Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

QUESTION: Norman Fu with The China Times. Mr. Schriver, I'd like to pursue the previous first question a little bit. I think the question is quite clear. We want to know whether top U.S. officials, including the President himself, in private meetings and conversations, ever told the Chinese in such language as, "We oppose Taiwan independence," because publicly, the U.S. position, as you are doing now, is always, "We do not support Taiwan independence," or non-support of Taiwan independence.

I think it would be helpful to clarify this, you know, as we see it, pretty important issue. It's not just semantics, because when you say you don't support, or when you say you oppose, there is some difference. I'm aware the fact that Secretary Armitage explained this a year or so ago in Tokyo, but still, that doesn't seem to have put the whole issue to rest. So, as I said, it would be helpful for you -- I'm mindful of what you said, you are not always present at those meetings, but still, you have access to the transcripts and briefings, whatever. So, simply put, I still want to know precisely what is the operative language insofar as Taiwan independence is concerned? Is it, we do not support, or we oppose?

MR. SCHRIVER: Well, let me speak with as much clarity as I'm capable of: Tthe policy as determined by the President, and the policy of this Administration, the United States does not support Taiwan independence.

MR. DENIG: That's pretty clear! Gentleman in the first row here, please.

QUESTION: Charlie Snyder of the Taipei Times. I'd like to know what the Administration makes of this ratcheting up of the verbiage across the straits with the daily comments, increasingly bellicose comments from Beijing. Does the -- is there a feeling that, you know, the stability is fraying a little, that perhaps we're entering a more dangerous time, and if so, have we talked about this to them? Has Kelly said anything in Beijing or have we said anything to the embassy here?

MR. SCHRIVER: Well, I can't tell you what's in the minds of the Chinese and what their rationale, what their intent is. I can tell you what we observe, what we hear, and I think it's clear that the volume is up a little bit, the rhetoric is up, and a little bit stiffer, and we take that to mean that there are serious concerns in Beijing and we listen to those and we acknowledge those.

And Taiwan is almost always a part of our discussions with the Chinese. It's something that they will almost always raise, and this was the case recently when Mr. Kelly was in Beijing, and he had an opportunity to reiterate our policy with respect to our one-China policy based on the three communiqués, and the Taiwan Relations Act, our non-support for Taiwan independence, our opposition to the use of force.

And he, of course, addressed some of the views about the ongoing election campaign, very similar along the lines which I just described, that we're supportive of Taiwan's democracy, supportive of the electoral process, but neutral, don't favor or lean to one candidate or another, nor are we in any way involved in shaping campaign policy or positions. We're, in fact, rarely consulted.

These are the domestic politics of Taiwan and the campaigns are unfolding their strategies as they see fit. When our equities are touched upon in a way that might be seen as unhelpful, we let the Taiwan authorities know privately about that. But I think what Mr. Kelly had an opportunity to say was that we are neutral in this campaign.

QUESTION: Just to follow-up on something you said. You said that you told the Chinese that you're not involved in shaping the campaign policy. Have there been any suggestions that the United States is somehow involved in shaping the campaign policy there?

MR. SCHRIVER: Well, I think, from some of the questions that we get from the Chinese, I think sometimes they overstate our ability to influence either one campaign or another, and so I think it's important for people to understand that this is Taiwan's domestic politics, their campaigns.

MR. DENIG: Chris up in front here.

QUESTION: Chris Cockel from the China Post of Taiwan. Based on what you just said about Mr. Kelly having to restate the policy in Beijing, is it a concern of the State Department that certain comments by government officials in Taiwan or an official, officials, U.S. officials in Washington may derail this delicate balancing act that has been achieved?

MR. SCHRIVER: No, and I didn't say Mr. Kelly had to restate the policy. I said he was in Beijing, and of course, Taiwan is almost always raised, so he had the opportunity to restate the policy.

I think, look, we read the press, and we see what comments are out there, and I think it's in our interest to be as clear as possible to try to achieve clarity. If I can contribute to that today, if officials beyond today can contribute to that, but I think our view is, our policy has been consistent. We've done our best to portray that in an absolutely consistent way, and if we can do that in a better way, or be as articulate and clear as possible, we're going to strive to do that, because we have an appreciation and understanding of how important the words and the messages are.

MR. DENIG: Okay, let's go back there to the lady. Yeah, that's fine.

QUESTION: Vincent Chang, United Daily News, Taiwan. Well, Randy, yesterday Mr. Ereli said in a State Department --

MR. SCHRIVER: Sorry, Mr. who?

