Tracking Number: 401920
Title: "Wiedemann Cautions Against Taiwan-UN Resolution." Testimony by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kent Wiedemann before the House International Relations Committee in which he states that passage of a resolution to promote Taiwan's membership in the UN would violate the US' "one China policy." Text of the resolution is included. (950803)
Date: 19950803
Text:
*EPF408
08/03/95
WIEDEMANN CAUTIONS AGAINST TAIWAN-U.N. RESOLUTION
(Texts: Wiedemann at 8/3 HIRC hearing, H.Con.Res. 63) (3400)
Washington -- Passage of H.Con.Res. 63, a Congressional resolution to promote Taiwan's participation in the United Nations, would contradict the United States's "one China" policy, according to Kent Wiedemann, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs.
Testifying at an August 3 hearing before the House International Relations Committee, Wiedemann said the U.S. could support Taiwan's participation in the U.N. only if Taiwan and China worked out an agreement for Taiwan's participation. "Until Taiwan and the PRC reach such an agreement, however, we believe that no good -- and considerable harm -- would come from U.S. support of Taiwan's participation in the U.N. We should not seek to insert the U.S. into the middle of this issue," he said.
According to Wiedemann, premature support for Taiwan's U.N. effort would come at great cost to U.S. relations with China, would jeopardize China's support for a broad range of important issues in the U.N., and would threaten peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Wiedemann also pointed out that the Congressional resolution comes at an especially difficult time in U.S.-China relations with the recent visit of President Lee of Taiwan, the Harry Wu case, and the spying charges leveled at two U.S. Air Force officers.
The resolution would "express the sense of the Congress" that "(1) Taiwan deserves full participation, including a seat, in the United Nations and its related agencies; and (2) The Government of the United States should immediately encourage the United Nations to take action by considering the unique situation of Taiwan in the international community and adopting a comprehensive solution to accommodate Taiwan in the United Nations and related agencies."
"The question of Taiwan's relationship to the PRC is an issue to be resolved by the Chinese people themselves," Wiedemann concluded. "We urge Beijing and Taipei to continue patiently the talks and economic interchange that they have successfully initiated. This -- not U.S. support for a quixotic resolution in the U.N. -- is the way toward a secure and prosperous future for the people of Taiwan."
Among the resolution's supporters who attended the August 3 hearing were Chairman Benjamin Gilman (Republican of New York), Representatives Steve Chabot (Republican of Ohio), David Funderburk (Republican of North Carolina), Sam Gejdenson (Democrat of Connecticut), Tom Lantos (Democrat of California), Dana Rohrabacher (Republican of California, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (Republican of Florida), Robert Torricelli (Democrat of New Jersey), and Delegate Eni Faleomavaega (Democrat of American Samoa).
Representatives Douglas Bereuter (Republican of Nebraska), Jay Kim (Republican of California) and James Leach (Republican of Iowa) expressed opposition to the resolution.
The resolution is currently before the full House International Relations Committee.
Following are the texts of Wiedemann's testimony, as prepared for delivery, and H.Con.Res. 63:
(begin text of Wiedemann testimony)
TESTIMONY BY KENT WIEDEMANN
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
AUGUST 3, 1995
Taiwan and the United Nations
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss one of the United States' most important relationships in Asia. We may have only unofficial ties with the people of Taiwan, but I will describe today a relationship that has strengthened and prospered under a unique set of circumstances. I will explain why the Administration cannot support Taiwan's participation in the U.N., and the Administration's view that only by maintaining the unofficial character of our ties with Taiwan can we ensure that the people of Taiwan and the U.S. continue to enjoy a stable and peaceful future.
The "One China" Policy I would like to begin by reviewing U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Our policy is often described simply as "one China," but too rarely is the full definition of this position set out. The key elements of our policy are as follows:
Since 1979, the United States has recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.
Since 1972, the U.S. has acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. The Reagan Administration, in 1982, clarified that the U.S. has no intention of pursuing a policy of "two China's" or "one China, one Taiwan."
Within this context, the people of the U.S. will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.
The U.S. has consistently held that resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter to be worked out by the Chinese themselves. Our sole and abiding concern is that the resolution be peaceful.
