U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
Monday, July 1, 1997
Briefer: John Dinger
ARMS CONTROL | |
14-17 | Experiments Permitted Under CTBT/Sharing Technology and Results/Compliance with CTBT/Monitors |
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB # 97
TUESDAY, JULY 1, 1997 1:11 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
QUESTION: John, on a different subject -- how is - is the United States upholding the spirit of the Test Ban Treaty by conducting a subcritical nuclear test tomorrow?
MR. DINGER: That test will be conducted, I think, under the auspices of the Department of Energy. I would refer you to DOE for the details. However, we are confident that subcritical experiments are not experiments that - I should say are consistent with the provisions of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treatment.
I understand that a subcritical experiment is not an experiment performed on a nuclear weapon. In fact, it is designed to insure that nuclear materials will remain subcritical. This quickly gets very complex. I would note that an independent group of scientists called the Jasons has concluded that there is no conceivable scenario in which these experiments could lead to criticality. But I would refer you to the Department of Energy for any details on this experiment.
QUESTION: Is it something that you would welcome or you would share this technology with other nations with nuclear arsenals that don't have the supercomputers to do it?
MR. DINGER: I'm not sure. Maybe the Department of Energy could comment on their bilateral cooperative agreements with other countries. I am not aware that this has anything to do with sharing information with other countries, though.
QUESTION: So, would it be okay with the United States for other countries with nuclear weapons to conduct subcritical nuclear tests?
MR. DINGER: We would hope that other countries would comply with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty just as we are.
QUESTION: And if they conduct subcritical nuclear tests, they will still be complying and you won't have any complaints?
MR. DINGER: I don't think I want to speculate about tests that aren't taking place.
QUESTION: And what is this complying?
MR. DINGER: We are complying.
QUESTION: What about countries without nuclear programs that want to conduct subcritical nuclear tests? Is that okay with you, as well?
MR. DINGER: I think we will watch and we believe everybody should comply with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
QUESTION: Is it the U.S.' position there is no other -- the purpose of the test is supposedly to make sure that the weapons arsenal is safe. The argument has always been used for testing. Is this the only way to do that?
MR. DINGER: Well, what I can say --
QUESTION: I thought we crossed this bridge a long time ago.
MR. DINGER: -- is that these are experiments using high explosive and nuclear weapon materials, including special nuclear materials like plutonium. The experiments are designed to ensure the nuclear materials will remain subcritical. That is, there will be no self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction. Therefore, the experiments will be consistent with the provisions of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signed by President Clinton on September 24, 1996.
The first experiment has been reviewed by technical experts at the Los Alamos and Livermore Laboratories to insure it will remain subcritical. Each subsequent experiment will be reviewed in a similar fashion.
In addition, a review of the first two planned subcritical experiments has been conducted by the Jasons, which is an independent group of eminent, qualified scientists. The Jasons concluded that these experiments will add valuable scientific information to our database relevant to the performance of our nuclear weapons and that there is no conceivable scenario in which these experiments would lead to criticality.
Now, the Department of Energy does have some points it can make describing how these will contribute to its national defense-related mission. I will leave all these details, which are very technical, and the Department of Energy's mission in this context to the Department of Energy. But we are absolutely confident this does not violate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
QUESTION: Is this an American group? Do you happen to have --
MR. DINGER: I don't know.
QUESTION: Do you know if anybody but Americans have been monitoring or will monitor these tests?
MR. DINGER: I am, frankly, not concerned about that because we are absolutely confident that these fall within the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
QUESTION: It sounds like you'd be eager to share the results of these tests?
MR. DINGER: Perhaps. I refer you to the Department of Energy. I think they conduct our bilateral programs.
QUESTION: To make sure other nations' nuclear arsenals are safe?
MR. DINGER: I won't speculate about that because I believe those would be programs that the Department of Energy would --
QUESTION: But you don't think this will set off a chain reaction?
MR. DINGER: No.
QUESTION: People playing at the edges of the agreement and just have teeny, teeny, little tests? And then maybe little bigger ones?
MR. DINGER: No.
QUESTION: No? I thought - I don't know. I missed something. I thought there was a huge debate in the Administration, and the proponents of teeny, teeny, teeny, little tests lost. Apparently, they won.
MR. DINGER: I really don't want to get into the details.
QUESTION: No, I --
MR. DINGER: But I believe that that is not accurate. But I think if the issue that you may be referring to were teeny, teeny, little nuclear tests.
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. DINGER: This is sub-critical. This is not - it does not fall under that category.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. DINGER: But I believe you need to go --
QUESTION: Computers - that's what they agreed on.
QUESTION: Oh, these are totally computer tests?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. DINGER: Well, this debate, perhaps, could move to the Department of Energy.
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