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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

[EXCERPTS] DoD News Briefing

Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ASD(PA) Tuesday, May 6, 1997 - 1:30 p.m.

..............
Q: The national missile defense issue. The Administration's three plus
three plan, the logic behind it is largely we don't want to rush in terms
of deploying a system. We also want to sort of take another look at
what the threat is a couple of years down the road. 
This morning, Mr. Tenet in his confirmation hearing before the Senate
subcommittee, said that the national intelligence estimate on the
ballistic missile threat, which I guess was completed in '95, and said it
was about 15 years out, he said there were some things, in his
opinion, that were not looked at in that estimate -- proliferation,
transfer of scientific expertise to rogue nations, things like that. 
Can you say whether or not three plus three is still the position of the
Administration, will stay that way, or is that something that also could
be opened for another look in terms of this whole debate about more
money? 
A: Three plus three is still the Administration's position. I'm not aware
of any systematic effort to change that schedule right now. The
conclusion was, as Mr. Tenet said at his hearing, that we have some
time, and as you know, the program is calibrated to put off
deployment as long as possible on the theory that as long as we can
work on development before deployment, we can develop a better,
more technologically advanced system. That's what we would like to
do. We would like to deploy at the last prudent moment in order to
get the system that best meets whatever threat we face at the time. 
Q: Do you have a comment on the report that the Secretary has
decided to add $2 billion to the national missile defense as part of the
QDR? 
A: From the very beginning we said that the QDR would be
strategy-driven and not necessarily budget-driven, and it could
involve increases in spending as well as decreases in spending. This is
one area in the course of our analysis where we found we needed
more money to stick to the schedule. So there will be some additional
funds. I think the way you should state it is probably up to about $2
billion, because it's not clear how much more money has to be put in
over the next five years of the defense plan. It could be in the range
of about $1 billion to about $2 billion, according to our current
calculations. 
Q: But this is to meet the deadline? 
A: Remember, it's the three plus three program. The first three years
are development, and that's supposed to lead to integrated system
tests by fiscal year 1999. To stay on that program, the ballistic missile
defense office decided that it needed more money. As currently
structured, there wasn't enough money in the program in order to
develop a national missile defense system to test at the end of the
three year period, so there will be more money put in. The exact
amount will depend on how much we decide we have to add. 
The second part of the three years, of course, is deployment. And
that, there is no commitment yet to deploy. The program is designed
to develop a program, a national missile defense system, and then to
evaluate the threat after it's developed. And from the time we decide
to deploy until actual deployment will take another three years. 
...............
Q: A couple of issues that were raised by Tony Hall this last week
over at the State Department and elsewhere around town.
Congressman Hall noted that his travels, led by the North Korean
Department of State, that there were thousands of North Korean
soldiers that did not fit their uniforms, that were physically attenuated
-- thin. He also noted that the situation was far worse than expected,
and he recommended immediate increases in food aid and in medical
aid to North Korea. I see that today in news that the talks yesterday
between the North and the South on this food aid have broken
down. 
Could you address especially those soldiers and what the United
States or what the international community should do with the army
of North Korea problem? 
A: First I want to congratulate you on being a fast learner and picking
up the Pentagon lingo. Physically attenuated as a definition of thinness
is truly a good Pentagon term. I'll try to remember that for future
briefings. (Laughter) 
I spoke at great length about the food situation in North Korea last
week, and I don't want to run through all those figures about caloric
intake again, but I think you were here for that or you can get a copy
of the briefing if you'd like. There are clearly severe food shortages
going on in North Korea. North Korea has been trying to turn food
aid into a political weapon, I believe, in their discussions with us and
with the South Koreans as well. 
We have provided a fairly substantial amount of food to North
Korea, and we're prepared to provide more on a humanitarian basis,
but there are talks going on with us and with other countries on a
variety of topics. I think there has to be a willingness by the North
Koreans to recognize the depth of the problem and to accept food
aid. That's a pre-condition to getting more aid in there. 
I can't explain why the talks between the North and the South on
food broke off, but that is an indication of some of the complexities of
the negotiations that have been going on. 
Q: You skipped the subject matter of thousands -- not just a few, but
thousands of North Korean soldiers... 
A: Physically attenuated. 
Q: ...physically thin and perhaps getting desperate with hunger. Is
there any policy that this Administration has regarding how to deal
with that problem? 
Q: A "feed the enemy" program. (Laughter) 
A: We actually have, one of the issues here is to make sure that food
aid that's given to North Korea is not siphoned off to sustain its
military, but actually reaches women and children and the people who
are at the greatest risk. In the past, the military has been better
insulated from starvation -- in the recent past -- than the rest of the
population as a whole. There have been reports coming out of North
Korea of children starving to death. We know that there's vast
foraging for food; that many of their industries have basically shut
down because workers don't go to work. They go out and they root
around for greens or bark or other things they can eat to supplement
their very small diets. Even with the foraging, they're probably
managing to consume only 80 to 85 percent or less of what we
consider the minimum daily caloric requirements for an adult. There
are real problems. 
But as I say, there have been discussions underway to try to
ameliorate those problems, and those discussions will continue. 



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