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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

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QUESTION: Do you have any light on a report that IBM secretly provided a Russian nuclear facility with advanced computers?

MR. RUBIN: I can say the following. The United States is undertaking an investigation of the transfer of computer technology to Russia. Under US policy, computers that operate from 2000 to 7000 millions of theoretical operations per second - that is called MTOPS -- require an individually validated license for export to military and nuclear end users in Russia.

In 1996, US companies sought Department of Commerce licenses to export US high-performance computers to Chelyabinsk and Arzamas Weapons Labs in Russia. The application stated that the computers were for use in groundwater modeling and simulations. We did not approve these requests because of the risk of diversion to nuclear weapons programs at these facilities, and because Minister Mikhailov, the relevant minister in Russia, stated that the purpose of the computers included work on the safety and reliability of Russian nuclear weapons. Assisting Russia to maintain the reliability of its nuclear weapons is contrary to US policy.

This is a matter that is the subject of an ongoing investigation by the Department of Commerce and the US Customs Service. These investigations are under the direction of the US Attorney's Office. We cannot comment on the specific investigation. We did, however, once it became clear that the Russians had certain computers -- that is, on January 13, 1997, when the Russians announced that it had acquired the two high performance computers for these two facilities -- we immediately commenced an investigation and sought Russian assistance in the investigation. We also sought return of the computers or some other mutually acceptable solution.

Over the next several months, the United States continued to press this issue at the highest levels with the Russians. We noted that Russian refusal to cooperate in finding a mutually acceptable solution would jeopardize joint US-Russian cooperation and would result in tightening of US export controls vis-à-vis Russia.

In late September, Russian officials informally broached the idea of having the computers transferred to other Russian facilities with US monitoring. We view this idea with interest and hope the Russian Government makes a formal proposal that we can evaluate, including details on what the alternative facilities might be and how the end use would be different. That is the status of the two computers you asked about.

QUESTION: Is it a creative suggestion or is it within the known boundaries, do you happen to know if American sales - in other words, if there is a monitoring provision, does that connect under the rules?

MR. RUBIN: All of these, in a sense, are cases of first impression in this policy because this is the first time, I think, as you may have noted in some of the reporting on this, that experts from Russia and the United States have found themselves in a situation where they are engaged in this kind of cooperation. The point is that we have a lot of export controls that are designed to make sure that when a sensitive product is sold that its end-use is non-military.

If the facility and the end-use is determined to be acceptable, then we would view this proposal with interest and would get back to the Russians with the formal discussion and probably get into the details of this.

But let me emphasize, we view this as a very serious matter. Nonproliferation is one of the highest priorities, if not the highest priority, for the Secretary and the President. We want to be sure that our export control systems are kept as clear and workable as possible. We have made clear to the Russians throughout the CTB negotiations that high-performance computers are simply not something they're going to be able to obtain for the purpose of checking the reliability of their nuclear weapons. If they want to spend their efforts on that deterrent, it shouldn't be assisted by these kind of computers.

QUESTION: Is the investigation focusing on end-use? What I'm trying to ask you is whether the scale, the type of computer is an established fact. You're not investigating what kind of computer it is, are you?

MR. RUBIN: Again, I am wary, whenever we start the question with an investigation...

QUESTION: I know.

MR. RUBIN: And I'm inclined to refer you to the Justice Department. As I indicated in my lengthy remarks, it's Customs and Commerce, overseen by a US attorney - a Justice Department official.

Let me try to answer the question I think you were getting at. There is no question that the Russians have computers, and we believe they are computers that they specifically requested a license for that we turned down. We believe they are at locations precisely where we didn't want them to be. That is why we consider this a very serious matter. That is why we have raised it at the highest levels with the Russian Government. That's why we're going to continue to work to come up with an acceptable solution.

QUESTION: One last - can I get one, very quick last question?

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: Relevant only this week, maybe. Is this the type of computer that if the Chinese produced the properly phrased pledge of nonproliferation, they would be eligible to receive from eager American manufacturers? IBM's not the only eager American manufacturer.

MR. RUBIN: At the risk of incorrectly stating the elaborate export control system, what I believe we are hoping to be able to achieve with China - if we receive the necessary assurances - is an agreement that will permit China to develop nuclear energy with American know-how and American companies involved.

We will only pursue that agreement if the President believes the highest possible standards of nonproliferation have been met. This is an agreement about changed Chinese proliferation practices, not about US commercial diplomacy. If we believe that we have achieved the necessary assurances that China will not be assisting non-nuclear weapon states from becoming nuclear weapon states, the President would be in a position to make that determination.

We believe additional progress has been made in that area. Substantial progress had been made prior to the visits. The deal is not done yet. And if the President makes the determination, what that would be focused on - again, in the hypothetical formulation, or the subjunctive clause - that would be about nuclear energy, not this kind of computer.

