08 October 1999
Text: UN Background Paper on Disarmament Debate to Begin October 11
(NKorea, India, Pakistan are cited for longer-range missiles) (6190) The United Nations released October 8 a Background Paper setting the scene for the start of the Debate on Disarmament that will begin in the First Committee on Monday, October 11. The First Committee, the paper said, "begins its general debate amid growing global concerns about a renewed nuclear arms race and the increased reliance on nuclear weapons as a basis of security." The Committee's full scope disarmament and security debate will be shaped, the Background Paper said, "by significant events of the past year, including: the delayed entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the testing and development by several countries - notably, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan - of longer-range missiles, upon which nuclear warheads could be fitted; and the development of missile defenses." Following is the UN text of that Background Paper: (begin text) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DISARMAMENT DEBATE BEGINS 11 OCTOBER AMID GROWING CONCERN ABOUT NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS Background Release October 8, 1999 The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) begins its general debate on 11 October amid growing global concern about a renewed nuclear arms race and the increased reliance on nuclear weapons as a basis of security. The Committee's full scope disarmament and security debate will be shaped by significant events of the past year, including: the delayed entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); the testing and development by several countries - notably, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan -- of longer-range missiles, upon which nuclear warheads could be fitted; and the development of missile defences. The Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, in its annual report, has noted that concern is mounting over the steady progress being made in the development of delivery vehicles and ballistic missiles by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a country whose nuclear weapons policies and programmes remained unclear. At the same time, the Advisory Board says that the development of ballistic missile defence in the United States threatens to stimulate a new arms race and undermine incentives to reduce offensive arms, calling into question the viability of an important bilateral agreement -- the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty) -- by which the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to limit the deployment and development of anti-ballistic missiles. Attempts to revise that cornerstone treaty of strategic balance could have other ramifications, such as the further delay in ratification by the Russian Duma of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), which is the second of two treaties by which the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to significantly reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The original treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or START I, was signed in 1991 and called for a 30 per cent reduction in strategic weapons over seven years, with stringent verification. In 1993, START II provided for the elimination of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other multiple-warhead ICBMs, as well as a two-thirds reduction of the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both sides. Negotiation on further reductions under START III can commence only upon entry into force of START II. Such developments and delays prompt the Advisory Board to warn that if the United States and the Russian Federation did not rapidly become involved in discussions of long-term strategic relationships, taking into account the impact of ballistic missile defence on the evolving offence-defence equation and future arms reduction, "a new arms race is likely to appear at the beginning of the next century". Curtailing an "unfettered missile arms race", the Board says, is one of the most difficult tasks on the arms control agenda. The Secretary-General also emphasizes this point in his annual report on the work of the Organization, saying that recent activity in the development and defence of ballistic missiles had underscored the urgent need for multilaterally negotiated norms -- where none existed -- against the spread of ballistic missile technology for military purposes. Restraining missile development, he says, would considerably reduce the threat posed by ballistic missiles, whether armed with conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. Such norms would substantially improve prospects for progress on bilateral and multilateral disarmament and arms control negotiations, including the prevention of an arms race in outer space. One multilateral effort -- the CTBT -- still requires the ratification of 18 countries critical to the Treaty's success. Of the necessary ratifications by nuclear-weapon States, three are pending: the United States; Russian Federation; and China. Other States whose ratification is required under Article 14 of the Treaty, namely, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan, still have not signed the Treaty. A conference to promote the Treaty's entry into force concluded today -- 8 October -- in Vienna. Further reflecting the impasse in nuclear disarmament, the three preparatory committee sessions leading up to the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) -- held from 7 to 18 April 1997; 27 April to 8 May 1998; and 10 to 21 May -- were marked by disagreement. The Treaty, which was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, is considered by many experts to be the bedrock of the non-proliferation regime. With 188 States parties, it is the most universal of all disarmament agreements. The NPT divided the parties into two classifications -- those that had tested nuclear weapons before 1968 and those that had not -- and assigned different obligations to each. The nuclear testing by India and Pakistan in 1998 drew strong reactions from the nuclear-weapon States -- whose original decision to join the Treaty was based on an assumption that no more nuclear- weapon States would be created beyond the initial five -- and threatened to undermine nuclear non-proliferation. In light of new technological advances and the discoveries of major clandestine biological weapons programmes, the threat posed by other weapons of mass destruction will also be the focus of the Committee's debate. A high- level international group convened by the Japanese Government, the Tokyo