09 May 2000
Text: Sen. Craig Thomas May 9 on Taiwan Security Enhancement Act
(Thomas opposes Act, says China is changing for the better) (3400) Amidst the rising crescendo of debate over the vote later this month over granting China permanent Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status, Senator Craig Thomas (Republican of Wyoming), the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, sees long-term progress in U.S.-China relations. "I believe that U.S.-China relations have been improving over the past 20 years," Thomas said in a May 9 speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington D.C. as part of a conference entitled "U.S.-China Relations since the End of the Cold War." "You can't unilaterally isolate a country like China," Thomas said. "Cut off trade, and the European Union is more than happy to step in and sell China airbuses in place of our Boeings." The Wyoming Republican said the best way to influence China "is to engage it." The central issue for U.S.-China relations in the future will be Taiwan, he said. The East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee chairman warned against the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which passed the House of Representatives overwhelmingly earlier this year. To have a stable U.S.-China relationship over the coming decade, the Wyoming lawmaker said, it will be necessary to build a stable Taiwan-China relationship. Following is the text of the Senator's remarks: (begin text) UNITED STATES SENATE Washington DC 20510 SPEECH BY SENATOR CRAIG THOMAS, CHAIRMAN SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS MAY 9, 2000 As the Chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I have some twenty-five countries with which I work. Of those, without a doubt, the most important and the most potentially troublesome is the People's Republic of China; and that will continue to be the case in the region long after I have left the Senate. For those of you familiar with the lunar calendar, the year 2000 is a dragon year. In fact, it is a double dragon year -- a rare intersection of the Chinese zodiac cycle that happens only once every sixty years. It is an interesting coincidence that this new century, in which I believe China will play an increasingly visible and important role on the world stage, begins under the sign of the dragon -- the symbol of China. With the Soviet Union and the Cold War having been relegated to the past, we find ourselves left in a different world with the United States as the sole superpower. But while the players may have changed, the stage has not. We still live in a world where countries have competing, and often conflicting, national and regional interests. Just by virtue of its size and population alone, China is the 600 pound gorilla in Asia; the end of the Cold War has done nothing to alter that fact; and the other major player in Asia currently is the United States. And when you take into account our different cultures, our different systems of government, and our different interests, it would be naive not to recognize that at some point those interests are going to somehow collide. Having said that, however, I believe that US-China relations have been improving over the past 20 years. True, we seem to lurch from mini-crisis to mini-crisis -- the Lee Teng-hui visa, the missile tests off Taipei, the bombing of the embassy in Belgrade, the State Council White Paper on Taiwan -- so that if you plotted the relationship on a graph it would look somewhat like the current stock market. But while there are ups and downs, the overall movement is upwards. I also believe, unlike some of my colleagues, that China is changing and changing for the better. You only have to compare the China of 1978 -- the China of the Cultural Revolution and Mao suits and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong theory -- with the China of 2000 -- the China of the economic revolution and Hugo Boss suits and Keynesian theory -- to see that the changes are both substantial and wide-ranging. That is not to say that there isn't a great deal of change left for China to undertake. The country continues to have an abysmal human rights record, stifle political dissent, subjugate Tibetans, attempt to cow Taiwan into submission, etc. There is no argument in Congress as to whether China needs to change. I believe, though, that the question is: how do we best effectuate that change? Do we do it by attempting to isolate China as some Members would have us do, or do we accomplish the task by engaging China, by drawing it further into the rest of the world? In my opinion, the latter is the best course to pursue. Isolating China may be the "feel good" solution -- improve your human rights record or we'll cut off trade, stop threatening Taiwan or we'll cut off military-to-military exchanges, stop selling military hardware to other countries or we'll cut off high-tech transfers -- but do we want a policy that makes us feel good or a policy that works? You can't unilaterally isolate a country like China. Cut off Trade, and the European Union is more than happy to step in and sell China airbuses in place of our Boeings. Cut off military-to-military exchanges, and we lose the opportunity to impress upon the PLA the vast superiority of our military while increasing mutual distrust among our two militaries. Cut off high-tech transfers, and Beijing simply gets it somewhere else. Add to that the fact that foreign governments rarely react kindly to ultimatums from other governments -- think, for example, how we in the U.S. react when another country tells us how to manage our own affairs -- and I believe the unworkability of "isolationist solution" becomes self-apparent. Instead, I believe the best way to influence China is to engage it, to draw it inextricably into the world community, to expose it to the world of ideas. On my first trip to China as Chairman in 1995, the difference that contacts with the west and interaction with western businesses make was clearly evident to me as I traveled down the coast from Beijing to Hong Kong. In Beijing, the vast majority of the population was still riding bicycles, there were very few private cars, and political questions -- especially Taiwan -- and the party line were the sole topics of discussion at my meetings. In Shanghai, bicycles were replaced by mopeds, there were many more private cars, and while Taiwan and "one China" were still topics of discussion, individuals with whom I met were