SSRC OCCASIONAL BRIEF: No 18
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* THE UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR *
* WEAPONS DEBATE *
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* by *
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* J F DUNN *
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6 April 1993
DISCLAIMER
The views expressed are those of the authors and not
necessarily those of the UK Ministry of Defence
THE UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEBATE
1. On 16 July 1990 (i.e still during the existence of the old Soviet Union) the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet (Verkhovna Rada; VR) adopted by a majority of 355 to 4 a "Declaration of State Sovereignty". This Declaration proclaimed inter alia the intention of the Ukraine "to become in future a permanently neutral state ... holding to three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, produce or acquire nuclear weapons."
2. In conformity with this Declaration and other agreements signed at the creation of the CIS, the Ukraine transferred all its tactical nuclear missiles to Russia by May 1992.
3. Since then a debate has begun in Kiev on the wisdom of eliminating the Ukraine's remaining 176 strategic nuclear missiles (ICBMs): 130 SS-19s and 40 SS-24s. This debate has been brought into focus by the need for the VR to ratify the START I and Non-Proliferation (NPT) treaties, signed by the Ukrainian government in Lisbon on 23 May 1993. The VR is now deeply divided over whether or not to remove the remaining strategic weapons.
4. The main arguments for denuclearisation can be summarised as follows:
a. Because of existing strategic nuclear command and control links, a nuclear Ukraine could never be completely independent of Russian control. A rejection of nuclear weapons would, however, eliminate one further Russian constraint on the independence of the Ukraine.
b. The retention of nuclear weapons would alienate the West, reduce the possibility of western financial and technical aid and simultaneously enrage xenophobic nationalists in Moscow.
c. Ukrainian control over the remaining ICBMs amounts only to control over their non-use; the Kiev government cannot launch the weapons independently. Also, given that Russia supplies parts, maintenance, training, testing, control and early-warning facilities, the Ukraine is unlikely to have an effective, independent nuclear force even in the medium term.
d. Nuclear weapons and their related infrastructure are expensive to develop and maintain. Given current economic constraints, the Ukraine could not afford such expenditure. The retention of nuclear weapons would divert resources from other sectors of the economy.
e. The Ukraine must avoid a nuclear arms race with Russia (which the latter, with its greater economic potential, would almost certainly win).
f. The inter-continental range of the remaining ICBMs (3,000-10,000 km) makes them irrelevant to the Ukraine's immediate regional security concerns. (Given that the major security concerns relate to the Ukraine's immediate neighbours, national security would have been better served by the retention of tactical nuclear weapons.)
g. The end of the Cold War has replaced the "threat" of global superpower confrontation with a series of regional "risks". Nuclear weapons have never protected their owners from regional war, and when involved in such wars the nuclear powers have never used their nuclear capability. The remaining ICBMs are therefore irrelevant to the Ukraine's regional concerns.
h. Nuclear weapons are potentially so destructive that they can never be used in battle; their value lies in the "restraint" imposed on potential aggressors through the threat of their use. However, this "restraint" only develops its full potential given a "balance of terror", when both sides possess a credible "second-strike capability", making a preemptive nuclear attack by one side unacceptably costly. Since the Ukraine has no such second strike capability (and is unlikely to develop one in the near future), its ICBMs are more likely to invite a preemptive strike than to provide security.
5. Most VR deputies recognise that they are bound by the July 1990 Declaration. However, they now believe that the promised non-nuclear identity can be attained only at an unspecified date in the future and after the fulfilment of certain conditions. These include:
a. "Guarantees" for Ukrainian security from the major nuclear powers. (Since the West has refused to consider Ukrainian membership of NATO or to give security guarantees beyond those given to all NPT signatories, the Ukraine has downgraded its request to "political commitments" or "assurances".)
b. Financial and technical assistance to deal with the costs of denuclearisation.
c. The right to use, sell, reprocess the materials in the remaining ICBMs.
6. As the political and economic costs of denuclearisation have become clearer, arguments for the retention of nuclear weapons have increasingly been advanced. The main points are:
a. The uncertainty of the political situation in Russia, the possibility that a "national-patriot" will come to power in Moscow and repeated Russian claims on Ukrainian territory (e.g. Crimea, Sevastopol') mean that the Ukraine must retain a nuclear defense capability.
b. Since the Ukraine currently lacks a strong conventional army, a powerful economy or a reliable system of allies, it is internationally exposed. To compensate, it must retain its nuclear weapons. These weapons should be eliminated only as part of a multi-lateral disarmament process, and as the Ukraine is integrated into west European economic and security structures.
c. Since the Ukraine already possesses a nuclear force, it should not "give it away"; subsequent attempts at nuclear rearmament would be blocked by the West.
d. Nuclear weapons are cheaper to maintain than a large conventional army. Moreover, retaining nuclear weapons makes sense as part of a policy of preserving those parts of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex which produce high-quality, internationally competitive weapons.
e. In a world in which increasing numbers of states are developing covert nuclear capabilities the Ukraine should not give up its force. Other states of comparable size (e.g. France and the UK) maintain nuclear weapons; the Ukraine has the same right to nuclear security as they.
f. Nuclear weapons confer authority and leverage. The Ukraine will have greater international influence if it retains its weapons. Although retaining a nuclear capability might initially disconcert the West, it would eventually learn to accommodate a nuclear Ukraine and would give greater weight to its arguments.
7. The momentum in the nuclear debate in Kiev is currently away from denuclearisation. (The two biggest parties, RUKH and the Socialists, are both against the elimination of nuclear weapons.) Political instability in Moscow and the growing influence of Russian "national-patriots" reinforces the desire to retain the weapons. Pressure from the West for denuclearisation (in the absence of financial assistance) seems to have been counter-productive in that it has generated resentment at western interference.
An increasingly likely scenario is that the Ukraine will ratify START I in 1993, but refuse to endorse the NPT. It may give up the 130 older SS-19s, but attempt to hold onto the more modern 46 SS-24s (each with 10 warheads).
The West may yet be forced to offer positive (as opposed to negative) inducements in order to gain Ukrainian compliance with the global non-proliferation regime.
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