Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Washington -- U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed assessments that the threat to North America from an unauthorized or accidental launch of Russian or Chinese strategic missiles "is remote, so long as Moscow and Beijing maintain current security practices."

They expressed concern to members of Congress December 4, however, that a severe internal crisis in either country could compromise the nuclear command structures in those two nations.

John McLaughlin, vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), said a dozen other nations have ballistic missile development or production programs, but those programs are designed to serve "regional goals" only. He told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that making "the change from a short- or medium-range missile -- that could pose a threat to U.S. troops located abroad -- to a long-range ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) is a major technological leap."

McLaughlin reaffirmed a year-old intelligence assessment that no nation other than the five declared nuclear powers -- France, China, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States -- "will develop or otherwise acquire an intercontinental ballistic missile that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada."

McLaughlin testified in an open hearing about the main conclusions of a still classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 95-19, entitled "Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years."

He said North Korea is the only potentially hostile state with a missile program capable of reaching U.S. territory by 2010. North Korea, he said, is believed to be developing the Taepo Dong 2 missile which could reach as far as Alaska, some U.S. territories in the Pacific, and the far west portion of Hawaii.

Even so, the official said, it would still take North Korea considerable time to develop a new propulsion system, develop or acquire an improved guidance and control system, and carry out a flight test program. The intelligence community has no evidence that North Korea has begun or intends to pursue such a program, McLaughlin said, and even with substantial foreign assistance North Korea would need time to meet such technical challenges.

He also pointed out that nations which already have an indigenously developed space launch vehicle -- including India, Israel and Japan -- have the technical ability to develop an ICBM within five years, but that intelligence analysts are likely to detect such efforts long before deployment.

NIE 95-19 also reflects a consensus that countries which now possess ICBMs will not sell them, he said, having already agreed to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). McLaughlin said they would also avoid selling technology because they are too worried that these weapons might some day be turned against them.

NIE 95-19 also examines the threat of a cruise missile launch from forward-based ships. By 2005, several countries, including some that are potentially hostile to the U.S., will probably acquire land-attack cruise missiles. But while technically feasible, he said, such an attack is unlikely.

National intelligence estimates, like NIE 95-19, are the U.S. intelligence community's most authoritative projection of future developments on a particular subject. They are prepared by the NIC with participation by all relevant agencies.

McLaughlin and David Osias, the national intelligence officer for strategic programs and nuclear proliferation who prepared NIE 95-19, testified in place of Central Intelligence Agency Director John Deutch, who is expected to testify before the committee on December 18. The officials defended the conclusions and methodology of the study against congressional criticism that the estimate had been politicized by the Clinton administration.

McLaughlin said he rejects "in the strongest terms" the allegation of politicization of the estimate, insisting that there was no attempt by the administration to shape the intelligence judgment at any time. He also defended the methodology of NIE 95-19 as being consistent with past estimates and said the analysis is professional.

Both McLaughlin and Osias stressed that even though there is no projected overarching ballistic missile threat to the U.S. for 15 years, intelligence analysts will continue to actively monitor and evaluate the situation.

Former CIA Director Robert Gates, one of a seven-member congressionally mandated panel appointed to independently evaluate the process and product, agreed in his own testimony that there was "no evidence" the report had been politicized.

But Gates, who served as CIA director from 1991 to 1993, faulted the high speed with which the estimate was prepared and deemed foolish what he saw as its failure to address the threat to Alaska and Hawaii.

Gates also contended that the estimate is flawed by the analysts' failure to ask what would happen if an adversary undertook some unexpected technological development in pursuit of a long-range ballistic missile.

The committee held the hearing during the congressional recess because of concern by some members that President Clinton is minimizing the ballistic missile threat to justify what they consider unduly slow development of a U.S. defense system against such weapons. During the question-and-answer session, Gates noted that he believes it "is absurd" that the U.S. does not have the ability yet to defend itself against a single errant missile.

McLaughlin described the estimate as "politically neutral," stressing that it nowhere suggests that the U.S. should not have a ballistic missile defense system in place. The decision to have missile defense and the speed of its deployment should be determined by the policymaker, he stressed, and not the analyst.

Gates also challenged the intelligence community to examine the ballistic missile threat annually and highlight changes occurring since the previous estimate. McLaughlin said Gates' suggestion of periodic reviews has "great merit," but that a biannual examination would suffice.
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