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Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to take a moment to read a story in today's New York Times on proposed military actions by the People's Republic of China [PRC] against the Republic of China on Taiwan. I ask unanimous consent that this article appear in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. PRESSLER. According to the story, the People's Republic of China has finished plans for a limited missile attack on Taiwan--an attack that could come following Taiwan's first Presidential election, which is scheduled for March 23.
This revelation is the latest in a series of intimidating tactics that work to threaten Taiwan and destabilize East Asia. Between July 21 and July 26, the PRC conducted a series of ballistic missile test firings 85 miles off the coast of Taiwan. All the missiles were modern, mobile and nuclear capable. No country ever has held this level of field tests for nuclear capable missiles before.
The results of that action were predictable--the stock market and the local currency in Taiwan plunged. These ballistic missile exercises resumed on August 15, and continued through the fall leading up to last December's elections in Taiwan for the 164-seat Legislature.
Now comes word that the PRC has done more than just test its military capability. It has matched its hardware testing with military planning--a plan that calls for one ballistic missile to be launched each day for 30 days.
As was the case with the missile tests, this recent report can be seen as a blatant attempt to influence the outcome of the upcoming Presidential elections in Taiwan. There could be more to this story. I believe this is an attempt to intimidate the Clinton administration and test our Nation's resolve in the Taiwan Straits. The fact that the PRC has advanced a limited but sustained missile attack plan indicates that it believes the Clinton administration may do nothing to strengthen Taiwan's defenses or come to its aid in the event of an attack.
It is not hard to understand why the PRC has come to this conclusion. The Clinton administration's policy with respect to the Taiwan-Mainland China issue is nothing short of confusing. The administration claims to be advancing a policy of deliberate ambiguity. For example, high level administration officials recently have been asked if the United States would come to Taiwan's defense in the event of an attack from the PRC. Their responses were consistently and ominously vague.
The administration seems to believe that this ambiguity will be enough to deter Beijing. Today's report indicates that the exact opposite has occurred. I believe this policy of strategic ambiguity is wrong and has failed. It is not just dangerous for the people of Taiwan, it is potentially destabilizing for the entire East Asia region. It is an approach that clearly advances the PRC's interests and not our own. The administration's ambiguity policy has fueled the belief within the PRC that the United States will look the other way if PRC missiles are launched. Because of our ambiguity, the PRC believes that it can achieve its policy goals at the very least through intimidation and military posturing. Even if the PRC privately has no intention for a direct military confrontation against Taiwan, our ambiguity gives the PRC's military maneuvers greater credibility. It sends a signal of weakness. It fosters a belief that we can be pushed around by the PRC. It is a belief shared by many in Taiwan as well. Indeed, this ambiguity has troubled other Asian democracies in the region, compelling many--from Japan to the Philippines--to increase their defense budgets.
Mr. President, as I said last August, in response to the PRC's first ballistic missile exercise, the United States is faced with three choices: First, we can
do nothing, which appears to be the present course. I believe that is not in the national security interest of the United States. We must not allow Asia--a region of many thriving free market, democratic societies--to be dominated by an aggressive, nondemocratic power.
Second, at the other extreme, we could intervene should the moment of conflict become imminent by interposing the United States Pacific fleet in the Taiwan straits. President Truman did so in 1950. This, again, is an extreme course and thus, should only be considered as a last resort. It is a course that could result in a direct military confrontation with the People's Republic of China.
Finally, we can take what I believe is the wisest course, which is a clear and unambiguous demonstration of political and military support so that Asian democracies, including Taiwan can resist aggression. In short, a clear statement of U.S. policy goals and conditions in the region will promote peace and stability far better than the administration's deliberate vagueness. Both houses of Congress have come to this conclusion as well. Both the House and Senate versions of the State Department authorization bill contain identical language that would amend the Taiwan Relations Act [TRA] to supersede restrictions on United States arm sales to Taiwan. These restrictions were imposed in a August 1982 communique between the People's Republic of China and the United States. The amendments to the TRA represent a clear statement by Congress that the TRA requires the United States to provide Taiwan with the appropriate means to defend itself.
This latter course achieves a number of important policy goals. First, it demonstrates to all democracies in Asia that the United States intends to work with them to ensure peace and stability in the region. Second, it demonstrates support for the continued political liberalization in Taiwan. Third, it sends a clear signal to the People's Republic of China that the United States will not accept the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland by force.