QUESTION: Ereli. Yeah, Ereli. Okay. Well, he said in the briefing yesterday that the United States opposed, you know, any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo of the strait, by either side of the strait. Well, I don't know -- can you elaborate here more on how, why he choose to use a word, opposed, instead of, you know, instead of saying that you don't want or you don't expect the kind of things to happen as usual?

And my second question is that, what is your definition for status quo?

MR. SCHRIVER: I think the spokesman's words speak for themselves, and in fact, Dr. Rice made a very similar statement, and I think this notion of being opposed to unilateral attempts to change the status quo is, in effect, a very consistent kind of statement, in terms of what we've always said about our One-China policy, our opposition to the use of force, the fact that we don't support Taiwan independence. So I don't regard this as a new formulation. It's, perhaps to add some clarity, but Dr. Rice, in fact, most recently said it before the spokesman.

The definition of status quo, I mean, this could be a very lengthy description of economics and politics and a very elaborate description. I think what's important in this case is that there are differences between the two sides, and to date, these differences have been managed in a peaceful way.

Our job, our policy, is designed to try to create an environment and an atmosphere that's conducive to peaceful dialogue. So our understanding of where things stand is that there are differences between the two sides that need to be worked out between the two sides. And we're not the major participant here. It's between the PRC and Taiwan. All our actions and policies are designed to have the right and appropriate environment for the two sides to sit down in peaceful dialogue to try to resolve those differences.

QUESTION: So your answer is you're quite ambivalent, isn't it?

MR. SCHRIVER: Well, that's not what I said. I mean, I could talk for a long time about the political situation on both sides, the political situation and the cross-strait relationship, the economics that all sort of defines the status quo, but what we're interested in, the operative part of this, is the simple fact that there are remaining differences between the two sides. They are being managed peacefully. The rhetoric is up right now, particularly on the PRC side, but it's being managed peacefully, and our job is to make sure that that peaceful situation is sustained, and that we get to a point where the two sides can have dialogue to ultimately resolve these differences.

QUESTION: Well, sorry for another follow-up. Randy, so do you agree that the status quo is some kind of that Taiwan, being the Republic of China, and mainland China being the People's Republic of China, as it is now?

MR. SCHRIVER: Respectfully, this is sort of an uninteresting question to me. I think what I described is the important elements of what we think about when we speak of the status quo, and that's that there are differences and that they be managed peacefully.

QUESTION: Can I follow up?

MR. DENIG: Let's go to the lady back there, please.

QUESTION: This is Min Lee with Taiwan Television. Randy, can you confirm that Mr. Moriarty at NSC has -- whether he has visited Taiwan recently and what's the purpose of his trip?

And my second question is a follow-up on the submarine. Does it seem silly to you that Taiwan want to buy subs?

MR. SCHRIVER: No, I have no comment on the first. On the second, no, in fact, I already said, we think Taiwan needs submarines. There is a requirement there. That's why we approved the system in spring 2001, and fulfilled our side of the deal, which is we make the system available to Taiwan. And I think there is a requirement there. And if Taiwan is interested in pursuing submarines, which involves coming up with money, which involves working with us to create a program, we're -- we're ready to pursue that.

MR. DENIG: The lady right here, please.

MR. SCHRIVER: Hi, Betty Lin of the World Journal. What is considered provocative, from the U.S. point of view, on the part of China and on the part of Taiwan?

And also, when former Vice Premier Qian Qichen was here, did he express any wish that China hope U.S. would do on the issue of Taiwan?

MR. SCHRIVER: I am not going to go through a set of hypotheticals, "this is provocative and this isn't." I mean, I think that, for the sake of clarity, we're firmly opposed to the use of force, and we don't support Taiwan independence, and that is fairly broad.

We had an earlier question about referenda and the new constitution. If those efforts go in the direction or lean in the direction of independence, we would not support that. But to go beyond that and start talking about hypotheticals -- is this provocative, or is that provocative -- I don't particularly think that's a useful thing to do.

And I'm sorry. I just forgot your second.

QUESTION: On Qian Qichen.

MR. SCHRIVER: I think the Department -- I think we already released statements on Qian's position. I think the Department released a statement after the Secretary's meeting, so I'd refer you to that.

MR. DENIG: Okay. Let's take the gentleman in the middle here please.

QUESTION: (Inaudible), Central News Agency. Randy, China is not happy with what Ms. Shaheen said in New York, that President George Bush is guardian angel of Taiwan. What comment do you have on this?

The second question is: President Chen Shui-bian said in a public -- public speech that when he was in New York somebody called him, assuring him that he would meet Colin Powell in Panama. I would like to know who is that somebody.

Thank you.

