Free China Review September 1999 To TMD or
Not to TMDPublish Date: 09/01/1999
Story Type: SECURITY
Byline: GARY KLINTWORTHPHOTOS BY HUANG CHUNG-HSIN
What's in an acronym? To some observers, three
little letters spell peace and security; to others, they
represent an unnecessary escalating of tensions.
The two sides can't both be right.
Following the return of Hong Kong in July 1997, and even before the return of Macau in December 1999, Beijing's attention has turned to Taiwan as the last piece in the greater China jigsaw. Taiwan, however, will not easily return to the fold."A durable peace will rest
less on arms than on success
in addressing differences
through dialogue on a mutually
acceptable basis."
--US Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asia Susan Shirk
Taiwan is in a strong international position, morally and economically. It has considerable international prestige as a modern, democratized and well-to-do state. It has self-confidence and considerable self-esteem. Compared with most other Asian societies, it is well-led and well-governed. It is stable politically. It has survived the Asian financial crisis. It has a sharply focused public relations bureaucracy that has been able to target influential audiences around the world. It is strong militarily and, relatively speaking, it is a long way from the mainland Chinese coast.
Diplomatically, Taiwan has gained the Marshall Islands, Macedonia, and (at least briefly) Papua New Guinea. But last year, four countries cut diplomatic ties with Taipei in favor of Beijing.
Until recently, things were running in mainland China's favor. In the Asia-Pacific region, Beijing consolidated relation ships with all the countries that count--the United States, Russia, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the ASEAN states. In the case of Australia, now one of mainland China's preferred partners in the region, there will be a state visit by President Jiang Zemin in early September 1999.
The recent Clinton-Jiang leadership summits made clear the overriding importance that the United States attached to stability in its relations with mainland China. Washington knows it has to cooperate closely with Beijing if it wants solutions in North Korea and cooperation on finance, technology, trade, nonproliferation, and peace in the Asia-Pacific region. Presi dent Clinton does not want US-PRC relations derailed by confrontations over Taiwan, and he has affirmed that the United States will not support Taiwan's independence or its bid to join the United Nations.
But US-PRC relations have begun to take a dramatic turn for the worse, with significant implications for Taiwan. The catalyst was the North Korean missile test on August 31, 1998, and the US decision to proceed with Japan to develop a theater missile defense (TMD) system. As the term "theater" implies, a TMD system could provide an umbrella that shields Japan and the region from incoming missiles fired from any country. The joint US-Japanese project envisages an anti-ballistic missile shield with a radius of about 3,000 kilometers to cover Japan within ten years.
Japan worries about an unpredictable North Korea with a handful of medium-range missiles armed with chemical or biological weapons. However, the real focus of Japan's long-term strategic concern is mainland China's Second Artillery--that is, the PLA's strategic rocket force. Recent Japanese Defense White Papers have noted mainland China's continuing efforts to modernize and diversify its nuclear arsenal. Japan was alarmed by the North Korean missile test in 1998, but it was even more concerned about mainland China's missile tests around Taiwan in 1996 because they straddled Japanese sea and air lines of communication in the East China Sea. It might be said, therefore, that the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have a common strategic interest in developing an anti-missile shield that can protect all of Northeast Asia.
The United States has offered to sell Japan anti-missile systems being developed for its own forces, but what it really wants is Japanese technological and financial cooperation on projects aimed at developing a joint supersmart TMD. If it works, a TMD system would neutralize tactical ballistic missiles, whether from North Korea or mainland China. If a TMD includes Taiwan, it could herald the end of mainland China's only credible means (at present) of threatening the use of force against Taiwan.
Two incidents have compounded what could become a crisis in Washington-Beijing relations. One was the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on May 7, and the jingoistic Chinese response. The other was the release of the Cox Report by the US Congress on May 27. It alleged that mainland China had gained illicit access to information on just about every weapon in the US strategic arsenal. According to the report, the PRC now has nuclear weapons and missile technology that puts it on a par with the United States and could thus seriously threaten the United States with its next generation of ICBMs and SLBMs. The Cox Report, whatever its shortcomings, will bolster US plans to develop a National Missile Defense to protect the US mainland, and a TMD to protect America's perimeter.
