Tracking Number: 428339
Title: James Lilley, director of Asian Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute and former ambassador to China testified before the House Committee on National Security on US relations with China. (960321)
Date: 19960321
Text:
*PFS404
03/21/96
TEXT: LILLEY 3/20 HILL TESTIMONY ON CHINA SECURITY ISSUES
(March 20 House National Security Committee hearing) (2420)
Washington -- The United States must make clear to China the negative consequences of using military means to achieve its political goals, strategy experts said at a March 20 hearing sponsored by the House National Security Committee.
It is important to make clear to China that "military adventurism" doesn't work, or else China will keep using this tactic, said James Lilley, director of Asian Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.
Lilley, a former ambassador to China, said that continued Chinese aggression would cause the United States to increase the forward deployment of troops in the Asia-Pacific region and could redirect the U.S.-Japan security relationship against China. Other consequences could include stunted Asian economic growth, a stronger missile defense system for Taiwan, a military build-up in Southeast Asia, and increased North Korean aggression and conflicts on the Korean peninsula.
"China wants none of these, but all of these could be reactions to its military activities," Lilley said.
Lilley advised the United States to have high-level talks on military transparency with China as soon as possible.
"We have to discuss candidly our perception of a Chinese military build-up and their perception of a U.S. `containment' policy," he said. "Our focus should be (as it has been) on confidence building measures, defense conversion, and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."
The United States should also encourage China and Taiwan to pursue their bilateral talks and to continue their economic interaction, Lilley said.
"The future of Asia lies in economic growth, political stability, and regional cooperation," Lilley said. "What disrupts this is not good for all of Asia."
According to Lilley, the international community should work to "discredit the militant wing in China."
"China has faced hard decisions in the past as to whether it should go the unilateral (or `Central Kingdom') route or go with international forces," he said. "When the costs and benefits are clear, China is more likely to take the more pragmatic route.
"There is much room for maneuver between China's basic principles -- sovereignty and unity, and ours, democracy and free markets. These need not collide in Taiwan. The Chinese cannot use force to tamper with democracy or disrupt free markets just as we cannot break our commitment to a One China policy," Lilley said.
David Lampton, President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, pointed out that the United States and China share important common, strategic interests, including avoiding a regional arms race and cooperation on global issues such as the environment, international health, and drug control.
"Both sides should articulate this rationale and build upon it," Lampton said.
Lampton also warned against any moves to "contain" China, stressing that "the logic of containment is absolutely antithetical to economic interdependence and open global systems."
"Containment is infeasible and inadvisable not only because America needs the trade, investment opportunities, and markets we would have to forego to even try to implement the policy, but, as well, no other major strategic or economic player would join Washington in such an effort under current or likely future circumstances," he said. "Without cooperation, such a policy would be stillborn."
"If we treat China as a threat, it will feed the worst impulses in that society; it will become the threat it need not be," he said.
Following is the text of Lilley's testimony: (begin text) PREPARED TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR JAMES R. LILLEY BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 1996 The current imbroglio off Taiwan, centered on China's use of military flamboyance, threat and intimidation, is rooted in China's concept of itself as a rising world power. It is also consistent with its military strategy outlined in 1985 to enable itself to fight limited wars on its periphery against weaker powers. China is in effect a non-status quo power, with a thriving economy and an increasingly powerful military machine with which it is trying to change the ground rules in Asia. Its 1992 NPC law on extended sovereignty (my word) is a clear and specific example of this. In this current situation in Taiwan, China's basic motives are:
-- to change U.S. policy towards Taiwan -- to influence the domestic political process in Taiwan -- to isolate Taiwan internationally -- to divert its people to a form of strident nationalism -- to get the U.S. to pressure Taiwan into political unification talks with China
First: To change U.S. policy towards Taiwan: China wants the U.S. to agree to further limit arms sales to Taiwan and in fact to terminate them. It wants high level visits and exchanges curtailed and it seeks U.S. cooperation in combating Taiwan's search for international legitimacy -- especially its desire to join the U.N.
