Face-Off: Maintaining the ROC-PRC Military Balance
Sinorama, Vol. 23, No. 10 (October 1998)
Since 1995, when PRC missile tests in the Taiwan Strait raised the specter of military confrontation between the ROC and PRC, people in Taiwan have awoken to the fact that "the Taiwan Strait crisis" is no longer a term of purely historical interest. A new Taiwan Strait crisis could break out at any moment.
Faced with the PRC's policy of deliberate unpredictability, what is the possibility that there may be another Taiwan Strait crisis in the future? What form might this take? Does the ROC possess the military capability to resist a PRC attack? The Taiwan Strait security question is getting a lot of attention these days.
In 1955, mainland Chinese forces attacked Yijiangshan Island, completely wiping out the ROC forces stationed there. The two sides continued fighting on Kinmen, Matsu, and along the mainland Chinese coast. The fighting even extended to mainland Chinese coastal ports. This was the first "Taiwan Strait crisis" after the retreat of the Nationalist government to Taiwan in 1949.
The second Taiwan Strait crisis occurred in 1958. Over 44 days, Communist forces bombarded Kinmen and Matsu with 4.8 million shells, and blockaded military supplies to those islands. The ROC military fought ferociously, and ultimately secured the Kin-men/Matsu front line. These events are known in Taiwan as the 8-23 Artillery Battle, because the firing began on August 23.
The clouds of war again swept over the Taiwan Strait in 1995. Using military exercises and missile tests, mainland China attempted to influence Taiwan's presidential elections and the future policies of the winner of those elections. This third Taiwan Strait crisis received a great deal of international attention.
From the most recent Taiwan Strait crisis we can see how the military situation in the Taiwan Strait has evolved since the previous such crisis 40 years ago. It is now characterized by two new features: high-technology military conflict, and uncertainty about when a cross-strait conflict might occur. Every day that the Taiwan Strait problem persists, a crisis could break out, and such a crisis will take the form of high-technology warfare.
Modeling a Taiwan Strait crisis
The 1990 Persian Gulf War was a shock to the international community. The shock was not limited to the political front. The war was also extremely revealing in military terms. According to Wong Ming-hsien, director of the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University, the high-technology warfare used by the US and its allies in the Persian Gulf stimulated the PRC to begin rethinking its strategy. Mainland China has decided to move from an emphasis on quantity to one on quality. The PRC's new national defense strategy is to streamline its military forces and raise technology levels.
Wong says that the PRC could choose one of several forms for starting a Taiwan Strait crisis in the future. These include "quasi-military conflict," "small-scale military conflict," and "full-scale military conflict."
Quasi-military conflict refers to the deployment, but not first use, of military power. It may take the form of military exercises. The PRC missile tests in 1995 and 1996 are examples. Quasi-military conflict may also take the form of blockade. For example the PRC could blockade the shipment of supplies to Taiwan's offshore islands, cutting them off but not initiating the fighting. Or it could attempt to blockade Taiwan itself, cutting off Taiwan's external trade links either through long-distance blockade or close-in blockade.
Small-scale military conflict could be an attack against Taiwan's offshore islands. The PRC could attack the offshore islands in an attempt to force Taiwan into negotiations on the PRC's terms. Of Taiwan's offshore islands, because Kinmen and Matsu are in a high state of military readiness, it would be costly to attack them. Thus, the PRC could choose to assault those islands in the South China Sea which are currently occupied by ROC forces. Another possible form of small-scale military conflict would be the use of surface-to-surface guided missiles. Since the political effectiveness of such missiles against offshore islands would be limited, these would more likely be targeted against political or economic centers in Taiwan itself.
The goal of full-scale military conflict would be to destroy Taiwan's military capacity and will to fight. Geographically, it would not be limited to offshore islands, but would cover the air and seas around Taiwan and Penghu, or even involve a PRC landing on Taiwan itself.
In discussing full-scale conflict, many people are most concerned about whether the PRC would use nuclear weapons. Wong Ming-hsien says that under current conditions there is a very low possibility of the PRC using nuclear weapons against Taiwan. The main reason is because of international political considerations. In the defense white paper issued by the PRC earlier this year, the PRC says it "will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances," and moreover "unconditionally promises that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries or areas which do not have nuclear weapons." If mainland China were to use nuclear weapons in a cross-strait war, thus breaking its commitment, this would create a tremendous international backlash, resulting in incalculable political consequences. Thus the PRC's nuclear weapons remain mainly for strategic deterrence.
