DATE=8/28/1999
TYPE=ON THE LINE
TITLE=ON THE LINE: THE TAIWAN DILEMMA
NUMBER=1-00771
EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY - 619-0037
CONTENT=
THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE
Anncr: On the Line - a discussion of United
States policy and contemporary issues. This week,
"The Taiwan Dilemma." Here is your host, Robert
Reilly.
Host: Hello and welcome to On the Line.
In July, Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui declared
that bilateral relations between China and Taiwan
should be on a "special state-to-state" basis.
China took this remark as a challenge to the "one
China" policy that has been followed by both China
and Taiwan, as well as the United States since
1972. China regards Taiwan as a renegade province
and has threatened to invade if Taiwan declares
independence. During Taiwan's presidential
campaign in 1996, China conducted military
exercises in the Taiwan Strait that included the
firing of missiles near Taiwan. The United States
responded by sending two aircraft carrier battle
groups to nearby waters. Observers wonder whether
the latest war of words is a prelude to some kind
of military confrontation.
Joining me today to discuss the Taiwan question
are three experts. David Lampton is director of
China studies at the Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies. Robert Manning is
a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations. And Stephen Yates is China policy
analyst at the Heritage Foundation.
Welcome to the program. David Lampton, what
prompted President Lee to make this most
provocative remark last July and has the reaction
to it been apposite, overdone, or how would you
characterize it?
Lampton: I think there are many reason that Lee
Teng-hui probably made these remarks and some are
known best to him. But there are several obvious
factors. One is certainly the domestic politics in
Taiwan. They are coming up on a presidential
election, and I think he thought this would put
his preferred candidate in position and, more to
the point, lock in a policy with which he
personally agrees for the future, irrespective of
the electoral outcome. So certainly domestic
politics was a consideration.
Host: However, he chose the occasion to express
this new term, "state-to-state," to a German
magazine.
Lampton: I think that he is in sympathy with the
general proposition that, prior to reunification
in Germany, there were two separate and equal
states. So I think the symbolism was not lost on
him, nor indeed on the Chinese. The P-R-C
[People's Republic of China] disagrees with that.
I think that there were a couple of other
considerations, though. I think President Lee was
looking at the state of U.S.-China relations. It
was at a low ebb. He was looking at the fact that
he has a Congress in the United States, so to
speak, that is sympathetic to the kind of
viewpoint that he was putting forth. And I think
he thought it was a politically expedient time to
move in terms of his major, big power backer, so
to speak. And finally, I think he is looking ahead
to his role in history and how history is going to
view him after he leaves the presidency. And I
think he is very deeply committed to the viewpoint
that he expressed there.
Host: Robert Manning, do you think that
President Lee miscalculated in terms of China's
reaction to his new policy?
Manning: That's not clear. There is another
dimension to this, and that is the role of the
Clinton administration in creating a context in
which he felt compelled to do this. If you go back
to the President's trip in 1998, a nine-day tour
of China, when in Shanghai, they planted a
question that was supposed to look cute and
unofficial. The president for the first time in
public, a president of the United States in China,
iterated the three no's: no independence, no
organizations that require statehood for
membership, no one-China-one-Taiwan. That had
never been publicly stated before, certainly by a
president. The whole process that led to Lee Teng-
hui's statement began after that. He organized a
commission to review the status. And then you had
the declaration that we [the United States] are
going to have a strategic partnership [with
China]. If you are Lee Teng-hui and the U.S. says
we are having a strategic partnership with China,
where does that leave you?
Host: So he saw support for him eroding in the
United States?
Manning: That's just the beginning. Then the
administration began talking in very amorphous
terms about an interim solution. Nobody could
figure out what it was. Every time I asked I
could never get an answer as to what they had in
mind. But the notion was there should be some
political agreement. Against that background, you
had Chinese negotiator Wang Daohan coming in
October, and I think it is probable, who knows
what's in Lee Teng-hui's mind, he may have felt
that he was going to be put in a box by the US.
And that he was going to find a clever way to get
out of it which, whatever else he achieved, he
certainly did that.
Host: Do you agree with that, Stephen Yates?
Yates: I met with President Lee about a week and
a half ago, and -- although I agree with a lot of
what has been said -- he insists that his only
consideration in this was the relationship between
Taipei and Beijing. He said that he had received
word that the P-R-C was prepared to make a
statement on national day on October first, as
they celebrate the 50th anniversary, to make a
statement on Taiwan that would be extremely
unfavorable to Taipei's view of future relations
with China. He saw Wang Daohan coming shortly
after that, basically hand delivering that message
to Taiwan and putting them in a very difficult
position. So before that process go too far down
the road, he felt the need to reassert Taipei's
status, that they are not just another local
government, and that the relations with Beijing
are not father to son, but brother to brother.
That is the analogy he likes to try to make. So
that is the explanation he gives. I agree very
much with the notion, though, that they felt like
they had been put on a slope. And that slope was
tilted against them, and that, unless they found
some way to wake up the United States, wake up
China, and wake up others, they felt that that
slope was going to have them drift off into
oblivion. And no one would pay attention to where
these twenty-two million people were going.
