Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Pentagon Spokesman's Briefing
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REGULAR BRIEFING
BRIEFER: REAR ADMIRAL CRAIG QUIGLEY, USN, SPOKESMAN
PENTAGON BRIEFING ROOM, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
2:00 P.M. EDT TUESDAY, APRIL 24, 2001
Q: Craig, is the U.S.-Taiwan meeting now over at the NDU [National
Defense University]? Could you tell us if the full U.S. offer was
presented and what the tone of the meeting was? And what incentive
does Taiwan have to buy Kidd class destroyers if they have the
prospect of buying Aegis within a year or two?
Quigley: Well, the meetings with the - this was General Huoh --
H-U-O-H is the correct spelling - he is the vice chief of their
defense staff - went from about 9:00 to noon today. They were held
over at the National Defense University on Fort McNair.
And what these exchanges of information are - we need to be clear
here. This is an expression of the United States' willingness to
approve these systems, this list of systems, if the Taiwanese wish to
purchase them. And the way ahead from here is that the Taiwanese will
take this list back home and they will discuss it within their
government, within their military, in the weeks and months ahead, and
make an assessment as to whether or not the individual items on the
list are affordable; is this a system that fits into their overall
blueprint and architecture for their defense capabilities in the years
ahead; will I have training systems, maintenance systems in place, or
can I hire those out? How will I support these systems once I have
them in my inventory?
And it's entirely conceivable and, in truth, many times in past years
that an item that we say will be approved, should the Taiwanese ask
for it, the Taiwanese never ask.
And after further assessment on their part they determine that it's
not affordable or not desirable for some reason or another and just
simply never ask.
But if there's an item on the list that they do wish to pursue, then
it's a separate and individual exchange of letters; it's a request for
a sale and it goes through the normal process that you are more
familiar with, I think, in our normal discourse between nations, where
you ultimately have the notification of the Congress and the whole
bit.
So this is the first step, really, in this process that will go on for
another year. It's an additive process, of course. The sales of
equipments from prior years all go into the assessment that we do to
try to determine the legitimate defensive needs of Taiwan.
Q: Just a brief follow up: Again, what incentive do the Taiwanese have
to buy Kidds if you're still holding out the prospect of aegis? And
how do you respond to Chinese charges that submarines are offensive
weapons and not defensive weapons?
Quigley: Well, if you - to the first question, Charlie, the next step
from here would, once we have expressed our willingness to approve the
sale or transfer of the four Kidd-class destroyers, the Taiwanese then
take that back and they say, "Okay, do we want four, do we want a
number different than four, how would we man them, how would we train
our sailors to operate them, how would they fit into our overall
defense architecture?" And it's possible that they would not ask for
those four Kidd-class destroyers to be made available to them. That's
entirely possible. So that the next step from here is them to take
this list back home and to go through it item by item, look at it
holistically: "How does it improve my defense capabilities, is it
affordable, is it maintainable?" - and things of that sort.
So the answer to your first question at this point, really, rests with
the Taiwanese.
Q: And again - and again, excuse me --
(Cross talk.)
How about the charge by the Chinese that submarines are offensive
weapons - and we don't build diesel-class subs - how would that be
handled?
Quigley: Well, I don't know the answer to the "how it would be
handled" yet. I mean, we're just not to that - first things first.
And first, the Taiwanese would have to express their interest in
pursuing the acquisition of diesel electric submarines, and that there
are a variety of designs available in the world today. But we just
have to take that one step at a time, and we're not that far yet.
Q: But the Chinese say they are offensive weapons.
Quigley: Well, I would disagree with that and say that the purposes
that - the spirit in which - that we would pre-approve them for sale
to the Taiwanese was - excuse me - as a system that would meet the
legitimate defense needs of Taiwan.
Q: Are you raising the possibility of building diesel submarines for
Taiwan?
Quigley: I don't know the answer to that one yet, Pat. Like I say,
first things first. There are a variety of good diesel electric
submarine designs available today. You could manufacture them in
several different places.