Paralyzing strike
Clearly there are many forms that a PRC-instigated Taiwan Strait crisis could take. However, according to Professor Chung Chien, a specialist in nuclear sciences and an expert on the PRC's "Peoples Liberation Army" (PLA), the most likely form that future PRC military action would take would be a "paralyzing" strategy to bring Taiwan to its knees in a rapid, bloodless fashion. In this regard, a long-distance blockade would perhaps have the greatest strategic advantage.
In terms of geostrategy, Taiwan is an island state. It depends on sea transport for more than 99% of its imports and exports. In particular, its economy depends on petroleum imported from the Middle East, North Africa, England, and Indonesia. If the PRC adopted a long-distance blockade, it could intercept oil tankers headed for the ROC in the South China Sea. If petroleum shipments did not arrive in a timely fashion, Taiwan would quickly be paralyzed.
In contrast, the possibility of direct action against Taiwan is not high. The greatest consideration is time. A full-scale war would involve tremendous effort. A close-in blockade of Taiwan's coast and airfields, or guerrilla war (which is hardly suitable for invading a democratic society) are not types of warfare which would serve the PRC's interests. Because Taiwan occupies an important strategic position in the Asia-Pacific region, and because the US has always paid close attention to developments in the Taiwan Strait, if the PRC could not achieve a rapid and complete victory in an outright conflict, there would be numerous opportunities for foreign powers to intervene politically or militarily. This would be extremely disadvantageous to the PRC.
PRC military modernization
According to the PRC's national defense white paper for this year, mainland China has realized that there is a global trend toward domination of the battlefield through high-technology weapons. Therefore, the PLA is aggressively "moving along the path of a streamlined, high-quality military with Chinese characteristics." The PRC plans to reduce its total armed forces by 500,000 men within three years, so that the PLA will stabilize at a level of about 2.5 million personnel.
In terms of strategic deployments, one of the PRC's strategic goals for the new era is to be able to "win a partial or regional war under high-tech conditions." Moreover, the focus of strategic attention has been shifted from the north to the southeast. Main force units have been transferred from the PRC's northern borders to its southeast coast. Also, high-technology "active defense" has replaced "People's War" (which relied on massed manpower) as the main strategic concept. And there has been a shift from "inland defense" to "coastal defense"; they are extending the front line of defense into the Pacific Ocean. In order to achieve its new goals, the PRC has been buying or developing (with the help of hired Russian experts) SU-27 fighters, inter-continental ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, and is forming a naval task force capable of independent operational capability.
General Tang Fei, chief of the ROC general staff, judges that there are a number of objectives behind the PRC's transformation of its military strategy. It hopes to raise its political status at a global level and at the Asia-Pacific regional level through the development of a high-technology operational capability. It also aims to increase its capability to deal with domestic and border area instability. Besides these, however, and of more immediate interest to Taiwan, another of the main goals behind mainland China's new strategy is to maintain a reliable military threat to cope with Taiwan and its so-called "separatist tendencies."
According to the recent ROC national defense report, under the PRC's new strategy of "active defense," it has already begun to shift its focus from a past emphasis on land warfare (with air and naval forces playing purely supportive roles) to combined operations (with greatly increased importance for the naval and air components). From July 1995 to March 1996, the PLA staged seven sets of live-fire exercises in the Nanjing military region in which it rehearsed attacks on Taiwan. Similar exercises have continued over the last two years. (Please see the accompanying table.)
The PRC already could. . .
In addition, in the last two years, the PRC has formed a "Rapid Reaction Force," constructed military facilities on the southeast coast, and upgraded arms and equipment. It has also established a variety of command, control, communication, and intelligence systems to support its new deployments. Finally, as noted earlier, it has undertaken a number of military exercises aimed at Taiwan. According to the ROC Ministry of Defense, the PRC already has the ability to mount sea or air attacks against Taiwan, to partially or completely blockade the island, or to assault offshore islands. If the PRC were to mobilize forces for an attack against Taiwan, the following capabilities would be at its disposal (please also see the accompanying graphic):
Land forces: The 31st army group in Fujian has approximately 80,000 troops. In addition, it would be possible to mobilize about 260,000 soldiers from the Rapid Reaction Force and strategic reserves in other military districts.
Naval forces: The PRC could use submarines and mobilize motorized fishing vessels to undertake an extended blockade of Taiwan. It could deploy mines in the waters surrounding Taiwan and outlying islands. Using its amphibious capability, it could land a reinforced division. Finally, motorized fishing boats could ferry as many as 350,000 well-equipped support troops across the strait should a beachhead be established in Taiwan.