That is where Taiwan comes into the picture.
Taiwan's ace in hand used to be its air force. Its survival still depends on preserving its technically more advanced air force so that it can venture out from hidden bases at a time of its own choosing. Mainland China recognizes the strength of Taiwan's air force. It has long thought of ways to neutralize Taiwan's air defenses so that it can land amphibious forces on Taiwan's beaches unimpeded--or, more likely, land jumbo jets loaded with troops on a captured Taiwanese airfield. How ever, with a powerful air force, Taiwan is an almost impregnable island bastion.
Previous PLA thinking about how to crack Taiwan's defenses concentrated on using a quantitative advantage in fighter aircraft to eventually overwhelm Taiwan's small but higher-quality air force. This is not viable, as the attrition rate against modern aircraft like the Mirage and the F-16 means mainland China risks losing most of its air force. Besides, the PRC does not have enough airfields in Fujian and Guangdong to get the numbers it would need into the air, nor the expertise to manage concentrations of military aircraft over Taiwan's relatively small but well-defended airspace.
Mainland China's submarine strength has been neutralized by the powerful ASW capability of Taiwan's Knox-class frigates. A PRC aircraft carrier would be worse than useless.
For mainland China, the cheapest and most effective option has been the development of short-range ballistic missiles, like the M-9 and M-11, and long-range land- or submarine-launched cruise missiles.
In July 1995, mainland China fired six M-9s north of Taiwan, while in March 1996, it fired four M-11 missiles in the East China Sea north and south of Taiwan's main ports of Keelung and Kaohsiung.
The PRC is working hard to improve the accuracy of its M-11 and M-9 missiles. In one or two years, it will have finished developing maneuverable versions. The M-11 (range 300 kilometers) has aerodynamic tail fins to make it maneuverable. The M-9 (range 600 kilometers) has cold gas controls for similar purposes. These missiles, possibly with global positioning and inertial navigation guidance systems, could have an accuracy of between twenty and thirty meters. They can descend from an altitude of thirty kilometers, and then be tipped over so that the angle of re-entry is more acute--or even vertical. This means they could hit targets currently thought to be secure in Taiwan on the east side of the 3,000-meter-high Central Range. If armed with sub-munitions or mini-cruise missiles, holes could be punched into concrete runways--for example, at the Jiashan airbase near Hualian in the northeast, and at Chihhong in southeastern Taitung. The AIDC's factory in Ching Chuang Kang in central Taiwan (where the IDF fighter is assembled) and high-value C4I targets could be hit.
By 2002-03, mainland China will have over 100 accurate M-9 and M-11 missiles. They could effectively neutralize the bulk of Taiwan's air defenses and destroy Taiwan's navy in ports such as Kaohsiung and Su-ao, as well as knock out Taiwan's communications and early warning systems.
In addition to its tactical ballistic missiles, there are reports that mainland China, with Israeli assistance, has obtained the "Popeye"--an electro-optical air-to-ground missile with a range of fifty kilometers. It is air-launched and has a ninety-four percent hit probability. It is a heavy weapon but it can be carried by mainland China's new Spey-engined FB-7 maritime fighter bomber or the Su-27. The missile is accurate enough to hit a door in a building--or an aircraft or command bunker, as demonstrated in Kosovo.
The PRC is also developing a long-range cruise missile derived from Russian technology. This missile, known as the Xiong Ying (Male Eagle) 20 with turbofan and booster, has a range of 1,500-2,000 kilometers at Mach 0.9. Using minicom puters, GPS and INS, it could fly out to sea to the north of Taipei, make a U-turn, and then come back in from an easterly direction to hit high-value fixed targets on Taiwan's east coast--like the air bases at Hualien and Taitung, as well as Pingtung North and Pingtung South. Once secure behind the Central Range, they could then be exposed to mainland China's next generation of accurate cruise missiles. Mainland China is also working on shore-based C-301 supersonic (Mach 2) cruise missiles (range 100-200 kilometers); an upgraded, longer-range (800 kilometer) air-launched C-601 anti-ship missile; and a submarine-launched version of the C-802, which is a Tomahawk-type cruise missile known as the Ying Ji 82 (range 200 kilometers).
