Statement by the Representative of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Thematic Discussion on "Conventional weapons" in the First Committee of the 79th session of the UN GA, New York, 24 October 2024
25 October 2024 12:32
1988-25-10-2024
Unofficial translation
Madam Chair,
The Russian Federation consistently calls for further strengthening of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) regime through the universalization of the Convention and Protocols thereto, as well as good-faith implementation of their provisions.
We welcome the approval by the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW of a new mandate for the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) until 2026, as well as the results of the Group's sessions in 2024. We consider the GGE on LAWS to be the best suited platform for discussing issues pertaining to the military use of artificial intelligence technologies. This forum effectively strikes a reasonable balance between humanitarian concerns and legitimate defence interests of States related to the respective weapons systems. We expect that the Group will be able to achieve meaningful results and to agree on conclusions and recommendations to be submitted to the Seventh CCW Review Conference, while taking into consideration the approaches of all High Contracting Parties.
In recent years, the interdisciplinary and multidimensional problem of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has become acute. IEDs made from various types of ammunition are exactly the main cause of losses among military personnel and civilians and pose a major threat to civilians due to a number of circumstances. Their makeshift production considerably complicates IEDs detection and elimination and also makes unpredictable their functioning and the consequences of their use. In the post-conflict period, IEDs can detonate not only after a direct contact with a human being but also due to other natural and man‑made reasons.
We proceed from the necessity of further expert discussion of these issues within the framework of the Amended Protocol II to the CCW. However, we would also like to warn the High Contracting Parties against attempts of expanding the interpretation of the CCW mandate on improvised explosive devices. Any proposals with regard to future work on IEDs should, first of all, be consistent with the subject-matter and the purposes of the Convention. We support the idea to regularly update the compilation of the existing guidelines, "best practices" and other recommendations aimed at addressing the problem of leakage or illicit use of materials that are needed for IEDs production.
Madam Chair,
In the context of compliance with the CCW, the criminal acts of the Kiev regime require condemnation and response by the international community. The number of daily violations by Ukrainian units of norms and principles of international humanitarian law (IHL), including placement of heavy weapons in residential areas, use of civilians as "human shields" and use of civilian infrastructure for military purposes, demonstrates absolutely deliberate application of inhumane tactics of combat in violation of IHL.
We record the facts of targeted mining by Ukrainian armed units of roadsides between human settlements, rural trails, bridges, dams, areas around residential houses, educational and healthcare establishments and other civilian facilities.
We also note that in a number of human settlements the Ukrainian armed forces (UAF) planted mines in places of mass visit by civilians. The most egregious example is the use against civilians of anti-personnel mines PFM‑1 "Lepestok" that Ukrainian servicemen are actively scattering in towns and villages. It is also known that Ukraine uses industrially manufactured booby traps looking almost identical to civilian items and that the UAF systemically mines bodies of deceased servicemen and civilians.
All of the above-mentioned represents a direct violation of the fundamental provisions of IHL, including the Amended Protocol II to the CCW. At the same time, we note Kiev's disregard for its obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, to which Ukraine has been a party since 2006 and the accession to which required Ukraine to destroy all stockpiles of anti-personnel mines by 2010, with the exception of the minimum number necessary for the development of and training in mine detection techniques.
Madam Chair,
As we attach great importance to the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, which essentially remains the only specialized global instrument on combating illegal trade in SALW, we call for increasing its practical output and strengthening national control over all weapons life cycle stages, from production to disposal. We deem the following measures essential: the introduction of a ban on the supply of all types of SALW to unauthorized entities of the recipient State; strict regulation of brokering activities; prevention of unauthorized re-export of weapons; halting of the "pirated" production of weapons, i.e. without licences or under expired licences.
In addition, we are paying increased attention to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as one of the main mechanisms for transparency and ensuring international security by monitoring and identifying destabilizing accumulations of weapons in certain regions of the world. At the same time, we are concerned about attempts by certain states to expand the scope of the Register, given the past instances when this mechanism was used to achieve objectives inconsistent with its purpose, including in determining the parameters of the arms embargo imposed through the UN SC.
We still find it inexpedient to accede to the International Arms Trade Treaty and to participate in official events held under its aegis. Besides, we proceed from the fact that the standards set by the Treaty are significantly lower than Russian ones. In addition, the practical implementation of the Treaty raises serious questions as well. It is totally unacceptable when some of its State Parties continue to supply military goods directly or indirectly to the zones of armed conflicts.
Thank you.
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