09 March 1998
TRANSCRIPT: BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
(With the SecState en route Kiev, Ukraine March 6, 1998) (1290) En route Kiev -- Secretary of State Albright will focus on nonproliferation issues during her talks with Ukrainian officials, according to a senior administration official. The official, who briefed reporters on Albright's plane en route Kiev, said the United States has received "confidential written assurances" that Ukraine has decided not to provide turbines to an Iranian nuclear powerplant and has terminated nuclear cooperation with Iran. The official indicated that during her visit the Secretary expects to initial an agreement that will make possible an expansion of U.S.-Ukrainian "commercial cooperation in the nuclear field." The official also said Ukraine has dismantled all its strategic missiles and is now dismantling medium-range missiles under the intermediate nuclear forces treaty.The official called Ukraine a pivotal state in terms of security, politics, and economics, noting that the United States has provided provided it with more aid -- $750 million in the past six years -- than any other state of the former Soviet Union. The United States has also brought Ukraine into a "special relationship" with NATO through the NATO-Ukraine charter. Following is the State Department transcript: (begin transcript) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Spokesman (In flight Kiev, Ukraine) March 6, 1998 BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Secretary is coming to Ukraine in part just to underscore the significance of our view of the future of Europe. Ukraine is obviously a pivotal state, both in security terms, politically, economically. We've devoted immense resources to it. They've received more aid than any other state of the former Soviet Union. That's three and a quarter billion dollars in the past six years. We've brought them into a special relationship with NATO through the NATO-Ukraine charter. More than that the visit is going to give us an opportunity to address some important substantive issues that have been on our agenda and problematic for some period of time, particularly on our non-proliferation agenda. We expect to be able to initial a 1-2-3 agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with Ukraine that will make possible an expansion of commercial cooperation in the nuclear field and support for Ukraine's efforts to diversify its sources of nuclear fuel. The big obstacle that we've had here is the same obstacle that we had last year in considering a peaceful nuclear agreement with China. And that is nuclear co-operation with Iran. We are now satisfied that we are going to be able to get a complete cessation of nuclear co-operation with Iran. At the heart of this is, you know, is the famous Bushier nuclear plant for which Ukraine had agreed to provide turbines. We have confidential written assurances from the Ukrainians that this will not go forward and that its nuclear cooperation with Iran will end. Q: Can I ask whether, other then the turbines which are actually being sold in Russia, whether Ukraine has any other nuclear cooperation with Iran? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe they were considering contracts but to my knowledge there haven't been any other contracts for Bushier and we have an understanding that any contracts that are being considered will not go forward. Q: So far there are no Ukrainian scientists in Bashier; there's no intellectual transfer. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I know of. The focus at Bushier has been on the provision of equipment. Q: One last thing. I presume that the paragraph in there about transfer to third parties is about Bushier... (unintelligible) SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will, the Secretary and Foreign Minister will sign a joint statement on Ukrainian-American relations focusing particularly on non-proliferation and there will be a provision in there discussing cooperation with third parties. Q: So it's not in the actual piece -- about cooperation as such. It's in a separate... SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No 1-2-3 agreement will contain such language. The 1-2-3 agreement is what is made possible by our agreement about Iran. Q: The agreements you're going to sign or initial today don't make any mention of dealings with Iran, or do they? You're relying on what you described as confidential assurances... SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. There's a mention of Iran but it's not as specific as the assurances exchanged between governments. Q: Yeah, but this framework agreement makes Iran not happen and that's a facilitating... SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's the other way around. By framework agreement do you mean the 1-2-3 agreement? Q: It's the one described here. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The 1-2-3 agreement is what is made possible by the agreement on Iran. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me say it another way round. This is a standard procedure in non-proliferation: to get concrete assurances at the government-to-government level that meet our needs that for whatever reasons they may not want to state publicly, so we can talk about these confidential assurances, much as we did in the case of China. And based on those concrete assurances it is our belief that we can hold the government to this standard and we're prepared to move forward with giving them nuclear energy technology. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Steve. Q: I presume that before the breakup of the Soviet Union, this company was making turbines for Soviet reactors. Do Russians have no capacity to make turbines and if they do not now I presume they could. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These are highly specialized turbines that would have had to be custom-built for this plant. And to our knowledge nobody else in the world makes them such that they could be bought off the shelf for Bushier. Q: So this shuts down Bushier... SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well Bushier isn't built. Q: So this shuts down progress on the Bushier project. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our judgment is that it has to delay it. Q: Is one of the goals of your policy to make Ukraine less dependent on Russia? They are totally dependent on Russian oil now and by supporting nuclear reactor programs you make them less dependent on the Russians and more independent. Is that part of the picture? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not at the heart of the question. The question is part of this policy aimed at reducing Ukraine's energy dependence on Russia. I don't want to promise too many good things from this particular policy. You can't accomplish everything and it won't really accomplish that although one thing that will be possible under a nuclear cooperation agreement will be to enable Ukraine to diversify its sources of nuclear fuel. (unintelligible remark) SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.. Q: What is the (unintelligible) part of this agreement... SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right Q: We know that they make short-range and medium-range missiles and presume that... SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no...yeah, yeah. Senior Administration Official: Ukraine has been a missile-producing power and it's had large numbers of missiles on its territory. All of its strategic missiles have been dismantled and its now dismantling medium-range missiles under the INF treaty. A remaining force of short-range SCUDs are in Ukraine's inventory, And the future of that force has been under discussion between us as part of agreeing on Ukraine's accession to the missile technology control regime. Q: Those don't come up under the missile technology... SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're category one missiles. Yes they do. Q: How many do they have? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't know. Q: Hundreds? Tens? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Hundreds. (end transcript)
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