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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Great Seal

U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

INDEX
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1997
Briefer: JAMES B. FOLEY

RUSSIA
1-3Weapons and Nuclear Technology Transfers to Iran and Amb. Wisner's Report
2Command and Control of Nuclear Devices in Russia and the Newly Independent States


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB # 142
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1997, 1:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

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QUESTION: Did you see the statement by the Russian Federal Security Service to the effect that the Iranians have, indeed, been trying to acquire missile technology from Russia but that all such attempts have been thwarted?

MR. FOLEY: I haven't seen that statement.

QUESTION: Okay. So I guess you can't respond?

MR. FOLEY: Well, we take these reports of alleged Russian involvement in transfers of such weapons to Iran very seriously. We have raised our concerns about these issues to the highest levels of the Russian Government, both recently and over the last few months. Russia has made clear to us that its policy is to abide by its MTCR commitments and not to assist Iran's missile program. As you know, we have established a mechanism under the direction of Ambassador Frank Wisner to pursue this issue with the Russians. We are working hard to resolve this problem.

QUESTION: Can I phrase Jim's question--

MR. FOLEY: Yes, Carol.

QUESTION: -- a little differently. Putting aside any press reports, because you have been engaged so intensively on this issue with the Russians, are you aware of instances when the Russians have, in fact, thwarted transfers to Iran?

MR. FOLEY: I can't get into with any specificity the nature of our exchanges with the Russians on this. This is highly sensitive, these discussions. The topic is sensitive and one of great concern to us. As I have said, previously we believe it's one of great concern to the Russian authorities, as well. They have not failed to point out to us on numerous occasions that the acquisition by Iran of weapons of mass destruction or the means of delivering them is, perhaps, even of more immediate concern to their security than it would be to ours, although, I think our concern and our interest in the matter is second to none.

So we are convinced that they take this seriously. Obviously, I don't want to get into the nature of the discussions. They are ongoing and the mechanism that we have established is ongoing and will continue. I would only say that press reports have indicated that some Russian entities have been involved that are not necessarily under the direction of the Russian government but, nevertheless, the information that is being developed addresses all of the concerns and all of the reports that you have seen.

QUESTION: Are there any plans for Wisner and his group to go back --

MR. FOLEY: I believe that they will be meeting again. I don't have a date or a venue. But I believe Ambassador Wisner was in Moscow just a couple of weeks ago. As part of their discussions, it was agreed that he and his Russian counterparts would be meeting again, I believe within about a month or so. Yes, Betsy.

QUESTION: Jim, I don't think you will have a response to this, but let me just sort of add something for the record. The man who testified on the Hill said that these weapons were made by - I believe he said the weapons were made by the KGB or made for the KGB and not for the army. So for the army to deny that they have either had these weapons or that some have gone missing may be sort of going to the wrong department, and maybe the wrong people are being asked.

MR. FOLEY: Well, the issue of reliable command control and the physical security of nuclear weapons and materials, as I said, is very important to us. It's an issue that the United States Government takes very seriously. The government of Russia continues to assure us that it retains adequate command and control of its nuclear arsenal and materials, meaning its entire nuclear arsenal and materials, and that appropriate security arrangements exist for these weapons and facilities.

As you know through our Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction and other programs, we are indeed working cooperatively with the Russian and other newly independent states' governments to enhance security of their nuclear storage facilities. So I think that we believe, as I have said, that the assurances that the Russian government has given us on this score are credible. We don't have information that we have developed independently on our own that runs counter to those assurances but, again, it's a matter that bears constant attention and we take it extremely seriously.

QUESTION: On the matter of nuclear technology, are you satisfied with the Russian role in restricting nuclear technology for the various Iranian power plants? Are you satisfied that the Russians are restricting such information to things that could not be used for nuclear weaponry?

MR. FOLEY: You're referring to the Bushehr nuclear reactor that they're working on? Well, the Russians have assured us that this nuclear power plant is one that involves the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that they believe that they have adequate safeguards in place to insure that their cooperation meets only those ends. As you know, Iran also is subject to IAEA safeguards as well and inspections, and I believe that's a matter that this agency also keeps a close watch over.

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