J F Dunn
"The Ukrainian Nuclear Weapons Debate"
March 1993
Soviet Studies Research Centre
The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
Camberley, Surrey GU15 4PQ
DISCLAIMER
The views expressed are those of the author and not
necessarily those of the UK Ministry of Defence
1. INTRODUCTION
On 16 July 1990 the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet (Verkhovna
Rada) adopted a "Declaration of State Sovereignty" by a
majority of 355 to four. Article IX of this document,
dealing with the "External and Internal Security" stated
inter alia:
"The Ukrainian SSR solemnly proclaims its intention
to become in future a permanently neutral state, taking
no part in military blocs and holding to three
non-nuclear principles: not to accept, produce or acquire
nuclear weapons."
Since the Declaration proclaims itself to be binding, its
non-nuclear principles have been reflected in subsequent
legislation such as Article 1 of the Law on Defence.
The radical non-nuclear policy of the Declaration is
explicable in terms of the circumstances in which it was
conceived. First, the Ukraine was at that stage being
swept by a nationalist revival; the democratic and
nationalist opposition in the VR harnessed this mood and
pressed the communist majority into concessions. Thus,
in part the Declaration represented an attempt to
differentiate the aspiring new state from the central
authorities in Moscow. Secondly, the non-nuclear policy
was driven by a hope that radical denuclearisation would
favourably impress the West and thus secure international
recognition. Thirdly, the Declaration came only four
years after the Chernobyl explosion and thus reflected a
still widespread mistrust of all nuclear capabilities,
both military and civilian. Finally, the non-nuclear
policy was conceived without military in-put. At this
stage the Ukraine had no army of its own to indicate to
policy-makers the implications of their decisions. The
main concern was to counter the Soviet army, seen by many
nationalists as foreign, but still operating on
"sovereign" Ukrainian territory.
Although the 1990 Declaration did not stipulate that the
Ukraine should immediately divest itself of all nuclear
weapons (the "intention to become in future" indicates
that non-nuclear status might be qualified in the
interim), it was nevertheless an unconditional surrender
of nuclear weapons which the international community read
into the document and which Ukrainian leaders initially
seemed to espouse. Thus, in conformity with the
Declaration and agreements made earlier with Russia, the
Ukraine transferred all its tactical nuclear weapons
(approximately 3000) to Russia for destruction, a process
completed in May 1992. This left the Ukraine in
possession of only 176 inter-continental strategic
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with 1240 warheads and a
limited number of bombers with strategic nuclear
capabilities.
However, even before the transfer of tactical nuclear
weapons to Russia was complete, Ukrainians began to
debate the wisdom of abandoning their nuclear arsenal.
Although the top political leadership in the government
still support the elimination of the remaining ICBMs,
they now face growing opposition in parliament. The
intensity of the debate is evidenced by two issues.
First, on 28 October 1992 the VR failed to ratify the new
draft Military Doctrine. To a majority of VR deputies it
seemed that the consistently defensive and non-nuclear
draft doctrine was too pacifist to provide adequate
security. Secondly, the VR is due to consider
ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START I) and the Ukraine's accession to the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as negotiated by the
executive in Lisbon on 23 May 1992. Despite pressure
from the West and the knowledge that both Belarus and
Kazakhstan have now acceded to both treaties, the Ukraine
has not yet ratified the treaties in parliam
ent.
2. ARGUMENTS FOR ELIMINATION
There is little doubt that the Ukraine's initial espousal
of a non-nuclear policy was politically (rather than
militarily) motivated. The "Financial Times" has
identified Professor Volodymir Vasylenko of Kiev
University as "the architect" of the decision to renounce
nuclear weapons. According to the "Financial Times"
Vasylenko persuaded the government of the benefits of
non-nuclear status by arguing:
"You cannot have a nuclear force that is not tied to
the Russian force, because of technology and control
systems. By being a nuclear power we would not have full
independence."
The obverse of the desire to distance the Ukraine from
its colonial masters in Russia is the desire to integrate
the Ukraine into west European economic and security
structures. Thus, the political leadership has pointed
out that retention of nuclear weapons could antagonise
the West and jeopardise the acceptance of the Ukraine
into the western order. Deputy Foreign Minister, Boris
Tarasyuk has stated:
"Our western partners made it clear that if the
Ukraine had not chosen nuclear-free status, all possible
political, economic and psychological sanctions would
have been applied against us."
