Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

PARITY, PEACE, AND WIN-WIN:

The Republic of China's Position on the

"Special State-to-state Relationship"

Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan

Republic of China

August 1, 1999

I. To Develop a New Era of Cross-strait Relations Based on Parity

In response to a question during an interview with Deutsche Welle radio station that "the Beijing government views Taiwan as a renegade province," President Lee remarked: "the cross-strait relationship is a ¡¥special state-to-state relationship.¡¦"

President Lee's remarks concerning the nature of the cross-strait relationship were based on the necessity of protecting national interests and dignity. From the political, historical, and legal perspectives, he merely clarified an existing fact. He by no means twisted or exaggerated the truth, nor did he exclude the goal toward future unification of a new, democratic China.

This practical and forward-looking view fully voiced the aspirations of the twenty-two million people in Taiwan. It is designated to lay a foundation of parity for the two sides, to elevate the level of dialogue, to build a mechanism for democratic and peaceful cross-strait interactions, and to usher in a new era of cross-strait relations.

II. To Oppose Beijing's Hegemonistic "One-China Principle"

Since its establishment of 1912, the Republic of China has always been a sovereign state. Although its jurisdiction is currently limited to the territories of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, the ROC is the 19th largest economy and the 15th largest trading country worldwide. These are facts.

The People's Republic of China was founded in 1949. In the past fifty years following that, the two sides of the Strait have been ruled separately, with neither side subordinate to the other. To date, a special cross-strait relationship of a divided China has not changed. These are also facts.

In 1991, we took the initiative in demonstrating our goodwill by renouncing the use of force to reunify China, acknowledging Beijing's rule on the Chinese mainland, and replacing military confrontation with peaceful exchanges and dialogue. However, Beijing has not responded with goodwill, but rather has denigrated the ROC as a local government through its hegemonistic "one-China principle." It downgraded the ROC in cross-strait exchanges, and appropriated the "one-China principle" as the premise for all cross-strait negotiations, in order to force us to gradually acquiesce to the "one country, two systems" formula.

Moreover, Beijing has done its utmost to suppress our international living space. Consequently, the international community has become accustomed to Beijing's pronouncements, while disregarding the obvious fact of separate and equal rule on the two sides of the Strait.

Precisely because the facts have been distorted by Beijing and neglected by the international community for many years that President Lee's announcement drew a great deal of attention from all circles, when he clearly stated these simple facts. While, Beijing's hegemonistic "one-China principle," which is the actual root of the problem, has been ignored in the discussion.

III. To Start Political Negotiations with Prudence

The experience of countries negotiating with the Chinese communists has shown, through the years that, during the initial phase of negotiation, the Chinese communists always insist on setting advantageous "principles" for themselves. Once such "principles" are in place, subsequent results are unlikely to exceed those boundaries. Since 1995, when the PRC unilaterally terminated institutionalized consultations, Beijing has left functional issues, vital to the rights and interests of the peoples of both sides, unattended and has obstinately demanded negotiations on highly sensitive political issues with the ROC government.

Furthermore, drawing upon its presumptive "one-China principle" in cross-strait political negotiations and its "one country, two systems" formula, Beijing has denied the existence of the Republic of China by treating us as a local government. The ROC government is not afraid of negotiations, but we will not engage in negotiations, if we are placed in an unequal status, or if we are under pressure from a hegemonistic regime that assumes preset conclusions.

Should the ROC government conduct negotiations with the PRC under such circumstances, while vaguely claiming that we are only a "political entity," we would be placing ourselves at a disadvantage. Thus, before commencing any negotiations, we must have a clear orientation of cross-strait relations. In order to engage in meaningful dialogue with the other side and to protect the dignity of our country and the interests of our people, the ROC government must transcend the unfair framework in which a "political entity" deals with a "sovereign state." Only when cross-strait consultations are on an equal basis, can they win support from the people.

IV. Returning to the Agreement on "One China Respectively Interpreted by Each Side"

     Taiwan and the Chinese mainland have always differed in their definition of "one China." Thus, in 1992, following the establishment of the SEF and the ARATS, bilateral talks focused mainly on the definition of "one China." It was only after several rounds of consultations that the two sides eventually reached an agreement on "one China to be interpreted respectively by each side." That is, both sides are free to state their own definition of "one China."