Host: Well, it certainly has provoked a lot of
debate within the United States and a call for
some greater clarity in U.S. policy toward Taiwan.
Any number of people are under the impression that
the Taiwan Relations Act from 1979 mandates that
the United States has to come to Taiwan's defense
if it is invaded. Some people think the U.S.
should do that even if it is not required. What do
you think of the debate this has kicked off within
the United States?
Lampton: First, I think it is wise to be clear
about what the United States obligations under the
Taiwan Relations Act are. I think the Taiwan
Relations Act sort of mandates two things. One, it
mandates that the United States view with "grave
concern" any use of force and coercion against
Taiwan. It does not specify exactly how that grave
concern is going to be expressed, but it mandates
that we see it as part of the larger issue of
stability in Asia. So clearly, the Taiwan
Relations Act says you will be concerned if force
is used. Secondly, the Taiwan Relations Act
mandates that we provide the people of Taiwan
means adequate for their defense. How much is
adequate and so forth is to be determined. So when
people say we are committed to come legally to
Taiwan's defense, including American armed forces,
that is not exactly true in terms of the Taiwan
Relations Act. It may be a correct, and I believe
is a correct, description of what would probably
happen in the worst extremity. So it is probably
accurate in terms of predicting American reaction.
But in terms of legal obligation is it fuzzier
than many people realize.
Host: Robert Manning, what might happen now? The
reactions in the official organs of the Chinese
Communist party are hysterical in the rhetoric
they are using, calling President Lee a "deformed
test-tube baby" and a "rat running in the street
that everyone wants to swat." And China could not
be more explicit about its threat to take military
action if Taiwan declares independence. Now, is
that threat as serious as it seems and, second of
all, is it credible? Are there interim steps that
China might take of a military or other nature to
which the U.S. would have to respond?
Manning: My sense is that the reason that they
have not done anything yet is that they really do
not have any viable military option, period. There
are some things that might have some therapeutic
value. They can take a little island just to show
that they can do it, but then they would end up
looking weak, because what is going on really is a
psychological warfare campaign on both sides.
From the Chinese side it is designed to walk Lee
back to the status quo ante, before July 9th. And
taking a small island would not do that. All it
would do is make then look weak, so I do no think
that they are going to do anything like that.
Host: Why wouldn't their taking a small island
make the United States look weak?
Manning: It does not get them anything. They still
end up with the same dilemma of the specter of
Taiwan, in their perception, marching inexorably
toward independence. And then the reaction of [the
U.S.] Congress, the reaction of the rest of the
world to a major power using force, the downside
and benefit are not in any kind of equilibrium on
this one.
Host: Why make threats of this nature then?
Manning: I think they are deadly serious. They
seem to have drawn a red line at Taiwan changing
its constitution, as that would be the irrevocable
step that puts them on an absolute course toward
independence.
Host: You spoke with President Lee, Steve Yates.
Is this declaration of state-to-state relations
one step on the road to a declaration of
independence?
Yates: In his mind, no. Obviously there are people
in Taiwan and in China and in the United States
who disagree with his viewpoint.
Host: Who think that it should be a step toward
independence?
Yates: Who think that it is. Some people and
many Beijing have believed that Lee Teng-hui has
wanted independence all along and he is just a
conniving man who is just trying to find a back
door way to declare independence, instead of
calling for it outright. My personal view is that
this really is the only path toward unification if
it is going to be peaceful. Beijing's policy of
pretending that a government does not exist in
Taipei, that it does not represent the people of
Taiwan, does not bring them any closer to any real
solution. Perhaps Lee's statements don't either,
but I think President Lee views this as the only
way to position his government somewhat favorably
in negotiations with the mainland. They feel like
they are getting pushed into negotiation at a
position of great disadvantage.
Manning: I think you have to role the tape back
quite a bit further. Starting in 1972 we created a
framework to manage the Taiwan problem. It was
based on a wonderful political fiction that there
is but one China and that people on both sides of
the strait believe this is the case. And the U.S.
claimed to acknowledge that position, not support
it, not accept it or deny it, but acknowledge it.
This worked very well. Everybody has prospered
over the last generation, remarkably. It does not
work anymore. There is a new factor in the
equation, and that is the democratization of
Taiwan. That is what all the tension we have seen
over the last four or five years stems from. And
the problem is that both Beijing and Washington
have their heads in the sand. They like it the old
way. I can't blame them. It worked well, but it
doesn't work anymore. And the whole framework has
to be adjusted to take into account that Taiwan is
a democratic society. They're tired of being kind
of a ghost in the whole international system.
They want some kind of political space. And I
believe there are possibilities for them to
achieve that within the framework of one China
with a little bit of political imagination, which
is unfortunately missing from all sides in this
equation. But if you don't understand that, then
the rest of this dos not make sense. And the other
thing I would say is there is no possibility
anytime soon that I can see of a mutually
acceptable resolution of the Taiwan question.