I would refer you to the Commerce Department to get a complete list. Basically this is the kind of computer that you have to not only specify what it's for, but that you have a single end user. It's a single item export control, as opposed to a broad category that you just get permission to sell. Every time you want to sell one of these, you've got to get a specific license.

QUESTION: Go back to the Russian computers. What does this say to you, though, about the credibility of the Russian Government? And why are you even entertaining the possibility of some kind of a deal with them that would allow them to keep these computers, when they acquired them under false pretenses anyway?

MR. RUBIN: This is a matter under investigation, and I'm not going to be able to comment specifically on the investigation.

We made a decision that the original request ought to be turned down, precisely because of the risk that the end-use might be nuclear weapons reliability or design. If, as a result of negotiated arrangements, the end-use does not contribute to that purpose, that would be a different story. In other words, a specific request was made to us about these computers going to specific facilities that we believed, if implemented, would yield possible inherent knowledge and capability in this nuclear weapons reliability program; and so we said no.

Clearly, computers arrived in Russia. At what stage they are in, to the extent their operational or not, I am not in a position to tell you at this point. But if, after investigating the matter and working with the Russians, we were to conclude that the computers would not end up posing the risk -- the very risk that caused us to turn the original application down -- then the policy objective would be met.

QUESTION: But my question still stands; and, that is, if the Russians acquired these computers and are using them in a way that you didn't want them to use them from the beginning, why would you give them a second chance to negotiate a deal that they could then violate?

MR. RUBIN: Again, the premise of your question assumes that they are already being used for a purpose that we didn't want them to be used for. All I can tell you is that the transfer of computers and the application of those computers to a program of nuclear weapons is a many- month-long process. It is not like you arrive with your high-performance computer in its box and you open it up and start using it. It takes many, many, many months for it to be fully integrated into the kind of program that we would have problems with.

If, prior to that point, we have adequate safeguards in place to assure us that the computers will not be used for that purpose that we reject, that would be a horse of a different color and then we might be prepared to entertain that proposal and to discuss it with the Russians.

I'm not saying we are going to accept the Russian proposal. What I'm saying is that we found this specific idea interesting and we are prepared to discuss it with them. But the bottom line is, we view this as a very serious matter that the Russians obviously obtained these computers and it is a matter that is so serious that it has been brought up at the highest levels in our discussions with Russians.

QUESTION: In the story that has triggered all this discussion, there was a suggestion that there was a deal made, that in exchange for signing on to the Test Ban Treaty that we left them -- the Russians -- with the impression that they could go ahead and buy these computers. According to the article, Mikhailov actually pulled out a letter from Clinton or something suggesting such.

MR. RUBIN: If you read the next sentence in the article in a publication whose name I will not mention because I don't mention publications from this podium, he specifically acknowledges that it is not an explicit promise to provide this kind of technology. Without getting into that letter, what I can say to you is that at no time during the negotiations of the Comprehensive Test Ban or subsequently did we ever make a statement that could be fairly construed as indicating a US commitment to provide Russia access to these kinds of computers.

What we did do is make clear to the Russians that we were prepared to engage in extensive scientific exchange and that we were prepared to have those exchanges be at the unclassified level. We did not provide any reasonable basis for them to draw this conclusion. When they first started to suggest it, we took every reasonable step we could to explain to them that they were under a fundamental misimpression. By the time this happened, I think the Russians had no illusions that we thought this was okay.

QUESTION: Jamie, if the computer winds up in permissible use, do you still have a violation if a sale was made, a transfer was made, behind the government's back -- a furtive transaction? In other words, in answer to Carol, do you say the government is willing - horse of a different color - if it turns out it is not being used in a suspicious way --

MR. RUBIN: I was trying to simplify a very complex issue.

QUESTION: Yes, a horse of a different color is a nice turn of phrase, but did IBM or whoever the company is, violate American law by engaging in a deal that didn't have the US' approval, however happy the use of the computer may be.

MR. RUBIN: Fair enough. The question that I was trying to address, however effectively, was the Russian side of it. As far as the American company side of it is concerned, we have policies and laws in effect precisely to protect against these kinds of efforts. There is an ongoing investigation. We consider this a very serious matter. It is being pursued as a criminal matter or it may be a civil - please forgive me if I got that wrong. It is an investigation

about whether US companies violated American law --

QUESTION: By doing this.

MR. RUBIN: By doing this, period. Absolutely.

QUESTION: Jamie, can you explain why it is a US policy to oppose verification simulation by computers? I thought it was the US policy that it was a pretty good idea -- better than the alternative, which is actual testing.

MR. RUBIN: It is our view -- and you haven't stated the words exactly right. It is not about verification technology. It is about whether by using computers that we have the Russians will be in a better position to insure the capabilities of their nuclear arsenal.