This latter point is important. Since President Nixon's overtures to Communist China, this Nation has taken a one China policy. The advent of that policy, coupled with the passage of the TRA, was designed to foster a strong diplomatic and economic relationship with the People's Republic of China, while sending a clear signal that our Nation would defend against any forced reunification of Taiwan by the People's Republic of China. Reunification, if it is to occur, must be done through diplomatic means.
I have said before on the Senate floor that our relationship with Taiwan is one of the ironies of history. Taiwan is a democracy and a growing economic power. The United States is Taiwan's primary foreign investor and trader. About 25 percent of Taiwan's exports go to United States markets. Many of Taiwan's business, academic and cultural leaders have studied in the United States. Yet, we do not have diplomatic ties with Taipei.
We must not add tragedy to this irony. In the midst of all its posturing, the People's Republic of China's real intentions are not clear. Most experts are divided on the question of whether or not the People's Republic of China actually will put its military plans into action. We must leave nothing to chance. Regardless of the People's Republic of China's intentions or its goals, the Clinton Administration has to recognize that its current policy of strategic ambiguity has failed. The United States needs to maintain a positive, constructive relationship with both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. It is time we recognize that this triangular relationship can only be furthered if all sides of this triangle understood United States policy goals in the region.
It is time this Nation make very clear that we will not ignore direct or indirect intimidation against an Asian democracy. It is time that the administration not engage in any sales of advanced telecommunications technology that could be used to further the People's Republic of China's military capability. It is time that the administration came to the conclusion that any military attack by the People's Republic of China against any Asian democracy directly threatens the crucial regional and national security interests of the United States. It is time that we reassert that any reunification of Taiwan with the mainland must not be done through military aggression.
Mr. President, when Congress returns next month, it is my hope that Congress will take the opportunity to take a step toward a clear definition of United States policy in the region, and demonstrate its clear support for the democratic process underway in Taiwan. Given the strong support for amending the Taiwan Relations Act, we may want to consider making these changes through legislation independent of the State Department authorization bill, and to pass this legislation before the upcoming March 23 elections. That's one possible option. Wherever democracy may emerge, the United States should demonstrate its support for such efforts. I believe we should do so, hopefully with the administration's cooperation, but if necessary, without it.
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Exhibit 1
From the New York Times, Jan. 24, 1996
As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens
Beijing, January 23: The Chinese leadership has sent unusually explicit warnings to the Clinton Administration that China has completed plans for a limited attack on Taiwan that could be mounted in the weeks after Taiwan's President, Lee Tenghui, wins the first democratic balloting for the presidency in March.
The purpose of this saber-rattling is apparently to prod the United States to rein in Taiwan and President Lee, whose push for greater international recognition for the island of 21 million people, has been condemned here as a drive for independence.
While no one familiar with the threats thinks China is on the verge of risking a catastrophic war against Taiwan, some China experts fear that the Taiwan issue has become such a test of national pride for Chinese leaders that the danger of war should be taken seriously.
A senior American official said the Administration has `no independent confirmation or even credible evidence' that the Chinese are contemplating an attack, and spoke almost dismissively of the prospect.
`They can fire missiles, but Taiwan has some teeth of its own,' the official said. `And does China want to risk that and the international effects?'
The most pointed of the Chinese warnings was conveyed recently through a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Chas. W. Freeman Jr., who traveled to China this winter for discussions with senior Chinese officials. On Jan. 4, after returning to Washington, Mr. Freeman informed President Clinton's national security adviser, Anthony Lake, that the People's Liberation Army had prepared plans for a missile attack against Taiwan consisting of one conventional missile strike a day for 30 days.
This warning followed similar statements relayed to Administration officials by John W. Lewis, a Stanford University political scientist who meets frequently with senior Chinese military figures here.
These warnings do not mean that an attack on Taiwan is certain or imminent. Instead, a number of China specialists say that China, through `credible preparations' for an attack, hopes to intimidate the Taiwanese and to influence American policy toward Taiwan. The goal, these experts say, is to force Taiwan to abandon the campaign initiated by President Lee, including his effort to have Taiwan seated at the United Nations, and to end high-profile visits by President Lee to the United States and to other countries.
If the threats fail to rein in Mr. Lee, however, a number of experts now express the view that China could resort to force, despite the enormous consequences for its economy and for political stability in Asia.