Forum, warned in a report issued in August that "years of relentless effort have not eliminated the clandestine weapons of mass destruction programmes of the most determined proliferators". The Secretary-General commended the Japanese initiative as timely. Advisory Board members also called for "heightened vigilance" with respect to biological weapons. They acknowledged the need for a verification regime, as well as the challenges of creating one, given the dual-use nature of biological research and the difficulties in differentiating between defensive and offensive development. In formulating a verification system for the 1978 treaty banning biological weapons, the Advisory Board underlined the value of industry participation, which has been so decisive in the success of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention). The entry into force of that Convention in April 1997 triggered the operation of its complex verification mechanism, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which has completed 503 inspections and has witnessed the destruction of more than 3,000 metric tons of chemical agents. So far, 126 States have ratified or acceded to the Convention. The issue of small arms will dominate the Committee's consideration of conventional weapons. Those "weapons of personal destruction" have devastated civilian populations, creating humanitarian crises worldwide, the Secretary- General said in his annual report. They impaired economic and social progress and impeded the best development efforts. He pledged the support of the United Nations in making disarmament and arms control central aspects of future peace initiatives. In West Africa, the United Nations has been helping to implement the moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of its weapons. Further, the European Union's code of conduct on arms exports was an example for other regions emerging from conflict. In a related action, the Committee is expected to take a decision on the objective, scope, agenda, dates, venue and preparatory committee for an international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects, in accordance with a resolution on the subject adopted last year by the General Assembly, which calls for such a conference by 2001. Among other items, the Committee will also consider reports on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, transparency in armaments, verification in all its aspects, the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament, the reduction of military budgets, the relationship between disarmament and development, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Committee will also consider the question of Antarctica, for which it will have before it a report of the Secretary-General. When the Committee last reviewed the topic in 1996, it approved a draft resolution recognizing that the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which provides for the demilitarization of the continent and the prohibition of nuclear explosions, was in furtherance of the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Reports before Committee The Committee will have before it the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament (document A/54/27), the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, which ended its 1999 session in September. The items it considered at that session were: nuclear disarmament and cessation of the nuclear arms race; prevention of nuclear war; prevention of an arms race in outer space; effective international arrangements for guaranteeing non- nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of such weapons; transparency in armaments; new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction; radiological weapons; and a global programme of disarmament. The Conference deliberated on the elements of a possible programme of work, but was unable to reach a consensus. On all of the items, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions. Intensive consultations indicated that there were some common elements, but it was evident that further consultations were needed on two subjects, namely, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and nuclear disarmament, in order to reach consensus. The Conference President concluded that there was "a strong collective interest" in commencing substantive work as soon as possible during the next session, to be held, as follows: 17 January to 24 March 2000; 22 May to 7 July; and 7 August to 22 September. On 5 August, a consensus decision was made to admit five new members to the Conference -- Ecuador, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Tunisia -- thus, bringing to 66 the total membership. The Conference still has before it requests for membership from 21 countries. Some nations called for universal membership; others stressed the need to consider the effects of admitting new members on the efficiency and practical functioning of that negotiating body, and to take into account political and regional balance. The Conference has produced a number of important disarmament agreements. Those included the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (Partial Test-Ban Treaty) and the 1968 NPT. Other instruments include the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention. On the CTBT, it was unable to achieve consensus -- which is required in the Conference under the current rules of procedure -- although the Treaty adopted by the General Assembly in 1996 was identical to the version negotiated in the Conference. The Committee will also have before it the annual report of the Disarmament Commission (document A/54/42), which is a specialized deliberative body of the General Assembly. During its 1999 session, the Commission concluded its long-term consideration of three disarmament issues by reaching agreement on guidelines for two of them: the establishment of nuclear-weapon- free zones; and conventional arms control, limitation and disarmament. The Commission did not reach consensus on the objectives and agenda for a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. According to the guidelines on nuclear-weapon-free zones, the initiative to establish such a zone should emanate exclusively from States within the region concerned and be pursued by all the States of that region. Further, any such proposal should be considered only after consensus on the objective has been achieved in broad consultations within the States of the region concerned. In addition, the nuclear-weapon States, as well as any States with territory or internationally responsible for territories within the zone, should be consulted during the negotiations. Finally, a zone