These elements of our policy are set out in the three joint U.S.-PRC communiques of 1972, 1979 and 1982, and the legal framework for our unofficial relations with Taiwan is provided by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. The Act also stipulates that the U.S. will make available to Taiwan such defensive arms as necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Clinton Administration is committed to fully implementing this and all other elements of the Taiwan Relations Act, which is consistent with the three communiques. In our view, the TRA and the 1982 communique are complementary, both serving our goal of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area.
The foundations of our China policy have been supported by six administrations of both parties. All administrations since 1972 have shared these basic objectives: peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area; constructive engagement with China; continuation of strong economic and cultural relations with the people of Taiwan; and peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese people. This "one China" policy has worked exceptionally well, and has enabled us to achieve progress toward all of our objectives. I will briefly discuss that progress.
~Peace and Stability First, peace and stability. Without a doubt, our China policy has been a key factor in the reduction of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's defense capability is as strong as it has ever been. We cannot overlook the recent PRC missile exercise near Taiwan -- which is clearly not helpful to a peaceful and stable atmosphere in the Strait -- but we do not believe China poses an imminent military threat to Taiwan. In fact, we believe Taiwan has never been more secure.
What has this meant for the people of Taiwan, and for our relations with them? A great deal, in both political and economic terms.
The shift from a belligerent to a peaceful and stable climate in the Strait has had a direct impact on Taiwan's tremendous political transformation. Martial law was ended on Taiwan in 1987, setting the stage for democracy. In 1992, the Legislature was directly elected by the people of Taiwan, and the second election will be held in December. Last year the governor of Taiwan province and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung were, for the first time, directly elected. This movement toward democracy will culminate next year with the first direct presidential election.
Peace and stability in the Strait also created the foundation for Taiwan's economic miracle. The people of Taiwan now enjoy an average annual income of US $11,600 -- up from less than $2,000 in 1979. Taiwan holds about one hundred billion dollars in foreign exchange, the second highest reserve level after Japan. Taiwan is a major force in the global high-tech market, as a producer of PCs and the world's largest supplier of computer monitors. Just over 25 years ago, the U.S. was providing aid to Taiwan. Now, Taiwan is an important aid donor to others.
Another objective of our China policy is engagement with China. In recent testimony, Assistant Secretary Winston Lord and I have described the importance of the President~'s policy of pursuing a constructive, cooperative relationship with the PRC. Our strategic goal is to help China integrate further into the international community, and to encourage it to accept both the benefits and obligations that come with interdependence and cooperation. Under the engagement strategy, this Administration has secured China's cooperation on security issues such as North Korea, Cambodia, the NPT, narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling, and regional security dialogues. We have also reached important economic agreements. At the same time, we have had ongoing problems in other areas, notably human rights where the situation is distressing and disturbing. We hope to overcome our current difficulties and to make progress in this very important relationship.
~Cross-Strait Relations Mr. Chairman, I would also like to focus today on another important relationship, the ties between Taiwan and China. These ties have grown at a phenomenal pace during the last two and one-half years. New exchanges in the fields of commerce, science and culture take place virtually every week. This year, trade across the Strait is expected to reach almost $20 billion, nearly double the level of 1992. China may this year replace the U.S. as Taiwan's largest export market. Since 1987, Taiwan is estimated to have invested more than $20 billion in the mainland. Delegations from academic and business communities cross the Strait for meetings, and nuclear scientists from the mainland have visited Taiwan to discuss power plant operation and disposal of low-level waste. Taiwan residents may take as many as 1.5 million trips to the mainland this year. Last month's PRC missile exercise may have slowed, at least temporarily, the pace of these exchanges, but they are expected to continue because they are in the interests of both sides. China recently suspended high-level meetings of the unofficial cross-Strait dialogue, indicating that this was tied to Lee Teng-hui's private visit to the U.S. We urge that these meetings resume soon.
Given Taiwan's important role in the global economy, it strikes some as anachronistic that the U.S. -- and all but 30 countries around the world -- maintain only unofficial relations with Taipei. I agree that it is an unusual, indeed unique relationship. The key point is that our policy works.