much more interested in talking about trade and what we could do to facilitate economic exchange. By the time I got to Guangzhou, there were even fewer bicycles or even mopeds to be seen, private cars -- including BMW and Mercedes-Benz -- appeared to be the norm, and politics never reared its ugly head as a topic of discussion -- instead, there was even more talk of trade and some interest in talking about how to increase the personal freedoms commensurate with their new economic status. The lesson to me was as simple as it was clear. The establishment of the rudiments of a market economy coupled with trade with the outside world leads to increased personal wealth and an increase in personal entrepreneurship. That in turn leads to an increased interest in, and expectation of, a growth in certain basic personal freedoms. We've seen the same developments in Taiwan, and in South Korea, where authoritarian governments have been replaced by thriving democracies over the past 20 years. The same will happen with China; once the genie is let out of the bottle there is no putting it back in. The march towards a more open and democratic society is inexorable, the only question is how long it will take. And that question of time is part of the problem. By our very nature, with a history of little more than 200 years, Americans like instant gratification. We want to see results and see them immediately, or we don't think the proposed solution is working. In contrast, with a history reaching back over 5,000 years, the Chinese are a little more sanguine about the pace of things. 20 years to us may seem like a long time, but to the Chinese it's just a blip on the radar screen. What we might see as, not much change in a long period of time, the Chinese would view as a lot of change in a short period of time. We would do well to keep that in mind sometimes. As for US-China relations in the future, I believe that central to our relationship will be the issue of Taiwan. Since 1978, when the Carter Administration recognized the People's Republic of China, we began a triangular relationship which has required a delicate balancing act on our part to keep stable. Unfortunately, much like the Chinese dualistic concept of "yin" and "yang" -- where everything contains both a positive and a negative, a masculine and a feminine, a light and a dark, a good and an evil -- key to the success of this relationship is also the source of its potential downfall: it is constructed to be vague. And this nebulous character pervades the entire trilateral relationship. For example, at the core of the stability of the relationship is the principle that there is but one China, and that Taiwan is a part of China. All three sides have agreed, in principle, to adhere to this "one China" policy, and by doing so have enabled the maintenance of status quo for the past 22 years. Yet adherence to that policy sows the seeds of its own demise because what is unstated is that each of us has a slightly different definition of what that policy is. To the PRC, it means there is one China, Taiwan is a part of China, Taiwan is a renegade province of China, and Taiwan must be returned to the fold under the leadership of the central communist -- government in Beijing, forcibly if necessary. To Taiwan, it means there is one China, Taiwan is a part of China, and Taiwan must be returned to the fold under the leadership of a democratic -- preferably KMT (or given the recent elections in Taiwan, DPP) -- government somehow installed in Beijing. Finally, to the US, it means there is one China, Taiwan is a part of China, but it is up to the two sides to determine -- peacefully and between themselves -- when, how, and if that rapprochement is achieved. Trouble ensues when those differences stop being tacit and become vocalized. For instance, last year President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan stated that the relationship between the PRC and ROC was that of one state to another. He used the Chinese term "guojia" which infers sovereignty. That statement, then, ran counter to the PRC's definition of "one China" because it elevated Taiwan from a constituent -- and subservient -- region of China to a separate independent entity. You will all recall the resultant chill in relations between Beijing and Taipei. In addition, there is a certain duality and vagueness built into the Shanghai Communique which governs in part our diplomatic relationship with China and our dealings vis-a-vis Taiwan. In it, we commit on the one hand to decrease the number and quality of weapons we sell to Taiwan. And, we say we will restrict our sales to defensive weapons. On the other hand, we never actually say we're going to stop, nor do we define what constitutes a defensive weapon. Like the other ambiguities in this triad, this has allowed us to calm the concerns of the PRC, while at the same time ensuring that we still support our friends on Taiwan. Finally, that same kind of ambivalence is built into the legislation that forms the legal basis for our on-going relationship with Taiwan, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Nowhere in the Act does it legally mandate that the United States come to the rescue of Taiwan if it is attacked. Rather, it is stated in Section 2 of the Act, entitled "Findings and Declaration of Policy," that peace and stability in the region are in the national interest of the United States, that the US expects that the future of Taiwan will be settled peacefully, and that any attempt by the PRC to do otherwise is a threat to regional stability. The inference is, therefore, that were the PRC to attempt to settle the Taiwan question by force, that would threaten US vital interests and we would react accordingly. This vagueness was not an oversight on the part of the drafters of the TRA; rather, it was purposefully built in to serve a dual purpose. On the one hand, it was thought that reading the Findings Section one way -- following the logic and inferring the conclusion -- would keep the PRC guessing as to whether we would intervene in any conflict across the Strait and thus acts as a strategic deterrent to any Beijing-instigated aggression. On the other hand, reading it the other way -- noting that our military support is not promised anywhere in the Act -- would keep Taiwan from provoking the PRC while thinking it could shield itself from any bad results by hiding behind the skirts of our Seventh Fleet. Yet despite its weaknesses -- some might say flaws -- there