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The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. Horn] is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, the diplomatic recognition of the government in Beijing in 1979 did not end our relationship with Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 formally reiterated United States support for the people of Taiwan. Since 1979, U.S. relations have grown steadily closer with both the People's Republic and the Republic of China within the framework of `One China, Two Systems.' Despite the growing interaction of the United States with both governments, a dark cloud hangs over future peaceful development. This dark cloud is the refusal of the Beijing Government to renounce the use of force against Taiwan.
Beijing still regards Taiwan as a renegade province that is destined to return to the motherland of China--by peaceful means if possible, by force if necessary. If the people of Taiwan freely and fairly choose to reunite with the mainland--which they have not yet done--then that is their business. If the people of Taiwan are forced to reunite with the mainland--or are intimidated into doing so--then that situation will become the business of the whole world, including the United States of America. The people of Taiwan are friends of the United States, as we are friends with them. We respect the aspirations of the Taiwanese and support them in the pursuit of their dreams.
Increasingly, the people of Taiwan also seek a role in governing themselves--a dream that will be fully realized on March 23 when they freely elect their own president and national assembly. This free election is the culmination of years of reform in the political process in Taiwan. It is an obvious contradiction to those who say that Asian cultures cannot and do not support widespread democratic reforms. That is the view by many of the autocrats of Asia. Sadly, it is also the view within some Western circles. March 23 will be an historic date in the advance of freedom during this troubled century.
There is no freedom for the 1.1 billion people of mainland China. There is growing economic freedom. But the aging Communist oligarchy that rules the People's Republic of China is out of step with the aspirations of its own dynamic citizenry.
Now, in recent weeks, officials of the government in Beijing have recklessly escalated their rhetoric, threatening the lives of not only the people of Taiwan, but even the United States. In an appalling turn, the veiled threat of nuclear destruction has been leveled against Taiwan and the United States. Apparently, the mainland Chinese believe that the people of the United States, and Congress, will be cowed by their bluster. They are wrong.
Shortly before the invasion of South Korea in June, 1950, it was suggested by the American Secretary of State that the Korean peninsula was outside of direct United States interests. This played a large part in encouraging the leaders of North Korea that the United States would not interfere with their plans to reunify Korea by force. The recently dedicated memorial on the Mall to the thousands of Americans who died to prevent aggression is proof that they were wrong. It would be a tragic mistake for the current leaders in Beijing to make the same mistake that their then allies in North Korea made nearly a half century ago. It is time for the President to clarify a somewhat stealth China policy that could invite disaster for the people of China, Taiwan, and the United States.
The United States supports peace, and will welcome the opportunity to discuss and resolve our current differences with the people of China. The people of the United States have no dispute with the Chinese. We share many of the same interests. We agree on many important issues. It would be foolish to throw away years of careful progress. That progress has led to mutual friendship and mutual respect. That progress should not stop over aggressive moves that threaten peace. Unfortunately, recent actions by the Government of the People's Republic of China suggest that these hopes are not important to that current government.
This, however, begs an important question: Is this situation important to the Chinese people? Do the people of China support the bellicose statements of their government? We have no way of knowing because, of course, their government has not asked them, and does not care what its own people think. This is why the United States supports Taiwan, and that is a fundamental reality that those in Beijing cannot ignore.
Mr. Speaker, I ask consent to include the House Republican Policy Committee statement concerning `Communist China's Taiwan Invasion Threat.'
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Communist China's Taiwan Invasion Threat
On January 30, Communist China's Premier Li Peng emphasized that in trying to absorb Taiwan as `a region of China . . . in the final analysis, we cannot promise to give up the use of force.'
This statement is the latest example of the PRC ratcheting up unsubtle threats against Taiwan. In recent weeks, Chinese Communist leaders told American visitors that the PRC was preparing a plan for a sustained attack on Taiwan should it pursue a policy that they deemed too `independent.' These threats against Taiwan were coupled with threats of attack on the U.S. should we seek to protect Taiwan--a remarkable slap in the face to the President after three years of the Administration's `engagement' policy, and in a region the Administration has highlighted as its top foreign policy priority.
While a number of observers have been startled by Communist China's most recent provocations, its threats against Taiwan are part of a pattern aggressive behavior in territorial deputes in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, Communist China's economy and military structure have recently undergone enormous changes, including a sustained nine-percent economic growth rate and dramatic--and ominous--transformation of the military's force structure and doctrine. This recent growth and modernization of the Communist Chinese military threatens vital U.S. national security interests in Asia.