You could do licensing agreements. Just don't know which way that
would go.
Q: Craig --
Q: A German diesel submarine --
Quigley: The Germans have a good design. The Dutch have a good design.
I believe the Italians - there are good designs for diesel electric
submarines out there.
Q: They would build them, and we would supply them to Taiwan?
Quigley: Don't know that step.
Q: Craig, the Germans and the Dutch are the two main manufacturers of
private subs, and both of their governments said today that they
haven't even been approached or sounded out on the issue of licenses.
Quigley: Right. That's because we're not to that step yet. The next
step, as I've said, is the Taiwanese to express their interest in
pursuing this. This is our willingness to approve their request in
advance, pre-approval, if you will, should they so desire.
Now there's no requirement for them to - they take this back. They
assess this. They could ask for a smaller number. They could ask for
the same number, with particular design details in mind. We just don't
know. We're just not to that point.
Q: Well, how do you phrase the offer to them of submarines?
Quigley: Diesel electric submarines, no particular design.
Q: Why are we offering them something that we don't have? Why is the
U.S. even inserted into that process? If they want them, why don't
they just go directly to manufacturers of them? Why are we involved?
Quigley: Well, let me just - if the Taiwanese choose to come to us --
Q: Right.
Quigley: - and ask for the acquisition of diesel electric submarines,
we're saying that we would say yes to that request.
Q: But we don't have them.
Quigley: And much homework would then be required after that step.
Q: So I just - could you please explain, because I think a lot of
people don't understand, why the United States is giving permission
for them to purchase from us or from someone else a weapon that we
don't have to give them?
Quigley: Well, I think you have to take it one step at a time. I don't
have all the details, Pam. I'm sorry.
Q: Oh, I'm not asking for the details, I'm asking for the arrangement
that we have with Taiwan. Why are we giving them permission to buy or
lease or get a weapons system that we don't have at the moment?
Quigley: We would help them find a way if that is something they wish
to pursue.
Q: And why wouldn't they just turn to someone else who has it and get
it directly from them?
Quigley: Can't answer that one. I don't know.
Q: Can I follow up on that, Craig?
Quigley: Yes.
Q: Okay. Is this list made up somewhat from the Taiwanese giving some
input to some of the things they're interested in? Does that go into
making up this list?
Quigley: It is an element of that, yes. But it's also an individual
U.S. assessment every year as to trying to determine the most pressing
and legitimate of their defense needs. So it is a combination of that.
Dale?
Q: How did the submarines get on our list in the first place? I mean,
somebody had to say, "Well, I wonder if they'd be interested in
diesel-electric submarines?" How did that get on our list of things
that we'd be willing to sell them?
Quigley: I don't know the derivation of that.
John?
Q: The White House spokesman today said that there would not have been
an offer to provide diesel submarines to the Taiwanese if the United
States was not reasonably certain it could make good on that offer,
suggesting that some groundwork has already been done on this. This
isn't just sort of out of mid-air. Can you describe any kind of
preparation work that the Pentagon has done to see that this deal can
go down? Or are you saying that no preparation work whatsoever has
been done by the Pentagon to look into seeing whether these submarines
can be provided?
Quigley: We are reasonably sure that if the Taiwanese wish to come
through us to obtain submarines, then, going back to Pam's question,
we will find a way to make that work. But to the best of my knowledge,
no advance prep work - because those of you who have been rapid to
pick up the phone and call the Dutch and the German governments have
found that there has been no interaction with their governments
because it's premature to do so at this point. But if they express
that interest, we are confident that we can find a way to make that
happen.
Q: Craig, on this point of the Taiwanese interest in specific weapons,
isn't it true that they in fact did come to the U.S. government and
say, "Here is what we want" --
Quigley: Yes.
Q: - including submarines?
Quigley: I don't know that submarines or any other element was on that
list. I know they come to us with a list of what they consider to be
-- they think that they'd like us to consider. We take that as an
element and then we do an independent assessment of what we feel their
legitimate defensive needs are, in accordance with the law.