Political arguments for giving up nuclear weapons have
been reinforced by practical considerations. A Colonel
in the Ukrainian army and VR Deputy, Valeriy Izmalkov,
has pointed out that the main threats to Ukrainian
security are regional, potentially emanating from
neighbours such as Russia and Romania. However, the
Ukraine's remaining nuclear weapons have an
inter-continental range, making them all but irrelevant
to current security concerns. Thus, Izmalkov believes
that Ukrainian security would have been better served by
retaining tactical nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, although the Kiev government now has
"administrative" (as opposed to "operational") command of
the ICBMs on its soil and has a direct presidential link
with their launch pads, this command amounts to no more
than control over "non-use"; it does not include the
ability to launch the weapons independently. Grigoriy
Perepelitsa points out that any attempt to operate a
nuclear policy would require the co-operation of Russia
(which is seen by most Ukrainians as the main potential
aggressor)! On available evidence it seems unlikely that
the Ukraine would be able to develop the know-how and
infrastructure necessary to support an operationally
effective, independent strategic nuclear force in the
short to medium term.
Given the gravity of the economic crisis now facing the
Ukraine, there is also growing unease about the cost of
retaining nuclear weapons. Defence Minister Konstantin
Morozov has stated that their retention would not be in
the economic or strategic best interests of the state.
Georgiy Kostenko suggests that nuclear weapons are so
expensive to develop and to maintain that they would
impoverish the Ukraine and render it incapable of
maintaining a conventional army or fleet (precisely, he
says, the capabilities which the new state needs most,
given existing regional threats). Moreover, Izmalkov has
pointed out that while the Ukraine has the capacity to
produce missile delivery systems (rockets), it cannot
manufacture nuclear warheads. The Ukraine is therefore
dependent on Russia for parts, design, maintenance,
testing and early warning. Any attempt to "remain" a
nuclear state would necessitate the development of a
complete home-based nuclear infrastructure, thus
diverting resources from other sectors. The Ukrainian
Ambassador to the UN, Victor Batiouk, points out that 20%
of France's military budget is devoted to its "force de
frappe" and implies that the Ukraine could not afford
such expenditure. On the other hand, as a positive
incentive to denuclearisation the US Ambassador to Kiev,
Roman Popadyuk, has suggested that a non-nuclear Ukraine
could profit from US aid; he suggests that ratification
of START I will "open the door to significant financial
gains for the Ukraine".
In addition to the practical and economic considerations
outlined above many more "theoretical" arguments for the
elimination of nuclear weapons have been adduced. Chief
among these is the fear that a nuclear Ukraine could be
drawn into an arms race. Such a development would
seriously weaken both the Russian and the Ukrainian
economies and would inevitably favour the larger,
potentially richer Russia. Moreover, since the Ukraine
has no territorial claims on other states, most war
scenarios in Kiev postulate an invasion of Ukrainian
territory by (an)otherpower(s). The detonation of
nuclear weapons anywhere in the world, but especially on
Ukrainian territory would mean the unacceptable death and
destruction of Ukrainian personnel, resources and
territory. Since the resulting devastation would make
"victory" impossible, the usefulness of even tactical
nuclear weapons is severely circumscribed. Thus, nuclear
weapons can be effective only as a threat; their
relevance is military-psychological rather than
military-strategic.
However, the efficacy of the nuclear "threat" can be
measured only by the "restraint" which it imposes on a
potential aggressor. Restraint becomes effective only
through the establishment of a "balance of terror", when
both sides know that each has a "second strike
capability" and will therefore be able to respond even to
a preemptive unilateral attack. Supporters of the
Ukraine's non-nuclear policy argue that the Ukraine has
no credible "second strike capability" and thus can never
hope to establish a "balance of terror" and effective
nuclear restraint vis-a-vis Russia.
Another argument suggests that since the end of the Cold
War the threat of superpower confrontation has been
replaced by a series of regional "risks". The major risk
factors are those associated with regional conflicts
which have the potential to involve outside powers. In
such regional conflicts nuclear weapons are irrelevant.
First, it is argued, nuclear weapons have never protected
their owners from regional war, and, when involved in
such wars, the nuclear states have never used their
nuclear capability. According to this interpretation the
Ukraine's strategic nuclear weapons would be relevant
only if the Ukraine intended a global projection of
power, a policy which it has decisively rejected.
