Statement by H.E. Sergey Vershinin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the High Level Segment of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 26 February, 2025
27 February 2025 14:17
310-27-02-2025
Madame President,
Distinguished colleagues,
This year marks the 80th anniversary since the foundation of the UN. Established in the aftermath of the Second World War, the World Organization remains the unique universal platform to develop collective decisions to respond to common challenges, primarily in the field of maintenance of international peace and security. It was the UN that laid the ground for the system of multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, in which the disarmament "triad", in particular the Conference on Disarmament (CD), plays a key role.
We are approaching the 80th anniversary of the UN amid a severe crisis in the field of international security. The situation is deteriorating at a dramatic rate, and the risk of direct military confrontation of nuclear powers is high. There is widespread growth of tensions and conflicts.
The reason for the current situation lies in unremitting rivalry around a model of the world order: hegemonic ambitions of some clash with the aspirations of others for a more equitable, polycentric basis of international relations. On the part of those who aim at global dominance, there are flagrant violations of the principle of equal and indivisible security, refusal to recognise and take into account the fundamental interests of other states, undermining of former agreements, and attempts to gain undisputed military superiority. This provokes other states to undertake compensatory measures.
The Ukrainian and Middle Eastern crises are a direct consequence of this state of affairs. The situation in Ukraine is a result of aggressive and inconsiderate policy of Western countries that have been indulging the "etching" of everything Russian from public, cultural and religious life in Ukraine, and increasing supply of all types of weaponry to the Kiev regime, including long-range weapons. For its part, Russia has always advocated conflict settlement through negotiations. At the same time, the dialogue should not have a short truce as the ultimate goal, but be aimed at establishing long-term peace based on taking into account the root causes of the conflict and respect for legitimate interests of all states and nations living in this region.
In the Middle East it is important that the agreements reached by Israel and Hamas are strictly observed. This will provide an opportunity to achieve a sustainable ceasefire and, finally, overcome the crisis in Gaza, unprecedented in its devastating consequences, which claimed the lives of more than 48,000 people.
Against the background of the confrontation over the model of the world order, there has been total misbalance and partial collapse of the architecture of joint maintenance of global stability. The system of agreements in the field of arms control, that for many years made it possible to maintain the military-strategic balance of power, is now shaken and largely lost.
These are the root causes of the difficulties and contradictions that hinder the revitalization of activities on the disarmament track in general and at specific specialized international venues, including the CD. A one-sided approach to disarmament efforts that ignores the context of contemporary reality, does not ensure a balance of interests and creates unilateral advantages for individual states or groups of states, is in clear dissonance with the ideas of complete and general disarmament aimed at forging a safer world for everyone.
A striking example in this context could be calls to consider nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament separately from the complex of interrelated processes taking place in the strategic sphere, as well as to isolate these issues from the fundamental contradictions between nuclear states in the security sphere. Such negative factors include, first and foremost, the actions of some nuclear powers that are intended to undermine radically the security of other nuclear states. It is precisely this fundamentally unacceptable course, which involves inflicting a "strategic defeat" to our country, that the Western states have previously declared.
There have also been other deeply destabilizing steps. We note with concern Washington's recent decision to expand its national anti-missile programme to a scale comparable to that of R.Reagan's "Star Wars". The relevant efforts, now openly aimed at devaluing Russian and Chinese strategic deterrence capabilities, combine the building of a global multi-domain missile defense system, the build-up of disarming strike capabilities, as well as placement of weapons in outer space and its transformation into an arena for combat operations.
No less destabilizing in nature are such military-technical programmes as the forward deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as further development of NATO "nuclear sharing practice", elements of which are actively being integrated into schemes of the so-called "extended nuclear deterrence" implemented in the Asia-Pacific region.
Given the above mentioned circumstances, it is impossible to speak seriously of any favorable political and military prerequisites for moving towards nuclear disarmament, which can be carried out only on the basis of the principle of undiminished security and must be integrated into the context of general and complete disarmament.
In light of the actions of Western states to enhance capabilities for conducting combat operations and getting military superiority in outer space, yet another example of which has been the US decisions to develop the "Iron Dome" system, the priority task is to keep outer space free from any kinds of weapons and armed conflicts. The CD should prioritize the development of a long overdue legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, that would prohibit the weaponization of outer space and the use or threat of force against or by means of outer space objects. The basis for such a document is the relevant Russian-Chinese draft treaty. The substitution of a legally binding instrument by some norms, rules and principles of "responsible behaviour" that would preserve legal uncertainty in this area and provoke unrestricted military exploration of outer space is unacceptable.
Our joint objective amid current international instability is to ensure sustainability of the NPT. We expect reaching mutually acceptable substantive decisions before the completion of the current five-year review cycle in the framework of the Treaty.
The strengthening of international nuclear non-proliferation regime contributes to establishment of Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ). The justification for clarifying reservations to the protocols to nuclear-free zone treaties is confirmed by the situation around the AUKUS partnership, which creates risks of the appearance of nuclear states military infrastructure on the territory of a non-nuclear State Party to Rarotonga Treaty. Russia consistently advocates for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We urge the United States and Israel to reconsider their position and to accede to our joint work on the establishment of the designated zone.
The situation around the CTBT leaves much to be desired. Since 1999 the United States have taken no steps to ratify the Treaty. Such irresponsible line prompted us to withdraw ratification of the CTBT and thereby correct imbalance in our commitments compared to Washington. Russia remains a full and faithful party to the Treaty and in 2023 completed the creation of its national segment of the International Monitoring System - the second largest in the world. We continue to observe the moratorium on nuclear tests introduced in 1991.
The Russian Federation, as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Depositary State, is in favour of comprehensive strengthening of its regime, including through the adoption of a legally binding protocol to the BWC with an effective verification mechanism. We will continue to contribute substantively within the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention. We will seek answers to the questions posed by Russia with regard to the facts of biological and military activities on Ukrainian territory disclosed during the Special Military Operation and conducted in violation of the BWC with the support of the Pentagon and the structures affiliated with it, including private companies.
We are deeply concerned by the ongoing unprecedented politicization of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) activities carried out by the Euro-Atlantic allies. It is necessary that States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention make every effort to restore the rule of international law, to maintain the integrity of the Convention, and to recover the OPCW former credibility.
The Russian initiative to develop an International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Chemical and Biological terrorism at the CD remains relevant. The negotiations on this document could become a viable way to overcome the current impasse in the CD substantive activities.
Mr. President,
The CD remains a unique and single negotiating forum to develop multilateral legally binding agreements in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The agenda, which was set many years ago, is still relevant. The urgency to start negotiations on some of its items is increasingly evident in the current circumstances.
Our country is interested in resuming the substantive work at the CD and in implementing its mandate. We welcome the recent decision to re-establish five subsidiary bodies. We expect that their activities will contribute to the preparation of a substantive basis to launch subsequently the negotiations on appropriate international legally binding instruments at the CD, taking into account the established procedures and Member States priorities in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Simultaneously we would like to warn against attempts to start a discussion on matters outside the mandate of the Conference.
Russia is open to cooperation with all interested states at the CD to achieve promptly results in the interests of peace and international security that satisfy everyone.
Thank you.
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