U.S.-Taiwan Ties Let me quickly review the extent of our unofficial relationship with Taiwan: -- U.S. economic ties with Taiwan have grown stronger since 1979. Taiwan is our seventh largest trading partner. It is the fifth largest importer of U.S. agricultural products. We have a $10 billion trade deficit with Taiwan, but that has declined from the high of $17 billion in 1987. Cumulative U.S. investment in Taiwan now stands at over $5 billion, representing a quarter of all foreign investment there.
-- We are selling to Taiwan the material necessary for it to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, consistent with the TRA and the 1982 joint communique with China.
-- Under the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) -- our unofficial link to Taipei -- senior Administration officials regularly meet with Taiwan representatives. Most recently, Under Secretary Summers and his Taiwan counterpart met, at Treasury, to discuss a broad range of economic issues.
-- AIT has signed 90 agreements with its Taiwan counterpart. These agreements call for U.S.-Taiwan cooperation on issues such as protection for the environment and endangered species, protection for copyrights, textile trade, safeguards for nuclear power plants, and disease prevention.
-- Cultural ties have also expanded. In 1981, AIT processed about 70,000 nonimmigrant visas. Last year, there were more than 300,000. More than 37,000 Taiwan students are in the U.S., and American institutions are the top choice for Taiwan's post-graduate students. (By now, everyone knows that Lee Teng-hui earned a Ph.D. at Cornell.) Complementing that flow, more than 25,000 Americans are living in Taiwan.
-- We have actively supported Taiwan's membership in international economic organizations open to entities other than states. For example, we ensured that Taiwan, under the name "Chinese Taipei," is a member of APEC. We are also strongly supporting Taiwan's accession to the WTO.
All of this adds up to an unofficial relationship that is closer, and more productive than the official, diplomatic ties we have with many countries. Our current China policy has made this possible.
Taiwan and the U.N. The question before us today is, should the U.S. support Taiwan's participation in the United Nations, and can it do so without harm to its highly successful policy Of the past 16 years? The Administration's answer is, no. Let me be clear. The U.S. could accept any solution to this issue which is consistent with the U.N. Charter and is agreed upon by the people on both sides of the Strait. Until Taiwan and the PRC reach such an agreement, however, we believe that no good, and considerable harm, would come from U.S. support of Taiwan's participation in the U.N. We should not seek to insert the U.S. into the middle of this issue.
Let's look at this question from a practical perspective. Last year, 12 countries supported a U.N. resolution for Taiwan participation. The U.N. General Committee dropped it without a vote. This year, 15 countries support a similar resolution: Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Guatemala, Nicaragua, the Niger, Panama, Solomon Islands and Swaziland.
Outside of these co-sponsors, there is almost no support for the resolution among U.N. members, and China has made clear its intention to block or veto U.N. consideration of the Taiwan issue. With a permanent seat on the Security Council, China can accomplish this.
Even if a motion for Taiwan participation in the U.N. is an effort doomed to fail, why shouldn't the U.S. lend its support? U.S. support for this Pyrrhic effort would come at great cost to our relations with China. Support for Taiwan participation in the U.N., an organization of states, would contradict our policy, since 1979, of recognizing the PRC as the sole legal government of China. The PRC has said it would view U.S. support as our abandoning one of the most fundamental elements of the U.S.-China relationships, an element reaffirmed by the commitment in 1982, under President Reagan, not to pursue a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." It is important to note that Taiwan continues to have a "one China" policy.
U.S. support for Taiwan's U.N. effort could also jeopardize China's support for a broad range of important issues in the U.N. -- issues of importance to the American people, such as democracy building in Haiti and stability on the Korean peninsula. Without Chinese cooperation, the U.N. would be significantly weakened.
Most importantly, U.S. support for Taiwan participation in the U.N. would jeopardize peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. We would put at risk the economic and political progress achieved by the people of Taiwan. We would also risk the growing peaceful exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland, exchanges that benefit people on both sides of the Strait.
In the end, our support for an effort that clearly will not succeed could put at risk U.S. interests in the Strait area, as well as the interests of the people of Taiwan. Until Taipei and Beijing can reach agreement on this issue, supporting Taiwan participation in the U.N. is not in the U.S. national interest, and we believe it is also not in the interest of the people of Taiwan, nor the people of the entire region, who would not benefit from a destabilized situation.
