[EXCERPTS] HOLUM MAY 15 NEWS CONFERENCE IN GENEVA
(15 May 1997 - transcript)
HOLUM: It is a pleasure to be back in Geneva at the Conference on
Disarmament. I am here for a little over three days of consultations,
including, of course, the speech at the plenary session today.
We believe very strongly in the United States that the Anti-Personnel
Landmine ban and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty are ripe for
negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. There is a great deal
of interest here in dealing with the question of nuclear disarmament.
One of the things I emphasized this morning is that the Fissile
Material Cut-off is precisely a nuclear disarmament step in the sense
that it will facilitate and permit additional progress on nuclear
disarmament among the nuclear weapons states, including the progress
we have seen most recently in the joint summit statement at Helsinki.
The Conference on Disarmament has a real challenge ahead of it. It has
become immobilized by this concept of linkage; that it can't move on
one issue until countries are satisfied that it is dealing with their
particular unrelated issue. That is a formula not only for
immobilization of the conference, but also for its ultimate failure.
And one of the things the delegations will have to consider, and I am
sure they are now beginning to wonder about at the end of the first
session, is whether the conference itself has a viable future, given
the pernicious influence, and the dangerous precedent set by the
concept of linkage holding up all progress in the negotiations. So it
is best for the conference, as well as for the cause of global
security and peace and disarmament, that the conference get on
promptly with its real work. I'll be happy to answer your questions.
QUESTION: The arguments, however, don't seem to be that much different
from when you were here last year, and I am wondering if you see any
way out of the current impasse?
HOLUM: I think the best way out is to begin action. Probably the only
way out will be sufficient passage of time so the few delegations who
are intent on holding up action hear from their colleagues that that
is not the proper way to operate in a conference that depends on
consensus for moving forward. (And) that every country is bound to be
disappointed by some elements of the process, and by some parts of the
treaties that are ultimately produced. But if we insist on linkages,
then the conference itself is unviable. Remember that the Conference
on Disarmament is the instrument by which many of the countries
represented here, including in particular the non-aligned countries,
have access to and have a prominent part in genuine negotiations on
binding international agreements. It would be a terrible loss to them
as well as to the international community and to the United States,
frankly, if this forum were to decline in influence and value. So I
think it requires some sober thinking of the sort I tried to inspire
with my statement this morning. Am I hopeful about the prospects for
immediate progress? I just can't say. I don't know what the impact
will be. I have, in my consultations this week, found a number of
countries who are increasingly frustrated at the delays and
misdirection of effort, but how broad that is remains to be seen.
.................
QUESTION: Sir, by taking this extreme position against nuclear
disarmament aren't you being as inflexible as some of the states that
are trying to push it?
HOLUM: I am not taking a position against nuclear disarmament. What I
am saying is that the Conference on Disarmament is an institution that
is ill-suited to handle it. For example, how would the Conference on
Disarmament deal with the specific methods of verification of
reduction in nuclear warheads, or nuclear weapons? Those are obviously
matters requiring detailed technical expertise, and careful bilateral
negotiations. It is not something that can be done in a multilateral
forum.
Plus the fact, as I noted this morning, that the Conference on
Disarmament would have a very difficult time, given its recent history
and current operating practice, of agreeing to anything in nuclear
disarmament. If it can't begin the first step, if it can't begin
dealing with the spigot for nuclear weapons -- that is the fissile
material -- how could it possibly deal with the ultimate elimination
of nuclear weapons?
Does that mean that the countries other than the nuclear weapons
states have no business in the nuclear disarmament process? Absolutely
not. There are a multitude of forums in which the nuclear weapons
states are answerable for their progress, and we just completed one in
the first preparatory committee meeting for the year 2000 in the NPT
review conference. These issues are discussed regularly at the U.N.
First Committee, in the U.N. Disarmament Commission, and many other
places. But this is a negotiating forum in Geneva. I am convinced that
bringing nuclear disarmament here will have the opposite effect from
that intended or professed to be intended by those who want to bring
it here. It would stall it rather than move it forward.
QUESTION: In your statement, you said that the Fissile Material Treaty
should be accomplished relatively quickly. What time frame would you
have in mind ideally?
HOLUM: Well, nothing happens overnight in the Conference on
Disarmament, but it seems to me that the time frame that we used in
the case of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would be more than
reasonable, given that this is a considerably simpler treaty. The
obligations are not that complex. I think the Fissile Material Cut-Off
is something that, if negotiations were begun in earnest, could be
completed within a year.
QUESTION:
India successfully blocked the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
in the CD. Do you see India as the main, or one of the main, obstacles
to furthering efforts on the Fissile Material Cut-Off and the
Anti-Personnel Landmine negotiations?
HOLUM: I would rather not single out specific countries. They can
speak for themselves in terms of their positions. What I have been
trying to do is emphasize objection to the principle of linkage,
rather than personalize it with any specific country.
QUESTION: The Ukraine this morning proposed to include also the
destruction of existing fissile material in the negotiations. What is
your reaction to that? Second question, as far as I understood it,
Canada also joined in for the creation of an ad hoc committee on
nuclear disarmament. What is your reaction to that?
HOLUM: On the Ukraine proposal, it seems to me that it is best to
stick with the mandate that was already agreed in 1995, the Shannon
mandate, which made clear that stocks could be discussed, but the
mandate focuses on the future production of fissile material for
weapons. It is also very difficult in the context of a global treaty
to deal with wide variations in fissile materials among countries. I
don't know how you would equalize or level that out in the context of
a global treaty. It is better suited to regional or bilateral
discussions. I would emphasize that the United States has already
removed some 225 tons of fissile material from that available for
weapons and is in the process of putting that material under
international safeguards, and we and others are very actively engaged
in efforts to reduce and eliminate excess fissile material.