Second: Influencing Taiwan's domestic politics: China wants Taiwan to foreclose the Independence options and to begin unification talks on China's terms at an authoritative level. It seeks to discredit President Lee Teng-hui and reduce his capability to govern. It supports the pro-unification New Party in Taiwan and seeks to increase its power base.
Tactically, the Chinese leadership believes that diplomatic and political means have failed to deter Taiwan's moves towards greater autonomy. It has therefore initiated high stakes military means -- short of invasion or direct confrontation -- to achieve its political objectives. It seeks to establish, as acceptable, these military means, and will try to use them again and again when it feels its objectives have been frustrated. This is consistent with past Chinese military acts on its periphery, such as:
-- Seizing Mischief Reef, challenging the Philippines in 1995 -- Staging the Vietnam "incursion" in 1979 -- Seizing the Paracels Islands in 1974 -- Seizing territory from India in 1962 -- Attacking Quemoy in 1958 What compounds the current friction is the internal situation in China. China is in the throes of a wrenching leadership transition. From the second generation to the third -- from revolutionary to pragmatic -- from agriculture to industry -- from rural to urban. Enormous dislocations in China have been caused by rapid and sometimes unrestrained economic growth in the regions, by huge population movements, by corruption, by disparities in wealth and by regional challenges to central control. The leadership is, in a word, insecure but at the same time is arrogant with its power and its growth. China has often expressed concern, even fear, about spiritual pollution, bourgeois liberalization. The U.S. wants to turn China into a Yugoslavia or a Russia -- code words for western democratic infiltration which accompanies free market growth. Jingoistic nationalism has had some impact in steering China away from internal difficulties and into such national "sacred sovereignty" problems as Taiwan and Hong Kong. China believes it must have its rightful place in the world, and especially in Asia, after a century of humiliation and decades of isolation. China believes this is its immutable right and those who stand in the way invite China's wrath. The U.S. is in that position now and is accused of both a containment policy and of peaceful evolution -- containment to restrain China's legitimate extension of sovereignty -- peaceful evolution to undermine China's socialist system.
Given these fears and concerns which border on paranoia at times, there also has been the mishandling and misdirection of policy by the U.S., Taiwan and China, and this has exacerbated the existing contradictions and tensions.
On the U.S. side, the misguided Taiwan Policy Review in 1994 infuriated China, disappointed Taiwan and upset our own Congress. It was a hypocritical exercise which accomplished nothing positive, only a minor name change. This was further advanced by the inept handling of President Lee Teng-hui's visa to visit his alma mater, Cornell University, in 1995. The Administration cavalierly treated the One China policy as a moveable feast. At first, the Administration said that Lee's visit would be a violation of our One China policy, but later Lee's visit as a private citizen was said not to be a violation of our One China policy. The Chinese could not take this lying down. What was even worse was the lesser known mishandling of Lee's stopover in Hawaii in 1994. This is well documented so I will not go into it, but suffice to say, it was insulting to Taiwan in the extreme and contributed to Taiwan's loss of confidence in the Administration's intent and ability to mange the relationship. The U.S. vacillation on MFN and human rights, its mishandling of the critical proliferation problem in the fiasco of the Chinese ship, the Milky Way (Yin He), all led the Chinese to conclude that the Administration was not serious about China policy, and even when it was, did not know how to manage it. The Chinese unfortunately, then concluded that pressure works on the U.S., so it turned on the military pressure.
The Chinese on their side gave us the wrong signal. They did little when President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan visited Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines in 1904 -- all of whom recognized China and met in each instance the leading political figure of that country. In the U.S., Lee did not even meet a janitor from the Federal government, but China withdrew its Ambassador. We were treated like a Banana Republic -- relegated to Rodney Dangerfield's comment on not getting any respect. China, at the same time, miscalculated its move on Mischief Reef. This was military adventurism which stirred up Southeast Asia and resulted in the U.S. taking a stronger position on sea lanes throughout the South China Sea. China backed off and turned an affable face to Southeast Asia. Then it turned its attention to Taiwan. As I said earlier, the 1992 NPC law was provocative and driven by the Central Kingdom mentality -- a piece of legislation dominated by militant thinking. It was both unneighborly and unfriendly.