     This is an ideal approach that would have enabled the two sides to continue promoting cross-strait relations, while resolving their differences. However, Beijing has unilaterally abandoned this agreement in recent years. It has often objected to the application of the agreement in international relations. At times, Beijing has stated that the agreement only applies to technical consultations and not political negotiations in cross-strait relations. On other occasions, Beijing has even denied that such an agreement was ever reached in 1992. Then, in recent years, it has gone as far as to object to the ROC's right to state its own definition.

In the framework of the 1992 agreement, whereby each side is entitled to its respective interpretation, we have always maintained that the "one China" concept refer to the future rather than the present. The two sides are not yet unified, but are equals, separately ruled. We both exist concurrently. Therefore, the two sides can be defined as sharing a "special state-to-state relationship," prior to unification. Cross-strait relations are "special," because we share the same culture, historical origins, and ethnic bonds. The people on the two sides engage in exchanges in social, economic, trade, and other areas, activities for which other divided countries cannot match.

What is most important is that the two sides are willing to work in concert and engage in consultations on an equal basis to pursue the future unification of China. If the two sides can recognize and appreciate this special relationship and return to the agreement that each side is entitled to its respective interpretation, then, through consultations on the basis of equality, we can transcend our political differences to jointly cooperate in opening a new chapter in cross-strait relations that will be conducive to the unification of the country under democracy.

V. To Clarify, Not to Change the Status Quo; To Seek Peace, Not to Make  Trouble

The purpose of clearly defining the cross-strait relationship according to reality is to ensure the equal status of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. We have also repeatedly stressed that various related policies will not be changed, especially those that promote constructive dialogue and positive exchanges between the two sides. Our resolve in seeking a win-win cross-strait relationship and our determined policy of pursuing the future unification of China, under democracy, freedom, and equitable prosperity, have not changed. Since there was no policy change, there is certainly no need to revise the Constitution, the laws, or the Guidelines for National Unification. Much less is there the issue of changing the status quo, or making trouble.

We hope that all concerned will examine the matter from a reasonable and objective viewpoint. Also, we would like to increase contacts with any party to fully communicate our ideas, so together we can maintain the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region.

VI. Wholeheartedly Welcoming Mr. Wang Daohan's Visit to Taiwan.

The agreement for Mr. Wang Daohan's visit to Taiwan this year was reached during the "Koo-Wang" talks of October 1998. Later, we sent out the formal invitation to Mr. Wang. Over the last six months, Taipei's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Beijing's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) have conducted exchanges and made preparations for this historic activity. We would like to reiterate that we sincerely welcome Mr. Wang's visit to Taiwan in the fall.

We understand that the mainland authorities have been hoping to carry out talks on highly-sensitive political topics with us during Mr. Wang's visit to Taiwan. At this time, we have clearly defined the cross-strait relationship for the talks, so the two sides will be able to conduct thorough discussions of various issues, including the definition of the relationship between the two sides.

     In the course of cross-strait consultations, if the two sides raise different positions and views, it should be seen as a necessary stage in the course of seeking common ground while resolving differences. If one side can express its position, it should also be able to accept the fact that the other side express its position as well. In fact, exactly because differences now exist, all the more need is for consultations. Through consultation, there will be opportunities to comprehend or resolve differences. If either of the two sides refuses to hold consultations because of different views, then the cross-strait relationship is sure to recede.

     We believe such is not the outcome that the two sides and the international community would like to see. We maintain that the Koo-Wang dialogue in Taipei can further enable the two sides to understand each other's overall views and eliminate misunderstandings. This will not only help reduce tension between the two sides while furthering the discussions for a clear direction of cross-strait relations, but will also contribute to regional peace and stability.

VII. To Achieve Parity, Peace, and a Win-Win Cross-strait Relationship

Stability in the Taiwan Strait directly affects peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The maintenance of peace in the Taiwan Strait should be considered the common desire of both sides and the international community. The status of cross-strait relations is now clearly defined and reflects objective political and legal realities, offering a new opportunity for the resumption of positive interaction between the two sides.

After the normalization of cross-strait relations, a long-term pattern of peace and stability can develop through constructive dialogue, institutionalized consultations, and orderly exchanges. This should be the common goal of both sides, as they develop a unified and democratic new China in the future. A win-win situation would then be established for both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Nations in the region would also benefit. The situation is compatible with the long-term interests of the two sides and the entire Asia-Pacific region.

     We call on the PRC to face reality and to acknowledge our earnestness in promoting cross-strait relations. We hope Beijing will be pragmatic and open-minded, so the joint efforts of both sides will create a new era of constructive interactions in the 21st century.