[EXCERPTS] ACDA DIRECTOR HOLUM REMARKS TO CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
15 May 1997
(begin text)
Mr. President, it is an honor again to present to this body the views
of the United States -- and to congratulate you for ably discharging
your duties as its President. Our delegation pledges its support in
the weeks to come.
I want to discuss the progress and future of arms control, and the
role of this Conference -- which I believe will depend heavily on how
it handles two key issues that are clearly ripe for its resolution.
The first, a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), would take an
important step toward a world in which the risks and roles of nuclear
weapons are further diminished -- and our ultimate aim, their
elimination, is brought closer. The second seeks to free the world of
anti-personnel landmines -- for as President Clinton stressed again in
his message to this body in January, our children "deserve to walk the
Earth in safety."
The Conference on Disarmament has the capacity to succeed in both
these vital negotiations. The evidence is manifest in its remarkable
recent body of fruitful work. The Conference reported the Chemical
Weapons Convention to the U.N. General Assembly in September 1992. It
has now entered into force -- with the United States, I'm more than
happy to say, among its original parties.
Last year this Conference generated the text of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), extracting all the consensus that was
available. The United Nations General Assembly was able to adopt it
without change -- thus completing a quest long and ardently pursued by
some of the international community's greatest leaders.
These treaties define the Conference on Disarmament. This is the body
where arms control negotiations, not merely discussions, are
conducted. This is where the world's substantive expertise on arms
control, not just its polemical vehemence, resides. This is where
every perspective -- every region, every alignment, every ideology,
every interest -- is represented. And as a result, this is a place
where treaties of true global standing are given life -- treaties like
the NPT (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), now with 185 members; the
CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention), with 165 signatories; the CTBT,
already with 144 signatories, including 41 of the 44 countries needed
for entry into force.
As President Clinton made clear in his message to you this January,
the United States stands ready to help expand this body of
achievement. But of course the Conference itself will decide whether
it will solidify its tradition of success -- or perhaps commence a
slide toward the periphery of international affairs.
In short, this is a year of decision for the Conference on
Disarmament.
Consider the practical benefits of success on a fissile material
cutoff treaty.
Mr. President, the objective of banning the production of fissile
material for any nuclear explosive device is nearly as old as the
nuclear age itself. The initiatives of such statesmen as (Indian)
Prime Minister Nehru in 1954 and (Canadian) Prime Minister Trudeau in
1978 confirm the historical breadth of support for a global treaty
toward that end. Indeed, for many years it was championed by the
non-aligned.
In 1993, President Clinton placed the United States squarely on that
same side of the issue. Also in 1993, the United Nations adopted a
consensus resolution calling for a global, verifiable treaty to cut
off the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or any
other nuclear explosive devices.
But this body -- having agreed two springs ago to a negotiating
mandate -- has found itself unable to proceed because a few
delegations have chosen to block consensus even to initiate
negotiations.
What, in practical terms, is at stake here? Two truths are dominant.
First, fissile material is the modern chokepoint -- the critical-path
necessity, far scarcer than bomb know-how in building or enhancing
nuclear stockpiles. Without it arsenals can neither be established nor
expanded. And second, new fissile material for weapons requires
reprocessing or enrichment.
So the issue squarely before this body is whether these processes, in
perpetuity, will be used only for (nuclear) reactor fuel, for peaceful
research, for medical isotopes and other non-explosive purposes -- and
never again for nuclear weapons. The issue is whether we can safeguard
newly produced material to guarantee that the stocks available for use
in weapons will not and cannot grow.
We would codify in a global, binding, verifiable treaty, what has only
lately become a practice of the nuclear weapon states -- one that is
eminently reversible, one that is predicated on the relatively benign
geopolitical security environment that thankfully prevails at this
moment.
Keep in mind that this is a constraint specifically on the nuclear
weapon states. They will be subject to a universal upper bound on how
much fissile material can ever be devoted to nuclear weapons. All
their HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) and plutonium removed from nuclear
weapons and disposed of could never be replaced. All reprocessing or
enrichment would be declared and subject to international verification
-- for nuclear weapon states and other states alike.
Moreover, this manifestly is arms control as well as nonproliferation.
It is hard to imagine how nuclear arms reductions can proceed much
further without a dependable limit on the nuclear materials, without
confidence that any clandestine production of fissile material will be
detected.
And this step is achievable now. For the treaty should be simple and
straightforward. It could be accomplished relatively quickly. And it
could even make use of an existing international organization,
appropriately adapted, for implementation.