Q: So you don't know --
Quigley: And from that you end up with this list that was discussed
with the Taiwanese this morning.
Q: You don't know what - (inaudible) - is on that original list?
Quigley: No, I don't.
Chris?
Q: Is there a precedent with Egypt and U.S. companies being in
involved in a diesel-electric submarine of European origin? Isn't that
working its way through the process?
Quigley: News to me. Let me take that. It's the first I've heard of
that. [In September 2000, Egypt signed a letter of intent with a
consortium of Lockheed Martin Undersea, Ingalls and RDM (a Dutch
company) to build two Dutch "Moray" class submarines. The subs will be
built at the Ingalls facility in Mississippi. Egypt requested a waiver
to use foreign military financing (FMF) grant funds to build these
submarines and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) approved
the waiver in principle.]
Q: If Taiwan accepts everything that the United States has offered,
what's the total value of --
Quigley: I have no idea.
Q: And how soon would the Kidd class destroyers be able to be
delivered?
Quigley: Well --
Q: (Off mike) - tomorrow, would they have them a year from now?
Quigley: No, it would be a couple of years, at best, to bring them out
of mothballs, test them, train up crews, set up some sort of a
maintenance system, the logistics support mechanism within Taiwan to
support them. A couple of years is a good estimate, but that's just
that, at this point.
It's not at all clear to me that the capabilities of the ships, as
they would be turned over to the Taiwanese, would be identical to the
capabilities as they left active service in the United States Navy.
Don't know that.
Q: Could you go over the other things in the package, like the P-3s,
when they would be available?
Quigley: No idea.
Q: Craig, what else was approved for sale, besides the P-3s, the
destroyers and the submarines?
Quigley: I think I'll not go farther than Ari did.
Q: No weaponry? No --
Quigley: There were other items on the list.
John?
Q: The list seemed to include - and even your remark about the
destroyer seems to imply a certain level of training by the U.S. --
Quigley: Sure.
Q: - that would go to the Taiwanese. The Chinese have been worried
about this, about an increased military-to-military relationship with
the U.S. and the Taiwanese. Is that envisioned in this package, and is
there going to be a sharp increase in the amount of
military-to-military?
Quigley: I don't know if I'd go "sharp" because the timing is very
much up at the discretion of the Taiwanese. When they have assessed as
to whether or not these items will fit into their overall
architecture, they are then free to come to us at a timing that is
completely their discretion. So they could do one at a time over
several months, or something, or two at a time or something like that
-- whatever they think is digestible, if you will, by their system.
But there is never a system that the United States would sell or make
available to any other government that does not come with some sort of
crew training, maintenance training. That's just always the case,
John. You just never say, "Here you go. Good luck." And there is
training that comes along with the ownership of that system. So we
have done that for many years. I don't think this would be more or
less than other sorts of arms sales to Taiwan in years past, or any
other country, for that matter.
Dale?
Q: The United States buys nuclear submarines now from Newport News and
Electric Boat.
Quigley: Right.
Q: Would the Pentagon have an objection if one or both of those
companies wanted to produce submarines for Taiwan?
Quigley: I don't know as if any option is off the table, if the
Taiwanese choose to exercise that option.
Yes, sir?
Q: Yeah, Admiral, yesterday the Chinese embassy here in town said that
this particular sale would be destabilizing to U.S.-China relations.
I'm wondering, in his recommendation to the president, did Secretary
Rumsfeld take into account China's reaction to the arms sale?
Quigley: I'm sure that every member of the president's national
security team looked at this from their particular area of expertise,
made their individual recommendations known to the president, and
ultimately he made his decision as to which way he was going to go.
But as you know, the secretary does not publicly share his advice to
the president, and, you know, only the secretary knows what his advice
is to the president on any given issue. And that's something he does
not share publicly.
Q: Aside from what you told John about normal training on exchange or
weapons, is the United States now preparing to increase its
military-to-military ties with Taiwan, such as - in areas such as
command and control and other areas?
