13 November 1997
TEXT: CLINTON NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF WMD CONTINUING EMERGENCY
(Emergency extended re weapons of mass destruction) (2920)
Washington -- In a notice to Congress, President Clinton says "The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign
policy, and economy of the United States.
"Therefore," the President said, "I am advising the Congress that the
national emergency declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on
November 14, 1995 and November 14, 1996, must continue in effect
beyond November 14, 1997. Accordingly, I have extended the national
emergency declared in Executive Order 12938 and have sent the attached
notice of extension to the Federal Register for publication."
Following is the White House text:
(begin text)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
November 12, 1997
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass
destruction" -- (WMD)) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I
issued Executive Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et
seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of
its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and transmit
to the Congress a notice of its continuation.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign
policy, and economy of the United States. Therefore, I am advising the
Congress that the national emergency declared on November 14, 1994,
and extended on November 14, 1995 and November 14, 1996, must continue
in effect beyond November 14, 1997. Accordingly, I have extended the
national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938 and have sent the
attached notice of extension to the Federal Register for publication.
The following report is made pursuant to section 204(c) of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and
section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)),
regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency
declaration. Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or
chemical and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is
contained in the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of
Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
Weapons, provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993
(Public Law 102-190), also known as the "Nonproliferation Report," and
the most recent annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to
section 308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the "CBW
Report."
Chemical and Biological Weapons
The three export control regulations issued under the Enhanced
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remained fully in force and
continue to be applied in order to control the export of items with
potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery
systems for weapons of mass destruction.
Chemical weapons continue to pose a very serious threat to our
security and that of countries friendly to us. On April 29, 1997, the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the
"Chemical Weapons Convention" or (CWC)) entered into force with 87 of
the CWC's 165 signatories as original States Parties. The United
States was among their number, having deposited its instrument of
ratification on April 25. As of November 5, 104 countries had become
States Parties.
Russia did not complete its legislative approval process in time to be
among the original CWC States Parties. In our March meeting in
Helsinki, President Yeltsin did, however, assure me of his
understanding of the importance of the CWC to Russia's own security.
On October 31, 1997, the Russian Duma (lower house) approved
ratification of the CWC. On November 5, 1997, the Russian Federation
Council unanimously approved the CWC and the Russian government
deposited its instrument of ratification. Russia,s ratification makes
it possible for Russia to join the United States in playing a
leadership role in ensuring that all of the Convention's benefits are
realized.
Given Russia's financial situation during this difficult period of
transition to a market economy, serious concerns have been raised
about the high costs of environmentally sound destruction of the large
stocks of chemical weapons Russia inherited from the former Soviet
Union. Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, we are
working with Russia to help address these complex problems, and we
will continue to do so now that Russia has ratified the CWC.
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has
been established to achieve the object and purpose of the CWC, to
ensure the implementation of its provisions and provide a forum for
consultation and cooperation among States Parties. The executive organ
of the OPCW, the Executive Council, has met five times since May to
oversee decisions related to inter alia data declarations,
inspections, and organizational issues. The United States plays an
active role in ensuring effective implementation of the Convention.
The CWC is an ambitious undertaking by the world community to ban an
entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Its members have
committed themselves to totally eliminating chemical weapons stocks
and production facilities, prohibiting chemical weapons-related
activities, banning assistance for such activities and restricting
trade with non-Parties in certain relevant chemicals. Destruction of
U.S. chemical weapons stocks is moving forward. Other CWC States
Parties have now taken on a similar task, and we are working hard with
the other members of the CWC to make membership in this treaty
universal.
The United States is determined to ensure full implementation of the
concrete measures in the CWC that will raise the costs and the risks
for any state or terrorist attempting to engage in chemical
weapons-related activities. The CWC's declaration requirements will
improve our knowledge of possible chemical weapons activities, whether
conducted by countries or terrorists. Its inspection provisions
provide for access to declared and undeclared facilities and
locations, thus making clandestine chemical weapons production and
stockpiling more difficult, more risky, and more expensive.
Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated and
banned from trading with States Parties in certain key chemicals. The
relevant Treaty provision is specifically designed to penalize in a
concrete way countries that refuse to join the rest of the world in
eliminating the threat of chemical weapons.
The United States also continues to play a leading role in the
international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons. We
are an active participant in the Ad Hoc Group striving to create a
legally binding protocol to strengthen and enhance compliance with the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction (the "Biological Weapons Convention" or (BWC)). This
Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special
Conference. The Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in November 1996,
commended the work done by the Ad Hoc Group and urged it to complete
the protocol as soon as possible but not later than the next Review
Conference to be held in 2001. A draft rolling text was intro-duced by
the Chairman at the July Ad Hoc Group session. Work is progressing on
insertion of national views and clarification of existing text,
largely drawn from the consultative phase of Ad Hoc Group work since
1994. Three-week sessions are scheduled for January, July, and
September of 1998. Another 2-week session will be scheduled for either
March or December of 1998. Early completion of an effective BWC
protocol is high on our list of nonproliferation goals.
The United States continues to be a leader in the Australia Group (AG)
chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation regime. Last year,
the United States supported the entry into the AG of the Republic of
Korea, which became the group's 30th member in time for the October
1996 plenary.
The United States attended this year's annual AG plenary session from
October 6-9, 1997, during which the Group continued to focus on
strengthening AG export controls and sharing information to address
the threat of CBW terrorism. At the behest of the United States, the
AG first began in-depth political-level discussion of CBW terrorism
during the 1995 plenary session following the Tokyo subway nerve gas
attack earlier that year. At the 1996 plenary, the United States urged
AG members to exchange national points of contact for AG terrorism
matters. At the 1997 plenary, the AG accepted a U.S. proposal to
survey all AG members on efforts each has taken to counter this
threat.
The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief that full
adherence to the CWC and the BWC is the best way to achieve permanent
global elimination of CBW, and that all states adhering to these
Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national
activities support this goal.
AG participants continue to seek to ensure that all relevant national
measures promote the object and purposes of the BWC and CWC. The AG
nations reaffirmed their belief that existing national export
licensing policies on chemical weapons-related items fulfill the
obligation established under Article I of the CWC that States Parties
never assist, in any way, the acquisition of chemical weapons. Given
this understanding, the AG members also reaffirmed their commitment to
continuing the Group's activities now that the CWC has entered into
force.
The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue to provide briefings
for non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations on export
controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding
of national policies in these areas.
During the last 6 months, we continued to examine closely intelligence
and other reports of trade in chemical weapons-related material and
technology that might require action, including evaluating whether
sanctions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 were warranted. In May 1997, we
imposed sanctions on seven Chinese entities and one Hong Kong company
for knowingly and materially contributing to Iran's CW program through
the export of dual-use chemical precursors and/or chemical production
equipment and technology. In September 1997, we imposed sanctions on a
German citizen and a German company determined to have been involved
in the export of chemical production equipment to Libya's CW program.
The United States continues to cooperate with its AG partners in
stopping shipments of proliferation concern. By sharing information
through diplomatic and other channels, we and our AG partners have
been successful in interdicting various shipments destined to CBW
programs.
Missiles for Weapons of Mass Destruction Delivery
During the reporting period, the United States carefully controlled
exports that could contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons
of mass destruction and closely monitored activities of potential
missile proliferation concern. We also continued to implement U.S.
missile sanctions law, in cases where sanctionable activity was
determined to have occurred. In August 1997, we imposed sanctions
against two North Korean entities determined to have engaged in
missile proliferation activities. Similar sanctions imposed in May
1996 remain in effect against two entities in Iran and one entity in
North Korea for transfers involving Category II Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) Annex items.
During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to share
information about proliferation problems with each other and with
other potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners
also emphasized the need for implementing effective export control
systems. This cooperation has resulted in the interdiction of
missile-related materials intended for use in missile programs of
concern.
The United States was an active participant in the MTCR's June 1997
Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting (RPOC). At the RPOC, MTCR Partners
engaged in useful discussions of regional missile proliferation
concerns, as well as steps the Partners could take to increase
transparency and outreach to nonmembers.
