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Introduction

President Clinton describes his policy about defending Taiwan in the event of a Communist Chinese attack as "deliberately ambiguous": his goal is to leave the PRC's leadership in doubt as to whether the United States would assist Taiwan in repelling an invasion or more limited attack. A top official of the Clinton Defense Department told the Communist Chinese leadership last November that "we don't know and you don't know" how the Administration would react to military action against Taiwan. And on February 6, Defense Secretary William Perry reiterated that "[a]t this point at least, with the present level of concern but no imminent danger, I don't think we will make a statement more definite than that." As a result, the Administration is increasing, not diminishing, the risk of conflict with Communist China.

A Firm Formula for Deterrence

Just as surprise and unpredictability are fundamental elements of success in warfare, credibility and predictability are absolutely imperative in maintaining peace. Only when potential adversaries clearly understand the limits of acceptable behavior is it certain that they will not inadvertently take steps that trigger an avoidable conflict. U.S. postwar policy in Europe is an outstanding example of how the clearly expressed, credible security policy of both Democratic and Republican Administrations made successive Soviet leaders understand that an assault on Western Europe would lead to war with the United States.

Early in the Cold War, the Truman Administration helped set this pattern of firmness in the European theater with its airlift to bring food and supplies to West Berlin. That Administration's actions made it clear to the Soviet Union that if it attempted to absorb West Berlin into East Germany, that the West would consider this act an intolerable affront.

So, too, was Ronald Reagan's policy of "peace through strength" a success story in deterrence. However little they may have liked it, the Soviet leadership always knew precisely where they stood with the Reagan Administration, and precisely what actions we were unwilling to tolerate. And that "peace through strength" policy got the Soviet Union to make unilateral and asymmetrical concessions in arms reductions talks (such as the 1987 treaty eliminating intermediate nuclear forces) and ultimately relent in the Cold War struggle altogether.

The Perils of Ambiguity

By contrast, when potential adversaries are confused about the limits of acceptable behavior, either because American policy is unclear or because it lacks credibility, the risk that they will test those limits--and thereby provoke war--is great. The Persian Gulf War is one recent example where clearer U.S. policy might have averted Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait.

An unquestionable example is the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, an instance when the Soviet leadership appears to have been genuinely surprised by the Carter Administration's hostile reaction in light of its prior limp response to aggressive Soviet efforts to win over client states in the Third World. And the result was to encourage the Soviet Union to expand the scope of the Brezhnev Doctrine (reserving the right to use force to prevent Communist governments from being overturned) from Europe--where it was applied in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968--to the Third World.

And, of course, the classic instance is the Korean War: only five months before the North Korean invasion, in his January 12, 1950 address at the National Press Club delineating the United States' security perimeter in the Far East, Secretary of State Dean Acheson omitted any reference to South Korea--leading Stalin and Kim Il Sung to believe that they could invade that country with impunity.

The Clinton Administration Posture on Defending Taiwan

Secretary of State Acheson's failure to make clear American security guarantees to South Korea provides an especially apt parallel to the Clinton Administration policy regarding Taiwan. The Clinton Administration's policy of "deliberate ambiguity" suffers from the weaknesses of being both unclear and of limited credibility.

First, as to its ambiguity: why would the United States want to leave the Chinese leadership in any doubt as to the outcome of action against Taiwan? There can be little doubt that an unambiguous statement from the United States would effectively deter Communist China; the current policy of ambiguity enables the Chinese leadership to hope that an attack on Taiwan would go effectively unpunished. And only through a tortuously loose construction of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 can one argue that the United States is not committed to coming to Taiwan's assistance if faced with an attack by Communist China. Yet the Administration still declines to clarify its commitments.

And the "ambiguity" of Clinton's policy has been overstated. In the October 30, 1995 issue of U.S. News and World Report, "a State Department official" is quoted as saying that U.S. policy is "meant to be ambiguous." But "a senior State Department official" had this to say: "You don't really know what would happen until you get there....[But] we would not be in a position to react with force. We would not elect to do that, I'm sure." There is nothing ambiguous about that statement. Apparently, senior Clinton appointees at the State Department doesn't think Beijing subscribes to U.S. News.

Communist China has recently intensified its aggressive words and deeds in a campaign to intimidate Taiwan as it prepares to hold the first free, fair and competitive presidential elections in 4,000 years of Chinese history. Yet when the Clinton Administration did the right thing by ordering the U.S.S. Nimitz and four escort vessels to pass through the Taiwan Straits on December 19, 1995, it failed to make the rationale clear. An Administration spokesman said the ships were rerouted through the Straits strictly because of inclement weather (even though the Hong Kong Royal Observatory indicated there was no tropical storm at the time in alternative routes for navigation, contrary to the Administration's claims).

The PRC is now amassing 150,000 troops and 220 fighter aircraft in Fujian, only 100 miles away from Taiwan. Despite Communist China's dramatic effort to deploy troops and military hardware on adjacent mainland territory and ships in the Taiwan Straits for exercises just before Taiwan's elections, the Administration is downplaying the likelihood of any "imminent" military action against Taiwan.

In fact, the Administration announced on February 20 that its response to recent provocations by Communist China on Taiwan, proliferation, and trade was to revive high-level contacts with that nation. Nothing could better illustrate the Clinton-Christopher belief in negotiations as an end in themselves than the "strategic dialogue" the Administration is recommending.

Administration Weakness in its Policy Throughout the Region

Even if U.S. policy were unambiguous in Taiwan's favor, it is at this point an open question whether it would be credible. A record of preemptive capitulation throughout the region makes a mockery of the Clinton Administration's credibility. First, the Clinton Administration has only encouraged Communist Chinese adventurism with its policy of appeasement toward North Korea. The President's pledge not to permit North Korea to obtain nuclear weapons was promptly followed by the August 12, 1995 "framework agreement," in which the Administration rewarded the Communist regime for its nuclear arms program with aid and reactor technology.

Another flip-flop followed the Administration's May 16, 1995 threat to slap 100 percent tariffs on Japanese luxury automobiles as a result of a Section 301 unfair trade practices case involving sale of autoparts in Japan. On June 28, 1995, the Administration simply dropped the threat, without any counterbalancing Japanese concessions.

And the Most Favored Nation trade status question provided an example of weakness which directly involved Communist China itself. Candidate Clinton lambasted President Bush for coddling the dictators of Beijing after the Tiananmen massacre of June 1989. In May 1993, Clinton issued an Executive Order formally linking the PRC's MFN status to progress on human rights, which he had charged Bush with overlooking. Precisely one year later Clinton tore up the Executive Order, "delinking" MFN trade status from human rights. Whatever the merits of Clinton's individual decisions in these and other cases, their collective impact was unmistakable. They have torpedoed the Clinton Administration's credibility in dealing with Communist China, as Beijing's contemptuous responses to our policy demonstrate.

Restoring A Policy of Firm Deterrence

American policy must return to the formula which helped win the Cold War--clarity of purpose, especially in dealing with Communist nations. United States national security policy should be focused on avoiding the need to commit American military forces to combat. But the only effective manner of implementing that policy is through a clear threat to use force if provoked. The Clinton Administration has done nothing of the kind.

As Communist China rattles its saber against the democratic state across the Taiwan Straits, the United States cannot afford to be ambiguous. And without a clear U.S. policy, there is little to hold "high-level talks" with the PRC about. The United States must pledge to stand by Taiwan if attacked, a policy wholly consonant with our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act.