Air forces: There are 13 military and civilian air fields within 250 nautical miles of Taiwan. As many as 1200 aircraft could attack in a single wave. In addition, the PRC has 59 air transport planes which could carry two airborne regiments for a parachute assault.
Rocket forces: The PRC's DF-15 and DF-21 rockets could be targeted directly at important political, economic, and military sites in Taiwan. This remains the military option posing the greatest threat to Taiwan.
Second-generation forces
Faced with changes in the global strategic situation and Communist China's unrelenting buildup of its military capacity, does the ROC have the ability to defend itself against attack from the PRC? General Tang outlines several steps taken by Taiwan to update its military posture vis-a-vis the PRC: The ROC military has abandoned its past strategic goal of having a military which, beyond defending Taiwan, would also be capable of invading mainland China. Strategy now focuses on defense against and effective deterrence of a PLA attack. The ROC is in the midst of a reorganization and restructuring of its military, which is scheduled to run from 1998 to 2001. It is building a new generation of military forces based on the principles of smaller numbers, higher quality, and high operational capability.
The new generation of military forces in the ROC will feature greater automation in weaponry, a much stronger missile component in the land forces, and "3-D" coordination integrating all three branches of the service. There will be fewer soldiers, but more firepower and operational capability.
General Tang indicates that Taiwan's military has already had a number of concrete successes in raising its operational capability. In terms of air power, Taiwan has successfully developed and begun to manufacture its own indigenous defense fighter (IDF), called the Chingkuo; it has also purchased F-16 fighters from the US and Mirage-2000 fighters and air defense missiles from France. These are steadily coming into service. In terms of naval power, there's a new generation of warships, including Chengkung-class, Kangting-class, and Chiyang-class ships. These can effectively undertake counter-blockade, patrol, escort, and anti-submarine missions. In terms of land power, armed helicopter and reconnaissance-and-destroy helicopter units have been established, significantly raising the capability of the ROC military to bring firepower to bear on the ground from airborne platforms. In addition, the development and construction of various missiles also promises to raise the fighting capability of the ROC at all levels.
Defend against what is likely to attack
The goal of second generation military upgrading in the ROC is "to possess what is needed to fight what is out there." The goal is to build a high-technology military capable of deterring the PRC and conforming to the new strategic situation. However, it must be said that at present the Taiwan military is far from completing its high-tech re-armament.
The ROC and PRC both purchase weapons abroad and manufacture them domestically. General Tang states that since 1991, the PRC has purchased a large number of SU-27 fighters and AA-10 medium-range air-to-air missiles. At present, the ROC Air Force's F-16 fighters are equipped with the AIM-7 Sparrow missiles, which cannot ensure air superiority for the ROC in the face of the AA-10. Therefore, at present, the ROC needs advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles which are superior to the AA-10.
Another need is submarines. The PRC has an enormous undersea force and has been developing nuclear subs. Meanwhile, Taiwan has only four subs, two of which are re-fitted submarines used by the US in World War II (they are outdated and useful only for training). The current ROC submarine force cannot effectively undertake counter blockade missions. Therefore, the purchase of new submarines is urgent.
Taiwan's main achievements in terms of homemade high-technology weaponry fall mainly under three categories: aircraft, ships, and missiles. In terms of aircraft, the Chingkuo fighter went into mass production in June 1994. The ROC plans to produce 130 of them. The first fighter wing of these planes is already in service. As for missiles, a number of types have completed development, entered mass production, or entered service. These include Sky Sword I and II air-to-air missiles, Sky Bow I and II surface-to-air missiles, and Hsiung Feng II ship-to-ship missiles. Finally, with regard to warships, the guided missile frigates Chengkung and Chengho have already come into service, and the Panchao and Changfeng have completed construction and are in the "shakedown" process. In addition, the Chinchiang-class coastal patrol boats are in service. Other ship-building plans will continue to go forward.
The PRC also has had successes in high-technology weapons development. These include completed development and manufacture of Luhai class destroyers and Jiangwei escort vessels, continued development of J-10 and FC-1 fighters, production of the multiple-warhead DF-5 missile and the DF-13 strategic missile, and development of a long-range guided missile.
