Tracking Number: 422556
Title: "Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Nye 2/8 Briefing at FPC."
According to former assistant secretary of defense Joseph Nye, the US wants to see a peaceful settlement to the problems between China and Taiwan in the Taiwan straits. (960213)
Date: 19960213
Text:
FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE NYE 2/8 BRIEFING AT FPC
(Transcript: briefing on one-year anniversary of Nye rpt) (5610)
Washington -- The United States wants to see a peaceful settlement of relations in the Taiwan Straits, according to Joseph Nye, former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.
Speaking at a February 8 briefing at the Foreign Press Center, Nye warned against any actions by China or Taiwan that could affect the security or stability of the region.
"It would be a grave mistake, I think, if Taiwan were to press for a de jure independence that would destabilize the situation. And it would also be a grave mistake if China were to mistake the situation as one in which the United States is indifferent," he said.
"The United States believes the current situation is stable, and that it will be possible to resolve these tensions by peaceful means with time," Nye said. "Therefore, as long as Taiwan does not press the envelope of independence and bring on a crisis, and as long as Beijing understands that any unprovoked attack in the Taiwan Straits would have very grave consequences, then I think it is clear that there will not be trouble."
According to Nye, the United States has also maintained its other interests in the region, as outlined last year in the Department of Defense East Asian Strategy Report. These include reaffirming alliances, maintaining about 100,000 troops forward based in the region, pursuing a policy of engagement with China, and working out security issues with North Korea.
"If we maintain that (regional) stability, then I think East Asia will continue to prosper, as it indeed has done over the past 20 years. And in that greater period of prosperity, I think some of these security issues will gradually be resolved," he said.
(begin transcript)
USIA FOREIGN PRESS CENTER BRIEFING WITH:
JOSEPH S. NYE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
MODERATOR: JAKE GILLESPIE
TOPIC: U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS WITH ASIA
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1996
MODERATOR: Welcome to the Washington Foreign Press Center. My name is Jake Gillespie. We are very happy to have with us this afternoon, making his first visit in his new role as dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard, Joseph S. Nye. He is well known to many of you, directly and indirectly -- a recent stint at the Department of Defense.
He will have a few opening remarks for a few minutes, and then we will go to questions. I ask you all please, because there are a large number of you here, to try to hold yourself to one question at a time when we recognize you. We'll try to get around to as many of you as we possibly can today. Welcome.
MR. NYE: Thank you. I thought I might say a few words about the position of -- the U.S. security position in East Asia, since this is the one-year anniversary of the East Asian Strategy Report, sometimes called the Nye Report, that came out about a year ago -- but properly the East Asian Strategy Report.
And let me remind you what it said. It said that the United States had a strong and growing national interest in East Asia. There was no danger of isolationism or withdrawal from the region; that the U.S. presence was welcomed in the area by other countries, because we had no territorial ambitions and because the presence of the United States had tended to produce stability, which was good for growth and prosperity in the region; third, that we intended to reaffirm our alliances and to maintain about 100,000 troops forward based in the region; and, fourth, that we were concerned about the North Korean situation as the major threat to the region; and that, fifth, we intended to pursue a policy of engagement with the People's Republic of China. I thought I might just give you a one-year view of how all that has turned out.
Certainly in terms of our interests, we have maintained them. And in terms of our alliances -- I think particularly in the case of the U.S.-Japan security treaty and security relationship -- the year-long U.S.-Japan security dialogue has indeed strengthened that relationship. As evidence of that I would cite several things: the successful two-plus-two meeting, where the two foreign ministers and two defense ministers met in September; the passing by the Japanese Diet of the host nations support bill, which provides very generous host nation support for American troops -- a slight increase over the past; the Japanese national defense program outline, that was issued in December, which commits to the importance of the U.S.-Japan security relationship, and therefore is very complementary to the East Asian Strategy Report; the meeting between Prime Minister Murayama and Vice President Gore in Osaka, which again reaffirmed publicly the importance of the U.S.-Japan security relationship; and the one major event which is still to come, and which was delayed by the U.S. budgetary battles, will be President Clinton's visit to Japan in April.
