U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
Thursday, October 30, 1997
Briefer: James P. Rubin
[end of document]
IRAQ 1-4, 11 Potential crisis over Iraqi action against UNSCOM; consequences; US position; options for the Security Council; Iraqi deadline to conform; US inspectors; Iraqi official comment; repercussions on UN oil for food resolutions. CHINA 6-10 Certification and Agreement for cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy; licensing procedure; Chinese assurances; potential list of consequences; President's role; MOU; Zangger Group; status of cooperation with Pakistan and Iran; Future Einhorn briefing 9 Reported construction of chemical plant in Iran
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB # 156
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1997 1:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)................
QUESTION: All right. Let me ask you about Iraq, if I may. How serious --
MR. RUBIN: Asia and Australia.
QUESTION: Yes, okay. How serious is this latest Iraqi action? Is there a crisis brewing?
MR. RUBIN: Well, Iraq has made the mistake of trying to interfere with the business of the United Nations Special Commission. The Security Council's unanimous statement yesterday is very clear - the Iraqi regime's action against UNSCOM is unacceptable. Iraq must comply with the UN Special Commission, and comply with all its UN obligations, period, full stop.
There should be no uncertainty in Iraq about what the Security Council is insisting Baghdad do - reverse its action and comply immediately and fully with its obligations. This is not an attack on the United States personnel; this is an attack on the very fundamentals of the UN system. It is the Security Council that set up the UN Special Commission, and it is the Security Council that has been attacked by this attempt to differentiate between personnel.
If Iraq fails to comply with what the Security Council has demanded, the Security Council was also clear that serious consequences would result. I'm not going to speculate on what those consequences might be, but they will be serious. As I understand it, Ambassador Butler has provided a letter indicating the latest state of play to the Security Council, and they will be meeting on this matter probably tomorrow.
QUESTION: From time - let me start a different way. The United States has generally taken the toughest line toward Iraq, supported almost by Britain, but sometimes by nobody else. Is this the kind of action where the Secretary, the Administration is confident that the allies understand the situation and would coordinate with the United States? Or is it a matter of doing some convincing again?
MR. RUBIN: This is another case of Saddam Hussein shooting himself in the foot. He may have thought that because there were tactical differences between us and some of our allies about the need for additional sanctions, that this somehow mitigated or changed the determination of all Council members that Iraq comply with the requirements of the United Nations.
The point here is that all members of the United Nations Security Council are united in demanding Iraqi compliance with the Special Commission. Secretary Albright spoke to Foreign Minister Primakov yesterday about this subject, and he was very clear with her that Iraq cannot pick and choose who the inspectors are and the nationalities of inspectors. It is up to UNSCOM to make those determinations, and this kind of attempt is simply unacceptable. We have every reason to believe that all Council members, including Russia and others, are making that point very clear to Iraq. If they have the wisdom to change their position, to reverse themselves, as they have many times in the past when they miscalculated, then this matter will lessen in intensity.
QUESTION: I know you said that you don't want to get into the specificity of the options, but do you mean to leave out there that military action, some sort of military action, is an option that is active at this time? Is this an appropriate --
MR. RUBIN: This is a very serious matter, and we are not ruling any option out at this time.
QUESTION: The British have mentioned the possibility of punitive military action here. How much time would the Iraqis have, approximately, to conform?
MR. RUBIN: The UN Security Council called on Iraq to comply immediately, that was the word, and fully with its obligations, and warned of serious consequences if it did not. So the time for Iraqi change in their decision is now.
QUESTION: Jamie, will the United States, under any condition, pull its inspectors out of Iraq?
MR. RUBIN: Again, these are decisions to be made by the chairman of the UN Special Commission, and it is up to him to report on what has or has not happened in the field.
My understanding is that the UN Special Commission is not going to allow itself to be dictated to about who can participate or not participate in its inspections. So there's no reason to believe that there would be a requirement for American-born or inspectors who happen to have American passports to be separated or distinguished from.
The pattern in the past is that the UN itself refuses to accept those kinds of restrictions, and simply refuses to continue to do its job. Because let's remember what this is about. If the UN Special Commission doesn't do its job, what happens is it postpones even further the day that Iraq can ever see sanctions lifted.
