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Ambiguity a risky cross-strait stance

Taiwan Journal
12/19/2003

Story Type:Commentary;
Byline:Manik Mehta
        The government of the United States has been careful in the past not to make too clear-cut a position statement on the Taiwan issue, though it has repeated its firm resolve to defend the country against any external aggression. The United States appears determined to effect change in China through what it euphemistically calls "constructive engagement." This language is aimed at appeasing the mainland while hoping that China will soon put an end to its belligerent posturing vis-a-vis Taiwan.

        In the past, messages concerning Taiwan sent from the United States to China have been couched in diplomatic ambiguity, leaving the mandarins in Beijing wondering what the U.S. reaction would be to overt moves on the part of the communist regime to take the island by force.

        Unfortunately, history provides ample evidence that dictators tend to misinterpret an adversary's ambiguity as a lack of resolve. Evidence suggests that former Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein may have misinterpreted ambiguous remarks by a U.S. representative to Baghdad as Washington's desire to remain neutral in his border dispute with Kuwait. Hussein then promptly launched a ruthless invasion of the tiny, oil-rich gulf state in August 1990.

        At a recent press briefing in Washington, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Randall Schriver reportedly expressed "grave concern" about China's latest threat to use force against Taiwan. Such remarks suggest that the United States is determined to resist any overt Chinese belligerence targeted at Taiwan. Here again, though, Schriver's comments can be interpreted in two different ways, depending on whether they are heard in Beijing or Taipei. To be fair, Schriver had the unenviable task of performing a diplomatic balancing act to ensure that the message neither upset China nor gave Taiwan the impression that the United States would abandon the tiny democracy.

        While the United States has not had a formal defense treaty with the ROC since diplomatic ties were severed in 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) provides a legal basis for U.S. intervention in defense of Taiwan in the event of invasion by China. The TRA provides a mechanism--indeed, an obligation--for the United States to help Taiwan maintain the capacity to resist the use of military force against it.

        Schriver's remarks are significant against the backdrop of recent Chinese threats to invade if President Chen Shui-bian makes any moves toward declaring independence. They were far less ambiguous than what emanated from the White House during the Clinton administration, which generally responded to such blowhard pronouncements by China by voicing the "expectation" of a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait problem.

        Chinese politicians have been suggesting that the Bush administration has surreptitiously been trying to influence the next ROC presidential election on March 20 through innuendoes in favor of the Democratic Progressive Party.

        Schriver was careful not to offend Beijing's sensitivities when he stressed that, while remaining "completely neutral" on the outcome of the election, the United States fully supports democracy and the electoral process in Taiwan. Some experts believe that the United States will eventually embrace the idea of a referendum on independence vs. unification, provided such a move does not take place in the near future. After all, they argue, referendums are part of a vibrant democracy. While referring to the decision to hold a referendum as a matter of Taiwan's "internal affairs," Schriver made it clear that Washington would not support any referendum on independence.

        In short, Washington is trying to send a message to China on Taiwan: that it would like to maintain the status quo even as it supports democracy on the island. It is also telling Beijing that while it will not support efforts by Taiwan's politicians to move toward independence, it also will not tolerate an invasion of the island.

        In a way, the message is as confusing as it is clear to both Beijing and Taipei. In Beijing, it seemed that Schriver was warning China to keep its hands off Taiwan or face opposition from Washington, though he failed to specify what consequences China would face in the event of aggression.

        In Taipei, it appeared that Schriver was supporting the democratic process in Taiwan, but only to the extent that it does not rock the geopolitical boat by leaning towards independence. The assurance of support for Taiwan is also vague, leaving Taipei to guess whether Washington will provide the crucial military support against a Chinese attack.

        While it is not clear to what extent Washington will involve itself in Taiwan's defense, the Bush administration has reiterated its opposition to the use of force in settling the Taiwan question. While it is understandable that Washington is hesitant to unequivocally delineate the extent of its commitment to Taiwan, given growing opposition in the United States to involvement in foreign disputes, Washington needs to avoid repeating past mistakes--specifically those stemming from ambiguous statements.

         --Manik Mehta is a free-lance writer based in New York.