Taiwan in its turn, pushed the envelope hard -- aggressive, open lobbying at the U.N., defiant statements on Taiwan's identity, and a political focus at variance with its economic interests in China. There is every reason for Taiwan to want greater international legitimacy and acceptance, but its quest was handled in a way to undermine its stable economic relationship with the PRC and to challenge more openly upon PRC's fundamental principles of unity and sovereignty.
All of this came together in 1995 and China over reacted -- what should the U.S. do about all of this?
-- Secretary Perry's recent strong statement backed by his movement of substantial naval forces into the Taiwan area were good first moves. But the contest will be prolonged. This situation can be resolved peacefully by moving the focus away from the military. China, Taiwan and the U.S. should be economic partners and competitors in achieving prosperity and stability for all Chinese and Asians.
-- Point out to the Chinese the negative effects for China and for the whole Pacific area if China pursues military means. The U.S.-Japan security relationship will grow stronger, as an anathema to China, Taiwan could get a stronger missile defense system, the U.S. will remain forward deployed in even greater strength, there could be a military build-up in Southeast Asia, a dangerous North Korea could become more aggressive leading to conflicts on the Korean peninsula, and the Asian economic growth could be adversely influenced. China wants none of these, but all of these could be reactions to its military activities.
-- China is not a viable sea power -- this is not the Cheng He era, he was the eunuch admiral in the early Ming Dynasty. The sea is where the U.S. and Taiwan have a clear comparative advantage and will have indefinitely.
-- The common policy of the U.S., other Asian powers and world powers, should be to discredit the militant wing in China. China has faced hard decisions in the past as to whether it should go the unilateral (or "Central Kingdom") route or go with international forces. In Desert Storm, Cambodia, and on the Korean peninsula, pragmatic forces prevailed over the more chauvinistic elements in China. When the costs and benefits are clear, China is more likely to take the more pragmatic route.
-- There is much room for maneuver between China's basic principles sovereignty and unity, and ours, democracy and free markets. These need not collide in Taiwan. The Chinese cannot use force to tamper with democracy or disrupt free markets just as we cannot break our commitment to a One China policy.
-- China and the U.S. must work together to resolve the dangerously explosive problem of North Korea. We cannot be diverted by our bilateral squabble. China is critical to ensure a safe landing for a deteriorating North Korea, just we are crucial in deterring it from military adventurism.
-- We need to have frank talks at the highest level soon on military transparency. We have to discuss candidly our perception of a Chinese military build-up and their perception of a U.S. "containment" policy. Our focus should be (as it has been) on confidence building measures, defense conversion, and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
-- China and Taiwan have to be encouraged to pursue their bilateral talks and to continue their broad economic interaction. Both North Korea and China have been hold-outs on resuming their respective bilateral talks, not for solid reasons but for reasons of face and pride. Ironically, China supports resumption of North-South Talks in Korea but has so far rejected Taiwan's overtures.
--The U.S. should continue to be forward deployed, especially on the seas, as a constant reminder that there is not a use of force option.
-- China should be encouraged to adhere to the Manila Doctrine on peaceful resolution and should eschew the use of force, as well as dropping its constant reminders of its rights to use force.
-- The U.S. should rebuild Taiwan's confidence in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. American bureaucrats have to resist the temptation to try to push Taiwan around and to gratuitously insult it. This may make them feel important but it gets little done.
Finally, the future of Asia lies in economic growth, political stability, and regional cooperation. What disrupts this is not good for all of Asia. Both China and the U.S. as major powers in the area have the prime responsibility. Let us quiet down and get to work.
(end text)
NNNN
File Identification: 03/21/96, PFS404
Product Name: Wireless File
Product Code: WF
Keywords: LILLEY, JAMES/Speaker; CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF/Politics &
Government; CHINA-US RELATIONS; HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY CMTE; CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY; ASIA; CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS
Document Type: TXT
Target Areas: EA
PDQ Text Link: 428339
USIA
Notes: *96032102.PFS
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