must conform with international law, and its status should be respected by all States parties to the treaty establishing it, including the nuclear-weapon States. The conventional arms control guidelines, which were designed for consolidating peace in post-conflict situations, state that the excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons could best be averted by a combination of reduction and prevention measures, including: practical disarmament measures and confidence-building in post-conflict situations; regional and international financial and technical assistance; other conventional arms control, limitation and disarmament measures; and the role of the United Nations. The report of the working group on the proposed fourth special session on disarmament, on which no consensus was reached, contained a Chairman's paper identifying the objectives and agenda of the session. Delegations disagreed about the reasons for the Commission's failure to reach consensus on the essential components of a fourth special session on disarmament, but in light of the commitment expressed by many delegations for convening the session, it was suggested that the impasse be resolved by the First Committee. Some delegations felt the Chairman's paper was a valid basis for consensus. Under a proposal approved on 8 September 1998, the Commission's agenda will comprise two agenda items per year, beginning in 2000, including one on nuclear disarmament, and its substantive session will be reduced from five weeks to three weeks. The report on the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters document A/54/218) covers the work of the Board's thirty-second and thirty-third sessions at Geneva from 20 to 22 January 1999, and in New York from 29 to 30 June 1999, respectively. The Board is a group of eminent persons and scholars who meet annually to advise the Secretary-General on studies concerning disarmament and arms limitation. It was established in 1978 by the General Assembly at its tenth special session. The Board formulated advice and recommendations to the Secretary- General on the following topical disarmament and arms control issues: the situation of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq; conventional disarmament in Europe; disarmament contributions to African security; tactical nuclear weapons; a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes; biological weapons; missile defences; and the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Concerning UNSCOM, the Board stressed the importance of ridding Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction, of Iraq's full compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions, and of the grave regional and international consequences of Iraq's persistent non-compliance. Although agreement was lacking on the exact nature and scope of the change necessary to resume effective verification activities in Iraq, some general guidelines for any future regime were put forward, as follows: preserve the well-established operations of the system put in place in 1991; enjoy international support; and find the means to renew cooperation with Iraq. On the issue of conventional disarmament in Europe, the Board acknowledged that regional security patterns were always unique, but general conclusions could be drawn from the successes and failures of other regional efforts; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could be a source of inspiration to other regions, in particular, to the Middle East, the Korean peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region and South Asia. Building upon certain features of the OSCE was also discussed, including reducing the likelihood of large-scale attack and implementing transparency measures on the size and operation of the military forces. During the Board's consideration of the contribution of disarmament to African security, it agreed that efficient mechanisms to prevent, manage or solve Africa's conflicts were lacking. Despite some successful processes, such as the arms moratorium in West Africa, the Board entertained no illusions that such initiatives could deal with the region's numerous security problems. Members called for greater emphasis on the supply side of weapons transfers, and they expressed support for joint customs cooperation, joint surveillance of border traffic and information sharing. On the subject of tactical nuclear weapons, the Board considered the following four elements: the current deadlock concerning disarmament of strategic nuclear weapons; the absence of negotiations; the large numbers of those weapons; and the doctrines concerning their use. The Board called for increased international attention to the issue and offered a number of approaches, including transparency measures concerning the number or location of deployed or non-deployed weapons, and a formalization of the 1991 unilateral United States and Russian declarations. Regarding a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, Board members stressed that even though a ban would not result in the dismantling of any nuclear warheads, it would be an important disarmament achievement. A convention would significantly contribute to the implementation of the NPT. It would affect the separation of the civilian and military production cycles, generate more transparency of fissile material stocks, and lessen the current discrepancy between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Concerning biological weapons, the Board agreed on the prudence of heightened vigilance for the following reasons, among others: the discovery of clandestine biological weapons programmes; the easy concealment of such weapons; and the potential use of biological weapons on an unprotected civilian population, agriculture and livestock, which could produce a major disaster. The Board viewed the question of missile defence as an "old issue dressed in new clothes". Early designs for a missile defence system emerged in the 1950s, and the 1972 Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems permitted the deployment of missile defences at two sites. Most recently, in 1995, the two sides agreed to new treaty interpretations designed to permit the development of theatre missile defence within the terms of the existing treaty. The new strategic situation was central to the current issue, since the projected development of ballistic missile defence in the United States would likely increase the growing imbalance between the United States and the Russian Federation. With reference to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Board noted that the programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction in the Democratic People's Republic were not known with precision. The country was not party to multilateral agreements on chemical and biological weapons. What was clear was the steady progress being made in the development of delivery vehicles and ballistic missiles. The Board felt that all obligations under the NPT and with regard to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be met. There was also widespread support for the full implementation of the Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic, including recent efforts to address the subject of missile development. A report on a new resolution of the General Assembly entitled Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: The need for a new agenda (document A/54/372) addresses a request of the Secretary-General to compile a report on the resolution's implementation. The resolution, which was introduced in the First Committee in the fifty-third Assembly session, called upon the nuclear- weapon States to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their nuclear weapons. The report contains the Secretary-General's observations, as well as the responses of the following organizations in exploring the possible elements for developing global verification arrangements as envisaged in that resolution: the IAEA; the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL); the Organization of African Unity (OAU) regarding the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba); the Government of Thailand as the depositary of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), the South Pacific Forum regarding the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga); and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). In his report on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (document A/54/190), the Secretary-General strongly urges all concerned parties to review the situation in order to resume discussions and establish a common position as expeditiously as possible. He attaches particular importance to the issue and regrets that no positive developments have occurred in its consideration. The Secretary-General states in his report on verification in all its aspects, including the United Nations' role in the process (document A/54/166), that since 1997, the international community had continued its efforts in the field of the verification of treaties in a number of areas. With respect to weapons of mass destruction, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) had pursued its efforts to ensure the full implementation of the verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Over the course of its two-year existence, the OPCW had undertaken 500 inspections, and its inspectors had witnessed the destruction of approximately 3,000 tons of chemical agents and of more than 700,000 munitions and containers. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO concentrated on setting up the global verification regime envisaged in the Treaty, so that it might be operational by the time the Treaty enters into force. Its first technical training programme to familiarize operators with a specific verification technology and the use of instruments was held in Vienna in October 1998, followed by in-depth training at facilities in Argentina, Norway and the United States. Over the past year, the States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention had intensified efforts to formulate an efficient, cost- effective and practical verification protocol to the Convention. Since the 1997 report on verification, the system for monitoring compliance with the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) had begun to take shape. Following an agreement at the first Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention in May, it was decided that information on the transparency measures undertaken by governments in various categories, such as the total number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines, would be published on the Internet, similar to the data reported to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The report also contains replies from governments. For the report on the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament (document A/54/167), the Secretary- General was asked to seek the views of Member States concerning disarmament trends in the context of the changed security landscape. He was also asked to recommend possible approaches to multilaterally negotiated, universally acceptable, non-discriminatory guidelines for international transfers of dual- use goods and technologies with military applications. To date, the Secretary-General has received one reply. In the absence of adequate information from Member States, the Secretary-General is not in a position to make recommendations. Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures (document A/54/298), concerns the United Nations standardized reporting instrument for military expenditures. Member States are supposed to report their military spending on a yearly basis to the Secretary-General, who submits annual reports on the data to the Assembly. The major purpose of the reporting instrument, which was developed in 1980, is to facilitate the reduction of military expenditures and build confidence by increasing transparency. The present report includes information received from 35 countries and reviews the relevant actions taken by the Secretariat to enhance knowledge of the standardized reporting system. It also provides recommendations deriving from consultations with representatives of international and regional organizations. A reply from the European Union notes that, although the Union attaches high importance to the standardized reporting system, the transparency of the confidence-building measure -- in effect for 18 years -- continues to be inadequate, and participation remains very low. A report on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (document A/54/226) is the seventh consolidated report issued by the Secretary-General since the establishment of the Register in 1992. It contains data and information provided by 68 governments on imports and exports of the seven categories of conventional arms covered by the Register, namely, battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, attack helicopters, combat aircraft, warships, missiles and missile launchers. The report includes additional information provided by governments on procurement from national production and military holdings. It also attaches the views of governments on ways and means of enhancing transparency in the field of weapons of mass destruction, with a view to enhancing transparency in