So Iraq is shooting itself in the foot. Saddam Hussein is miscalculating, if he thinks it somehow benefits him to have sanctions stay on longer.
QUESTION: Jamie, just prior to coming into this briefing, the wires were carrying an official comment by the Iraqis to the Security Council's statement yesterday, saying that they were not going to reverse their decision. I know we're going to go back to the issue of a timetable, but now that they appear to have responded, by saying that they are not going to reverse their decision, at what point should we expect the Security Council to --
MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't think that statement will change. As of an hour ago, the plan was for Ambassador Butler to brief the Security Council tomorrow morning about what is going on on the ground and what this attempt by Iraq to change the rules of the game means. I expect that timetable to stay in place, and then it would be up to the Council to decide what next steps were necessary.
Let's bear in mind that in many cases in the past, Iraq has sought to find a lever or a wedge to place between members of the Council, and upon discovering that they fail to do so, they reverse course. We don't have any reason to think at this time that Iraq has made a decision to take this all the way to the end of the game. We know that in the past they have changed course rather rapidly, once they see the results of their miscalculations. I would expect that there would be a lot of diplomatic contact between key capitals and Baghdad in the course of the next hours and days. Hopefully, they will get the message and do the right thing.
QUESTION: But at any rate - I mean, any action that the Security Council might take is not anticipated in the next 48 hours?
MR. RUBIN: The last word that I got was that the report had been received in writing today, and that tomorrow Ambassador Butler would report in person to the Council, which would be a normal prerequisite.
I mean, let's remember, what happened yesterday was in record time the Security Council gathered itself together and agreed on a very strong statement indicating that they rejected completely this attempt by Iraq to divide the allies.
QUESTION: In the communications that have taken place between the Secretary of State and other members of the State Department, have you gotten any sense or word back from the likes of the Russians or the French or the Chinese that, oh yes, we understand our eagerness to do business with the Iraqis, and the seeming division over that last sanctions move was wrong?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we certainly think that anytime that the Council's unanimity is questioned, that Iraq has made a habit of trying to exploit this type of development. And we have certainly made the point to them that this is exactly the risk one faces when you show any leg whatsoever to the Iraqi regime. They misunderstand what's going on and they miscalculate.
Again, Saddam Hussein has shot himself in the foot. Whether it's a direct result of the failure to have unanimity in the last resolution or not is impossible to know for sure, but we do know that the more unanimous the Council is, the less likely it is for Saddam Hussein to miscalculate.
QUESTION: Has there been any acknowledgment from those who were not unanimous with the United States and Britain on that last issue that, oh, yes, we understand now?
MR. RUBIN: As I said, I think we've made the point clear. If they've had a change of heart, I'll leave it to them to report.
QUESTION: Jamie, you remarked that in the past, this government has noted Iraq's tendency to change course rapidly in response to serious admonishments by this government and others, for that matter, including the UN Security Council. However, is the US worried that this time around - or rather, should I say, do you have great concern Iraq might act a little more aggressively than they have in the past?
MR. RUBIN: No government and no expert or any one of us or any of those who ask these questions should try to make any money betting on the calculations of Saddam Hussein's government. They have miscalculated so many times in the past that it's not up to us to try to judge what they're up to.
All I can tell you is, when they have taken steps like this in the past, and the Council has unanimously rejected them, they have found it in their interest to change course. But that doesn't mean that this time they will. It just means that that's what's happened in the past. That's why this is so important for us to maintain unanimity. And let me be clear again. This is a very serious, unacceptable step, and we are going to demand that they reverse this requirement.
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QUESTION: Another subject. On China, if the United States finds evidence that China is not adhering to its agreement on the nuclear issue, would the Administration be prepared to reinstitute a ban on nuclear technology sales?
MR. RUBIN: That is a very good question, and I've got some very specific answers about how this procedure is going to work that I'd like to run through, in the course of which I think you'll have a direct answer to your question.
Once the certification procedure has been completed with Congress, US companies may apply to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission for licenses to export nuclear equipment and materials, such as reactors and low enriched uranium fuel. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission forwards export applications to the Department of State to coordinate our reviews by the various agencies. Written confirmation must be obtained from the Chinese Government that the transfer will be subject to the cooperation agreement. Once that's obtained, the Department of State provides coordinated agency views.
