Tracking Number: 421769
Title: "Kurt Campbell Testimony on Taiwan Before SFRC EAP Panel."
According to deputy assistant secretary of defense Kurt Campbell, "overreaction to current events" between China and Taiwan "would jeopardize US national interests." (960207)
Date: 19960207
Text:
KURT CAMPBELL TESTIMONY ON TAIWAN
BEFORE SFRC EAP PANEL
(Text: DoD's Campbell's 2/7 prepared testimony) (1640)
Washington -- "Overreaction to current events" between China and Taiwan "would jeopardize U.S. national interests," according to Kurt Campbell, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs.
At a February 7 hearing held by the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Campbell said such "overreaction "would put at risk the economic and political progress achieved by the people of Taiwan." It would also "risk the growing peaceful exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland, exchanges which benefit people on both sides of the Strait."
Campbell said that "actions which would be inconsistent with our long standing 'one-China' policy put at risk the interests of the people of the United States which are clearly for the preservation of stability and peace. Abandoning our policy commitments are a risk to the interests of the people of Taiwan, and the larger interests of the entire region. We must continue to maintain that the question of Taiwan-PRC relationship is an issue to be resolved by the Chinese people themselves. Our abiding interest is that the resolution come about peacefully."
Following is text of Campbell's testimony, as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
PREPARED TESTIMONY BY
DR. KURT CAMPBELL
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC AFFAIRS
TAIWAN'S SECURITY -- RECENT THREATS AND RESPONSES
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1996
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today. Ambassador Lord presented a very comprehensive statement on the security situation in the Taiwan Strait. I think it's important for you to know at the outset that we keep in close consultation with the State Department and share the Ambassador's conclusions. My comments will supplement Ambassador Lord's very thorough statement and address three major points focusing on our Department of Defense perspectives.
First, how we implement DOD responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act. Second, how the military component of Taiwan security fits into the broader context of Taiwan comprehensive security and stability in the Taiwan Strait. And third, some thoughts on how we believe we should proceed in the coming months.
Obligations Under The Taiwan Relations Act The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 is our framework for defense obligations. Somewhat simply put, it requires that we: 1) assess the military balance to ascertain Taiwan's defense needs; 2) provide the articles and services necessary to Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability; 3) keep Congress informed on Taiwan's security requirements; and 4) maintain the capacity of the United States to resist force or coercion against the people of Taiwan.
In assessing Taiwan's defense needs, the Department of Defense and U.S. military have dedicated significant intelligence resources over the past two decades to monitoring the military balance in the Strait. We also have active dialogue with Taiwan's security authorities to keep current on their defense issues. Additionally, the United States Government maintains a strategy of engagement with the PRC, and DOD specifically with the PLA, with the goal of gaining clearer insights not only into Chinese military capabilities, but also intentions. I would also note that since the events of last summer, we intensified our efforts in all areas that help us carry out our responsibility to assess the balance.
Our second obligation, providing Taiwan a sufficient self-defense capability, was covered thoroughly by Ambassador Lord. I would only reiterate his point that Taiwan has a formidable capacity to defend itself and maintains a strong defensive posture. When we look at the threats to Taiwan from air, surface, sub-surface, and PLA ground forces, in every area we feel Taiwan maintains a very credible defense. Regarding the PLA missile threat that was evidenced last summer, it is important to note that Taiwan is being equipped with a most modern missile defense system -- MADS -- a Patriot system derivative. That said, we continually reevaluate Taiwan's posture in fulfilling our obligations to provide Taiwan with sufficient self-defense capability.
Under the Taiwan Relations Act, our third obligation is to keep Congress informed. In this regard, as we are doing before you today, we maintain very active dialogue with members of Congress and Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee, House International Relations Committee, and House National Security Committee. We do this not only due to the Taiwan Relations Act, but because it is not possible for any Administration to maintain a China policy that supports our national interest without the active involvement and support of Congress.
Fourth, our obligation to Taiwan includes the maintenance of the United States' capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion that would jeopardize the security of Taiwan. This obligation is consistent with America's overall strategy in the region, our commitment to peace and stability, and our regional military posture. Our forward deployed forces in Asia, based primarily in Japan and the Republic of Korea, have deterred aggression and provided the regional stability that has made possible Asia's remarkable economic and political progress.