So the negotiating mandate for the fissile material cutoff presents
this body with a clear choice. We can continue to talk about nuclear
disarmament in the abstract -- or we can get on with it in practice.
With every passing week that the Conference avoids this next
achievable step so plainly before it, the world must wonder, on what
basis would a few states have it declare an end-point for nuclear
disarmament years in the future, when it cannot even begin work on
cutting off the spigot for more nuclear weapons today?
So, what we need is simple: A "Yes" to prompt commencement of
negotiations on the basis of the existing consensus mandate. By
undertaking and completing this negotiation promptly, this body can
make an immediate contribution to nuclear disarmament, and keep faith
with the United Nations General Assembly and the 1995 NPT Review
Conference, both of which assigned this work here.
.........
Both of these priorities -- the fissile cutoff and the APL ban -- are,
of course, constrained by another obstacle: the proposition that the
Conference on Disarmament should do nothing else until it starts
negotiating the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
I detect an assumption on the part of some here -- perhaps even an
expectation -- that eventually the United States will come around and
agree to such negotiations, or at least preparations for them, if only
so other important items can proceed. So I want to be very clear. The
real obstacle to nuclear disarmament negotiations here is not the
willingness of the parties, but the capacity of the forum. It will not
work. It will set back disarmament. We cannot and should not agree to
it. That is true today. It will be equally true next year, and five
years in the future.
Does that mean nuclear disarmament is dead? On the contrary, it is
striding ahead. START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) I
implementation is underway. In Helsinki, Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin brought START II nearer fruition. And they set a vision for
the next phase, after START II comes into force, with cumulative total
reductions of 80 percent from Cold War peaks in START III, and the
first agreed limits not only on delivery systems, but on the warheads
themselves.
Clearly, the way to extend nuclear disarmament today is through the
same painstaking step-by-step process that has produced such dramatic
results in recent years. In contrast, bringing nuclear disarmament to
this Conference unquestionably means halting all progress for the sake
of a long argument over the ultimate destination, and when we must
arrive there. Indeed, does anyone think any of our recent progress,
including Helsinki, could pass muster here? Of course it would be
blocked, because someone would pronounce it insufficient.
But the strategy of linkage is even more pernicious than that. For it
aims not only to bring disarmament here, and thus stall it, but would
specifically deny the basis for arms control progress elsewhere.
Real gains in arms control and disarmament depend not on leverage or
altruism, but on what is possible at a given moment as a matter of
security. Recall that Article VI of the NPT specifically places
nuclear disarmament in a larger disarmament context -- imposing this
broader obligation on all states parties. It thus embodies the
essential truth that nuclear disarmament cannot occur on demand or in
a vacuum, but must be approached in tandem with broader improvements
in the international security environment.
The permanent NPT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical
Weapons Convention, are all just such improvements. The enhanced
nuclear safeguards under review right now in Vienna are another, and
will contribute immensely more to disarmament than every resolution
ever written, and every pronouncement ever made, about how the nuclear
weapon states ought to do more. And cumulatively, all such practical
advances explain the progress at Helsinki -- and why further steps
thought impossible just three years ago are becoming possible now.
A cutoff in production of fissile material for weapons would be
another step in precisely the same direction. So countries that refuse
FMCT negotiations here are not only blocking one specific goal; they
are undermining the prospects for the very nuclear disarmament they
profess so fervently to cherish. Indeed, such an embrace offers
strangulation.
So who and what are harmed as paralysis settles in on this body?
The future innocent victims of anti-personnel landmines is one answer
-- mainly, of course, in non-aligned countries.
The cause of disarmament is harmed, as tangible steps here, fostering
further progress elsewhere, are stymied.
And I suggest that grave damage can be done to the Conference on
Disarmament itself -- as its credibility, standing and effectiveness
are sapped by months of inaction, foreshadowing an empty future. What
an irony that would be for those states who have waited years to join
the Conference on Disarmament -- to miss out on its glory, and only
share in its decline, as the real business of arms control seeks out
more promising venues.
Of course we can escape such dismal prospects. But not without
significant change from where we are today; not without restoration of
the practical, methodical, problem-solving, step-by-step methods that
have enabled this body's finest hours and greatest achievements.
Without further delay, let us return to work. Let us negotiate both
treaties that are now ready for action -- and thus build the
intertwined twin legacies of a strong Conference on Disarmament and a
safer world.
(end text)
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