3. THE DIFFICULTIES BECOME CLEARER
In the immediate pre- and post-independence period the
arguments of the anti-nuclear school of thought carried
the day. Originally Leonid Kravchuk, Chairman of the VR
and future President of the Ukraine, was "not worried" if
the weapons went to Russia for decommissioning.
Gradually, however, his worries developed sufficiently to
lead to him to reverse his position and on 12 March 1992
to suspend temporarily the transfer of tactical nuclear
weapons to Russia. Kravchuk's motivation for the
moratorium is a subject of speculation; his stated reason
was that there was no international mechanism for
verifying the destruction of the transferred Ukrainian
tactical weapons.
The Rukh leader, Vyacheslav Chornovil, was worried about
sole Russian possession of nuclear weapons from the
start. He argued that his country was a rightful
inheritor of nuclear weapons and although it should
maintain the objective of becoming nuclear-free, the
simple transfer of weapons to Russia was not the means of
achieving this. Instead Chornovil argued for a series of
international agreements, leading to the gradual
elimination of the republic's nuclear weapons. Volodymir
Filenko, later head of "Nova Ukraina", also argued
against transferring the weapons to Russia:
"Most MPs think we cannot just give weapons to
Russia. It would upset the balance of power between
Russia and Ukraine. We're afraid of Russia if you like.
We're fighting for independence from Russia."
Some believed that the Ukraine should decommission its
own nuclear weapons. The Chairman of the Parliamentary
Commission on Foreign Affairs, Dmytro Pavlychko, argued
that the Ukraine should destroy its nuclear weapons on
site with international assistance. Gradually, however,
the costs of this option became evident. Experts
estimated the cost of decommissioning Ukrainian nuclear
weapons at around US$2 billion. In fact, Izmalkov argues
that the Ukraine does not have the capacity to deal with
even the fuel of the remaining weapons. He points out
that of the 176 ICBMs, 130 are highly toxic, liquid-fuel
based rockets; the remaining 40 are solid-fuel based.
The Ukraine, he believes, has neither the capacity to
reprocess the fuel or to store it securel
y.
4. CONDITIONS ARE ATTACHED
As it became clear that the elimination of its remaining
nuclear weapons could be both politically and financially
expensive, the Ukrainian government began to make their
removal conditional upon the fulfilment of certain
conditions. The government argued that the unprecedented
decision of a state to eliminate its own nuclear weapons
warranted an unprecedented response from the
international community. Ukrainian denuclearisation
should, it said, be carried out in the context of binding
guarantees for Ukrainian security from NATO. It quickly
became clear, however, that neither NATO membership nor
security guarantees were on offer. Thus, the Ukrainian
government subsequently downgraded its request and sought
"political commitments" and "assurances" from the major
nuclear powers. The Deputy Foreign Minister, Boris
Tarasyuk commented:
"It is a question of the nuclear states making a
political commitment in the form of an appropriate
document stating that they will regard as unacceptable
any use or threat of force against Ukraine on the part of
the nuclear states. Needless to say, this kind of
commitment does not guarantee Ukraine's security, but it
will be of tremendous political and legal importance."
At the January 1993 summit meeting between presidents
Kravchuk and Yel'tsin, Russia agreed also to provide
security guarantees for the Ukraine. However, these
guarantees have not met Kiev's requirements on Russian
recognition of Ukrainian territorial integrity. They
have therefore been rejected and further consideration of
START I has been postponed.
The increasingly obvious costs associated with
denuclearisation also moved the Ukraine to insist on
outside financial and technical help. In November 1991
the US Senate approved a plan to provide up to US$500
million for help with dismantling Soviet nuclear and
chemical weapons. The Ukraine worries that the lion's
share of this aid has gone to Russia. It has rejected a
US offer of US$175 million to help with decommissioning
Ukrainian weapons as insufficient. On 14 April 1992
Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko declared that the
Ukraine could only meet targets on eliminating its
nuclear weapons "if we receive the proper help we expect
from outside, including western countries." However, on
28 October 1992 Defence Minister Morozov was forced to
admit that the Ukraine still had not received any foreign
assistance with decommissioning its nuclear weapons.
