• Military

• WMD Menu                           

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

Briefer: James P. Rubin

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. I have no statements, so I'm here to take your questions; and we're a little earlier today than yesterday.

QUESTION: Some of the familiar stuff again. China - China acting, threatening or warning it would use force if Taiwan separated. You know about the separationist gains. I wonder if force would be justified, in the US view, if Taiwan should feel it ought to be an independent state.

MR. RUBIN: Well, our view is long-standing and has not changed; and that is that we do not support Taiwan independence. We do not support one Taiwan, one China. What we do support is the resolution of this issue peacefully.

QUESTION: But on the force issue, though, if you don't support independence and Taiwan decides, despite your view, that it's a grown-up place and it wants to be an independent nation, does that justify - would that justify Beijing trying to do something to prevent it?

MR. RUBIN: What we do support, Barry, is the resolution of this issue peacefully. Therefore, we don't support the use of force.

QUESTION: Russia - have you seen - it just hit the wires, so maybe you don't have a reaction. Yeltsin is offering to further reduce the Russian nuclear arsenal by one-third?

MR. RUBIN: Obviously, we haven't had a chance to study this proposal. Any reductions by the Russians in their nuclear forces would not be something we'd be against. But what we think the central item on our agenda in arms control with Russia is at this moment is the ratification of the START II treaty. That is the central item of business in the arms control area.

We made a lot of progress recently in New York - for those of you who were at the General Assembly. We moved on the ABM issue; we moved on several aspects of the START process. What we now need to see happen is the Duma in Russia make the decision that's in Russia's interest and our interest and the world's interest, and go forward and ratify this agreement; after which, we have indicated, we are prepared to explore further reductions.

But for now, the first item of business in the area of bilateral arms control would obviously be ratification of START II. But again, it's not our practice to oppose reductions in nuclear forces by other countries. But again, we haven't seen the details; so it would be very hard to make any specific judgments about its significance until one had seen it.

QUESTION: But doesn't the treaty carry certain advantages in the sense of monitoring? Wouldn't you rather reductions be carried out in a formal, legalistic way?

MR. RUBIN: Absolutely. As I indicated, our arms control position is to move towards ratification of START II and to move towards a discussion of further reductions in a controlled regime with inspection, with verification and with the confidence that that entails.

QUESTION: Have you begun to doubt - because every time - I don't know how many times you've heard the promise, and it's been relayed to us, that the Russian leadership, just over the - just down the block, would be Duma ratification. Are you losing - is the US losing confidence in the Duma's willingness to ratify the treaty?

MR. RUBIN: I think if you looked back several months ago, you would have seen several issues before the Duma that we were concerned about, including the Chemical Weapons Convention; and similar concerns were expressed by outside parties - that they're never going to ratify that. They did move forward and they ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Russians have made clear to us this is a very high priority. So we expect the Russian Government, President Yeltsin, to follow through on this treaty by getting it ratified.

QUESTION: Did you have any advance notice of President Yeltsin's proposal? And do you think he made it with the full knowledge of his military chiefs?

MR. RUBIN: Again, I haven't seen the proposal. I have not heard about this proposal. That doesn't mean someone in our government hadn't heard about it; but I certainly hadn't.

QUESTION: Jamie, on another subject, have you seen the report - there's one in The New York Times today, but it's appeared elsewhere - that this grandiose water project in Libya may not, in fact, be primarily a water project, but could have some military purpose?

MR. RUBIN: We study very carefully what happens in Libya because we consider this regime a dangerous regime. We watch very carefully to ensure that projects like this water project are not covers for military projects.

We are confident that we keep a close eye on developments in Libya. As you know, we don't make it a practice of revealing publicly everything we think we know about a particular military or non-military development around the world. We watch developments in Libya very closely.

With respect to the Tarhuna plant, which was mentioned, as well, publicly, we believe the Libyan Government intended to use the Tarhuna plant as a chemical weapons manufacturing facility. We believe construction of that facility has ceased. Nevertheless, we remain deeply concerned about Libya's chemical weapons program. We believe Libya is actively working to increase its stockpile of chemical weapons, as well as delivery systems capable of reaching around the Middle East. That is the reason why we will continue to work closely with our allies to prevent Libya from acquiring the equipment and technology it seeks to produce weapons of mass destruction.

With regard to our specific assessment of this, I would merely note that some of our colleagues in other parts of the government, the Pentagon, as I understand it, has said that it's an irrigation project; at least that is their view.

QUESTION: Given the size of the conduit, could it be something in addition to water? Could it be used for water on Mondays and Tuesdays, but on the rest of the week, for moving troops?

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say this - we have no illusions about the Libyan regime and the Libyan regime's willingness to mask what it's doing in one area with cover stories. We have never been fooled by that in the past, and we will certainly do what we can to make sure that our efforts are devoted to knowing what goes on in Libya because we consider the regime dangerous.

As far as any specific analysis or assessment of this program, all I can tell you is that we watch it very closely.

QUESTION: Any export violations, for instance, by Caterpillar, as this article points out?

MR. RUBIN: I am not aware of any licenses issued for the export of American heavy equipment to Libya. As far as specific questions about licenses, I would refer you to the Treasury Department.

