Washington, Feb. 15 (CNA) The disturbing conclusion to an analysis by a renowned American think tank is that Communist China, despite an awareness of its relative weakness, might nevertheless be willing to use force against the United States or in a way that runs a major risk of US involvement, seeking primarily to achieve a political effect.
In a 106-page study on "Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings" for the US Air Force, Rand Corporation analysts Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky wrote that one can easily imagine circumstances in which the Communist Chinese might believe such a political effect could be obtained.
The most obvious cases would deal with Taiwan and would seek to exploit the ambiguities in the US commitment to defend the island, especially under circumstances in which a Taiwanese action could be viewed as having precipitated the crisis. "In such a case, Chinese use of force could be directed toward affecting US policy and driving a wedge between Taiwan and the United States," said the authors.
Force could also be used to influence the political situation in Taiwan. By raising fears of a major military action, mainland China might hope to exacerbate tensions on the island between those willing to run major risks for eventual independence and those who do not wish to change the status quo, they pointed out.
Other possibilities for mainland Chinese use of force are more remote, said the analysis. "One could imagine Chinese military actions in the South China Sea in support of its territorial claims. While this could easily involve minor incidents, it is more difficult to imagine how a major clash between the United States and China might result."
The authors are convinced that in any conflict or potential conflict with the United States, China, understanding that it is generally the weaker party, would have to look for asymmetric strategies that would provide leverage against the US and exploit its vulnerabilities, while preventing it from bringing its superior force to bear.
Beijing would seek to create a "fait accompli," they said, thereby forcing Washington, if it wished to reinstate the status quo, to escalate the level of tension and violence. China would then count on the pressure of "world public opinion," the general disinclination to see profitable economic relationships disrupted, and US public opinion to constrain the US in this situation.
In support of this goal, the authors added, mainland China would seek to suppress the US ability to project substantial military resources into the theater of conflict for a limited time, either by information warfare attacks or by missile attacks, or the threat of them, on ports, airfields, transit points, bases, or other key facilities in the Western Pacific.
Beijing could also seek to cause US casualties to influence US public opinion. The analysis said US forces did withdraw after suffering unexpected casualties in such places as Somalia and Lebanon.
Finally, Beijing could seek to exploit the fact that the United States was dealing with a crisis elsewhere in the world. For example, the authors said China could act against Taiwan at a time when the United States had made major deployments to the Persian Gulf.
But the authors noted that China usually took risks in the past when it could count on some support from one superpower against another. Even in 1969, before the Sino-US rapprochement, Beijing gained some benefit from the superpower rivalry. The Soviet Union had to fear that the US might exploit any opportunity created by a major war between the USSR and China.
The analysis pointed out that "the US status as a sole superpower reduces China's maneuvering room, which helps explain the Chinese preference for multi-polarity." (By Nelson Chung)
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