Quigley: No, not that I know of. I think that it's pretty much the
provision of the defensive systems that we offered to approve in the
briefing that we offered them today at NDU.
Chris?
Q: Craig, when you say that the capability of the Kidd class as
delivered, if they choose to take them, would not be the same, do you
mean that they will be dumbed down or they will be upgraded?
Quigley: I don't know. Both I guess are possible. They've been out of
commission now for several years; technology has moved on. They had a
variety of weapons systems. They're very capable ships. Would the
Taiwanese see that every system on board is necessary for them to
operate that ship and how it would fit into their architecture of
their defensive capabilities, they could choose to not exercise or not
use a given system.
For instance, the ships carried the LAMPS [Light Airborne Multipurpose
System] helicopter, okay? And if the Taiwanese should say, "I like
everything on the ship except we don't intend to operate LAMPS
helicopters," well, then, I cut out the cost and the maintenance and
the fuel and the people to run, maintain, refuel, rearm LAMPS
helicopters. And I therefore have cut down my crew size, I've cut down
my costs. Maybe that'll be the most important element of the ship's
capabilities to them. We just don't know that. Those are details we
don't know yet.
Q: Would it sell --
Quigley: John?
Q: Was there an effort by the Pentagon to try to low-key this meeting
today? Was there a photo op and various things?
Quigley: There is typically - I don't know if there's ever been a
photo op over the years. These meetings are private, and we have done
it that way as far as I can remember.
Q: Government to government, or government to entity, or whatever
Taiwan is? So there was an effort to downplay the publicity of this in
a way.
Quigley: Mmm-hmm.
Q: Yes?
Quigley: Mmm-hmm.
Q: And why?
Quigley: Because it's an agreement between Taiwan and our government
of many years that this is not a - the exchanges of letters and of
information and agreements is not publicly divulged. Now, ultimately,
if Taiwan chooses to come back from one or more items from this list
and purchase them from the United States, then that would be handled
in a publicly visible way, as all weapon sales are.
Q: Craig --
Quigley: Yes, Jim.
Q: The most pressing threat that's been pointed to in China is the
missile buildup across the Taiwan Strait. But what in this weapons
package addresses that? It seems like - at least the weapons systems
that have been mentioned so far seem to be mainly for fleet defense
and anti-submarine warfare. Is there anything in this package that
would help the Taiwanese counter that missile threat?
Quigley: I'm going through the list in my head. I can't give you an
accurate answer. I would say it's a robust package, heavily oriented
towards maritime capabilities. I don't know if there is anything in
there - I just don't remember, Jim, if there is anything - none of
the items that we've discussed publicly, as you've seen this morning,
the P-3 aircraft, the Kidd destroyers and the submarines, those are
all very maritime in their focus, with a sea control and an
anti-submarine warfare capability; more so than missile defense,
certainly.
Q: So, for example, did Taiwan express an interest in buying the
latest PAC-3 version of the Patriot missile, and was there a conscious
decision not to make that system available?
Quigley: Again, I will go no further than Mr. Fleischer has gone
earlier in the day in describing the systems.
Q: (Off mike) - was there a background briefing from the Taiwanese on
the PAC-3?
Quigley: I don't know.
Q: Also, could you say, in the case of the Kidd class, one of its
capabilities is to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles. Was that --
Quigley: No, actually it is not capable of doing that, yeah. That was
-- those ships were designed before Tomahawk had been invented, if you
will, except it was in its very, very early stages. And with as much
weight as high as you are in the ship - if you recall, Jim, in the
early days of the Tomahawk program we put these armored box launchers
on the topside of the ships. That really did bad things to the weight
and moment of that ship, and you just could not do that.
So, short of ripping out the entire missile - surface to air missile
launcher and magazine system and putting in a vertical launch system,
which is what you have in Ticonderoga-class cruisers - kind of the
next step up - which would have been astronomically expensive, they
just said no, for these four ships we will not give it Tomahawk
capability.
