• Military

• WMD Menu                           

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Publish Date: 08/01/2002
Story Type: FOREIGN RELATIONS
Byline: RICHARD HALLORAN

BY RICHARD HALLORAN

In both word and deed, the Bush administration has adopted a more supportive stance toward Taiwan than the US government has shown in decades. But Taipei is well aware that the backing has its limits, as Washington also places a high degree of importance on improving its relations with Beijing.
 

The first military officers from Taiwan to be enrolled at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Hawaii were scheduled to graduate this month after twelve weeks of seminars with colleagues from the United States and thirty other nations. In the grand scheme of things, this event will scarcely be noticed--but it quietly underscores the new US policy on Taiwan set by President George W. Bush.

By any measure, Bush has shown the strongest support for Taiwan of any American president since President Richard M. Nixon traveled to Beijing thirty years ago. Jimmy Carter shifted US diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing. Ronald Reagan was more concerned with the Soviet Union than with Asia. George H.W. Bush allowed F-16 fighters to be sold to Taiwan but more to score political points during a US election campaign than to defend Taiwan. And Bill Clinton hit a hard left rudder to come close to acknowledging Beijing's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan.

The current president's public pledge that the United States would do "whatever it takes" to help Taiwan defend itself is well known. So is his administration's permission for Taiwan to buy a raft of modern weapons for US$4 billion. Defense Minister Tang Yiau-ming's journey to Florida in March to meet with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, and senior representatives of America's leading defense contractors was the highest-level meeting between US and Taiwanese defense leaders in decades. It was well publicized despite efforts to keep it low key so as not to offend Beijing.

The most succinct American statement on resolving the Taiwan question, and the most forceful in recent memory, came from Secretary of State Colin Powell in testimony before Congress in January 2001: "We expect and demand a peaceful settlement, one acceptable to people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait." The demand that decisions about their homeland have the assent of the people of Taiwan crept into US rhetoric during the Clinton era but has been made part of policy by Bush.

Less well known changes have included a thorough revision of US war plans to assist Taiwan in the event of an unprovoked attack by the People's Republic of China (PRC). Under Admiral Dennis Blair, who retired in May as commander of US forces in the Pacific, those plans have been updated to account for Chinese acquisition of modern Russian warplanes and warships and have addressed weaknesses in Taiwan's defenses. "That was laborious stuff," said one officer. "It took thousands of man-hours. Some of the staff had to work so hard they started calling it the Blair Witch Project," referring to a popular horror movie. At the same time, Blair has told Chinese leaders that US forces are prepared to fight on behalf of Taiwan if a political decision is made to do so. And he has told them that the defense of Taiwan would be worth risking American lives. Whether Chinese leaders believe him, however, is open to question, as they have openly asserted that the United States would not take that risk. Such is the stuff of miscalculation.

In response to questions from Congress, the new leader of the Pacific Command, Admiral Thomas Fargo, referred to shortcomings in Taiwan's defense capability--and what the United States could do to help rectify them. He ticked off a list that included command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. Fargo said the United States should help in "improving their integrated sea and air defense capability and assisting them in the integration of their components into an effective joint defense."

In Washington, a Pentagon official explained that "helping Taiwan needs to go beyond hardware. There has been a growing realization here that arms sales are only half of the equation. They need to learn more about operating the equipment, about strategy, about joint operations." Inviting military officers and civilian officials from Taiwan to the Asia-Pacific Center falls into this category. In November last year, the Defense Department, which funds the APCSS through the Pacific Command, instructed the center to invite Taiwanese officers and civilian defense officials alternately with those from mainland China. Two senior officers from the People's Liberation Army and two civilian officials attended the course that ran from January to April. Then the Taiwanese came for the period from May to August.

In an email response to a query, Admiral Blair said that the APCSS course "builds confidence, bridges cultural differences, and helps eliminate potentially dangerous military misunderstandings." He said: "It only makes sense for the APCSS to include Chinese perspectives on key issues for the benefit and understanding of APCSS participants. The APCSS also desires and includes Taiwan's participation. Taiwan provides a vivid example of social, political, and economic transformation. As a showpiece of free-market ideals and democratic government, Taiwan's perspective is also valuable to all of our participants--including China." The Chinese, however, were incensed by what they regarded as an approach that favored Taiwan. Chinese officers then at the APCSS roundly criticized the center for becoming a hotbed of anti-Chinese propaganda.

American officers who watch the balance of military power across the Taiwan Strait say that China could not succeed in an invasion of Taiwan now. But that balance could tip in favor of China within three to eight years, depending on whose estimate is accepted. Short of that, the Chinese could make life miserable for the Taiwanese with the 400-600 missiles that they have deployed along their coast unless they are deterred from doing so. The expansion of American military ties with Taiwan has been accompanied by a fading of the "strategic ambiguity" that marked American policy on China and Taiwan for many years. That ambiguity was intended to keep both Beijing and Taipei guessing as to how the United States would respond to hostilities across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing would not know whether the Americans would come charging over the sea like nineteenth-century cavalry, nor was Taiwan to have any assurance that the cavalry would ride to the rescue if Taipei deliberately provoked the PRC. The intent was to deter both sides from rash action.

In the running debate between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan, a hardening of positions on both sides has cut into strategic ambiguity. Bush has emphasized the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and buttressed that with the "Six Assurances." The Chinese point to the "Three Communiques." Each mostly ignores the contentions of the other. In emphasizing the TRA, which was passed by the Congress over President Carter's objections after he switched diplomatic ties to Beijing from Taipei, Bush has been more forceful than his predecessors. It is the law of the land in the United States and takes precedence over the Three Communiques, a point the Chinese choose not to acknowledge. The TRA does not commit the United States to the defense of Taiwan but comes close.