Foreign and domestic sourcing
Chung Chien says that because the two countries are so different, there's no way to accurately compare their domestic weapons-making capability. Although in the past the mainland aimed to achieve 100% domestic production in weapons, and even to export weapons, given current levels of technology, the PRC, like Taiwan, faces the problem of a low domestic content rate in key weapons systems.
Ou Si-fu, an associate researcher at the Institute for National Policy Research, says that both sides of the Taiwan Strait must rely on foreign technology in high-tech weapons manufacturing. For example, for the ROC's Indigenous Defense Fighter, 60% of the necessary parts must be imported. In particular, manufacturing technology for that most vital component, the engine, must still be supplied by the US.
For the PRC, in its current joint production of the SU-27 with Russia, mainland China will eventually do, at most, only the last 70% of the production process. The most important initial technology for the aircraft's manufacture, such as the AL-31F engine, has not been transferred by Russia to the PRC; this is because Russia does not want to lose its technological edge over the PRC.
While foreign technology is for the moment irreplaceable, Taiwan and mainland China have both met considerable difficulties in purchasing high-technology weapons abroad. It is true that, as Chung Chien says, the restructuring of the military on the two sides is a simple generational evolution given considerations of the changing global strategic environment, and is not an arms race per se. However, given that arms sellers (those countries with a leading edge in technology) have their own interests to consider, the ROC and PRC must, in purchasing high-tech weapons, take into account the political, strategic, and economic situations in the arms-selling countries. In this respect, Taiwan, whose diplomatic space is restricted by PRC pressure, finds arms purchases particularly difficult.
Though the United States remains Taiwan's main outside source of arms, due to domestic and diplomatic considerations, the US policy on weapons sales to Taiwan is subject to frequent change. Meanwhile, France and Holland, being less directly subject to PRC political pressure and due to economic considerations in their home countries, have sold small numbers of fighter aircraft and submarines (respectively) to Taiwan, but they are unlikely to be long-term sources.
Lin Cheng-yi, a research fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies of the Academia Sinica, explains: "Even though the US continues arms sales to Taiwan, the supply of major weapons systems will certainly decline. . . . For example, it will become increasingly difficult to purchase high-tech weaponry like F-16 fighters or submarines. Under these circumstances, it becomes even more important to integrate and raise the overall operational capability of current weapons systems."
In this respect, Taiwan still has much room for improvement. For example, there is a great need to improve the operation and maintenance of existing weapons systems, as well as for more war games and live exercises.
The third wave
Even as the second generation of weapons comes on line in the Taiwan Strait and defense strategies evolve, yet another wave of high-tech warfare is stealthily taking shape. Lin Chong-pin, vice-chairman of the ROC's Mainland Affairs Council and an expert on the PLA, says that the development of third-wave weapons has already begun in the Taiwan Strait. The so-called third wave of warfare will involve striking at the enemy's information nerve centers, or, as the Chinese Communists call it, "acupuncture warfare" (so called because acupuncture numbs a patient by the insertion of needles at key nerve centers).
Lin says that this type of warfare is divided into "hard kill" and "soft kill." The former includes the use of missiles to paralyze an opponent's electrical systems and to destroy computer command centers, rendering weapons useless. In this type of warfare, weapons featuring high-energy lasers, microwaves, or wireless radio waves can destroy an opponent's weapons systems. Meanwhile, the "soft kill" type of warfare, called "information war," mainly involves the use of computer viruses and electronic interference to destroy military computer networks.
Lin adds that information warfare suits the PRC's economic conditions quite well. This is because this type of warfare is "asymmetrical." Advanced countries have the advantage of a high-level of computerization, but in information warfare, this becomes their Achilles' heel. Countries with a low-level of information technology can attack this weak point. The "asymmetrical" model in fact is very applicable to the current state of affairs in the Taiwan Strait, in which the ROC is far more "wired in" to information technology than is the PRC.
"By 2010, if there's been no qualitative political change in mainland China, or Taiwan has not developed any counter-measures against acupuncture warfare, given the PRC's current active preparation for information warfare, this could become a serious threat to us," warns Lin.
No provocations, no backing down
Whatever forms warfare have taken or may take, the main goal of the ROC government has been and will remain to avoid bloodshed and resolve the Taiwan Strait problem peacefully.
Liu Pi-jung, a professor in the Department of Political Science at Soochow University, points out that although at present the PRC is unlikely to do anything to threaten Taiwan, Taiwan must avoid presenting the PRC military with any temptations. If Taiwan's military capability becomes too weak, the PRC could attack Taiwan at a very low cost. The PRC would feel a great temptation to take advantage of such an opportunity. Correspondingly, if the PRC feels that Taiwan's military capability is growing to the point of threatening its interests irrevocably, a war could also break out.