In the case of the proposal for an ad hoc committee dealing with
nuclear disarmament, this is something that a number of delegations
have expressed some interest in. My concern is that, again, this is a
negotiating body. If it is going to get into nuclear disarmament as a
theoretical discussion, it is not productive, it is a waste of
resources. On the other hand, if it intends to negotiate the reduction
of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons states, it won't work.
It will prevent rather than expedite progress. So I think either
formulation of that is not helpful.
QUESTION: Just to follow up, first of all, were you surprised by
Canada's position this morning, and you couldn't see the proposition
of the Ukraine as a kind of compromise to get the third world
countries into the deal?
HOLUM: Well, dealing with the Ukraine proposal first. If you just
change the name, it doesn't do anything. On the other hand, if you
change the content of the negotiations you get into the problems I was
raising. And I think most countries are determining their positions on
this based on more than the cosmetic aspects of it. On the Canadian
proposal, we have had consultations. I guess I would rather not get
into specific reactions to individual country proposals.
QUESTION: If the CD is not the appropriate forum for negotiations on
disarmament, then which is the forum in your view?
HOLUM: There is a forum that is operating very effectively and that is
the bilateral negotiations between the United States and Russia, which
as I said in my statement this morning, have produced now a further
agreement at Helsinki that after Start II is in place, we will begin
work on the next step, which will include cumulative total reductions
of some 80 percent from the Cold War peaks in deployed nuclear
warheads. Let me also stress that I am not excluding nuclear
disarmament discussions in the CD. Or nuclear disarmament
negotiations. That, in fact, has occurred here in the NPT, in the
Comprehensive Test Ban, in the Fissile Material Cut-Off. Those are all
elements of the nuclear disarmament process and are appropriate to be
negotiated here. What I am concerned about is the impossibility of
negotiating in a global forum on the U.S. and Russian and other
nuclear weapons states' disarmament process.
QUESTION: What about China? Are you talking to China?
HOLUM: We are talking with China in general terms. I think the nuclear
disarmament process has to go a considerably further distance, as
between the United States and Russia, before other countries would
join the process. It was certainly appropriate to be engaged in
strategic discussions with China and other nuclear weapons countries
and we are doing that.
QUESTION: You say that time may be the only way out of this impasse,
and yet you say that the credibility of the CD may be dwindling. How
much time do you think there actually is before this body really loses
its stature?
HOLUM: That is a very hard question to answer, its a very good
question, but I think it depends on so many variables. Speaking for
the United States, I can say this: We have participated actively in
the Conference on Disarmament throughout its history. We believe very
strongly in this body as a forum for serious international
negotiations. At the same time we are under pressure from our Congress
to reform and limit expenditures on all international institutions,
and that inevitably forces us to examine whether resources are being
spent effectively. And the longer we go on without having real
negotiations underway here, especially when there are issues ready for
resolution, and in fact that were assigned to this body, in the case
of the Fissile Material Cut-Off, more than two years ago, I think
there will be more cynicism about the conference, and I think that
would be tragic. I don't personally favor that, but I think it is an
inevitable consequence of prolonged delay.
QUESTION: Just to follow up, what do you pay the CD, what part of your
budget goes to the CD?
HOLUM: It comes out of the regular UN budget. I don't know what the
specific amount is. We also pay to maintain our delegation here,
obviously.
QUESTION: Is that then an indication that you are going to give some
consideration within the next year, say, for example, to withdrawing
the U.S. position here?
HOLUM: No, no, I certainly am not suggesting that, and I am glad you
asked for the clarification. I am just responding to the question of
what the costs are for U.S. participation.
What I am concerned about is, if we are unable to move, the United
States, other countries, are likely to start wondering whether their
participation is justified. My preferred solution, my fervently
desired solution, is that this body begins again to do what it is
capable of, and that is to achieve real progress in negotiations.
QUESTION: But are you giving the people here in the CD a time frame
about how long you are willing to go along with this impasse?
HOLUM: No, and there is no way to judge what such a time frame would
be.
............
QUESTION: Sir, Egypt made quite a strong statement rejecting the
double standards which allow Israel to maintain a nuclear program when
other countries of the region are under sanctions, obviously in
reference to Iraq, and calling on nuclear power states to put more
pressure on Israel. Does the United States intend to have this
conversation with Israel in any serious way that they should finally
think of coming under international safeguards and joining the NPT?
And how do you respond to Egypt's accusations?
HOLUM: I think the case of Israel inevitably will be resolved in the
context of the broader security situation in the region, so it is
closely linked with the overall peace process. At the same time, we
do, for reasons of our non-proliferation policy, limit our cooperation
with Israel in the nuclear field. We have participated actively in the
effort to make the nuclear non-proliferation treaty universal, and it
is approaching that now with 185 member countries, and we have been
very favorably disposed toward the idea of a nuclear weapon free zone
in the region, which obviously is dependent on the security situation.
QUESTION: Since the last session, do you have any fresh concerns about
fissile material. I am thinking of North Korea and some of the things
that came out of the IAEA recently about their having this fissionable
material and not squaring with it?
HOLUM: I have seen the recent press accounts of a high level defector
from North Korea and statements that seemed to imply a larger quantity
of fissile material there than we have previously estimated. As you
know, the conclusion of the United States has been that there may have
been diverted in the late 1980s a sufficient quantity for one or
perhaps two nuclear weapons. That is an issue that will have to be
resolved before the Agreed Framework is fully implemented. I don't
have a basis for judging the accuracy or the reliability of estimates
that would suggest a larger amount.
(end transcript)
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