The Regulatory Commission then prepares recommendations, based on this process. If the commissioners concur, then the approval over the export license is issued. The time ordinarily required for Executive Branch review and NRC action for a major case like the first export of a reactor to China is from 60 to 120 days.
The US and China have agreed to a memorandum of understanding on arrangements for visits and exchanges of information. This memorandum of understanding will permit us to monitor sales and uses of equipment. In addition, the licensing decisions required for individual nuclear transactions will give the US the opportunity to make any necessary adjustments.
The Chinese know that any actions inconsistent with their obligations and assurances to us would jeopardize continued nuclear cooperation with the United States.
QUESTION: Jamie, just the very top. Does something set off the President's seeking certification?
MR. RUBIN: The President will send a notification of his certification to the Hill, I presume in a short number of days. Then there are certain legislative rules that kick in, if the Congress wants to try to change that certification or, in theory, to try to stop it.
QUESTION: -- Markey says he will try to change it.
MR. RUBIN: Well, we are confident that when all the assurances are demonstrated to the members of Congress, and when they understand the fact that the Chinese have gone far beyond even what they are required under the agreement, that this certification will be upheld.
QUESTION: So I think, if I understand correctly, he is going to go ahead without a contract proposal out there - God knows they're lined up for yards to try to make these deals --
MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't know who knows how long the lines are, but the President --
QUESTION: Well, there's big money in this. I'm sure they'll get in line.
MR. RUBIN: The President has decided that China has met the threshold --
QUESTION: That's the point.
MR. RUBIN: -- clear and unequivocal assurances --
QUESTION: And, in fact, better than met it.
MR. RUBIN: And in some cases, better than met it.
QUESTION: And this is from the statement yesterday?
MR. RUBIN: This is from diplomatic exchanges that we believe provide clear and unequivocal assurances that China is not going to conduct any new nuclear cooperation with Iran, among other assurances.
QUESTION: Right.
MR. RUBIN: So this threshold has been met, and he will then send the certification to Capitol Hill. They will then have, as I understand it, 30 legislative days to adjust or stop that certification. But we believe that as we consult fully with members of Congress about the nuclear certification and share the details of these assurances, both their substance and their form, that at the end of the day the Congress will see that we've met the certification requirements and go along with the certification.
QUESTION: Can we get a copy of that MOU?
MR. RUBIN: The MOU, I'll have to check on what we can do about that.
QUESTION: On the question of the Zangger Group versus the nuclear suppliers group, why is the United States willing to basically capitulate and allow China to get away with just joining the Zangger group instead of the tougher qualifications of the nuclear suppliers group that the United States has promoted for so many years?
MR. RUBIN: You won't be surprised if I object to the word "capitulate." We believe that as a result of the work we've done in recent years, that China has come a long, long way in this area. This original certification was put in place because we had very serious concerns about China providing assistance to unsafeguarded systems in Pakistan. That is why we got into this certification business in the first place.
In the course of time, as a result of a lot of work that we've done and a lot of effort that even the previous administration has done, China has come into the fold on the nuclear issue. They have joined the NPT; they have supported its unlimited and indefinite extension. They have joined this committee, which has very strict rules. They may not be strict enough for some proliferation experts, but they're quite strict. In the case of Iran, they have gone beyond what the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty requires. It bears repetition that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty envisaged a bargain between the nuclear states and the non-nuclear states in which the nuclear states transferred peaceful nuclear energy to the non-nuclear states. That was deemed to be part of the bargain.
What we have gotten an assurance about is that China is not going to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran of any kind - going beyond its requirements to not provide assistance to unsafeguarded reactors, but going to the very heart of our concern that no matter whether it's consistent with international obligations or norms, simply providing assistance to Iran is too risky. So we believe that China has gone the extra mile in this case, and we believe the combination of its export controls, joining the Zangger Committee, these are types of assurances that are more than sufficient to meet the criteria spelled out in the law.
QUESTION: Just one more on this. Does the assurance that you got from China spell out - when you say it will not permit any nuclear cooperation with Iran of any kind --
MR. RUBIN: New.
QUESTION: New. But does it spell out specifically, there will be no cooperation with this, with this? Will there be a list? Is there a list?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I'm reluctant to get into an elaborate discussion of what goes on behind the scenes. I know that our experts, Mr. Einhorn and NSC experts, have been engaged in extensive discussions with the Chinese over recent weeks and months about what exactly we are trying to prevent. They have gone into excruciating detail about the different projects that we're concerned about.