A GROWING PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
Trends in People's Liberation Army (PLA) expenditures for foreign military technology over the last decade reveal an emphasis on force projection through air and naval power, with a 2:3:5 ration for the Communist Chinese Army, Navy, and Air Force respectively. In 1992, Admiral Liu Hauqing, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission and the PRC's highest ranking military officer, publicly affirmed that the PLA Air Force and Navy would remain primary recipients of funding for foreign military technology and weapon systems. Recent notable purchases include: 26 Su 27 Soviet fighters from Russia (with an additional 26 under negotiation); 24 Mil Mi 17 helicopters from Soviet Union; 10 I1-76 heavy transport planes from Russia; In-flight refueling technology; 100 Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles and four mobile launchers; Rocket engines and missile guidance technology from Russia; Uranium enrichment technology and nuclear reactors from Russia; Airborne Early Warning (AEW) technology from Israel; Stinger anti-aircraft missiles from the U.S.; 100 Klimov/Sarkisov RD33 jet engines from Russia; Avionics from US for F-8II fighters;
Artillery munitions production equipment from the U.S.; Mark 46 MOD 2 anti-submarine torpedoes from U.S.; 50 T-72 tanks from Russia; and 2-4 Kilo-class conventional submarines from Russia.
The PLA has recently given a greater degree of attention to development of combined arms, rapid deployment units, air mobility, and a blue-water naval capability. Doctrinal changes, weapon systems modernization, and imports of advanced foreign weapons systems indicate an interest in increasing the PRC's ability to project power beyond its borders. Similarly, Beijing has announced its plans to develop two 45,000-ton aircraft carriers within the next decade, and the PLA is already capable of conducting military actions in close proximity to China's borders.
The PLA's greater emphasis on force project through the development of naval and air power resulted in substantial changes in budget allocations. The PRC's official defense budget has expanded every year since 1989, for an increases of 141 percent. The annual increase are as follows: 1989, 13%; 1990, 15.5%; 1991, 12%; 1992, 13.8%; 1993, 13.9%; 1994, 20.3%; and 1995, 25%.
Beijing argues that these six years of hikes were offset by 130 percent inflation. Yet the PRC's stated defense budget does not include research and development, military education, and extra-budgetary appropriations, such as the 1992 purchase of 26 Shukhoi-27 fighters from Russia. Modest salaries, free housing, and free medical services represent far lower outlays for pay and benefits for military personnel than in the West; hence, more of the PRC's defense budget goes to hardware.
Assessing the real value of Communist China's defense budget is extraordinarily difficult because of the aforementioned vehicles, unknown levels of civilian production from the PRC's military-industrial complex, and Beijing's reluctance to publish accurate statistics. As a result, comparative analyses of the PRC's defense budget range from $18 to $90 billion.
CHINESE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN DISPUTES WITH TAIWAN AND ELSEWHERE
The recent PLA buildup in land, sea, and air forces and the overall increase in military spending in the last six years are fueling the fears of Communist China's neighbors--especially Taiwan. The buildup aggravates a number of longstanding disputes in Asia involving the PRC. series of overt Communist Chinese provocations have further heightened tensions in the region.
One of Asia's most volatile strategic issues is the relationship between the PRC and Taiwan. Beijing has repeatedly declared its intent to use military force against Taiwan should the latter move toward independence. The PLA regularly holds large-scale combined air and naval exercises in close proximity to Taiwan. The most recent exercises coincided with Taiwan's national legislative elections and were designated to browbeat the Taiwanese electorate and show that Beijing is serious about using force in the event the island chooses an independent course. The PRC fired six nuclear-capable missiles in July 1995 about 100 miles north of Taiwan, shortly after Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's visit to his alma mater, Cornell University.
The PRC's belligerence has recently been raised to a new plane. Chinese Communist political and military leaders told former Assistant Secretary of Defense Chas Freeman that the PRC had drafted plans to
attack Taiwan with conventional missile strikes for 30 days if President Less refuses to desist in his calls for international recognition. Beijing's threatening statements and actions towards Taiwan are profoundly troubling, at a time when Taiwan prepares to fully enter the worlds family of democracies by holding its first free presidential election in March 1996.
Ownership of the Paracel and Spratly Islands is one of the most contentious territorial issues in Asia. The strategically-located Spratly Islands extend some seven hundred miles south of mainland China and hold oil and natural gas reserves of an estimated 45 billion tons, valued at $1.5 trillion. The island chains are claimed by seven nations (the PRC, Brunei, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines), with five (all but Brunei and Indonesia) deploying military forces in the area.
In July 1992, Vietnam signed a contract for Spratly Island oil exploration rights with the Mobil Oil Corporation. Exploration was blocked by PLA naval forces. And in February 1995, Communist China was discovered to have established an outpost on Mischief Reef, located in part of the Spratly Islands claimed by the Philippines. In March, the Philippine Navy responded by destroying small structures and concrete markers the PRC had erected on three reefs. Since then, PLA and Philippine warships have provoked each other, and both nations have detained the other's fishing ships in the area.