On the question of troops, the maintenance of 100,000 troops forward based is still in place. I should clear up one mistake that some people have reported, which is that the East Asian Strategy Report thought that there would be 100,000 troops for 20 years in the future. I've noticed sometimes this is reported in the press. That's not what it said. It said that we needed 100,000 troops, because of the current threat and the major part of the current threat is the fact that North Korea has 1.1 million troops -- most of them are close to the demilitarized zone on the Korean Peninsula -- and that's the reason for the size of the troops being at 100,000. Obviously if you get a peaceful situation on the Korean Peninsula we could do with far fewer troops. You tell me when that occurs, and I'll tell you when we'll have fewer troops.
On North Korea, the situation I think is somewhat improved. The framework agreement is being implemented successfully. We think that this is a considerable improvement over the security situation before that, but we still are concerned -- I would be concerned about the fact that North Korea is heavily armed. And even though there are difficulties, such as the current food crisis in North Korea, sometimes regimes that are in difficult situations do risky things. So I think the need for a deterrence there is still a major factor.
Finally, on engagement with the People's Republic of China, I think we have been able to convince our Chinese friends that we are interested in engagement, and not containment, and certainly that was the message I conveyed during my visit last fall. If the major question that's arisen is that there not be any misunderstandings over Taiwan, China has made clear that it regards Taiwan as part of its sovereign nation, and the United States has made clear to China that it still lives by the three communiques, which essentially agrees that there is one country of China.
But I think the danger I see is that there be some misunderstanding. It would be a grave mistake, I think, if Taiwan were to press for a de jure independence that would destabilize the situation. And it would also be a grave mistake if China were to mistake the situation as one in which the United States is indifferent. We are committed to peaceful settlement of relations in the Taiwan Straits, and we have, under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, a commitment to the idea that Taiwan should be able to defend itself. And so I think it's important to realize that any unprovoked attack in the Taiwan Straits area would be grave -- a situation which would have grave consequences. There should be no misunderstanding about that. But I do think that we'll be able to get through this period, that both we and China understand the seriousness of the Taiwan situation, and that we do want a peaceful settlement there.
So I would summarize this by saying, as I look over the range of issues that were dealt with in the East Asian Strategy Report a year ago, I would say that we are doing quite well. There is security and stability in the region. But because of the situations that I mentioned, we have to be very careful that there not be any misunderstandings or anything that would throw us off track. If we maintain that stability, then I think East Asia will continue to prosper, as it indeed has done over the past 20 years. And in that greater period of prosperity, I think some of these security issues will gradually be resolved. So let me stop there and answer your questions.
Q: Now, you touch upon the China-Taiwan issue, but the -- in your opening remark you still consider that the major threat in East Asia is the North Korean issue. But a lot of people in this town now consider that the -- you know, that the tensions in the Taiwan Straits are -- should be put on a priority list, and it's more serious than the North Korean -- at least for the time being. I don't know how will you see the situation. And do you think this administration really has put up the appropriate resource in terms of dealing with a situation like this? I mean, whether -- are you still considering North Korea is the number one issue?
NYE: Well, notice that I will just give my personal views. I can't speak for the administration any longer. I regard the government on Taiwan and the Chinese government in Beijing as both rational and sensible people who will react accordingly -- though there is no misunderstanding about what could happen if there were unprovoked attack in the region. Then I think we're not going to see any such actions. So I think as long as the authorities on Taiwan and the government in Beijing follow that type of rational behavior, I don't expect there will be conflicts in the Taiwan Straits.
On the case of North Korea, however, you have a regime which is under severe pressure, which has done some quite risky things in the past when it has been under pressure -- and even before it's been under pressure. And sometimes people take desperate actions when a situation looks particularly grim for them or difficult for them. So I personally -- if I were to make a guess of where the more likely area where fighting would occur, I still think it would be more likely on the Korean Peninsula than in the Taiwan Straits. That's not to say that the situation in the Taiwan Straits isn't serious. It is serious. But it's a seriousness which can be handled if both sides understand clearly the things that I mentioned a few minutes ago.