Ukrainian worries were further stoked by news that on 31
August 1992 the US had agreed to purchase enriched
uranium from decommissioned Russian weapons for use
(after reprocessing) in civilian nuclear reactors. The
deal was said to involve the purchase of between US$5 -
US$10 billion worth of fissionable material over ten
years. This news reinforced a growing Ukrainian belief
that the republic had ownership rights to the nuclear
materials on its soil, especially the enriched warhead
uranium and plutonium. Some argue that these represent a
significant economic investment by the Ukrainian state
and are extremely valuable. If they are to be
eliminated, then only by means of a sale, and they must
make a significant contribution to reviving the Ukrainian
economy. In the light of these developments many came to
believe that the unconditional transfer of tactical
nuclear weapons with their (allegedly valuable)
fissionable material to Russia was precipitate,
especially given that the Ukraine must re-import
low-grade nuclear fuel from Russia for use in its
civilian nuclear reactors.
The debate on nuclear weapons has thus moved a long way
from the initial principled decision to "denuclearise".
An awareness is growing that nuclear weapons represent a
valuable bargaining chip. The debate has moved from
principle to utility.
5. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ELIMINATION
As the political and financial costs of eliminating the
Ukraine's nuclear weapons became clear, those supporting
their retention became more confident. Many of those now
critical of the original non-nuclear policy recognise
that the Ukraine is bound by its July 1990 commitments,
but argue that it is not committed to relinquishing its
nuclear force immediately. The majority position, as
summed up by Ivan Plyushch, Speaker of the VR, is that
the Ukraine should "strive toward" nuclear disarmament.
However, this is a "goal for the future" and the exact
nature of future arrangements will "depend on many
factors".
For those opposed to denuclearisation the major worry is
the uncertainty of the political situation in Russia.
All are worried by recurring Russian claims on Ukrainian
territory (e.g. Sevastopol', the Crimea) and by the
possibility that an extreme nationalist might come to
power in Russia. Given this threat some observers are
sceptical about the value of security guarantees. One
commentator suggested that seeking security guarantees
from Russia is like "asking the fox to guard the
chickens". Igor Derkach, Deputy Chairman of the
Parliamentary Commission on Defense and State Security
has argued that were Russia to press a claim, the Ukraine
would be unable to defend its territory with conventional
weapons. On the other hand many believe that the
presence of nuclear weapons would act as a deterrent to
Russian military action.
Of those urging caution on elimination Yuriy Kostenko,
now Minister for Environmental Protection and Head of the
Nuclear Disarmament Commission, has made probably the
most informed contribution. Kostenko argues that all
states attempt to guarantee their
security by one or more of three methods: either through
military might or economic power or through a system of
international alliances. At present the Ukraine lacks
both the military and economic potential to defend
itself. Moreover, its closest relations are with the
former Soviet republics, in particular with Russia, from
which the greatest threat to its security emanates.
Kostenko therefore argues that the Ukraine is exposed.
To compensate, nuclear missiles should be retained in the
interim. He argues that they should be eliminated only
in direct proportion to the Ukraine's integration into
the west European community of nations:
"Figuratively speaking, the last strategic missile
on Ukrainian soil should be destroyed when the Ukraine's
fate has been fused with that of many states of Europe."
Major-General Volodymir Tolubko MP, Chief of Kharkiv
Military University (and seen by some as a possible
future Minister of Defence) is an outspoken defender of
the Ukraine's nuclear capabilities. Tolubko believes
that the political and economic benefits of owning
nuclear weapons are "obvious". Given that the Ukraine
already possesses these weapons, Tolubko believes it
would be economically unwise to attempt to substitute
them with a large conventional army. He asserts that
Soviet nuclear forces cost only a fraction of the money
spent on conventional forces (allegedly, only 6% - 8% of
the total military budget). He further believes that
retaining nuclear weapons makes sense as part of a policy
of preserving those parts of the Ukrainian
military-industrial complex which produce high-quality,
internationally competitive weapons. In this Tolubko has
the backing of the nationalist "Ukrainian National
Assembly" which has also argued that the preservation of
a nuclear status "meets the fundamental inte
rests of the Ukrainian armaments industry".
But Tolubko's main concern is military security. He
argues that in the absence of a single European
collective security system and of effective guarantees
for Ukrainian security, the new state should maintain its
nuclear arsenal. The Ukraine's nuclear weapons should be
reduced only in proportion to reductions carried out by
other nuclear states, including the UK and France. If
the latter maintain their weapons why should the Ukraine
renounce its nuclear potential?
"Against whom are Britain and France preparing to
defend themselves, or whom will they fight with nuclear
weapons? Why do these states have a right to possess
nuclear weapons without the question being raised, as it
has been in the case of the Ukraine, of their having to
destroy them?"
