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Statement by the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation,Deputy Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Konstantin Vorontsov at the Thematic Debate on Cluster IV "Conventional weapons" in the First Committee of the 80th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, October 24, 2025

25 October 2025 17:08
1778-25-10-2025

Unofficial translation

Mr. Chair,

The Russian Federation reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and consistently calls for its further strengthening through the universalization of the Convention and Protocols thereto, as well as good-faith implementation of their provisions. CCW regime has proven in practice its real ability to respond to humanitarian threats, as well as its high adaptability to changing conditions of warfare.

We welcome the substantive work on weapons systems using artificial intelligence (AI) in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). We consider the GGE on LAWS to be the best suited platform for discussing these matters and key issues related to the military use of AI technologies. Moving the discussion of this topic to other international fora (including the UN) is counterproductive.

The GGE on LAWS effectively strikes a reasonable balance between humanitarian concerns and legitimate defence interests of States related to the respective weapons systems. We expect that the Group will be able to achieve meaningful results and to agree on conclusions and recommendations to be submitted to the Seventh CCW Review Conference, while taking into consideration the approaches of all High Contracting Parties.

We also note the consideration of the topic of "military" AI within the framework of existing arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation regimes, in particular, within the UN Disarmament Commission. At the same time, it is extremely important that work in these forums does not lead to duplication of efforts.

Mr. Chair,

In the context of compliance with the CCW, the criminal acts of the Kiev regime require condemnation and response by the international community. Units of the Ukrainian armed forces (UAF) are mining territories of the Russian Federation to cause significant damage to civilian infrastructure and the civilian population. To this end, Kiev deliberately uses inhumane types of weapons (mines, booby traps, improvised explosive devices).

The most egregious example is the use against civilians of anti-personnel mines PFM-1C "Lepestok", which Ukrainian servicemen are actively scattering in towns and villages. Since the start of the special military operation, more than 180 cases of civilians being blown up by this type of mines have been recorded in the Donetsk People's Republic alone.

We also note the widespread use of foreign-made mines against the civilian population. In particular, these include M42/46 and M77 "Kolokolchik" mines, which do not have a self-destruction mechanism; M67/72 anti-personnel mines, some of which are equipped with a non-removable mechanism; DM 1399 and AT-2 anti-tank mines; the M18A1 (Claymore) and Halstorm Mini anti-personnel directional fragmentation mines. It is also known about the use of booby traps by Ukraine that are practically indistinguishable from civilian products, as well as about the systematic mining of bodies of dead servicemen and civilians by the UAF.

All of the above-mentioned represents a direct violation of the fundamental provisions of international humanitarian law (IHL), including the Amended Protocol II to the CCW and the Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The use of anti-personnel mines by the UAF in general also constitutes a violation of the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (APMBC), from which Ukraine announced its withdrawal on June 29, 2025.

We note that, in accordance with the APMBC, for a State Party involved in an armed conflict, the withdrawal from the Convention shall take effect only after the end of the said armed conflict. This provision is fully applicable to the withdrawal process launched by Ukraine. Thus, even after announcing its withdrawal from the APMBC, Kiev will be required to fulfill its obligations under the Convention until the Ukrainian crisis is resolved.

Mr. Chair,

We proceed from the necessity of further implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, which essentially remains the only specialized global instrument on combating illegal trade of small arms and light weapons (SALW). In order to increase its practical output, national control over all stages of the weapons life cycle should be strengthened, from their production to disposal. Along with this, the following measures are deemed essential: introduction of a ban on the supply of all types of SALW to unauthorized entities of the recipient State; strict regulation of brokerage activities; prevention of unauthorized re-export of weapons; halting of the "pirated" production of weapons, i.e. without licences or under expired licences.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms remains in focus of attention as one of the key mechanisms for transparency and ensuring international security by tracking and identifying destabilizing accumulations of weapons in various regions of the world. At the same time, we are wary of attempts by certain states to expand the scope of the Register, given the past instances when this mechanism was used to achieve objectives inconsistent with its purpose, including in determining the parameters of the arms embargo imposed through the UN Security Council.

We still do not intend to accede to the International Arms Trade Treaty and to participate in official events held under its auspices. We proceed from the fact that the standards set by the Treaty are significantly lower than the Russian ones. The practical implementation of the Treaty raises questions as well. It is totally unacceptable when some of its State Parties continue to supply military goods directly or indirectly to the zones of armed conflicts.

Thank you for the attention.