These new mainland Chinese weapons systems mean the shelters hiding Taiwan's air force have or will become vulner able. Thus, the idea of a TMD might seem to be an attractive proposition for Taiwan.
The United States is working on a two-layered TMD architecture. The first consists of long-range, high-altitude inter ceptors. The second layer uses a network of short-range atmospheric interceptors, such as the improved Patriot system, for terminal defense. These systems are to be supplemented by the Aegis-shipborne defense, a navy theater-wide defense system based on the Aegis radar and the Standard missile (range 200 kilometers). The Aegis system is a total weapons system, from detection to kill. The heart of the system is an advanced automatic detect and track, multi-function phased-array radar, the AN/SPY-1. This high-powered radar is able to perform search, track, and missile-guidance functions with a track capacity of over a hundred targets.
Taiwan has a lot to offer the
mainland in terms of political
reforms. Mainland China also has
much to offer Taiwan in terms
of market opportunities.
For Taiwan, Aegis-class warships--and they cost US$1 billion each--would complement its plan for low-altitude mis sile defenses using the Patriot II and III. One Aegis-class ship to the north of Taipei, one in the Taiwan Strait, and one in the south, near Kaohsiung, each armed with up to thirty-six Standard missiles, could give key parts of Taiwan's military indus trial complex considerable protection against incoming missiles.
Another possibility is to buy more US Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) III missiles--or the Russian S-300, widely regarded as superior to the Patriot. The Patriot's fast reaction capability and high firepower, as well as its ability to track fifty targets simultaneously and to operate in a severe electronic countermeasures environment, make it an attractive point defense against maneuvering and non-maneuvering tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft. However, its effective range is only about thirty to forty kilometers, which means it is basically only a point defense system. That, however, is all Taiwan really needs.
Taiwan already has Patriot II anti-missile batteries in place to protect Taipei and Kaohsiung. Meanwhile, the manufac turer of Patriot, the Raytheon Company, is cooperating with Taiwanese companies to co-produce a modified Patriot system for Taiwan called MADS, or Modified Air Defense System. But the intercept success rate of the Patriot II against old SCUD missiles was only about ten percent, while the improved PAC III has an estimated SCUD kill rate of around thirty percent.
Against the M-9, it has a kill rate estimated at around fifteen percent, while against the M-11 it is estimated to be at around twenty percent. Assuming new and improved Patriots double or triple these figures, the protection they offer still leaves a lot to be desired. TMD, in other words, is no magic, bulletproof vest: it will not make Taiwan into a new version of the old metaphor of an unsinkable aircraft carrier, although it may be important psychologically.
To make TMD more effective, Taiwan needs access to electronic warfare infra-red satellite systems for launch detection and long-range early warning precision radars for terminal guidance. Cumulatively, this means Taiwan will have to depend more and more on the United States. It will lead to the closer integration of Taiwan's defense systems with those of the United States and Japan. This has advantages and disadvantages.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that unless Taiwan is included in the US plan for a TMD shield in East Asia, it might have to consider going ahead with its own missile defense systems. Taiwan's well-regarded Chung Shan Institute of Industry and Technology has demonstrated its anti-missile missile abilities by testing the Tienkung (Skybow). ROC National Defense Minister Tang Fei has said that Taiwan wants to participate in the development of a TMD shield, and for that he has the support of a recent US House of Representatives resolution. However, Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura declared that Japan was not thinking about extending the scope of TMD to cover third countries or regions.
Mainland China is strongly opposed to TMD, which it sees as destabilizing the power balance in Northeast Asia. Beijing sees it as part of a US effort to counter what would otherwise be a natural expansion of mainland China's regional power and influence. For the PRC, a TMD system represents another step by the United States in its march toward the development of anti-ballistic missile systems. If extended to include Taiwan, it would eliminate the only credible option available to Beijing to force Taiwan to the negotiating table on mainland Chinese terms. From Beijing's perspective, TMD will help keep Taiwan out of the mainland's orbit--and, as we all know, Beijing has often declared that it is prepared to risk war to stop outside powers from meddling in what it regards as its internal affairs.