So, where do we go from here? As I stated at the outset of my testimony, we continue to maintain that the question of Taiwan's relationship to the PRC is an issue to be resolved by the Chinese people themselves. Our abiding interest is that the resolution come about peacefully. This will obviously not happen overnight. We urge Beijing and Taipei to continue patiently the talks and economic interchange that they have successfully initiated. This -- not U.S. support for a quixotic resolution in the U.N. -- is the way toward a secure and prosperous future for the people of Taiwan.
(end Wiedemann testimony)
(begin text of H.Con.Res. 63)
104th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. CON. RES. 63
Relating to the Republic of China (Taiwan)'s participation in the United Nations.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
April 7, 1995
Mr. Solomon (for himself, Mr. Torricelli, Mr. Lantos, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr. Ackerman, Mr. Brown of Ohio, Mr. Deutsch, Mr. Gejdenson, and Mr. Faleomavaega) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Relating to the Republic of China (Taiwan)'s participation in the United Nations.
Whereas the Republic of China was the first signatory to the Charter of the United Nations in 1945 and remained an active member of that world body until 1971;
Whereas China was divided in 1949, and the Republic of China (hereinafter cited as "Taiwan") and the People's Republic of China (hereinafter cited as "Mainland China") have exercised exclusive jurisdiction over their respective areas since then;
Whereas Taiwan has the 19th largest gross national product in the world, a strong and vibrant economy, and one of the largest foreign exchange reserves of any nation;
Whereas Taiwan has dramatically improved its record on human rights and routinely holds free and fair elections in a multiparty system, as evidenced most recently by the December 3, 1994, balloting for local and provincial officials;
Whereas the 21 million people in Taiwan have not been represented in the United Nations since 1971 and their human rights as citizens of the world have therefore been severely abridged;
Whereas Taiwan has in recent years repeatedly expressed its strong desire to participate in the United Nations;
Whereas Taiwan has much to contribute to the work and funding of the United Nations;
Whereas Taiwan has demonstrated its commitment to the world community by responding to international disasters and crises such as environmental destruction in the Persian Gulf and famine in Rwanda by providing financial donations, medical assistance, and other forms of aid;
Whereas the world community has reacted positively to Taiwan's desire for international participation, as shown by Taiwan's continued membership in the Asian Development Bank, the admission of Taiwan into the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group as a full member, and the accession of Taiwan as an observer at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as the first step toward becoming a contracting party to that organization;
Whereas the United States has supported Taiwan's participation in these bodies and indicated, in its policy review of September 1994, a stronger and more active policy of support for Taiwan's participation in other international organizations;
Whereas Taiwan has repeatedly stated that its participation in internation organizations is one of parallel representation without prejudice to the current status of Mainland China in the international community and does not represent a challenge to that status;
Whereas the United Nations and other international organizations have established precedents concerning parallel representation, such as the cases of South Korea and North Korea and the former two Germanies;
Whereas the decision of the United States to establish diplomatic relations with Mainland China, as expressed in the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8), is based "upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means"; and
Whereas Taiwan's participation in international organizations would not prevent or imperil the eventual resolution of disputes between Taiwan and Mainland China any more than the participation in international organizations by the former West Germany and the former East Germany prevented the eventual settlement of Germany's national status by peaceful and democratic means: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that -- (1) Taiwan deserves full participation, including a seat, in the United Nations and its related agencies; and
(2) the Government of the United States should immediately encourage the United Nations to take action by considering the unique situation of Taiwan in the international community and adopting a comprehensive solution to accomodate Taiwan in the United Nations and its related agencies.
(end text of H.Con.Res. 63)
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File Identification: 08/03/95, EPF408
Product Name: Wireless File
Product Code: WF
Keywords: TAIWAN-US RELATIONS/Policy; CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY; WIEDEMANN,
KENT/Speaker; CHINA-US RELATIONS; UNITED NATIONS; HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CMTE; CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS
Document Type: TXT
Thematic Codes: 2FP
Target Areas: EA
PDQ Text
Link: 401920
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