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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

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QUESTION: Jamie, revisiting that subject of Iraq sanctions and the US-British effort to get tougher -- again, negative reports coming out from the UN that you haven't been able to line up Egypt or France or Russia - some of the people you need to get travel restrictions imposed. Is it all over, that effort?

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't see it that way. The process of obtaining a Security Council resolution is often more open than it is clear. I have observed with Secretary Albright half a dozen of these exercises. What is usually true is that all the Council members are determined that Iraq should comply with the demands of the United Nations; that Iraq must give the UN inspectors unlimited access to their sites so as to confirm the objective, which is the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

There are differences of view, however, and have always been, on the tactics of achieving that joint objective. What you do in negotiating a Security Council resolution is to try to come to a consensus - as much of a consensus as you can. Invariably that involves those who view the need for stronger tactics to come out with the strongest possible proposal and then, during the course of the discussion, come up with a proposal that's as unanimous as possible. That, we believe, has proven over the years to yield a response from the Iraqi Government.

Let's remember what this is about. This is about irresponsible behavior on the part of the Iraqi Government -- a refusal to comply with the international community. And all you're seeing here are some tactical differences. The Council has already agreed that a next step will be to ratchet up the pressure, including the possibility of sanctions - additional sanctions.

The question now is about how you would frame that; how soon that would be; how specific it would be; when it would come into effect; how it would come into effect. These are tactical differences that are normal in a body like the Security Council. So we would hope and expect that at the end of the day, when the resolution is passed -- and we suspect it will be soon -- that you will see a stronger response than previously existed and again, a ratcheting up of the pressure on Iraq, making it clear to them that their refusal to comply with the Security Council only delays the day when their people can see the benefits of the sanctions being lifted.

QUESTION: Can you give us some detail about the Secretary's involvement?

MR. RUBIN: The Secretary, again, as I have indicated, has done a lot of these resolutions and knows quite a bit about the process, from her previous post, in addition to the importance that she attaches to the Iraq issue, as Secretary of State.

The resolution we're now talking about came out of a resolution that was passed in New York at the time of the Denver Summit, in which she and Foreign Minister Primakov and French Foreign Minister Vedrine discussed at great length the best way to ratchet up the pressure. In the last day or so, she has had two telephone conversations with Foreign Minister Vedrine. The first one may have been the day before yesterday, but she has discussed the subject with him twice. She has had a message delivered to Foreign Minister Primakov, a personal message. Other than that, she has been receiving regular reports from Ambassador Richardson.

Again, this is a negotiating effort; it's a tactical effort. Often in that process, it's appropriate to have the foreign ministers make sure they both agree that the objective needs to be met.

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QUESTION: You referred to President Clinton's notification of Congress on civilian nuclear cooperation as a mere "formality." He said the United States - he said all their nuclear orders, in fact, were filled until the turn of the century; that the United States is missing out - they should go ahead with this formality. Can you comment on that?

MR. RUBIN: I wonder if he would agree on your characterization of all his comments, but I will find out later when I get a chance to look at it. But again, based on your account, the President has made no decision, as far as I know. The Secretary has not indicated that to me or, I believe, neither has she stated her position on this subject internally, on whether this is going to go forward.

What I can tell you is that there were some further discussions in Beijing that the United States is committed to achieving the highest possible standards of nonproliferation. This is a matter of great concern to the United States - the highest possible priority. And we've made substantial progress with the Chinese over the years. I think those of you who are going to be asked to write a lot about this issue in the coming week, I'd ask you only -- since there has been a long time since there's been a summit or a meeting of this type -- to go back to the kind of practices that we were concerned about in the late '80s by China and compare them to what's going on now.

I think what you'll find is a dramatically improved record on nonproliferation, one which puts China very much in the fold of the international community on the subject of the Nonproliferation Treaty; on the subject of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; on the subject of the Chemical Weapons Convention; on the subject of accepting, at least bilaterally, missile technology control regime guidelines; stating to us bilaterally that they wouldn't provide assistance to unsafeguarded reactors; and all the policy and practice changes that have gone with that. What you'll see is a dramatic shift.

As I understand it, Mr. Einhorn and his team have finished the bulk of their work. They have made additional progress in this area, and they will be coming back to report to Secretary Albright and, through Mr. Berger, to the President. At that point, it will be possible to make a decision. We don't regard the certification that would be required by the President for this peaceful nuclear energy agreement to go forward as a formality. This is a very difficult decision. It will be based on whether we believe we have the clear and unequivocal assurances that we've asked for.

QUESTION: In recent days when you characterized progress or lack thereof in these talks, you'd say something like, we've made substantial progress, but gaps remain, or something like that. I notice you don't say that this time. Is that intentional?

MR. RUBIN: What I said was that in the past, there had been substantial progress and we still needed work to do. What I'm saying today is there had been substantial progress prior to Mr. Einhorn's visit. He appears to have made additional progress and, based on his report, we will know whether there are gaps remaining.

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QUESTION: On testimony about North Korea yesterday in the Senate, Jamie, defectors Colonel Joo-hwai and Mr. Ko, former officers in the North Korean Government, both testified that the United States was the primary target -- United States forces in South Korea and in Japan will be primary targets of North Korean missile attacks should war break out. And secondly, they testified that about $1 billion a year in missile sales were coming out of North Korea and going into the Middle East, primarily. How does the Department react to that testimony?

MR. RUBIN: Without getting into the specifics of some of those issues, which are obviously interesting, I can say this. North Korea's missile proliferation activities are of serious concern to the United States and have been addressed at the US-North Korea missile talks. That's why we are trying to get these talks back on track and to have these discussions both for limiting the capabilities of the North Koreans themselves and, importantly, to limit the prospect of any transfer of those capabilities.

For the past decade, North Korea has produced and deployed Scud B and C missile systems with the ability to reach targets deep in South Korea. North Korea also is in the advanced stage of developing the No Dong missile, with a 1,000-kilometer range, capable of reaching Japan. It is in the early stages of developing even longer-range missiles, including the Taepo Dong I and II. We do not know the exact range of the Taepo Dong I and II. As best as we can tell, they have not been flight tested.

But the important point here is not to miss what the objective is. The objective in the nuclear case several years ago was to convince North Korea that they had more to gain by giving up their nuclear capability and engaging in a dialogue with the outside world that has led to this watershed nuclear agreement with the North Koreans. We are now engaged in a similar exercise to try to convince them of the wisdom, for their own interests, of discussing with us limitations on medium- and longer-range missile systems. Hopefully, some day soon, we will get those talks back on track and be able to have as much success in the missile area as we had in the nuclear area.

QUESTION: If I could just follow up by asking, these defectors both testified that these missiles - that they may be operational --

MR. RUBIN: I just indicated to you what our best judgment was on the capabilities of those missiles.

QUESTION: On the Middle East --

QUESTION: A follow-up, actually, if that's okay. I just wanted to know if there was any date. You had said that you are still in negotiations with them.

MR. RUBIN: No, I specifically said we were looking and hoping to get it back on track soon, but we don't have a date.

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