From Taipei's perspective, anything that helps keep Taiwan beyond the reach of the PLA must be an attractive option. But in the end, a TMD system will take many years and a lot of money; and, even if it does get off the ground, it will not provide a leakproof umbrella.
Another option is to go on the offensive--that is, Taiwan could develop its own ballistic missiles. Taiwan has considered a counterforce short-range ballistic missile of its own (the Tien Ma, range 1,000 kilometers) that can cover much of the adjacent coastal region of the Chinese mainland. But a counterforce SRBM is not sensible for Taiwan, because it is offensive and therefore provocative; besides, it is not feasible to target the M-9s and M-11s before launch because they are mobile systems. This was a huge cause of concern in 1995 and 1996 because while Taiwanese intelligence knew that mainland China intended to fire a few missiles from somewhere in Fujian, the launch sites were unknown.
While a TMD has some attractions, it will not provide a permanent solution to Taiwan's problem with mainland China. For every defense, there is a counter. If a TMD system is eventually deployed in Northeast Asia, the PRC could find ways to counter its effectiveness--for example, by simply building more missiles; by fitting missiles with decoys; by increasing the number of warheads through MIRVs (multiple independent re-entry vehicles) to overwhelm the shield by sheer numbers; or by using MARVs (maneuverable re-entry vehicles) that can zigzag to avoid interception. Aegis-class ships will also be vulnerable to mainland China's superfast SS-N-22 Sunburn missiles that arm the mainland's soon-to-be-acquired Sovermenny -class guided missile destroyers, and possibly the new Dalian-class, now under construction. And the PRC could improve the accuracy of its long-range ballistic missiles.
The result is likely to be increased insecurity and instability in Northeast Asia--and inevitably, a new Cold War environ ment in the Pacific.
Taiwan could of course acquire PAC IIIs for point defense, and the technology to defend key facilities, while eschewing overt membership in a Japan-US security bloc. Or it could use the TMD concept as a negotiating chip with Beijing and, not least, with Washington.
Taiwan's best option is a non-military one. As US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Susan Shirk ob served in Washington on April 15, 1999, "A durable peace will rest less on arms than on success in addressing differences through dialogue on a mutually acceptable basis because missiles and missile defense systems cannot in themselves secure peace and prosperity, whereas dialogue and creative compromise can do so."
Taiwan has already used Confucian virtues and a non-provocative approach to deal with mainland China. This was manifest in the visit to the Chinese mainland in October 1998, by Straits Exchange Foundation Chairman Koo Chen-fu. He walked into the lion's den, so to speak, and reopened the process of reasoned dialogue with his mainland counterpart, Wang Daohan, chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait. On October 18, 1998, Koo held talks with mainland President Jiang Zemin. Koo acknowledged Jiang's reforms and liberalization on the mainland, but he also spoke about the need for democracy. Jiang, for his part, sang a few lines from the ROC national anthem and recited Sun Yat-sen's last words about one China. Hopefully, the cross-strait dialogue will continue with Wang Daohan's long-awaited visit to Taipei.
Both sides have been developing differently, and after fifty years of sometimes acrimonious hostility and distrust, it is not easy to overcome the past and start thinking about a common Chinese future. But, as ROC Premier Vincent Siew recently observed, you have to go slowly to walk a long way.
Taiwan has a lot to offer the mainland in terms of the reform of state-owned enterprises and, importantly, its uniquely Chinese experience in making the transition from authoritarianism to a democratic society. The mainland, likewise, has much to offer Taiwan in terms of market opportunities. A spiraling competition of missiles and counter-missile defenses is not in the interests of either side. On the other hand, if there is to be a journey of peace and an equitable solution to the Taiwan -mainland China issue, the smaller actor, Taiwan, needs reliable guarantees about its security. It has to be strong to avoid being forced into one-sided negotiations. Beijing might want reassurances about where Taiwan is heading, but it also needs to exercise restraint and think about giving Taiwan and its leaders the dignity and living space that they deserve.
Gary Klintworth is a visiting fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University. He was formerly the chief strategic adviser on China and East Asia in the Defence Intelligence Organisation, Department of Defence, Australia.
Copyright (c) 1999 by Gary Klintworth.
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