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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

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BRIEFING INDEX
Wednesday, June 25, 1997
Briefer: John Dinger

NORTH KOREA/
SOUTH KOREA
1-4Talks w/U.S. in New York on 6/30 to Discuss Four Party Proposal
3-4Food Aid to North Korea
5Missile Talks
16-17N. Korean Officials' Visit to Sandia Nat'l. Labs
IRAQ
5Sanctions/U.S. Support for UNSCOM
ISRAEL
5-7Advanced Computer Export to Ben Gurion University

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB # 95
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 25, 1997 1:13 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
..............
QUESTION: Can you give us an update on whether there are going to be renewed talks on North Korea? Four-party talks?
MR. DINGER: We have agreed that Acting Assistant Secretary Charles Kartman will meet with Republic of Korea Deputy Foreign Minister Son Yong Shik and DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan on Monday, June 30th, at the New York Palace Hotel. The three have met twice previously to discuss the four-party proposal. The first meeting, you will remember, was on March 5th at the joint briefing on our four-party proposal. The second meeting was April 16th through the 21st ,when the North Koreans provided their initial formal response to the four-party proposal.
Monday's meeting has been called for further discussions in which we hope to make further progress in realizing the four-party proposal. The latest meeting was scheduled as a result of a series of working level trilateral meetings following the April meeting. We certainly hope that North Korea will accept our proposal. When or if that happens, we will make a public announcement.
QUESTION: This is a discussion, this is not a briefing.
MR. DINGER: Right. We offered our briefing on March 5th. Since then, there has been a round where the North Koreans came back with their formal reaction and since then there have been several working level meetings where we have just discussed the four-party proposal, which we briefed on March 5th.
QUESTION: What is to discuss? Are you talking about the shape of the table or details?
MR. DINGER: Well, Jim, as you know, we do not get into the details of the discussion. We have found that in the case of our discussions on this issue, and other issues regarding North Korea, that we are much more effective if we don't reveal the details of our discussions.
We have said after each of the working-level rounds that have taken place in recent weeks, that we believe the talks are headed in the right direction. We hope that they will continue to head in the right direction, and we hope ultimately - it's difficult to predict exactly when - but ultimately we will go through several other steps here and realize, first, the four-party talks, and then ultimately peace on the Korean Peninsula. But that is obviously, one would guess, quite a ways down the road.
QUESTION: Why aren't the Chinese taking part in the discussions on Monday in New York?
MR. DINGER: Well, these are talks to discuss the four-party talks. The Chinese, we believe, will participate in the four-party talks if they are held. That is the point at which the Chinese enter into the picture formally.
Obviously, we do have discussions with China on the situation in the Korean Peninsula. It's on of the areas, in fact, in which we cooperate quite closely with the Chinese.
QUESTION: John, the South Koreans are quite a bit more optimistic than you on what these talks are going to be about Monday. They are saying that North Korea has, in fact, signaled that it is prepared to begin the four-party talks. And this is a preparatory meeting to iron out the site and agenda and so forth. What is your reaction to that?
MR. DINGER: I don't really have much of a reaction to offer on that. As I said, we have said over the last several weeks that we thought the talks were headed in the right direction. We have, in fact, learned that in our discussions with North Korea it is best to be patient and to not get ahead of the story, and that when we have things that we can announce, we announce them. Today we have nothing to announce besides the fact that there will be a senior-level meeting in New York on Monday.
QUESTION: And just for the record, since you have never said it, and no one has ever said it from this podium, what was their initial reaction to this proposal that you referred to a couple minutes ago?
MR. DINGER: Well, actually, the Secretary has mentioned that they expressed support in principle for our proposal, but they did not agree to the four-party talks.
QUESTION: Why didn't they agree to it?
MR. DINGER: Well, as I have just said, we have not gotten into the details of our discussions. We have found that it's best if we do not reveal publicly the content of these discussions. We find that is just more effective.
QUESTION: Are you now prepared to come forward with more aid, more food aid to North Korea?
MR. DINGER: Well, as you know, our humanitarian aid to North Korea is given on a humanitarian basis. It is not linked to these talks. We, I believe, are the largest donors to the World Food Program for North Korea. We certainly recognize North Korea has a severe food problem. We have no plans at the moment to provide additional food aid. However, should there be another request from the international community for food aid, we will certainly consider it.
QUESTION: Do you think the North Koreans, however, make a link, indirectly or directly, between the food aid which has been given and their agreement to discuss the four-party talks?
MR. DINGER: I don't want to speak for the North Koreans on that issue. You can ask them if they want to make such a link. We do not, however.
QUESTION: Are you prepared to discuss it on Monday, though? Are you prepared to discuss it once, if they agree to the --
