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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

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QUESTION: One of the newspapers, The Washington Times, leading the paper with a story about the possibility of some sort of trade-off. You probably know the terms of the story, so I won't recite the story, but is there some possibility that China can be induced to curb its proliferation of technology in exchange for access to computers and other technology that I'm sure there are many, many American industrialists who would be very eager to sell to China?

MR. RUBIN: Let me put this in perspective again. What we're talking about in this agreement is peaceful nuclear energy -- not so much computers and guidance systems and things of that nature. What we're talking about is American know-how in the area of nuclear power, which we are prohibited from providing to China unless the President has certified that China has made clear and unequivocal assurances that it will not provide assistance to non-nuclear-weapons states' efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

That is a very high standard, and our negotiators and Secretary Albright have been working on this problem for some time. We would like to be able to get to a point where China has made a sufficient number of commitments and we have reason to believe those commitments can be implemented, so that we can state that clear and unequivocal assurances have been provided.

Let's remind ourselves why. We believe a nuclear-armed Iran, in this case, that was mentioned in the story, would threaten US interests as well as regional and international security issues. For that reason, we have continuously opposed nuclear cooperation by all countries with Iran, even to safeguard the nuclear programs that are permitted under the IAEA, such as the one with which China has been involved. We have made our position clear to the Chinese.

In other words, we want to close down any possibility, however permitted under the international guidelines, that Iran will gain knowledge in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. During these negotiations with the Chinese, we have made substantial progress towards meeting the standard that I have described -- clear and unequivocal assurances - but we're not there yet. We need additional confidence that China's statements and actions will be sufficient for us to defend a certification of that kind.

This is a very important subject. There's no subject to which the President and the Secretary give greater attention than nuclear nonproliferation, especially to a country like Iran. So we want to be sure that we've done all we can to obtain the maximum level of cooperation from China on this subject.

When we've done so, we will sit down and make a judgment as to whether those commitments and that information we've been provided and our understanding of their export control system is sufficient to make the judgment. We're not there yet. We still have time. We're still hopeful that one of the things we will be able to do is obtain the commitments necessary to make that judgment.

QUESTION: Do you think you can get there in about two weeks, maybe?

MR. RUBIN: We're hopeful.

QUESTION: Also, how important is it in the US calculus that any technology go to an internationally-supervised area? You say no know-how that would help a country like Iran develop nuclear weapons. What about safeguarded? If it goes to internationally-monitored areas and it's questionable, would that be good enough for you?

MR. RUBIN: In the case of Iran, we think the risk is too great, even when it's safeguarded. Because this is a country that has proven its willingness to violate all norms of international behavior, going back as far as the taking over of the American Embassy, whether it's international terrorism, whether it's opposition to a peace process that everyone supports.

We think it's too risky, even when there are international safeguards, to help them, because some residual knowledge or some residual information or some residual technology might escape that safeguard system. The risk is too great, because the danger of the result is so great.

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