MR. SCHRIVER: On the -- on the first question, I can't speak for the Chinese, if they're happy or unhappy, and I think --

QUESTION: I mean, the comment by Shaheen --

MR. SCHRIVER: Well, no. No, I can't speak whether -- how the Chinese receive that. Somebody else can speak for China. I think the important thing is what the President has said, and what the policy is that he has promulgated, and what he has determined and promulgated.

And I've said it before, but it certainly includes strong support for the Taiwan Relations Act, and all the obligations it included. So you pick your descriptive term and what that makes the President. To me, it makes him somebody who is very firmly committed to implementing U.S. law and supporting U.S. law.

And in Panama, I can assure you that no one told President Chen Shui-bian that there would be a meeting in Panama. The Secretary already addressed this when asked, and he said that there was a handshake and exchange of pleasantries. And the Secretary's words, of course, speak for themselves.

MR. DENIG: Let's go to Charlie Snyder again, please.

QUESTION: Randy, when Lien Chan was here, there were questions about who did and who did not call Chen Shui-bian a troublemaker or not. And recently, when Tang Jiaxuan was here, some of the think tank people were complaining that some of Chen Shui-bian's activities are causing problems for the United States.

What is the -- what's the position of the Administration? Does the Administration feel that Chen -- some of Chen Shui-bian's actions are causing problems for the United States, and has the Administration let the Chen administration know -- know about that?

MR. SCHRIVER: To my knowledge, no Administration official has ever used such an expression that Chen Shui-bian is a troublemaker. That would be inappropriate. That would be an inappropriate description.

We're supportive of Taiwan's democracy. We have an important unofficial relationship that has many facets to it. President Chen and his administration have been supportive to the United States in some very important areas. And, of course, on occasion there are going to be actions that we don't necessarily agree with. And in those cases, we let the Taiwan authorities know privately.

MR. DENIG: Let's take the gentleman in the middle here. And if you'd introduce yourself please, sir.

QUESTION: Yeah. I forgot to introduce myself the first time. John Zang with CTI TV. Randy, in 1996, the rising rhetoric on the part of Beijing finally led to massive military exercises.

MR. SCHRIVER: Yes.

QUESTION: Do you see any -- any parallel development in the Taiwan Strait? Is the United States planning any military contingency, because in 1996, the Pentagon had to dispatch two aircraft battle groups? Are you contemplating similar actions, although it's still, you know, the initial stage?

Second question: Do you have -- do you still have full confidence in Therese Shaheen?

Thank you.

MR. SCHRIVER: Well, the second question is the easiest -- yes, absolutely.

The first question, this is different than 1996, perhaps that's a longer discussion we could have, but this is a different situation. To my knowledge, there is no planning or arrangements being made for any special deployments or anything along the lines of that by the U.S. military.

But I will refer to my earlier comment that it's in our law, and we have an obligation to maintain the capacity to resist force, and the implication of that is that our Pacific command does preparation. It's routine, and it's common practice to be prepared for contingencies.

QUESTION: Can I follow-up briefly? You have said twice on the TRA commits the United States Government to make sure that Taiwan has the capacity to resist aggression or military attacks. Does that capacity include U.S. direct military intervention?

MR. SCHRIVER: Actually, I'm sorry if I wasn't clear. It says two things: We'll provide Taiwan with weapons of a defensive character for their sufficient self-defense; and then it says the U.S. will maintain the capacity to resist force. And that's -- everyone has their TRA [Taiwan Relations Act], and you can read that for yourself, but that's the position of the law, that the U.S. will maintain the capacity, and that falls on the shoulders of our commander of the Pacific Command.

MR. DENIG: Last question. Let's go to the gentleman on the way back, please, in the middle.

QUESTION: Thanks. This is actually a prequel to John Zang's question. What is your understanding or assessment of why did the PRC -- why PRC officials have recently ratcheted up their rhetoric? What triggered this change? And I know that the Bush Administration has prided itself in being able to maintain good -- you know, two good sets of relationships, both with PRC and with Taiwan. Do you expect that to change at all because of what's happened in recent weeks and months?

MR. SCHRIVER: I can't speak for the PRC. I can only make an observation in terms of what we're hearing and what we're seeing, and I think there is obvious concern about what's happening in Taiwan and the election, but it's for them to explain why they've raised the volume on the rhetoric.

I think we have done a good job of pursuing good relations on both sides. There's no reason why that can't continue. It does take some vigilance and some effort on our part to sustain the two relationships, both moving in a positive direction, and so that's what we're going to endeavor to do. And like I said, there's no reason why we can't accomplish that.