One aim of the Ukraine's original non-nuclear decision
was to win favour in the West. Many now feel this policy
has failed. Instead, they fear that relinquishing
nuclear weapons could mean a decline in the Ukraine's
international standing with a consequent unwillingness on
the part of the major powers to include the Ukraine in
international fora. Thus, some now argue that the West
will be more impressed by the retention of nuclear
weapons. Mykola Porovsky of the Congress of National
Democratic Forces has argued that the US will not allow
war in any region with nuclear weapons pointed at NATO
territory. He implies that the West will cease to care
if or when nuclear weapons are removed from Ukrainian
territory. Were the Ukraine to retain its nuclea
r weapons (thus disrupting START I and II and the NPT),
initial western reaction would undoubtedly be negative.
However, many believe that this displeasure would be
short-lived; the West would eventually accommodate a
nuclear Ukraine and would attach greater weight to its
opinions given its nuclear capabilities.
Military theoreticians have also contributed to the
debate. Professor Vyacheslav Gordonov, for example,
argues that the Ukraine's non-nuclear policy fails to
take adequate account of current defence requirements.
Gordonov points to the "Law on Defence", which enacts the
non-nuclear principles of the original Declaration of
State Sovereignty. He believes the law is excessively
reactive and defensive and thus inherently flawed.
Gordonov points out that the word "defence" [Russian:
oborona] is semantically fixed; it is one type of
military action carried out under duress. As such,
defensive action can never bring victory and thus by
definition cannot guarantee the ultimate security of the
state. He argues:
"Thus from the outset legislative acts defining the
national security of the Ukraine carry within them the
conditions for their non-fulfilment."
According to Gordonov the present non-nuclear and
excessively reactive defense policy is inappropriate in a
world where significant threats to Ukrainian security
remain, and where other states are working towards a
nuclear capability.
6. CONCLUSION/PROGNOSIS
Despite the arguments advanced by those who wish to
eliminate nuclear weapons, the momentum in Kiev is
currently away from denuclearisation and towards the
retention of a nuclear capability. This is not to say
that the Ukraine will decide to retain its ICBMs.
Rather, as the problems and costs of denuclearisation and
the attractions of procrastination become more obvious,
it may not make a decision to get rid of them. A
significant delay in ratification of START I and the NPT
is possible.
The pro-nuclear momentum of the current debate can be
traced to a number of causes. First, there is a growing
belief that the original non-nuclear policy laid down in
the Declaration of Sovereignty was a response to a
particular historical situation, namely the need to
achieve and consolidate independence. Now that this has
been achieved (much faster than anyone expected in 1990),
there has been an inevitable re-evaluation of the
initial, some say hasty, non-nuclear decision.
Secondly, as the economic crisis has moved to the top of
the political agenda, the nuclear issue is increasingly
seen in economic terms. Over the past year it has become
clear that either retaining or eliminating nuclear
weapons will be expensive. Thus, the easiest option has
been to stick with the status quo. General-Colonel
Bizhan, Deputy Minister of Defence, has declared that:
" ... in today's economic situation, the Ukraine
cannot consider the destruction of nuclear weapons its
priority task."
Bizhan has suggested that those states interested in
seeing the ratification of START I accelerated, should
contribute financial and technical assistance. This
seems to indicate that without the deus ex machina of
western financial aid, denuclearisation will not take
priority.
A third factor contributing to momentum away from
denuclearisation is a realisation among VR deputies that
they hold the key to the global disarmament debate. The
fact is that START I and the new NPT cannot become
operative until ratified by the VR in Kiev. Also, the
recently negotiated START II treaty between Russia and
the US is meaningless if the provisions of START I are
not implemented first. Thus the deputies of the VR enjoy
the spotlight of global attention. Furthermore, since
they hold such a strong hand they have the potential to
demand a hefty price for the elimination of their
weapons.
A further factor is a growing Ukrainian disenchantment
with western security policies. It is a measure of
foreign policy naivety that having gained independence
from Russia, the Ukraine initially entertained hopes of
NATO membership and then of western security guarantees
(although these had consistently been refused to the
states of east-central Europe). Now the realisation of
Ukrainian security isolation is growing; if the West
failed to intervene in the former Yugoslavia, it will
certainly not involve itself (other than by exhortation)
in battles between Russia and the Ukraine. To many this
growing sense of isolation reinforces the need for a
nuclear "big stick" with which to threaten Russia.
.
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