India and Pakistan view each other warily, insist on retaining their nuclear options, and continue to pursue an increasingly more public missile race., For different reasons, each has a weak government and strong WMD constituencies, a volatile mix. If they could reach a domestic and then a bilateral consensus to abandon their nuclear and missile programs, this regional volatility would be reduced. If they choose to isolate themselves and accelerate their weapons programs, they will jeopardize the region'" fragile balance.
... ... ...
COUNTRIES with GLOBAL IMPACT: RUSSIA and CHINA
... ... ...
While the last year has seen sharper, more nationalist rhetoric -- in part because of the presidential elections -- there have been no great surprises or shocks in Russian foreign policy. The Yeltsin government -- including Foreign Minister Primakov -- continues to see Russian influence and interests better served by engagement and cooperation than by isolation or confrontation. Russia continues to meet its obligations under START I and CUE. On the nonproliferation and arms sales front, we and Moscow still have differences -- for example, sales of nuclear reactors to Iran and SA-10 antiaircraft missiles to Cyprus -- an the Russians search for new arms markets.
The next few months will be shaped by the way in which NATO expansion is accomplished and how it is perceived in Moscow. Russian officials have already said Russia's continued compliance with CFE and ratification of START II depend on this. Some Russian observers have correctly concluded that NATO expansion will occur and that Russia's interests need not suffer. Others have threatened retaliatory measurer if their interests are not sufficiently taken into account. Unsuccessful handling of NATO expansion will add credibility to more conservative, nationalistic voices in Russia.
... ... ...
PROBLEM STATES: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Cuba
... ... ...
Iraq. Iraq will remain a threat to regional stability and a country of egregious human rights abuses as long as the regime of Saddam Hussein remains in power. Saddam's 1994 movement of troops toward Kuwait and his 1996 move into Irbil demonstrate his aggressive ambitions and offensive capabilities. Despite the efforts of Chairman Rolf Ekeus and UNSCOM, Iraq has not yet complied with UNSCR 687 with respect to WMD and almost certainly retains residual missile and CBW capabilities. In recent years, Iraq has supported terrorism in the form of Mujaheddin e-Khalq (MEK) operations against Iran and, at times, terrorism directed against foreigners and others in northern Iraq.
Baghdad's hostility toward the United States stems from
Washington's leadership in marshalling the international community against Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait and our key role in sustaining the coalition that thwarts Iraq's regional ambitions. In northern Iraq, Saddam wishes to exclude the international community's involvement, and at the UN he has sought to undermine every effort to ensure UN enforcement of, and Iraqi compliance with, various aspects of UNSCR 687.
Iran. Iran's clerical regime regards the United States as its principal global adversary. It opposes all aspects of the US presence in the region and seeks to undermine governments enjoying good relations with Washington. Although the Iranian leadership can show considerable pragmatism and caution on specific issues, it remains active in a number of areas that pose a threat to US interests and is responsible for serious human rights abuses. Foremost among these is its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process and its direct support of terrorism. Its opposition to the peace process is more determined than that of any other regional actor; its support for violent opposition to the process -- through, for example, its support for Hizballah in southern Lebanon and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) more generally -- has facilitated terrorists attacks in Israel that have taken American lives. Iran has considerable WMD capabilities, particularly in the areas of missiles and CW, and is actively seeking to enhance those capabilities, which already pose a substantial threat to neighboring states.
Libva. Despite repeated disclaimers and deceptions, the Qadhafi regime continues to support terrorist groups -- including support for the PIJ and the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). It continues to develop WMD, particularly CW and missiles. Libya opposes the Middle East peace process, although not with the zeal and effectiveness of Iran. Libya also seeks to exploit differences between Washington and allied capitals on how to bring to trial those implicated in the destruction of Pan Am 103.
Syria. Syria has been engaged in the Arab-Israeli peace process since the 1991 Madrid conference and has not been directly involved in planning or executing international terrorist attacks since 1986. Nevertheless, Syria continues to support international terrorism by allowing terrorist groups to maintain a presence in Damascus and operate from Syria-controlled areas of Lebanon. Some of these groups include fundamentalist and secular Palestinian organizations, such as Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), as well as non-Palestine groups, such as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Syria acquired from the former Soviet Union standard SCUD-B missiles, with a range of 300 kilometers and a smaller number of 500-kilometer SCUD-Cs from North Korea; it has had a chemical warfare program since the mid-l980s. While there is no indication Syria is planning to initiate a conflict with Israel, there is always a danger that Syrian-Israeli tensions could result in the outbreak of hostilities through miscalculation by either side, particularly over the fighting in southern Lebanon.
North Korea. There remains a continuing threat to US and South Korean forces from the North Korean military. But domestic economic pressures are narrowing the Pyongyang regime's room for maneuver. We remain uncertain about many aspects of the domestic situation in the North, but it is clear that the economy is in even more serious trouble than last year, including a chronic food shortage. Kim Jong Il appears to be both actively and effectively in charge, even though he has not formally succeeded to his father's official positions, but new and growing internal pressures could change the decisionmaking calculus that has long prevented conflict. The submarine grounding incident heightened tensions between Pyongyang and Seoul and put aspects of the Agreed Framework on hold, but - largely because of the intensive efforts of State Department and NSC officials in close coordination with South Korea -- North Korea agreed on December 29 to issue a statement of regret. This move by Pyongyang cleared the way for renewed progress. North Korea's postponement of the scheduled briefing on proposed four-party talks appears to be primarily an attempt to highlight its food needs. We believe North Korea's unprecedented statement of regret concerning the submarine incident reflects a commitment by the regime to remain engaged in the negotiating process.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