conventional weapons. A report of the Secretary-General on assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them (document A/54/309) provides an update on developments, requests for United Nations assistance, and initiatives taken at the subregional, regional and international levels to address the issue. Among the developments, the Disarmament Commission in April adopted by consensus guidelines on conventional arms control, limitation and disarmament. Among further developments, the Commission concluded that the excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons could best be averted by a combination of reduction and prevention measures. The Security Council, in a presidential statement in July, recognized that a major contributory factor to the armed fighting among various parties or factions, that continued after the conclusion of peace agreements by the warring parties, was the continued availability of large amounts of armaments, in particular, small arms and light weapons, to conflicting parties. The Council, therefore, stressed the need for the inclusion, on a case-by-case basis, within United Nations peacekeeping mandates, of clear terms for disarmament, demobilization and the reintegration of ex-combatants, including the safe and timely disposal of arms and ammunition. Among the requests for United Nations assistance was a small arms collection process known as the Gramsh pilot project, which was officially launched by the United Nations in Albania in January, and reactivated in June. Under the project, some 60 tonnes of ammunition and 2,700 small arms have been collected. Subregional and regional initiatives include the moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in West Africa and a request made by the Cambodian Government for financial and technical assistance from the European Union for collecting and destroying small arms and light weapons on its territory. In his report on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (document A/54/162), the Secretary-General provides information on the status of the Convention and its Protocols. As at 15 June, 73 States had joined the Convention and at least two of its Protocols. The amended Protocol II -- Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices -- entered into force on 3 December 1998, and as at 15 June, 37 States had notified their consent to be bound by it. Protocol IV, on Blinding Laser Weapons, entered into force on 30 July 1998, and as at 15 June, 39 States had notified their consent to be bound by it. According to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (document A/54/29), the Committee held its session on 14 July. It last reported to the General Assembly at its fifty-second session in 1997, at which time it stated that it had been unable to reach a consensus on the manner of the implementation of the 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee held consultations, from which he drew the following conclusions, among others: that the objectives of the 1971 Declaration should be recalled; and that the position of three permanent members of the Security Council that have not participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee -- namely, France, United Kingdom and the United States -- had remained unchanged. A report on Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region (document A/54/261) contains replies by several nations to resolution 53/82 adopted by the General Assembly. This resolution encourages all States of the Mediterranean region to strengthen confidence- building measures through promoting transparency in military matters, participating in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and by providing accurate data to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The report on Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (document A/54/213) contains replies received from governments responding to a request of the Secretary-General for Member States to provide their views on the following questions: general appreciation of the issues of information security; definition of basic notions related to information security, including unauthorized interference with or misuse of information resources; and the advisability of developing international principles that would enhance the security of global information and telecommunications systems and help to combat information terrorism and criminality. A report on the relationship between disarmament and development (document A/54/254) notes that, in accordance with a decision by the Secretary-General, the high-level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development was established. It held its inaugural meeting on 26 May. The purpose of the Steering Group was to determine the short-, medium- and long- term priorities from a broadly defined mandate (as contained in the action programme adopted at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development), within the framework of current international relations. The Steering Group had identified specific programmes and activities, including the holding of periodic seminars to focus on specific issues in the disarmament and development field. The first series of seminars was held at United Nations Headquarters on 20 July. The present report also contains replies received from governments. The report on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (document A/54/332) summarizes the activities since the appointment of the Centre's new Director in December 1998. During the period under review, from July 1998 to August 1999, the Centre provided support for the implementation of peace and security-related activities undertaken by African governments. This included the destruction of weapons in Liberia, and observance of the peace talks between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front, which culminated in the signing of a peace agreement on 7 July. The Centre also provided support for the implementation of the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa. While a number of Member States have made financial pledges in support of the Centre, it continues to experience financial operational difficulties which impair its full functioning. The Secretary-General reiterates his appeal to member States, as well as to intergovernmental organizations and foundations, to contribute to revitalizing the Centre, strengthening its programmes and facilitating their implementation. The Secretary-General's report on the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (document A/54/255) indicates that during the reporting period, from August 1998 to July 1999, the Centre organized three major regional meetings, including