In July 1997, the United States also played a leading role at the
Swiss-hosted MTCR workshop on the licensing and enforcement aspects of
transshipment. The workshop was successful in focusing attention on
the enforcement problems raised by proliferators' misuse of
transshipment and fostered a productive exchange of ideas on how
countries can better address such activity.
The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination with its
MTCR Partners to combat missile proliferation and to encourage
nonmembers to export responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines.
Since the last report, we have continued our missile nonproliferation
dialogue with China, the Republic of Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK),
and Ukraine. In the course of normal diplomatic relations, we also
have pursued such discussions with other countries in Central Europe,
the Middle East, and Asia.
In June 1997, the United States and the DPRK held a second round of
missile talks, aimed at freezing the DPRK's indigenous missile
development program and curtailing its missile-related export
activities. The DPRK appeared willing to consider limits on its
missile-related exports, in return for sanctions-easing measures, but
did not engage in discussion of limits on its missile development
program. We intend to pursue further missile talks with the DPRK.
In July 1997, we held another round of nonproliferation talks with the
ROK. These talks were productive and made progress toward facilitating
ROK membership in the MTCR.
In response to reports that Iran had acquired sensitive items from
Russian entities for use in Iran,s missile development program, the
United States intensified its high-level dialogue with Russia on this
issue. We held a number of productive discussions with senior Russian
officials aimed at finding ways the United States and Russia can work
together to prevent Iran's ballistic missile development program from
acquiring Russian technology and equipment. This process is
continuing.
Nuclear Weapons
In a truly historic landmark in our efforts to curb the spread of
nuclear weapons, the 50th U.N. General Assembly on September 10, 1996,
adopted and called for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), negotiated over the previous 2-1/2 years in the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The overwhelming passage of this
U.N. resolution (158-3-5) demonstrates the CTBT's strong international
support and marks a major success for United States foreign policy. On
September 24, 1996, I and other international leaders signed the CTBT
in New York.
During 1997, CTBT signatories have conducted numerous meetings of the
Preparatory Commission in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid completion
of the International Monitoring System established by the Treaty. On
September 23, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate, requesting prompt
advice and consent to ratification.
The CTBT will serve several United States national security interests
in banning all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the development
and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the development of
advanced new types; contribute to the prevention of nuclear
proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; and strengthen
international peace and security. The CTBT marks an historic milestone
in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat and to build a safer world.
Formal preparations for the year 2000 Review Conference for the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) began in 1997 with
the first of three annual Preparatory Committee meetings of the
Parties to the Treaty. The United States is committed to working to
ensure that the 2000 NPT review Conference will further strengthen the
NPT and reinforce global nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Since
the 1995 NPT Conference, eight additional states have joined the NPT,
leaving only five states worldwide currently outside the NPT regime.
The NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee added China to its membership in
1997.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continued its efforts to upgrade
control lists and export control procedures. NSG members confirmed
their agreement to clarifications to the nuclear trigger list to
accord with trigger list changes agreed to by the members of the NPT
Exporters (Zangger) Committee, and the International Atomic Energy
Agency published these understandings on September 16, 1997. The NSG
also is actively pursuing steps to enhance the transparency of the
export regime in accordance with the call in Principles 16 and 17 of
the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.
The NSG held an export control seminar in Vienna on October 8 and 9,
1997, which described and explained the role of the NSG (and the
Zangger Committee) in preventing nuclear proliferation. The NSG also
continued efforts to enhance information sharing among members
regarding the nuclear programs of proliferant countries by (1)
"officially" linking the NSG members through a dedicated computer
network allowing for real-time distribution of license denial
information, and by (2) creating a separate session for exchange of
information on the margins of the NSG plenary meeting.
NSG membership will increase to 35 with the acceptance of Latvia. The
ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement of all suppliers,
including nations not members of the regime, to control nuclear and
nuclear-related exports in accordance with the NSG guidelines.
Expenses
Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly attributable
to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration of the
national emergency in Executive Order 12938 during the semiannual
reporting period.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 12, 1997
(end text)
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