That's at least fifteen or twenty years out there.
So that's out. The status quo does not work, and
my concern is that we could be headed toward a
military conflict if there are not some new
elements injected into this.
Lampton: I would agree with that. And I would say
that, as long as we are rolling the tape back, we
can roll back a little further and I think it
would be helpful. When Mao Zedong talked about
resolving this, he would, of course put it "the
Taiwan issue," he was speaking in terms of a
hundred years. In the recently released Kissinger
transcript, it is an interesting line: we can wait
a hundred years, but in the end we will fight you
for Taiwan. Deng Xiaoping shortened the time
horizon. He began to talk about fifty years. But I
think very recently, particularly about the
beginning of the year, Jiang Zemin and Vice
Premier Qichen Qian began to talk about this,
saying it cannot remain unresolved indefinitely.
And it seemed they had something more in mind of a
five-year time frame. The fact of the matter, I
think, is the P-R-C sees the trends that Bob is
pointing to working against it. And I think Lee
Teng-hui sees time working against him. And so
what we have now is two regimes that are
increasingly anxious to get their preferred
position locked in, and that is a very dangerous
situation, particularly when you have the
situation of the identity of the people of Taiwan
moving further and further away from a self-
conception of unity. In fact, more and more people
on Taiwan, all the public opinion polls show, when
they are asked, "are you Chinese or are you
Taiwanese?" the percentage that basically has a
heavy Taiwanese identification is going up. So
what makes this so dangerous is that, in fact, the
people of Taiwan are going in one direction, and
the governments of the two respective parties
think they have less and less time to solve this
problem.
Host: Well, what does the United States do,
because should a conflict break out we invariably
are going to be involved in some way? And some
people say that what the United States should do
now is dispel any ambiguity about what we mean by
"gave concern" and say, "we will come to their
defense," and make that clear. Others say that is
throwing gasoline on a fire.
Manning: What I am concerned about is that, if you
look since July 9th at all the public utterances
of the administration, the one thing that I think
it is imperative that they say, they have not
said, and that is: "no unilateral change in the
status quo." That to me is the bedrock of the
U.S. position on this, that and a peaceful
resolution.
Host: But isn't that implied when they simply
say we want a peaceful resolution and we would
view anything other than that with "grave
concern"? Doesn't that translate into what you
just said?
Manning: Not exactly. That sort of cuts on both
sides. It sort of puts us into the position of
putting everybody on notice rather than tilting
one way or the other.
Host: And your remark doesn't tilt both ways?
Manning: It does, but equally.
Yates: The problem that I have with that approach
is that: who is going to define what is a change
in the status quo? And what we have seen over the
last year or so, or even longer really, but
especially over the last year, is a constant
campaign for Beijing to define everything that
President Lee does as a move toward independence.
And with every step toward independence, they feel
that they have to ratchet things up a notch. And
what we see from the administration is increased
fear as Beijing beats its chest harder and harder:
"Oh no, we have go to do something." And I just
think that it is very, very difficult to try to
say, what is the difference between what President
Lee said and a move toward independence? Or was
this, in fact, a move toward independence? Or was
it simply a statement of what is the status quo
from one particular point of view? It doesn't
really get us out of the war of words.
Host: Well, what should he U.S. do?
Yates: I think the United States should be very
clear that if force is used it will be met with
force, and we do not consider any force used to
resolve a political dispute legitimate. If we are
going to use force to try to defend a million or
so Kosovars, I think it is just ridiculous to
think that we are just going to turn away from
twenty-two million people on Taiwan.
Lampton; But I do think that there is another part
of the problem, and I think Steve has half of the
problem. I am more sympathetic to what Bob was
saying as a strategy. And that is, the long and
short of it is Taiwan's leadership has the
capacity to create a situation that could drag the
United States into hot conflict. And the issue is
not only do we have to deter Beijing from use of
force, and I think they should be very clear that
we will respond to force as needed, but Taipei
needs to be sure that it understands that we have
interests. And not only do we have interests but
East Asia has an interest in stability. And they
have obligations and they cannot write a check to
be filled out in American blood. And they have to
understand that too. Everyone has got some
obligation to be responsible here. And I'm quite
sympathetic with the administration. How do you
deter Beijing at the same time, admittedly what is
provocative is in the mind of the beholder, but in
the end the irreducible reality is the United
States could end up in conflict. And Taipei could
precipitate it almost as easily as Beijing.
Shot: I'm afraid that's all the time we have
this week. I would like to thank our guests -David
Lampton from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies; Robert Manning form the
council on Foreign Relations; and Stephen Yates
from the Heritage Foundation --- for joining me to
discuss the Taiwan question. This is Robert
Reilly for On the line.
For On the Line, this is --------.
Anncr: You've been listening to "On the Line" - a
discussion of United States policies and
contemporary issues. This is --------.
18
18
26-Aug-1999 16:39 PM EDT (26-Aug-1999 2039 UTC)
NNNN
Source: Voice of America
.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