Q: Dr. Nye, you pretty much started the debate of strategic ambiguity in case of China's attack of Taiwan. I believe you gave this speech last November at Asia Society. And then as you said earlier, that if there is an unprovoked attack on the Taiwan Straits, do you think that maybe you should be more explicit to state U.S. position and U.S. reaction? I understand that maybe when you said ambiguity -- or I don't know what -- the U.S. will react -- maybe tacitly that is a good ambiguity. Strategically if they do something like that -- unprovoked attack -- don't you think the U.S. should be more explicit?
NYE: Yes. It's important not to misunderstand what I meant by strategic ambiguity, or deliberate ambiguity. The United States believes the current situation is stable, and that it will be possible to resolve these tensions by peaceful means with time. Therefore, as long as Taiwan does not press the envelope of independence and bring on a crisis, and as long as Beijing understands that any unprovoked attack in the Taiwan Straits would have very grave consequences, then I think it is clear that there will not be trouble.
Now, if the United States were to say we will come to the defense of Taiwan, no matter what happens, then clearly Taipei would say, `Oh, we can do whatever we want,' and that would be destabilizing. On the other hand, if the United States said we will not defend Taiwan in the case of unprovoked attack, then Beijing would think, `Oh, we can do whatever we want,' and that would be destabilizing. So that's the tactical reason that you just said for why the United States is careful not to give either side a carte blanche or a free ticket.
But what I said when I was in Beijing, and what I referred to in the Asia Society speech that you mention, was a deeper historical point, which is in 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson said that Korea was outside our defense perimeter; and yet within a year we were at war with North Korea and with China. And what I said to my Chinese colleagues and interlocutors is be very, very careful, because you cannot predict what the American people or the American Congress will do. Even if we were to say that we would not come to the defense of Taiwan, we might do so anyway. So you better be extremely careful in how you behave here.
So the example that I used of 1950 was to say that the time when the United States and China were at war was from a miscalculation, and that it should be not a type of miscalculation would occur again.
I think we've also made clear -- or the administration has made clear -- that we do not believe that the Chinese missile tests off the coast of Taiwan were helpful. We also have said -- I believe I said that in my Asia Society speech. And I think the administration has also said that any unprovoked attack would have grave consequences. So I don't think there should be any real ambiguity here. In other words, as you put it, there's a degree of tactical ambiguity, but I think it's pretty clear, if you read the Taiwan Relations Act, and you understand carefully what the Americans have been saying, and you add to that the historical example of 1950, there's really not much ambiguity here at all.
Q: Mr. Nye, before you left the Pentagon, you said that you would probably regret that you weren't able to see the final resolution of the Okinawa issue between the U.S. and Japan. And now that you are actually with Harvard, could you tell us what you had in mind at that time as to how to resolve that issue -- some concrete measures, and what you think right now that will be a good way to solve that issue?
NYE: Well, I was fortunate to be present at the first meeting of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa during my visit to Japan in November. And at that time, which was the last time when I had any responsibility or authority, we were looking for serious ways that within a year we could reduce the burden of American bases upon the people of Okinawa. That could range from a number of things -- from noise abatement to relocations -- a whole variety of things that could reduce the impact of the American bases on the people of Okinawa. And Secretary Perry made a commitment during his trip to Japan in the beginning of November that within a year's time we would indeed make such a reduction in the impact.
So I think the -- I'm sure that my colleagues, knowing that Secretary Perry gave it such a high priority, made some progress in moving in that direction. But, frankly, one of the either virtues or faults of being away in Cambridge, Massachusetts, is that I don't know the details of that. That's perhaps a virtue, because I shouldn't tell -- at this time anyway. (Laughter.)
Q: As for the U.S. military forces in Japan, do you think the United States government has any perspective or intention to remove the forces in the future? I mean, under what circumstances is it possible for the United States to remove the U.S. military forces from Japan?
NYE: Well, one circumstance would lead to removal of all U.S. military forces immediately, would be if the Japanese government said please remove them. I mean, the forces are in Japan at the request of the Japanese government, and at the will of the Japanese people. So if you wanted all the forces removed, you could have them removed immediately just by asking. So any removal of forces would be done in consultation with the government of Japan.