can be no argument that the TRA has not done its job, done it well, and maintained the status quo since 1979 when it was enacted. Despite arguments from some quarters in Congress that the TRA doesn't work, I think the most telling evidence to the contrary -- aside from the fact that it has maintained peace between the PRC and ROC, fostered a deep and close relationship between the US and Taiwan, and allowed democracy to flourish on the island -- is the fact that it has never been amended; not once in twenty-one years. I would challenge anyone to discover a piece of legislation that has gone unchanged for so long. Yet despite its success, there are those who would, in effect, amend the TRA, establish more official links with Taiwan -- links we have abjured for 22 years -- and upset the delicate balance we have achieved. The most recent example is the so-called "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act" or "TSEA." I believe that enacting this legislation would be a grave mistake. Let me state here that I don't question the motives of those supporters of this type of legislation. Clearly, they are doing what they believe to be in the best interests of Taiwan and the US. I support a free, democratic Taiwan determining its own future without threats of, or actual, intimidation from Beijing as much as any Member of Congress. But their intentions don't necessarily make them right. Legislation like the TSEA is, in my opinion, both unnecessary and would actually decrease stability in the region. First, there is nothing in the law now that would prevent our government from doing what the TSEA calls for. Both Admiral Prueher, the former Commander of the US Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) and present Ambassador to the PRC, and Admiral Blair, the present CINCPAC, have testified to that fact before committees of both Houses and I have not heard one TSEA supporter argue to the contrary. If we already have the capability, why restate it in another statute? This is especially true because the Chinese are so attuned to subtle signals and nuances. To them, enshrining the fact in a separate law -- something we might just view as being redundant -- carries with it an ominous, threatening intent. This shouldn't be a surprise to us; we view certain Chinese actions in exactly the same way. Take for example the placement of certain classes of Chinese missiles in Fujian Province, across the Strait from Taiwan. To place them there is a redundancy -- they could strike Taiwan no matter where they were located in China proper. But we view the closer proximity of placing them in Fujian as an ominous and threatening signal on their part of the PRC aimed at the heart of Taiwan, and protest accordingly. So while supporters of the TSEA argue that it's no big deal, just a simple matter of establishing some phone links and relations between flag officers in the two militaries, the missile analogy shouldn't be lost on us. There is no doubt but that Beijing would view passage of the TSEA as the US turning our backs on the "one China" policy, abrogating our commitments vis-a-vis Taiwan as spelled out in the three Joint Communiques, and supporting the notion of Taiwan independence. There is also no doubt that Beijing would respond in kind. Passage of the TSEA would could a large, serious, and immediate disruption in US-PRC affairs. More important in terms of Taiwan's security, Beijing would react by cutting off what contacts it presently maintains with Taipei, placing more men and materiel on the Strait, increasing the number of military exercises in the region, and upgrading the nature and number of weapons systems aimed at Taiwan. Will this somehow enhance Taiwan's security? Will it enhance ours? Hardly. The last time the PLA held a major military exercise off of Taiwan: Taiwan's stock market fell 14%, and the US sent part of the Seventh Fleet steaming through the Strait as a show of military might. Opposing TSEA is not a question of kowtowing to Beijing. It is not a question of not being supportive of Taiwan. And conversely, supporting TSEA as some kind of trade-off for a yes vote on China PNTR is not a "free" vote. Any benefit to Taiwan will be fleeting, and in the end will be vastly outweighed by the backlash from the PRC. The TRA may not be perfect; it may not be unambiguous; it May not be everything we wish it could be in a perfect world. But this isn't a perfect world, The TRA may not be pretty, but it works. And in Wyoming, we say, "if it isn't broken, don't fix it." I believe that maintaining a stable US-China relationship over the next decade will be primarily dependant on maintaining a stable PRC-Taiwan relationship. And key to that, I believe, is working to maintain the status quo, as we do with the TRA, so that over time the two sides can come to some mutually agreeable solution to their shared problem. The last time I was in Singapore, I had a the fortunate opportunity to meet with that country's Senior Minister, Lee Kwan Yu. We spent quite a long time talking about Taiwan. The Senior Minister said that he believes that although some solution to the Taiwan question would eventually be worked out, but that it will probably take a generational change in leadership on both sides of the Taiwan Straits before we see that come about. He agreed with me that in order to allow for that change, it behooved both sides to maintain the status quo; to avoid making any sudden or precipitous policy shifts; to work hard to keep the lines of communication open, and in fact, to increase those contacts where at all possible; and to gently nudge both sides forward, and avoid letting them push each other backwards. Towards those ends, we both believe that the United States can play a constructive role in helping to maintain the status quo while encouraging both sides to behave themselves and open the lines of communication and discussion. The trick is to do so without getting caught in the middle, which doesn't help either side resolve their differences and only gets us in trouble -- often with both sides simultaneously. The next century in Asia will be one of profound changes socially, politically, and economically; this is especially true in the case of China. It is my hope that the United States will follow a course that will allow us to influence that change for the better, and not one that will push China in the wrong direction. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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