Washington, Sept. 10 (CNA) Two US experts on Asia say that the Clinton administration is now pursuing a misguided "one China" policy that could be making war in Asia more, rather than less likely.
The United States has to adjust the policy to account for the views of Taiwan's 22 million people, according to the two experts.
Robert Manning, director of Asian studies at the Council of Foreign Relations, and James Przystup, a senior fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, jointly wrote in the latest issue of The New Republic weekly magazine that back when Taiwan was still an authoritarian state ruled by Chiang Kai-shek, the "one China" policy had a very different meaning.
For years after the 1949 communist victory on the mainland forced him to flee to Taiwan, Chiang clung to the belief that he would one day retake the mainland and reunify China on his terms. Thus, he was just as determined as Mao was to resist any formal declaration that Taiwan and mainland China were two separate states, they wrote in an article titled "Straits Jacket: The `One China' Problem."
The US government, unwilling to give up all hope that the Chinese communists might one day be toppled, supported Chiang, refusing to recognize mainland China and anointing Taiwan as the sole legitimate government of China, pointed out the two authors.
But that all changed in the early 1970s, when Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger initiated their strategic opening to mainland China. To do so, they had to placate both Mao, who still claimed Taiwan, and American conservatives, who were wary of selling out free China. "The solution was the artful political fiction known as the `one China' policy," which evolved into the three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, the two former State Department policy advisers said.
In this way, the authors noted, the United States managed to strike a careful balance. The "one China" principle remained sacrosanct, but the rightful leadership of that one China was left ambiguous -- as was the time frame within which Taiwan and mainland China would reunify.
No less important, they went on, the United States established a strategic ambiguity, "deterring China by making Beijing feel sufficiently certain that the United States would defend Taiwan if Beijing launched an attack, while leaving Taiwan uncertain about the US commitment to defend Taiwan if Taipei provoked Beijing by a formal, unilateral declaration of independence."
The authors wrote that as political pluralism developed in Taiwan, however, the conditions that made this formula so successful began to erode. Taiwan's political dynamism, on top of its remarkable capitalist economic success, fueled its citizens' desire for greater international standing and recognition. But with both Washington and Beijing still treating the 1970s framework as an idee fixe, growing international tension became inevitable.
While the 1996 cross-strait missile crisis ended peacefully, it led the Clinton administration to rethink its position on China and American officials resolved to seek a rapprochement with Beijing. During the summit meetings in Washington in October 1997 and in Beijing in June 1998, Clinton and Jiang Zemin said they were committed to build toward "a constructive strategic partnership."
But it soon became clear that the Clintonites were willing to go too far to reassure mainland China. Clinton stated in Shanghai the "Three Noes" regarding Taiwan -- the United States does not support Taiwan independence, does not support "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," and does not support Taiwan membership in any organization for which statehood is a requirement. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait reacted strongly: Beijing was jubilant, Taipei distraught, they said. (By Nelson Chung)
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