It had Harpoon anti-ship missiles, but those were much smaller, much
lighter; did not do the bad things to the weight and moment of those
ships.
Pam?
Q: I understand that there are both political and military reasons for
not offering the Aegis destroyer system. Could you explain, from a
military point of view, what the concern is about Taiwan not being
able to absorb Aegis? What does that mean? What's the danger if you
give a military a capability that they can't absorb? What could
happen?
Quigley: I think you try to make your decision based on what a country
or an entity can effectively use. Other than to say that a variety of
inputs went into the president's decision, that being one of them, I
can't rank them for you --
Q: Oh, no, I don't want you to. I'm just saying like, is it - is the
problem like if you give them Aegis and it can take on 100 targets at
once, it's going to start shooting the wrong people out of the sky
because they can't operate it? What's the danger?
Quigley: One of the concerns might be to devote so much of a defense
budget to a particular system that other capabilities atrophy over
time that you also feel are important to have a comprehensive,
well-rounded defensive capability.
Aegis is a demanding system technologically, training-wise,
maintenance-wise. It's very good when it's full up and running, but it
is not cheap to operate. And if you would devote so much of your
resources to that particular system, let's say, there is a possibility
that other elements of your defense capability might atrophy to the
point where you find yourself in a serious imbalance, and we would not
think that a good thing.
Chris?
Q: You mentioned that the Kidd class might be sold, or I think you
said "transferred". I'm guessing these would be - even if they were
sold, it would be a much smaller price tag associated with that than
the billion that an Arleigh Burke would cost.
Quigley: Oh, yes, yeah.
Q: Can you give us a rough idea?
Quigley: No. Have no idea. We're not to that step yet. I mean, the
sales of former U.S. ships have varied widely in price over the years,
depending on how many years service they are judged to have left, how
sophisticated they are. It's an element of Foreign Military Sales. If
the U.S. thinks its own national interests are increased by having a
friend or an ally in one part of the world have a very capable sort of
a system, whether it's a ship or another one, there could be discounts
or something given to the actual cost and the transfer. So it's all
over the map.
It's an individual decision.
Q: (Off mike) - right? They just have to pay, for example, for the
marginal costs of getting it out of mothballs and getting it ready,
rather than having to pay for the whole platform itself?
Quigley: I think we need to have step two take place first, and that's
an expression by the Taiwanese of their interest in such a system.
Dale?
Q: Well, just to follow that, I mean, have you all given the Taiwanese
a range of costs here? It looks like to me they'd have to know what
they're going to have to pay in order to help them decide what they're
interested in buying.
Quigley: If they're at all interested in one or more of the elements
from the list, Dale, they would come back to us and say, "Let's talk
in more depth on this item," and then we would go to the next step,
which would be more --
When you would receive a letter of request, it would - then that
letter typically asks for a detailed cost and maintenance and logistic
support and things of that sort, all as part of the package. And
typically, these are exchanges that take many months to accomplish.
Q: So as of now we haven't even given Taiwan a ballpark figure or a
range of figures? For example, the Kidds might cost between x and x.
We don't --
Quigley: Not that I'm aware of, no. Not that I'm aware of. They're
very aware of the capabilities of the ship type. You can pick up a
copy of Jane's and get a very good description of what those ships are
capable of doing. But to the best of my knowledge, there's been no
exchange of cost information yet or the numbers of people required to
maintain or repair, things of that sort.
Q: New subject?
Q: One more?
Quigley: Sure.
Q: At today's meeting, did the Taiwanese indicate how long they want
to mull over this, and when they decide what they want, what kind of
an announcement will be made? Will it be a public announcement of, We
want x, y, and z?
Quigley: The answer to the first part is no, and the answer to the
second part is when they make a request of the United States, then
that would be handled like a normal weapons sale to another
government, and that would ultimately be worked here, within the State
Department, other elements in the interagency process, and finally put
forward to the Congress for them to approve or disapprove. And then
it's completely public.
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