Now, what circumstances could I imagine where the U.S. government and the Japanese government would say we need less forces here? I think the major one would be that the differences on the Korean Peninsula would be resolved. In other words, if you look at why we came up with the number of 100,000 troops, it was part of the planning for two major regional contingencies that was done in 1993. And we felt that we needed 100,000 troops forward based in East Asia to be able to deal with one of those major regional contingencies, which was namely the Korean Peninsula. If the Korean problem were to subside, imagine that for some reason North Korea went away as a problem -- I don't know how that will happen, but just imagine that -- then I can imagine the U.S. and the Japanese government sitting down and saying we need half as many troops, or we need two thirds the number of troops of whatever. So that would be the conditions under which I think it would occur.
But remember that the troops in Japan are there because the Japanese government and the Japanese people want them for protection. If there is no sense of threat and there's no need for protection, then you don't need the troops. So it's really something that has to be done by consultation between the U.S. and Japanese government. And at that time of consultation that will depend upon how the two governments see the security situation in the region.
Q: Just now you mentioned a provoked attack or unprovoked attack. My guess is that when one kind of war is happening the kind of result of tension buildup. The attack never probably would be -- (inaudible) -- unprovoked. So my question would be: How would you characterize an unprovoked attack? In your judgment, do you think Taiwan and Mainland China people -- probably the leadership on both sides -- have the same kind of similar understanding of the provoked attack and unprovoked attack? And, well, do you think this is kind of, you know, good for the destabilization of the situation in the Taiwan Straits?
NYE: Well, I understand that my colleagues in the government have spoken about the dangers of unprovoked attack, and I know they probably don't want to define that too deliberately. But I will speak simply as an historian or an analyst, which is the answer is not what's in the mind of the U.S. policymaker when he says or she says "unprovoked attack." What will be critical is what will be in the mind of the United States Congress and the United States public opinion if something were -- if force were to be used. If it looked like it had been brought on by actions on Taiwan, that might be reacted to differently by the American public than if it looked like it had been brought on by actions initiated by Beijing. So the key question is not what's in the mind of the U.S. policymaker who speaks today. The key question is: What will be the reaction of American public opinion and the American Congress if something happens? And that is very difficult to say in advance. But you can imagine, just by spinning out some scenarios, that things that look like Chinese aggression against Taiwan are more likely to bring about an American response in the public and in the Congress, than if it looks like something that was started by Taiwan.
So it's almost impossible to give you an answer. And what I am trying to say is even if I were still a policymaker, and gave you an answer, it's less important than how would the American public and the American Congress, and the American administration, perceive it at the time. And that's the importance of this analogy to Korea in 1950. The American policymaker, the key policymaker and the secretary of state, Dean Acheson, said Korea is outside our defense perimeter. But when the North Korean troops came pouring across the 38th Parallel, it reminded Harry Truman and the American public and the American Congress of Hitler's aggression in the 1930s, and he said, We're going to resist this -- even though it was a total reversal of what had been said earlier.
So what I am trying to say with this is: Be very, very careful, because how the American people will respond will depend on how they perceive the origins of what is happening in the Taiwan state.
Q: Dr. Nye, on the same subject, you caution Taiwan against pressing the envelope in its dealings with China. Can you be more specific about what language or actions by Taiwan you would consider to be pressing the envelope?
NYE: Well, clearly one extreme would be a declaration of independence, which is outside the policy the United States has had as a bipartisan policy since the 1970s. That would be, I think, extremely destabilizing, and would certainly be the opposite of U.S. policy, and would be a circumstance which I think would reduce sympathy for Taiwan. So I mean that's a very clear-cut example.
Q: And a less clear-cut example? Can you -- NYE: Well, you can put it on a spectrum. That one is absolutely clear, and you can imagine for yourself the whole series of events that could get closer and closer to that. Sometimes people talk about tourism diplomacy or vacation diplomacy, or return to your alma mater diplomacy -- (laughter) -- which try to creep up to this. It seems to me that those tend to be destabilizing.