QUESTION: Yes, proofing of -

MR. RUBIN: Reliability testing, or inherently in reliability testing might be developmental testing for better weapons. We are not going to assist Russia in maintaining a nuclear deterrent. We are going to try to provide Russia as much scientific exchange as possible at the unclassified level to assist them in technical scientific exchange. We are prepared in many cases to provide significant assistance when it comes to the security of nuclear weapons or nuclear material. But as far as just making their nuclear testing, their scientific program better, we don't think that is a particularly wise use of American technology.

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QUESTION: You said that there's no deal yet on the nuclear side. But how is this deal going to come together? Is it going to take - will it not come together until - well, ultimately it won't come together until Jiang and the President meet. But I mean, is the Secretary going to meet with Qian Qichen when he gets to town? Is there any plan for that kind of preparatory --

MR. RUBIN: There are officials that are in regular contact, and have been for some number of days now, at the medium levels, who are reporting in a variety of developments to their superiors, including Secretary Albright and through Mr. Berger to the President. That process continues.

As I said, we have made significant additional progress in recent weeks in these discussions to achieve our objective, which is to make sure that China's nuclear cooperation with Iran stops. But whether the type of commitments we've received meet the threshold of clear and unequivocal assurances that the law specifies, and that the President would, and the Secretary would want to ensure before recommending such an agreement is something I'm not in a position to report to you.

But I would urge those of you who are in a position to comment on this subject one way or another, to take into account the fact that over the last five years, there has been a sea change in Chinese policies and practices on nonproliferation. Whether it's in chemical weapons - joining the Chemical Weapons Treaty; whether it's joining the Nonproliferation Treaty; whether it's signing the Comprehensive Test Ban; whether it's making direct commitments to the United States on missile technology; whether it's promising not to assist unsafeguarded reactors - these are things that your colleagues in this briefing room thought would never happen five years ago with the Chinese Government.

They have happened. There have been major changes. Practices have changed; policies have changed. If indeed these assurances are deemed sufficient, it will be taking place in a context in which the United States has succeeded in bringing the Chinese Government into the international rules of the game when it comes to this all-important issue.

QUESTION: I just want to get the --

QUESTION: -- five years.

MR. RUBIN: I use that - you could go back before that.

QUESTION: Well, you could say four years and ten months, to be more specific to the Clinton Administration.

MR. RUBIN: No, I believe that the --

QUESTION: You're taking credit - the Clinton Administration is taking credit for sea changes in Chinese behavior --

MR. RUBIN: Barry, I specifically used five years, and I specifically meant the Bush Administration. I am suggesting that in the area of nonproliferation, if you go back and look at the '89, '90, '91, '92 period and you see what the kind of problems were that were raised out there, and you fast forward to 1997, you've gotten enormous progress. There's been a sea change that is the result of a committed United States policy of both the final years of President Bush and President Clinton and the --

QUESTION: So the process began in the Bush Administration, and the current President of the United States ran against Bush's China policy - accused him of coddling the Chinese. But in reflection, it turns out the sea change began under George Bush.

MR. RUBIN: No, Barry, you're being engaged in debate mode.

QUESTION: No - you said five years. That's not an accidental number.

MR. RUBIN: Barry, what I was talking about was nonproliferation.

QUESTION: I know.

MR. RUBIN: Not human rights - where there was a difference of view during the campaign, which you are referring to. So let's please be clear on what the issue is. The issue is nonproliferation. I don't believe there were dramatic statements by any of the candidates for whatever office in that period of time. I'm talking about nonproliferation; and in that area, there has been major change, and that's what I'm pointing to.

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QUESTION: On Iraq, what's the United States going to do about Iraq and its threat to defy or pull out of cooperating with UNSCOM altogether?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we are concerned by statements coming out of Baghdad; and indeed, those that emanated from Iraqi representatives to the UN, even prior to the passage of the recent resolution.

The parliamentary statement aside, we have not yet heard from the government of Iraq what, if anything, it plans to do in reaction to the UN Security Council resolution. What matters is whether the government of Iraq is going to cooperate with the UN Special Commission or not. Iraq has the obligation to cooperate. I would emphasize to you, none of the to-ing and fro-ing that you saw in the Security Council changes the fact that all the members of the Security Council believe Iraq has an obligation to comply with the UN Special Commission. They have all demonstrated -- although they may have tactical views on this question of when to ratchet up additional sanctions -- that a failure to cooperate would be a very serious matter and would have serious consequences for Iraq. What those would be I am not going to speculate; but I can tell you from watching this episode up close with the Secretary in New York that the Security Council has time and again showed its willingness to back up the UN Special Commission when Iraq seeks to shut it down.

QUESTION: But you haven't heard anything from Baghdad so far as to what it is going to do vis-à-vis the parliamentary --

MR. RUBIN: The last time I checked, Iraq is not a democracy. Decisions are not made by its parliament. We have not heard anything from the leadership that is consistent with what may or may not have been said in a parliament like that.

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(The briefing concluded at 3:35 P.M.)

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