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A consequence of the PRC military threat

March 1, 2000 The China Post

Chen Li-an, a former senior KMT politician who broke ranks with the ruling party to challenge President Lee Teng-hui in the 1996 presidential race, on Monday publicly rendered his support for the KMT's candidate Lien Chan, claiming that the vice president is the person best able to negotiate with mainland China on behalf of Taiwan.

Chen said Beijing's recent threat that Taiwan will face invasion if it indefinitely delays reunification talks with the communist Chinese government, no matter whether you like it or not.

He believes that Lien's moderate and tolerant character as well as his willingness to listen to others' opinions would enable him, if elected, to play a key role in defending Taiwan's interests during such talks.

Chen's decision to support Lien also took into consideration the KMT factor. Chen, who previously served as defense and economics minister and in other key government positions, believes that with the backing of the KMT, Lien would be in a better position to deal with Beijing. Chen reasoned that the Nationalist Party has a historic connection to the ruling Chinese Communist Party, and thus could still carry weight with Beijing during negotiations.

By comparison, Chen continued, the other two front-running candidates would be less properly positioned to talk with the PRC if either of the two wins the March 18 election. As he explained, James Soong as an independent would face inherent and constant opposition from the other two major political parties, putting him in a weak position to carry out cross-strait talks.

As for candidate Chen Shui-bian of the DPP, he could possibly have difficulty in winning the trust of Beijing because both of his party's pro-independence platform and his own longstanding record on advocating independence for Taiwan.

Generally speaking, Chen Li-an's belief that Lien is better able to address Taiwan's crucial PRC relations than either of his two main rivals reflects the view of the majority of voters, as almost invariably revealed in past opinion polls on the various candidates' ability to deal with mainland Chinese leaders.

The decision by Chen to come out to support Lien at this point, however, seems to represent, in particular, a shared desire of many current non-mainstream KMT elders or former party heavyweights, who like him, left the ruling party because of their deep dissatisfaction with President Lee Teng-hui's mainland policy.

They want Lien to win the coming election and change the course Lee has taken in addressing relations with Beijing. These critics have held Lee responsible for Taipei's failure to improve PRC ties. They believe that Lee has been more sympathetic toward an independent Taiwan than his support for reunification with the mainland.

These anti-Lee people cited the president's Taiwan-first policy, his often high-profile diplomatic initiatives and, more recently, his confrontational description of Taiwan-mainland China relations as "special state-to-state ties." In a word, they consider that Lee has totally departed from Taipei's once firmly held "one China" policy.

What prompted Chen to believe in Lien's ability to pursue better ties with Beijing is a key statement he recently made on cross-strait relations as well as his moderate political views and his inclination to respect different opinions on vital public policies and issues.

The statement in question was Lien's recent announcement that he, if elected, will be willing to return to a 1992 tacit agreement Taipei reached with Beijing. This agreement requires both Taipei and Beijing to adhere to a one-China principle, but it allows each side the freedom to state its own perception of China.

This mainland position of Lien's was considered by Chen as more conciliatory and, furthermore, was also taken as his intention to follow the KMT's long-established unification policy. So he believes that with Lien being the next president, it will be possible for Taipei to repair PRC relations strained by Lee's declaration in July of his two states theory.

That Chen wants to throw support behind Lien also seems to show an attempt to use his influence to bring back many of the KMT's traditional voters, who are seen as having abandoned Lien in favor of supporting the candidacy of James Soong, who left the KMT to run on his own.

By attempting to do so, Chen apparently hopes to avoid what he may consider an undesirable prospect when the KMT vote is so seriously split by Soong that will provide a windfall victory for the candidate of the pro-independence DPP.

Yet it would be unrealistic if Chen Li-an and other former or current KMT politicians opposing President Lee hope that Lien, if chosen to be the next government leader, will totally abandon his mainland policy or take drastic reforms, as is also expected of him.

This is unlikely to be the case simply because of Lien's own personality. He has time and again stated during his campaign that he will work to make necessary reforms to current KMT policies rather than scrapping them. It should also be noted that scrapping of existing policies would be tantamount to denying the key role he has played in the government.