Communist China has additional territorial disputes with Japan over the Senkaku-Shoto Islands and with India concerning the Himalayan frontier, a dispute that led to armed conflict between India and China in 1962. Moreover, the Communist regime faces separatist movements in the northwestern provinces of Xinjiang, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia and Tibet. The PLA build-up has ominous implications for how the PRC might employ expanded military capabilities both abroad and at home.
U.S. INTERESTS AND CLINTON ADMINISTRATION VACILLATION
The U.S. has an immense economic stake in stability in the Asia-Pacific region, which accounts for more than 36 percent of U.S. international trade. Seventy percent of Asia-Pacific oil transits the South China Sea and the Spratly Island chain. Communist China's bellicose approach to territorial disputes in that region could affect a significant part of American foreign commerce.
The United States has a substantial stake in supporting fledgling and established democracies in Asia, and a special stake in supporting Taiwan. Taiwan is America's sixth largest trading partner, with hard currency reserves of over $90 billion. Also, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 implies a commitment of U.S. assistance in the event of foreign aggression.
Recently, as a sign of its commitment to Taiwan, the Congress initiated legislation to permit the sale of F-16 aircraft to that nation and to support Li Teng-hui's visit to the U.S. Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration has made its commitment to supporting Taiwan anything but crystal clear. In the event of military attack by the PRC on Taiwan, a senior State Department official was quoted by U.S. News & World Report on October 30, 1995 as saying, Clinton Administration policy is `meant to be ambiguous. . . . You don't really know what would happen until you get there . . . we would not be in a position to react with force. We would not elect to do that I'm sure.' Such a posture seems quite unambiguous, and it's small wonder that the Chinese Communist leaders view the Administration's policy as a green light to bully Taiwan--or worse. One Chinese leader told Chas Freeman that the PRC does not fear retribution from the U.S. because American leaders `care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan,' which the former Clinton Administration official interpreted as a threat to use nuclear weapons against the U.S. should it defend Taiwan.
Clinton's Taiwan policy is not an isolated case of weakness encouraging the PRC's bellicosity. The Clinton Administration has squandered U.S. credibility through a dizzying series of policy flip-flops and retreats in the region. The most noticeable reversal to the PRC was on most-favored nation (MFN) trade status. Candidate Clinton excoriated President Bush for kowtowing to the PRC's leadership after the Tianenmen massacre of June 1989. In May 1993, Clinton issued an Executive Order formally linking the PRC's MFN status to progress on human rights in Communist China, which he had charged Bush with overlooking. Then, on May 26, 1994--almost exactly one year after the Executive Order--President Clinton tore up the Order, separating MFN trade status from human rights.
Another Asian policy cave-in that did not go unnoticed in the PRC followed the Administration's May 16, 1995 threat to slap 100 percent tariffs on luxury cars exported by Japan to the United States as a result of a Section 301 unfair trade practices case involving sale of autoparts in Japan. On June 28, 1995, the Administration cast aside its threat in a `compromise' in which Japan made no commitments to particular numbers of foreign autoparts it had to buy or of dealerships that would sell foreign cars. And yet again Clinton's vow not to allow the North Korean tyranny to retain nuclear weapons was promptly followed by the August 12, 1995 `framework agreement,' in which the Administration rewarded Communist North Korea for its nuclear weapons program with aid and reactor technology. Whatever the merits of Clinton's ultimate position, the fact that he was so willing to alter his policies in the face of any resistance has not been lost on the Chinese Communists.
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CONCLUSION
Asian nations are concerned because the Chinese Communist leadership has historically shown a willingness to use military force to settle disputes within what it regarded as its sphere of influence. The PLA has seen battle at least 11 times since the inception of the Chinese Communist dictatorship in 1949. China's build-up of naval forces is designed to expand this sphere by enhancing its ability to project force; this program has already spawned a naval arms race among Asian nations. These developments have created mounting regional instability.
Its vast size, population, economy, and air and naval force projection capabilities make Communist China a tremendous regional power. The PRC's growing force-projection capabilities are further destabilizing the Asia-Pacific region. The rising military profile of Communist China in that region--in terms of both capability and aggressive intent--necessitates policies to protect American economic interests and the democracies in the region. And the greatest danger is to the Taiwanese democracy--which the PRC is now threatening to attack or invade. Despite repeated claims that the Asia-Pacific region is its top priority, the Clinton Administration has unwittingly encouraged Communist Chinese imperialism, and has completely failed to promote robust policies to counter these ominous trends.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Guam [Mr. Underwood] is recognized for 5 minutes.
[Mr. UNDERWOOD addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]
END
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