Q: Dr. Nye, two days ago in a New York Times story saying that Russia will sell 72 (advanced 227 ?) airplanes to PRC. And you know recently all major United States newspapers all covered the same story, saying that the CIA last December delivered a report to the White House, has decided that PRC last year sold nuclear weapon related equipment to Pakistan. And there is a rumor circulating around Chinese circles saying that because Pakistan got the F-16 that the United States will deliver to Taiwan later this year. And do you see that there is a change in the military balance across the Taiwan Straits in a short term, and especially at a time when the Congress tries to push for early delivery of the Patriot missile and other advanced weapons to Taiwan?
NYE: As you know, under the Taiwan Relations Act, the administration is responsible making sure that Taiwan can defend itself. And we have discussions and assessments of the balance of forces in the Taiwan Straits. If you look back to the testimony which I gave last October, what it showed was the Chinese military has a long way to go before it can present a major threat to Taiwan. I would say, frankly, my opinion -- my personal opinion -- is that China is not capable of a military invasion of Taiwan. Remember, just having a few more airplanes does not give you a serious power projection capability. In studying the lessons of Desert Storm, you will see that what gives you a serious power projection capability is not the hardware as much as it is the ways to integrate a system of systems. You have to have command and control. You have to have a logistics capability. You have to have a combined forces capability. None of those are very far advanced in the Chinese military.
My personal view is that Taiwan is quite capable of defending itself from an invasion.
Q: I would like to know that has the U.S. discussed -- (inaudible) -- situation with Japan? In your personal assessment was -- what's the degree of Japan's concern over the Taiwan Straits? And the last year you had the trip to China. And do you agree or disagree that the PLA's interest in politics has increased?
NYE: I don't know the answer of how much the United States and Japan have discussed the Taiwan case, because this really has come up since I've left the government. So I don't -- I can't answer that from any first-hand experience. I would think that as allies it would be surprising if there wasn't some discussion. But I have no evidence for you on that.
On the question of the PLA -- PLA is an important factor in Chinese politics. I mean, the -- it's -- I think I've said that publicly in testimony: One of the reasons for encouraging defense-to-defense and military-to-military contacts between the United States and China is so that we and the PLA can understand each other -- not only so that we don't have any mistakes or accidents in the cases where our forces may be near each other; but also so that in the political influence that the PLA has they understand clearly what we are saying.
So my view is that of course they have some influence, and that's all the more reason why it's important to have clear communications and frequent contacts -- so that there be no ambiguity or misunderstanding.
Q: Yesterday Secretary Perry announced some changes to a unified a-- (inaudible) -- And I wonder how these changes are related to the East Asia Strategic Report, because Arabian Sea -- the committee for Arabian Sea, Pacific, to Central Command -- well, should -- (inaudible) -- changes relate to the higher tensions with Iran?
NYE: The -- I don't know the answer, since I wasn't present in the last stages. But there has been discussion of some realignment of the command structures for some time. So I don't think it's related to anything that's happened just recently. My impression is that we have been looking for ways to rationalize the lines. There's never a perfect line. I mean, there's never a perfect answer. For example, why should Pakistan be CENCOM and India should be in Pacific Command? It's just that you have to draw a line somewhere. Whenever you draw the line, somebody says, Oh, but it should have been drawn here or drawn there. So I don't -- from what I saw of this before I left the government, I would not read too many implications into it. And so I doubt that -- I don't know the answer, but I doubt it has some special implications for many recent events.
Q: Dr. Nye, do you foresee this sort of dialogue between Taiwan and PRC in the near future? And if so what role can the U.S. play in trying to reduce the tensions and let the two sides start talking again?
NYE: We -- the United States would like to see dialogue, because we essentially stand for a peaceful solution of the problems that are represented by the Taiwan Straits. I expect that my colleagues -- my former colleagues in the government -- must be encouraging that. But, again, I can only speak as a private citizen.
Q: I want to ask you again about the strategic ambiguity -- the ambiguity concept. It sounds very interesting and very sophisticated perhaps in -- (inaudible) -- now. But in reality if you look at Congress today, clearly it has a pro-Taiwan constituency though. It looks to me that this strategy you're developing allows Congress -- or permits Congress to further -- and what the administration does is play the -- (inaudible) -- all the time. What will prevent in reality -- say, up till the democratic election -- from Taiwan to declare independence, and what will prevent the Congress from supporting that? And what will the administration do then? Don't you think there's most support, in terms of the balance of power of public opinion, in support of Taiwan in Congress and in the public? I mean, this is in reaction to the point you make that follows, you know, what would you -- how would you define "unprovoked attack"?