Since last summer, when the White House allowed Mr. Lee to visit the United States, the Chinese leadership has escalated its attacks on the Taiwan leader, accusing him of seeking to `split the motherland' and undermine the `one China' policy that had been the bedrock of relations between Beijing and its estranged province since 1949.
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeman, asked to comment on reports that the Chinese military has prepared plans for military action against Taiwan, said he was awaiting a response from his superiors. Last month, a senior ministry official said privately that China's obvious preparations for military action have been intended to head off an unwanted conflict.
`We have been trying to do all we can to avoid a scenario in which we are confronted in the end with no other option but a military one,' the official said. He said that if China does not succeed in changing Taiwan's course, `then I am afraid there is going to be a war.'
Mr. Freeman described the most recent warning during a meeting Mr. Lake had called with nongovernmental China specialists.
Participants said that Mr. Freeman's presentation was arresting as he described being told by a Chinese official of the advanced state of military planning. Preparations for a missile attack on Taiwan, he said, and the target selection to carry it out, have been completed and await a final decision by the Politburo in Beijing.
One of the most dramatic moments came when Mr. Freeman quoted a Chinese official as asserting that China could act militarily against Taiwan without fear of intervention by the United States because American leaders `care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan,' a statement that Mr. Freeman characterized as an indirect threat by China to use nuclear weapons against the United States.
An account of the White House meeting was provided by some of the participants. Mr. Freeman, reached by telephone, confirmed the gist of his remarks, reiterating that he believes that while `Beijing clearly prefers negotiation to combat,' there is a new sense of urgency in Beijing to end Taiwan's quest for `independent international status.'
Mr. Freeman said that President's Lee's behavior `in the weeks following his re-election will determine' whether Beijing's Communist Party leaders feel they must act `by direct military means' to change his behavior.
In recent months, Mr. Freeman said he has relayed a number of warnings to United States Government officials. `I have quoted senior Chinese who told me' that China `would sacrifice `millions of men' and `entire cities' to assure the unity of China and who opined that the United States would not make comparable sacrifices.'
He also asserted that `some in Beijing may be prepared to engage in nuclear blackmail against the U.S. to insure that Americans do not obstruct' efforts by the People's Liberation Army `to defend the principles of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and Chinese national unity.'
Some specialists at the meeting wondered if Mr. Freeman's presentation was too alarmist and suggested that parliamentary elections on Taiwan in December had resulted in losses for the ruling Nationalist Party and that President Lee appeared to be moderating his behavior to avoid a crisis.
`I am not alarmist at this point,' said one specialist, who would not comment on the substance of the White House meeting. `I don't think the evidence is developing in that direction.'
Other participants in the White House meeting, who said they would not violate the confidentiality pledge of the private session, separately expressed their concern that a potential military crisis is building in the Taiwan Strait.
`I think there is evidence to suggest that the Chinese are creating at least the option to apply military pressure to Taiwan if they feel that Taiwan is effectively moving out of China's orbit politically,' said Kenneth Lieberthal, a China scholar at the University of Michigan and an informal adviser to the Administration.
Mr. Lieberthal, who also has traveled to China in recent months, said Beijing has redeployed forces from other parts of the country to the coastal areas facing Taiwan and set up new command structures `for various kinds of military action against Taiwan.'
`They have done all this in a fashion they know Taiwan can monitor,' he said, `so as to become credible on the use of force.'
`I believe there has been no decision to use military force' he continued, `and they recognize that it would be a policy failure for them to have to resort to force; but they have set up the option, they have communicated that in the most credible fashion and, I believe, the danger is that they would exercise it in certain circumstances.'
Several experts cited their concern that actions by Congress in the aftermath of President Lee's expected election could be a critical factor contributing to a military confrontation. If President Lee perceives that he has a strong base of support in the United States Congress and presses forward with his campaign to raise Taiwan's status, the risk of a military crisis is greater, they said. A chief concern is that Congress would seek to invite the Taiwan leader back to the United States as a gesture of American support. A Chinese military leader warned in November that such a step could have `explosive' results.
In recent months, American statements on whether United States forces would come to the defense of Taiwan if it came under attack have been deliberately vague so as to deter Beijing through a posture of what the Pentagon calls `strategic ambiguity.'
Some members of Congress assert that the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 includes an implicit pledge to defend Taiwan if attacked, but Administration officials say that, in the end, the decision would depend on the timing, pretext and nature of Chinese aggression.
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