Surmounting difficulties in arms purchases and domestic production, maintaining a balance between excessive weakness and strength, and maintaining the military balance in the Taiwan Strait are the greatest challenges facing the ROC military today.
p.9
AH1 attack helicopters are an important part of the new second-generation army arsenal.
p.10
The PRC has in recent years conducted a number of amphibious assault exercises for an attack on Taiwan. (Agence France Presse)
p.11
PRC Military Exercises, 1995-1997
| Military District | Routine training | Routine maneuvers | "Directed maneuvers" | Total | ||||||
| Year | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | |
| Chengdu | 3 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 11 | |||||
| Shenyang | 3 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 17 | |||
| Lanzhou | 3 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 17 | |||
| Beijing | 4 | 6 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 20 | ||||
| Guangzhou | 9 | 4 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 25 | |||
| Jinan | 3 | 7 | 8 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 29 | ||
| Nanjing | 12 | 25 | 12 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 64 | |
| Subtotals | 37 | 54 | 49 | 10 | 15 | 11 | 4 | 3 | ||
| Totals | 140 | 36 | 7 | 183 | ||||||
Source: Report on National Defense, 1998/ Charts by Lee Su-ling
p.12
The PRC could spark a new Taiwan Strait crisis by harassing Taiwan's outlying islands; shoring up the defense of these outposts is a key task. (photo by Hsueh Chi-kuang)
p.15
PRC Forces Available for an Attack on Taiwan
Air forces: 1300 aircraft within range of Taiwan
Rocket forces: 2nd Artillery Command (ballistic missiles such as the East Wind 15 and East Wind 21 whose range covers Taiwan)
Land forces: 80,000 men of the 31st Army Group in Fujian, with 260,000 support troops (including the Rapid Reaction Force) from other regions
Naval forces: Submarines and motorized fishing boats for blockading Taiwan or offshore islands; mines to be laid in peripheral waters; amphibious landing craft
Source: Report on National Defense,1998
Charts by Lee Su-ling
p.16
A Comparison of ROC and PRC Military Capabilities
ROC
Land Forces
Characteristics: *Focus on destroying the enemy in the air and at sea, to prevent any landings
Equipment: *160 helicopters (attack, general purpose, search and destroy), 1300 M60 A3 and M48H main battle tanks, 1400 guns (artillery)
Naval Forces
Characteristics: *Combined operations with land and air forces to resist blockade, assault, or invasion from sea
Equipment: *4 submarines, 30 warships, 20 Hughes 500-MD and Sikorsky S70C(M) anti-submarine helicopters
Air Forces
Characteristics: *Capabilities: air defense and interception, anti-submarine warfare, close support, electronic warfare
Equipment: *400-plus aircraft, including F-5Es, Chingkuo fighters, F-16s, Mirage 2000-5s, AWACS, and S-2T anti-submarine aircraft
PRC
Land Forces
Characteristics: *Main force deployments shifting to southeast coast of China
Equipment: *14000 tanks, 1300 towed guns, 2100 multiple rocket launchers, 1500 self-propelled guns
Naval Forces
Characteristics: *Seaborne rapid response task force deployed to southeast coast
Equipment: *2700 warships of all types, armed with C-802 ship-to-ship missiles, Red Flag HQ-61 land- and ship-based surface-to-air missiles, Crotale ship-to-air missiles, 3 Russian Type 877 EMK and Type 636 Kilo-class submarines
Air Forces
Characteristics: *600 aircraft on airfields within range of Taiwan
Equipment: *5000 aircraft of all types including Chengdu J-7 Shenyang J-8, and Sukhoi Su-27 planes
Source: Report on National Defense, 1998
Charts by Lee Su-ling
p.17
The ROC needs to do more on-paper and live exercises to be prepared to defend against a PRC assault.
p.18
Modern second-generation weapons have been coming into service one after another, including French-made Mirage 2000-5 fighters (upper left, photo by Hsueh Chi-kuang), Dutch-made submarines (lower left), Taiwan-manufactured Chingkuo indigenous defense fighters (right), and US-made M60A3 main battle tanks (lower right).
p.21
(above and left) "Information war" is the next wave in warfare. The ROC military must be careful not to let its lead in computerization turn into a liability in this "asymmetrical" conflict.
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