QUESTION: I actually have seen no Iraq statement today, but that doesn't stop me from asking you, where do you stand? I mean, with all the twists and turns, is he getting closer to compliance or moving away from it?

MR. RUBIN: The Iraq story has been a long and complicated story from the beginning. We are vigilant in our determination to push for full access for the inspectors to do their job. My understanding is that they are on the ground, doing their jobs, and have been since November 21. My understanding is that Ambassador Butler plans to go to Baghdad this weekend to discuss his intentions to move forward in the inspection regime.

I think it's clear to all that the fact that Iraq chose unwisely to expel the inspectors has postponed the day when sanctions could be lifted, because it undermined the ability of the inspectors to establish a baseline of what Iraq had, what it didn't have, and thereby make a determination whether all its weapons had been destroyed.

We will only know whether we're closer to sanctions being lifted if Saddam Hussein changes course and allows the inspectors the full, unconditional and unfettered access to all facilities in Iraq that Ambassador Butler will be seeking.

QUESTION: Is Ambassador Butler going to be formally asking to see the so-called presidential sites?

MR. RUBIN: Well, you'd have to ask him about his particular plans. I can just assure you that we have full confidence that he knows what he needs to do to do the job; that he intends to continue to try to do his job; and if Iraq wants to improve its relationship with the international community and advance the day when sanctions can be lifted, it would behoove the Iraqi Government to change course and allow him to get the unfettered access to those sites that he needs.

QUESTION: Back to Russia for a minute --

MR. RUBIN: Yes, any more on Iraq?

QUESTION: Yes, one more. There was just a bulletin that came over the wire just before - the gist of which was that the Iraqi ambassador to the United Nations, Nizar Hamdun said that Iraq would not accept an increase in the oil-for-food plan -- which is currently $2 billion - unless the way the aid is distributed is revamped, unless there's a change in the aid plan. I was wondering what you thought of that, and what you thought of the possibilities of increasing the oil-for-food program.

MR. RUBIN: Before answering the specific, let me again emphasize there is a difference between sanctions relief on the one hand and a humanitarian program to aid the Iraqi people on the other. The sanctions regime has always included humanitarian exception; the oil-for-food program grew out of that. It was something the United States put forward in mid-1995. The Iraqis stonewalled for a year and a half in accepting that program, using excuses like the one that you are now indicating, which is that the distribution plan wasn't acceptable.

But let's bear in mind why the distribution plan is so important. Iraq has used its people as pawns in not using its money to provide aid to their people; using its scarce resources to build palaces for the Iraqi leadership. So it's been very important to the United States and all the members of the Security Council that when this oil-for-food program was instituted, that the UN was in charge of making sure that the food relief actually went to the people who needed it, and did not go to other purposes.

So a distribution program was established to ensure that throughout Iraq, including in the north and in the south and throughout the country, that the food went to the people that needed it. So Iraq has often tried to use food as a weapon and a card in its attempt to confuse the facts - namely that they are the ones who are refusing to spend their money on food and medicine for their people. They have plenty of money for military projects. They have money for palaces. You'd think they would care enough to spend some of that money on their people.

That is the reason why we have held to such a firm line on the distribution program for this oil-for-food. As far as whether we would be prepared to see that expanded, what I can say is that we will be supportive of continuing the program, looking to the Secretary General to make recommendations as to whether additional revenues would be needed in order to help those who are most critically in need in Iraq. We would be prepared to give any such recommendations urgent consideration.

My understanding is that what we would be looking at here would be a report from the Secretary General some number of months from the extension of the program about whether additional revenues would be necessary; again, for the sole and specific purpose of alleviating humanitarian suffering - in distinction from any easing of sanctions.

QUESTION: On the general subject of Iraq, do you have any updates on Rev. Farrakhan's aids or associates and any meetings here; and where his proposed trip to Iraq stands?

MR. RUBIN: A group, representing Minister Farrakhan, from the Nation of Islam, met with representatives at the State Department yesterday. The State Department officials included representatives from the Near East Affairs Bureau, the Consular Affairs Bureau, Legal Affairs and the Counter-terrorism Office.

We made the following points. Visits by US citizens to states like Libya or Iraq are not helpful. Those are states under international sanctions, which have violated international norms of behavior. These states know what they have to do to get out from under these sanctions. In the case of Libya, they have to turn over for trial those accused of these crimes. In the case of Iraq, that is complying with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

We believe that the visit of US citizens to these countries will therefore result in their being used for propaganda purposes. We are prepared to review, with Mr. Farrakhan's associates, restrictions on passport uses; but we made clear that a visit by Minister Farrakhan to Libya and Iraq would not be helpful, and we are therefore opposed to him going.

QUESTION: And did they say anything?

MR. RUBIN: They did not indicate what their intentions were. They did not seek validation for Mr. Farrakhan's passport.

QUESTION: But is it illegal?

QUESTION: No, it's not illegal.

MR. RUBIN: Well, I can go through the legalities on this, but I think most of the people in this room have heard that ad nauseum.

...................

(The briefing concluded at 1:20 P.M.)

[end of document]