I know, during the Secretary's discussion with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in New York, extraordinary detail was gone into about specific cases, about personnel exchanges, technology exchanges that involved extreme detail. In order to answer your question directly, I would need to specify what kind of assurance this is, which I'm not in a position to do. But I don't think we have any doubts that China knows what this assurance means in the concrete terms, as opposed to the abstract terms.
QUESTION: I wonder if we can get a briefing on this Friday with Mr. Einhorn.
MR. RUBIN: I'll work on getting that, yes.
QUESTION: Did you have a chance to see the front page article today about a chemical plant for Iran that China is said to have completed?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I don't know what newspaper that was in. Of course, we don't comment on newspapers --
QUESTION: -- habit of dunking on individual newspapers.
MR. RUBIN: Right. And my first answer to that is the standard answer - that any newspaper account that purports to be based on intelligence sources is one that I therefore can't make any specific comment on.
I can say this. For several years now, the United States has made clear its concerns about the inadequacies in China's system for controlling chemical-related exports. Moreover, we have long made clear our concern that these inadequacies have been exploited by Iran to obtain equipment and technology for its chemical weapons program. Indeed, in May 1997, the US imposed trade sanctions on seven Chinese entities, including one mentioned in today's story, for assisting Iran's chemical weapons program by providing precursor chemicals and chemical production equipment and technology.
These activities predated China's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which obligates China not to assist anyone in any way with chemical weapons activities. Since acceding to the Chemical Weapons Convention, China has made some improvements to its chemical export controls. But we still believe it needs to do more. We have urged China to make such improvements, and will continue to do so.
The point is that the company involved is one that we were very concerned about, and we have now received additional assurances from the Chinese that that company's activities will be monitored much more closely and therefore, some of the concern that may have led some people to worry about this particular issue should be ameliorated.
QUESTION: Now, that brings to mind, the State Department, the Administration has dealt with these allegations as if there are these free-wheeling independent companies and then there's the government, which doesn't know, for heaven's sake, what their companies are doing. Now you've entered into an agreement with China that is unprecedented. They've gone further than they even had to go. They're golden. Are we going to run into the same situation? Or put another way, has the Administration gotten assurances from the President of China or the people who worked the issue with him that Chinese companies will be strictly bound by these agreements? Or are we going to be back here in six months talking about some suspicious deal, and the point will be, well, that was that company, and we're going to sanction them?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we don't make a distinction between China and Chinese companies. These assurances that we've received --
QUESTION: But you don't punish China for those deals; you punish the companies.
MR. RUBIN: But that's a different issue. That's how do you choose to implement your sanction. That's not a question as to whether we think that the Chinese assurances --
QUESTION: Granted.
MR. RUBIN: -- apply to these companies. We believe that what we're looking for is the maximum effort on the part of the Chinese Government and its ministries to supervise any entity under the control or not under the control of the government to ensure that they've done all they reasonably can do to prevent any company or entity from engaging in activities that we have been assured will not happen.
This is not to make a comparison that suggests that these other governments have the same problems, but we all know that there were many cases in the '80s where European companies provided a lot of assistance to the government of Iraq's military programs that those companies' governments said they knew nothing about.
So this is a long-running problem, and what we can reasonably do, rather than throwing up our hands and saying we'll never make any progress in this area, is to put our shoulder to the wheel and try to get maximum cooperation from the Chinese Government, and see if their behavior changes. We believe that the changes in government policies over the last four years have yielded changes in what the companies have and have not distributed and the difficulty that they have in trying to do so.
So we're making progress. We have a lot of concerns. China is a complicated place. We don't have any illusions about - we're in trust-but-verify mode.
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QUESTION: One more on Iraq - does the Iraqi action warrant an end to the oil for aid program?
MR. RUBIN: Well, these are different tracks. Remember, the desire to provide Iraq a facility to purchase food by selling oil was a desire to meet the legitimate humanitarian need of many of the people in Iraq. We believe that, in fact, providing that facility has made it easier for many countries to support keeping in place this most comprehensive of sanctions regime. So those are on separate tracks, and I'm not aware there would be any need to change one or the other.
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