The Six Assurances, adopted by President Reagan in 1982, commit the United States to continue arm sales to Taiwan, to refrain from asking Beijing's okay for those sales, and to avoid any attempt to mediate between Beijing and Taipei. Reagan also pledged to uphold the TRA, to maintain the position that the question of sovereignty over Taiwan is undecided, and to abstain from pressing Taiwan to negotiate with China. For their part, the Chinese contend that the Three Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982 are evidence that the United States agrees that Taiwan is part of China. No US administration has ever admitted any such thing, although Clinton came close. The Three Communiques stipulate that the United States expects the dispute over Taiwan to be settled peaceably--a stand which the Chinese ignore, reserving the right to use force to resolve the dispute if necessary. Some Chinese argue that the communiques have the standing of a treaty. In neither international nor US law do they have that status.
 

Even those who earlier espoused strategic ambiguity have started to question its desirability. Kurt Campbell, a senior official in President Clinton's Pentagon, co-authored an article in the authoritative journal Foreign Affairs in which he said: "This policy of ambiguity has become difficult to explain and perhaps even more difficult to implement in recent years." Campbell noted a growing debate over whether the United States "should move toward a policy of more explicit deterrence to prevent both provocative ROC political actions and coercive PRC military steps." In an interview with this writer prior to his retirement, Admiral Blairdrew a distinction between political and military ambiguity: "You have to understand that it's only political ambiguity, it's not military ambiguity. There's no question as to what the military facts are in China and Taiwan." A senior US military officer added that the Pacific Command stands ready "to respond to any potential crisis, including the use of force against Taiwan by China."

"Strategic ambiguity," however, has not been replaced by "strategic clarity." Although the Bush administration started down that path, it has been sidetracked because of the time and attention that the campaign against terror has consumed since September 11. Moreover, the Israeli-Palestinian and Indian-Pakistani crises have caused Bush officials to set aside almost all but the most routine questions of foreign policy. Even more of an obstacle to strategic clarity has been a lack of consensus on policy toward Taiwan and China among American decision-makers, who can be divided into at least four schools:

"Panda huggers," a derisive term for those on the ideological left who assert that America must accommodate to China's emerging power, even at the expense of Taiwan's freedom.

Business executives and entrepreneurs who pursue the age-old dream of selling toothbrushes to 1.2 billion Chinese and who care little about what happens to Taiwan.

Balancers, including many American military officers, who say the United States should engage and deter China at the same time. Taiwan's fate is to be determined by the Taiwanese.

"Demonizers," another derisive label describing right-wingers who demand that China be confronted at every turn, although not contained as was the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

President Bush's stance on Taiwan, which appears to be balanced, has several motivations. Perhaps most far reaching, the world has changed since President Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, crafted the Shanghai Communique of 1972 with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. The primary purpose then was to enlist China in the Cold War against the Soviet Union; the fate of Taiwan was subordinated to that goal. Today, the Soviet Union is no more, and the Russian confederation is not considered nearly so dangerous a threat. Moreover, China and Russia have patched up their differences, and Russia is helping China to develop its armed forces as Beijing seeks to restore the Middle Kingdom as the dominant power in Asia.

In this context, Taiwan's strategic importance has risen. Taiwan sits astride the military frontier that China is trying to forge in the island chain from Japan through the Philippines to Indonesia. Taiwan also guards the northern exit from the South China Sea over which China claims sovereignty and through which passes about half of the world's shipping. The United States has pledged to maintain the freedom of navigation through that waterway. Furthermore, Taiwan's future is linked to America's credibility. Cutting through the diplomatic verbiage of the last three decades, the United States is obligated to help defend Taiwan--or see its alliances with South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia crumble. A failure to aid Taiwan would be seen in capitals all over Asia as a lack of American resolve and would severely damage, or possibly destroy, the United States as a power in the Western Pacific.

Then there are US domestic politics. The Bush people are driven by the slogan ABC--"anything but Clinton." Their distaste for the policies of Bill Clinton, including what they see as his soft posture on China, is palpable. The Bush administration is also pressed from its right by what is known as the Blue Team, who are hard-line conservatives critical of any US move that would appear to accommodate China. A longer-range element is American public opinion, which in a democracy exerts undeniable pressure on the president and the Congress in the long run. The American view of Taiwan has tended to become more favorable as Taiwan has conducted democratic elections and fashioned a free-market economy. A recent Gallup poll showed that 62 percent of Americans had a favorable image of Taiwan, while 22 percent had an unfavorable view and 16 percent had no opinion. Two years ago, only 47 percent had a favorable view of Taiwan.

Americans of many different political stripes, including those who favor a supportive policy toward Taiwan, often warn Taipei not to misjudge that support and to think that Taiwan would have a free hand in its relations with the PRC. A formal declaration of Taiwanese independence would almost certainly cause support to dissolve.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, in a recent speech in Singapore to a conference sponsored by the London-based International Institute of Security Studies, summarized President Bush's policy: "We have made it clear that the United States opposes any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means. We have reiterated our one-China policy. And we have made it clear that we expect Taiwan's future to be determined in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait. President Bush has also made it clear that he will do whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself against any use of force by Beijing." Wolfowitz explained in press briefings that the one-China policy meant that the United States, as has been said before, does not support formal independence for Taiwan.

President Chen Shui-bian seems to have gotten that message. "Having US backing does not mean we can do whatever we want," he was quoted by Reuters as telling American scholars on a visit to Taiwan. "We will never misjudge the situation and make a wrong decision that will influence the stability in the Taiwan Strait."

Copyright 2002 by Richard Halloran.