MR. DINGER: We find that the North Koreans, on virtually every occasion in these discussions, raise with us their severe food shortage. So it would certainly not surprise me if the issue is raised by the North Koreans.
QUESTION: What would be your response? What you just said, we're not prepared - we have no plans at the moment to provide you additional food aid?
MR. DINGER: Well, I'm not going to get into the details of our agenda or our talking points. But our position is very clear and has been since the beginning of this -- we don't link the two; we provide the food aid on a humanitarian basis.
QUESTION: John, the Red Cross has made an appeal recently - I believe within the last ten days - for food aid for North Korea. Is the U.S. considering giving aid under the auspices of the Red Cross?
MR. DINGER: Sorry, I have not seen any report of a Red Cross appeal for food aid. Of course, there have been the discussions between the Red Cross Societies of North and South Korea and all of that. I have not seen that.
Obviously, we frequently see reports that international organizations or entities are preparing a new appeal. I am not aware of any new appeal that is under consideration by us.
QUESTION: John, how will Monday's talks differ from the working-level talks that we have had over the past month and a half or so? Is it just the difference in level? Or is there a difference in substance? Does this represent a major step forward in the right direction you mentioned before?
MR. DINGER: I think what I would say is that we have felt that the talks were headed in the right direction. We have said that after every round of the working-level talks. Clearly, we would not be going to a more senior level if we didn't think that the talks were headed in the right direction.
But I don't have anything beyond that, in terms of speculating about the outcome on Monday -- just nothing I can offer you on that. We have discovered over and over again with the North Koreans that we have something to announce, we announce it, but not before. I certainly don't intend to do that today.
We have said the talks are heading in the right direction. We have put a very good proposal before the North Koreans. We think they should accept it, the four-party talks, and we certainly hope they will. But I can't predict for you when that might happen.
QUESTION: Did you see that the North Korean official newspaper monitored in Tokyo said that they would be willing to discuss peace as long as there was no provocation of war. Do you think that this is a sign that the North Koreans are coming around to the four-party talks proposal?
MR. DINGER: I don't want to try and read the tea leaves of official North Korean media. We have found that very difficult to do. So I don't think I want to react to that broadcast. However, I did see that report.
QUESTION: Just a quick one?
MR. DINGER: Sure.
QUESTION: Just one more, John. On missiles, what's coming up on talking missiles with the North Koreans? Is that off the stove?
MR. DINGER: No, not at all. I think, though, what I should do is - of course, we did have the missile talks recently in New York. I think I had better refer you to the record, because we did give the readout that we could following that. I just, off the top, of my head don't remember enough of it to recount it off the cuff.
It's best to go back to the record. We discussed that after the missile talks. There was mention of upcoming meetings, but I just don't remember what we said exactly about it. It's best to go back to that. Yes.
QUESTION: Iraq. Do you have reaction to the comments by Rolf Ekeus on the continued Iraqi efforts to evade sanctions?
MR. DINGER: Not much because they speak for themselves. Mr. Ekeus has done an outstanding job heading UNSCOM in its effort to track and uncover Iraq's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. His comments and report seem to be very thorough. It certainly doesn't surprise us that Iraq continues to make every effort to hide, obfuscate, block efforts to unravel its efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction.
We clearly believe that Iraq remains a threat to its own citizens, to the region, and beyond. This just confirms, once again, the need to maintain sanctions and maintain U.S. support for UNSCOM.
QUESTION: What about the need to toughen sanctions?
MR. DINGER: Well, of course, we just pronounced ourselves, along with the Security Council, just a couple days ago on that issue. Iraq is on notice that it needs to cooperate with UN inspectors or else it will pay a price -- and that price will be paid beginning October 1st. So I think we had, in fact, an announcement on that earlier this week or last week. So I would refer you to that. It was certainly raised in the briefing.
But Iraq is on notice. It has always been on notice. It never gets off notice. It just won't change its way. That is sad for the region and sad for the people of Iraq. We will remain vigilant and very supportive of UNSCOM.
QUESTION: On Israel?
MR. DINGER: Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: Do you have anything there about the sale of a supercomputer to Ben Gurion University -- to the network that runs Israel's nuclear system?
MR. DINGER: I can tell you that as a result of an interagency review last year, access by Israeli institutions, including Ben Gurion University, to advanced computers was significantly improved. Israel, like all other non-signatories of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, receives deferential treatment under U.S. export controls governing nuclear dual-use items. For this reason, Ben Gurion University, along with several other Israeli institutions, previously enjoyed only very limited access to high performance computers.
But Israel was reviewed first, under the President's October 1995 Computer Export Control Policy for the purpose of assessing whether such restrictions were appropriate. We gave this very careful consideration and restrictions were substantially reduced for Ben Gurion. Licenses are no longer required for computers under 2000 MTOPS. For computers above this level, there is a case-by-case review with no presumption of denial. For inter-university consortium use, there is a presumption of approval for computers of 2000 to 7000 MTOPS.