Today, this commitment continues through a stable forward-deployed force of about 100,000 United States personnel. The Administration's commitment to maintaining troops in the region for the foreseeable future is well-known and widely appreciated throughout the region. American strength is solid, and based on sound bilateral alliances and enduring friendships throughout the region. Partly because of our military presence, the Asia-Pacific region is now more at peace than it has been at any time in this century. Tensions and uncertainties remain, but as the only Asia-Pacific power with truly global capabilities, we are able to bring together multilateral coalitions to guarantee the maintenance of regional peace and stability. By maintaining our alliances and forward military presence while engaging in security dialogues with China and other key powers, we ensure both that the region remains at peace and that the United States remains a Pacific power.
Taiwan Security Beyond my discussion of military deterrence, my second point this morning has to do with Taiwan security in the broader context which Ambassador Lord emphasized. The success of our policy must be evaluated foremost upon the preservation of stability in the Taiwan Strait. Since 1979, our policy has had a direct positive impact on Taiwan's tremendous political and economic development which has added immeasurably to Taiwan's national strength. Our "one-China" policy has led to significant increases in cross-Strait trade and investment which provides powerful incentives to both Beijing and Taipei to seek peaceful resolution of their differences.
Our long-standing policy rests firmly on three legs -- Washington and Beijing relations which are built around our policy of engagement; the relationship between Washington and Taipei which I have just described and which remains vibrant; and, Beijing-Taipei relations which, until May 1995, showed encouraging signs through the sustainment of dialogue on important cross- Strait issues. It is through the third leg of this triangle, Beijing-Taipei relations, that the Chinese people themselves will ultimately find a peaceful resolution to their differences. The period of tension over the past 8 months is an anomaly when we look back over the cross-Strait relations since the early 1970s. Our belief is that it remains in the best interest of Beijing and Taipei to be talking and the likelihood of resumption of dialogue in the coming months appear good.
Where To Go From Here For my final comments, I will add some thoughts to those already expressed by Ambassador Lord. It goes without saying that we are vigilant and are closely monitoring events. However, for the longer term objectives of stability in the Strait and our own national interest, we must approach both Beijing and Taipei to get them to refrain from actions which increase tensions in the region and encourage them to resume dialogue.
Recent tensions between the PRC and Taiwan are exacerbated in Beijing and Taipei by complex domestic politics -- presidential elections in Taiwan and succession politics in the case of the PRC. We must ensure our own actions take cognizance of this. It is imperative that Beijing and Taipei manage the Taiwan issue prudently and not overreact to perceived slights or unwelcome actions. The delicate balance in the cross-Strait-relationship has been upset recently by Beijing's opposition to what it sees as Taiwan steps towards independence and, in important part, by recent PRC military exercises and provocative rhetoric. We cannot state strongly enough that it is in everyone's interest to restore the climate of security and stability that has existed for so long. In particular, we hope that Beijing and Taipei will agree to resumption of the high-level, cross-Strait dialogue and avoid steps that may be seen as provocative. Again, the key point is that our policy works to achieve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait over the longer term. Overreaction to current events would jeopardize U.S. national interests. We would put at risk the economic and political progress achieved by the people of Taiwan. We would also risk the growing peaceful exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland, exchanges which benefit people on both sides of the Strait. In the end, actions which would be inconsistent with our long standing "one-China" policy put at risk the interests of the people of the United States which are clearly for the preservation of stability and peace. Abandoning our policy commitments are a risk to the interests of the people of Taiwan, and the larger interests of the entire region. We must continue to maintain that the question of Taiwan-PRC relationship is an issue to be resolved by the Chinese people themselves. Our abiding interest is that the resolution come about peacefully.
(end text)
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File Identification: 02/07/96, EPF306; 02/07/96, EUR311
Product Name: Wireless File
Product Code: WF
Keywords: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS CMTE; CAMPBELL,
KURT/Speaker; TAIWAN-US RELATIONS; CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS; MILITARY EXERCISES; MILITARY CAPABILITIES; SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS; NEGOTIATIONS; COMPREHENSIVE ENGAGEMENT
Document Type: TXT
Thematic Codes: 1EA
Target Areas: EA; EU
PDQ Text Link: 421769
USIA Notes: *96020706.EPF
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