one on the proposal for a nuclear- weapon-free world, held at Nagasaki, Japan. The Department for Disarmament Affairs, through the Regional Centre, continues to extend technical and substantive assistance to the five Central Asian States in drafting a treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The Director of the Centre continues to operate from United Nations Headquarters in New York, due to the lack of sufficient resources to finance operations of the Centre at Kathmandu. A report on the Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (document A/54/310) reviews the financial situation of the reactivated Centre and outlines the programme of work drawn up by the Director. The Centre's activities included the training of national police forces and border patrol officers in combating trafficking in firearms, ammunition and explosives. Seminars were also planned for training regional peacekeepers in implementing disarmament mandates. The activities carried out during the period under review, from December 1998 to July 1999, demonstrated the usefulness and timeliness of reactivating the Centre. A report on the observance of environmental norms in disarmament agreements (document A/54/163) contains replies received from the Governments of Cuba and Saudi Arabia on the measures they have adopted to comply with the objectives of the relevant resolution. An addendum to that report (document A/54/163/Add.1) contains a reply from Iraq. A report on the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on security questions in Central Africa (document A/54/364) covers the activities undertaken by the Committee in the past year, including the tenth Ministerial Meeting of the Committee, held in Yaounde, Cameroon, in October, 1998. With the exception of Angola, there appeared to have been some improvement in the political and security situations in most countries of the Central African region. Among the most promising developments was the signing, on 10 July 1999, in Lusaka, Zambia, of the ceasefire agreement on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Relations between Cameroon and Nigeria have also improved, as demonstrated by a series of high-level contacts between the two countries. The Secretary-General, in a note on nuclear disarmament (document A/54/371), reprints a resolution on nuclear disarmament (53/77 X) and draws attention to the 1999 report of the Conference on Disarmament, which contains proposals made regarding the points raised in the resolution. He hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will be able to overcome the difficulties encountered in elaborating a programme of work which will enable it to address all issues on its agenda. Another note by the Secretary-General, on the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (document A/54/161), contains information received from governments on their implementation of the 1998 General Assembly resolution on the Court's opinion and on nuclear disarmament. An addendum to that note (document A/54/161/Add.1) contains information received by the governments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and India. It will also have before it two notes on small arms. By the first (document A/54/155), the Secretary-General transmits the report of the Group of Experts on the problem of ammunition and explosives. The Group concludes, among other things, that ammunition and explosives are an inseparable part of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation, transfer and misuse of small arms and light weapons. The Group recommends prevention measures, which included the creation of regional registers covering ammunition and explosives and efforts to expand the scope of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include small arms and light weapons, as well as ammunition and explosives. Another note on small arms (document A/54/258) submits a report of the Secretary-General prepared with the assistance of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. In a foreword to the report, the Secretary-General asserts that the easy availability of small arms and light weapons -- the weapons of choice in many contemporary conflicts -- exacerbates and increases the lethality of conflicts and obstructs development and relief assistance efforts. The report reviews the progress towards implementing the prevention and reductions recommendations contained in its 1997 report, and it outlines the objectives, scope and agenda for the international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects, due to be held no later than 2001. The Secretary-General acknowledges the leading role played by the United Nations in raising awareness of the issue and in promoting international efforts to address it. In the lead-up to the international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects, the Group's report is an important contribution to the development of an international consensus on ways and means to effectively combat and prevent illicit arms trafficking and transfers of small arms and light weapons. A further note on small arms (document A/54/160) contains the outcome of consultations held at Headquarters on 20 and 21 May, with a group of qualified experts to examine the feasibility of carrying out a study on restricting the manufacture and trade of small arms to manufacturers and dealers authorized by States. The consultative meeting of experts concluded that a study for restricting the manufacture and trade of small arms to manufacturers and dealers is both feasible and desirable, and could help Member States and the international community to promote national and international efforts in addressing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In a note on convening an international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects (document A/54/260), the Secretary-General acknowledges that political momentum has been building to give priority attention to curbing the illicit arms traffic. The Secretary-General supports the decision to convene an international conference on the issue no later than 2001. The report attaches the views of 23 nations. The Committee will also have before it additional notes of the Secretary- General, as follows: on the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (document A/54/201) which transmits the report of the Director for the period from July 1998 to June 1999; and on the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament (document A/54/324). Reports on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and on the question of Antarctica will also be before the Committee. * *
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