Now, we put a notice in the Federal Register to this effect. Publication of that is part of our U.S. policy so we can inform our industry of all special licensing procedures. So, that's what we did.
QUESTION: You're not willing to sell Ben Gurion University a supercomputer. Is that what you're saying?
MR. DINGER: I would send you to the experts. However, I am not at all certain that 2000 MTOPS falls under the category of supercomputer. In fact, while not an expert, I would guess that is not the case.
QUESTION: 2000 to 7000 for university use.
MR. DINGER: Well, that is for inter-university consortium use, obviously -- when they are joined up and using a computer jointly. But those will be reviewed.
QUESTION: Without mincing words, whatever the MTOP is for this computer, has the United States agreed to sell it and agreed to allow its companies to sell it to Israel?
MR. DINGER: Yes. Well, let's - it is important to go through it with some detail, though I certainly am not an expert on computers. However, licenses are no longer required for computers under 2000 MTOPS. For computers above that level there is a case-by-case review. Anything above 2000 MTOPS, that's the bottom line. Now, you can get into these other categories of 2000 to 7000. If it's for inter-university use, there is a presumption of approval. It would go into the approval process presuming it would be approved. However, there is still a case-by-case review.
QUESTION: Is there a case being reviewed now?
MR. DINGER: I'm not aware of it. I don't know. I don't know who necessarily would be reviewing that. It could well be Department of Commerce. So, you might want to talk to them.
QUESTION: Why do you have this lengthy guidance if there is not some specific case here you're addressing?
MR. DINGER: I think what we have found is that around the world, the capacity of computers has expanded just exponentially. Anybody who deals with Japan will be somewhat familiar with this issue. What happened is that a lot of computers that, when originally the regime was set up, fell into export controls are now widely available -- so widely available that, in fact, the regime got a little out of sync with what's available on the market. So, that's what's been going on.
There is a presumption, as the guidance said, that people who have not signed - party states that have not signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty receive differential treatment. So, what we've done is up to 2000 MTOPS for Israel, we have removed the differential treatment for that category. Licenses are no longer required for computers under 2000 MTOPS. Beyond that, they will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
I would send you to the experts, but I think you will find that 2000 MTOPS is not an enormously large computer in today's world. So, it just seemed a reasonable thing to do, which we have done.
..............
QUESTION: John, can you confirm that reportedly the North Korean delegation for the missile talks recently visited a U.S. military control center?
MR. DINGER: I can absolutely deny that. That did not happen.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. DINGER: A military control center?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. DINGER: No, that's not true. There was a report in the press yesterday about a visit by a North Korean delegation to an unclassified, private installation, I'll call it, a center. That did take place. That was part of an effort on our part to bring the North Koreans into the global arms control community. We did arrange this. We have a key objective of the United States Government of trying to, as I say, bring the North Koreans into the global community on non-proliferation.
We did arrange a visit to a private, unclassified facility in order to show them some of the confidence-building measures that are used elsewhere in the world to try to avoid proliferation of weapons. So that did happen. But as you described it, that simply did not happen.
QUESTION: They didn't go back to North Korea?
MR. DINGER: I refer you to the North Koreans for where they are now. I don't know.
QUESTION: Sorry, John, what kind of a site was this?
MR. DINGER: It was a private site, I believe run by Sandia - Sandia, I'll leave it there. That part of it, I believe, was described accurately in the press article. The name of the private firm that was involved, however, was a completely unclassified facility. It was absolutely in the vein of trying to further one of our top priorities of this Administration. That's the non-proliferation of weapons. So, yes, absolutely we did that, and hope it helps toward achieving our goal.
QUESTION: But what does this site actually do? It monitors U.S. missiles or --
MR. DINGER: No, on June 16th, six North Korean officials visited an unclassified facility - the Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center. They had a one-day workshop on general arms control principles.
Another private organization - the Atlantic Council - organized the workshop. The Atlantic Council is based in Washington; it's a research organization. Sandia National Laboratory is not a United States Government entity. It does have a relationship with the Department of Energy, however.
At no time did the North Koreans have access to any classified information, nor to any sensitive U.S. technology. All items displayed at the Cooperative Monitoring Center are commercially available technologies. The intent of the workshop was to introduce North Korea to general principles of arms control confidence-building measures that have been widely used in other regions of the world.
This was in the furtherance of one of our top national priorities. Yes, sir.
..............

(The briefing concluded at 2:01 P.M.)

[end of document]

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