NYE: The best answer to that is the title of a book that was written by a great American scholar named Edwin Corwin (sp), who was an expert on the American Constitution. And the book was about how is it that you understand the relationship between the Congress and the presidency in the area of foreign affairs. Who really has the final say? Who has the final power? And Corwin (sp) studied the Constitution and all the cases carefully, by carefully case-by-case. And he finally gave the title of his book, "Invitation to Struggle." In other words, the American Constitution does not say who will have the final say on foreign affairs. It essentially divides the power between the Congress and the presidency. So what I have been trying to say in answer to this is it doesn't matter so much what people say; it's how will be perceived at the time. If one is carefully historically, you will realize that it is important to be extremely cautious, because in the case like Korea in 1950, even though the secretary of state said one thing, it was the president who six months later decided the opposite -- and the Congress supported it.
So essentially this is in the nature of the U.S. political system since 1789. This is not something which is a new tactic of the Clinton administration. There is no way of saying in advance for certain how the Americans will respond, because power is divided. Therefore it will matter very much how the American public will perceive what is happening at the time the events happen. That's the point that I have been trying to make. In other words, when you talk about this ambiguity point, there is, as the questioner here said, a deliberate tactical dimension to it, which is we don't want to give a signal to Taiwan to be adventuresome, we don't want to give a signal to Beijing to be adventuresome. But behind that there's a deeper historical point, which is the Americans often wind up doing things which they said they wouldn't do just six months earlier -- such as going to war, as in 1950. So this is not just a tactic. It's a reality of the American political system. And when that's the case, it is incumbent upon other countries to be very, very careful. That's what I'm trying to say.
Q: You put North Korea -- (inaudible) -- priority of U.S. East Asia strategy. But how do you think about the North Korean military ability and the possibility that they dare to attack South Korea in terms of their -- (inaudible) -- and their old weapons systems?
NYE: I think if the North Koreans were to make the mistake of a military attack out of some desperation they would be badly defeated very rapidly. I think the American military capabilities, combined with the South Korean military capabilities, ensure that this would be a rash and futile act by North Korea. Nonetheless, in the process a lot of people would be killed. And so I think it's far better to deter any such action than it is to let it occur and to fight it. I have no doubts from the analyses that I saw when I was in the Pentagon that the United States would badly defeat North Korea quickly, and that that would be the end of the North Korean regime. But I think everybody would be better off if there's a soft landing rather than a crash.
Q: Are security concerns about casualties from foreign war in the United States after the -- (inaudible). And do you think (that it will impact the future ?) engagement of the United States armed forces in foreign wars?
NYE: People should be very careful about what they conclude are the lessons related to casualties from, let's say, Somalia. Remember that in Somalia the Americans had basically no national interests at all -- simply a diffuse humanitarian interest. If you look back at the Gulf War, which is a better example, it is not the fact that the Americans only had a few hundred or less than 200 casualties, it's what did they expect they would have as casualties when they made the decision to go in. And many of the estimates that were shared between the administration and the Congress were in the range of 10,000 casualties. So the Americans were willing to go to war in 1991, even though they expected very high casualties, because they knew they had a very strong national interest involved. So the lessons of Somalia, which is that the Americans decided to get out after a small number of casualties, should not be generalized to areas where the United States has strong interests, such as the ones that I've been talking about in East Asia.
(end transcript)
NNNN
File Identification: 02/13/96, EPF204; 02/13/96, NEA206
Product Name: Wireless File
Product Code: WF
Keywords: CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS; CHINA-US RELATIONS; NYE,
JOSEPH/Speaker; SELF-DETERMINATION; JAPAN-US RELATIONS; COMPREHENSIVE ENGAGEMENT; FORCE & TROOP LEVELS; KOREA (NORTH)-US RELATIONS; OKINAWA; MILITARY BASES; SECURITY ARRANGEMENT
Document Type: TRA
Thematic Codes: 1EA
Target Areas: EA; NE
PDQ Text Link: 422556
USIA Notes: *96021304.EPF
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